Lt. Gen. Bauernfeind

NORAD/NORTHCOM CC General Guillot

Regional conflicts no longer stay regional. Russian mercenaries in the Sahel advance Moscow’s interests. Chinese deals with the Houthis secure Beijing’s maritime chokepoints. Every insurgency becomes terrain for great power competition. The separation between ‘small wars’ and strategic competition has collapsed, forcing fundamental questions about force planning, resource allocation, and where America competes.

Tentative Panelists: Dr Gregory Johnson (Yemen SME), Ms Andrea Doyle (Dept of State), SOUTHCOM representative

RegionAir defense once meant fighters intercepting bombers and missiles tracking predictable trajectories. Advancements in tactics and technology have rewritten those assumptions. Threats now arrive as $500 drone swarms, terrain-masking cruise missiles, and loitering munitions that wait for targets of opportunity. Defense demands integration across domains: space-based detection networks, cyber disruption of command nodes, electronic warfare against guidance systems, kinetic interceptors from air and ground platforms, even infantry with small arms. Can joint force structures integrate these capabilities fast enough—or will the next conflict expose the gaps?

Tentative Panelists: Mr Lito Villanueva (Ukraine SME), COL Kevin Stonerook (JFCC-IMD Deputy CC), NORTHCOM sUAS expert

Projecting air power across the conflict spectrum now demands integration far beyond the cockpit. Our forces are contested everywhere, which mandates resilient C2, sensing networks, logistics, and a host of other operational necessities to overcome. Combat success now depends on both platform and system integration, with continuity across domains as a prerequisite. How are operational-level air planners adapting to a reality where air missions succeed or fail based on multi-domain integration?

Fireside Chat Participants: Maj Gen Joseph Kunkel (AF/A5/7I), Lt Col Joseph Bledsoe (F-15 pilot), Maj Trisdon Miller (EW SME)

Cyber is the only warfighting domain that simultaneously serves as weapon, intelligence platform, and battlespace. Cyber operations blur peacetime espionage and wartime attack, complicating deterrence, attribution, and resource allocation. With finite offensive and defensive capacity, how does the joint force prioritize protecting critical infrastructure, maintaining persistent access in adversary networks, and preparing for wartime cyber fires?

Tentative Panelists: Lt Col Michael Scott (341 Cyber Ops Sq CC), Col (ret) Omar Velasco (67th Cyberspace Wing Deputy CC), Maj Justin Soderland (OSI Cyber)

Lt Gen (Ret.) Chris Bogdan

Autonomous systems now make targeting decisions faster than human operators can intervene. The operational dilemmas are concrete: accept AI recommendations without verification and risk fratricide? Require human confirmation and lose the engagement window? Pre-authorize AI fires under specific conditions—and what are those conditions? Speed versus oversight, automation versus accountability, legal frameworks versus operational necessity. Can existing command structures function when the decision cycle collapses to machine speed?

Tentative Panelists: Dr Chad Mello (Kaminski Endowed Chair for AI), Maj Justin Soderland (OSI), Mr Jeff Wright (Former JTF Indo-Pacific Deputy/CC, CEO/Founder of SplashOne Robotics)

Plummeting launch costs have democratized space access, enabling states, non-state actors, and commercial entities to threaten US space capabilities. With the joint force dependent on orbital assets, planners can no longer consider space a sanctuary—it’s a contested warfighting domain demanding immediate operational integration. How can the US secure its interests in the ultimate high ground?

Tentative Panelists: Capt William Coen (Delta 9), Capt Nathan Hlavin (Delta 9), Ms Britany Washburn (Aerospace Corp.), Mr James McGrath (Aerospace Corp.)

Cold War deterrence theory assumed a firebreak between conventional war and nuclear use. That firebreak is gone. Russia, China, and North Korea no longer reserve nuclear weapons for existential conflict—they are tools of gray zone coercion, strategic messaging, and operational-level war planning. When adversaries wield nuclear threats as tools across competition, crisis, and combat, can US strategy—built for binary peace-or-war thinking—still function?

Tentative Panelists: Dr David Arceneaux (Center for National Security and Foreign Affairs), Dr Brad Roberts (Director, Lawrence Livermore National Labs) Lt Col Shane Praiswater (DO, B-21 Test and Eval Sq), nuclear submariner