Shortly after midnight on April 23, 1945, a special SS detachment marched a small group of men out of the Lehrter Street Prison in Berlin—on special orders from the newly-appointed city commandant, Joseph Goebbels. They directed the inmates to a nearby pile of rubble. They executed them one by one, by way of a single shot through the back of the head. One of the prisoners clutched in his hands a sheaf of paper on which were scratched some poems, which would later become known as the *Moabit Sonnets*. Number thirty-eight is entitled “The Father.” Its last stanza reads as follows:

*But my father broke away the seal.*

*He did not see the rising breath of evil.*

*He let the daemon soar into the world.*

The author was Albrecht Haushofer. The father was Karl Haushofer. The breath of evil was Adolf Hitler. The daemon was geopolitics.

Almost a year to the day, again around midnight, Karl Haushofer and his wife, Martha, committed double suicide on their farm near Ammer Lake, Bavaria. Both took arsenic. Martha then managed to hang herself from a tree branch; Karl had not the strength to follow suit. He left behind a detailed, colored map drawn to scale as to where his son, Heinz, could find the bodies. And a suicide note in which he gave precise instructions: he desired “no form of state or church funeral, no obituary, epitaph, or identification of my grave.” He closed more than half a century of service as officer, academic, publicist, and political adviser with the words: “I want to be forgotten and forgotten.”
And he was—for almost fifty years. After 1945, geopolitics was considered to be just another discredited “Nazi science,” one best forgotten. But the Cold War and the emergence of oil-rich Third World nations as independent global actors again brought up the topic of geopolitics—the relationship between human beings and their geography, their government, their history, and the natural world. As did Henry Kissinger in *The White House Years*. The breakup of the Soviet Union and the rise of China further accentuated the geopolitical debate. As did international piracy and terrorism. Thus, unsurprisingly, in 1999 two British academics, Colin Gray and Geoffrey Sloan, published what truly was the first scholarly investigation into *Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy* since 1945—to which I contributed a chapter on “Haushofer, Hitler and Lebensraum.”

There is today virtually not an issue of any major English-language journal or magazine, not a national television news broadcast that does not include the concept of geopolitics. A random search of the internet search engine Google using the phrase “Institutes of Geopolitics” brought 921,000 hits. Investigation into the catalog of the Library of Congress for just the past decade revealed a plethora of “geopolitical” titles: *Geopolitics of Oil, Geopolitics of Energy, Geopolitics of Super Power, Geopolitics of the Green Revolution, Geopolitics of Hunger, Geopolitics and Geoculture, Geopolitics and Maritime Power, Geopolitics of the Nuclear Age, Geopolitics of Information, Geopolitics of Strategic and Critical Materials, and Geopolitics of Domination*, just to name a few. There is even a multinational research combine to investigate sovereignty issues in the Arctic, entitled “Geopolitics of the High North.” Thus, I would like today to analyze the roots of *Geopolitik* in order to put that nebulous construct into historical perspective.

* * *
Karl Haushofer was the very personification of the Wilhelmian stereotype, *General Dr. von Staat*, as the Nobel novelist Thomas Mann famously put it: revered military officer, academic, and civil servant. He was born in 1869 into a family of academics, ranging from landscape painters to economists to geologists, who taught at both the Technical University and the Ludwig-Maximilians University at Munich. When lack of private wealth prevented young Karl from pursuing his dreams of becoming an architect or an artist, he chose the military, in his case the prestigious 1st Field Artillery Regiment Prinz-Regent Luitpold. Haushofer’s true intellectual inclinations came out in 1908, when he was selected to review the Bavarian War Academy curriculum as part of a sweeping reform planned from Berlin. Two issues stood out for him: he, the artillery specialist, vehemently rejected Chief of the General Staff Helmuth von Moltke’s call to remove “non-military sciences” from the curriculum, arguing that the army’s best and brightest needed to learn especially constitutional law and international law to prepare them for the wars of the future. Second, he was incensed by Berlin’s query whether geography should be abolished as a mandatory subject. He demanded instead both an increase and a change in the nature of geography courses. Rote map exercises needed to yield to economics, financial mobilization, statistics, and transportation geography. He recommended as required reading Friedrich Ratzel’s *Political Geography* (1897). Third, he denounced the Kriegsakademie as little more than a “drill barracks” due its large number of students, which meant that they remained anonymous to their instructors and were judged merely on standardized examinations and field exercises.

What might well have been a successful, but hardly eventful career was interrupted by two seminal experiences: in 1908 Haushofer was chosen to be Bavaria’s first military observer to Japan; and in 1914 he was reactivated to serve in the Great War.
Japan was the proverbial eye-opener. Haushofer took as his role model Yamagata Aritomo—field marshal, home minister, twice prime minister—because this member of the *genrō* managed to evade the “bright lights of public scrutiny” and operate from the behind the scenes, quietly and unobtrusively. In short, Haushofer’s role in the 1920s and 1930s. He sent fifteen lengthy reports home. Therein, he lauded the Japanese school system, a perfect fusion of youth, state, army, and throne. It stressed history, gymnastics, ethics, and veneration of the elders. National holidays, flag days, remembrance days, imperial holidays, and festivals for fallen warriors under the patronage of royal princes bonded students to army, state and throne. Officers, court officials, and civil servants sat on school oversight committees. And, this Clausewitzean social trinity was brought about not by force or coercion, but rather “unobtrusively” by “nourishment” from state, parliament and the public.

In 1913 Haushofer expanded his reports from Japan into a dissertation at Munich University, *Dai Nihon* (Great Japan). His aim, as he stated in the first sentence of the first chapter, was to direct Central Europe’s attention to the “rejuvenation” that Japan had brought about with the “storm of steel” that its wars with China and Russia had generated. And to its annexation of Korea, this “debilitated body of 12 million people under the leadership of about 400,000 privileged loafers”—and of 500 American missionaries. Moreover, he hoped that the book would counter Norman Angell’s pacifist *Great Illusion*. Nations, Haushofer lectured, rose and fell through wars. “The law of the world is unceasing struggle, not interminable stagnation.” Meiji Japan for the rest of his life was the model: the unified command power of a 2,000-year-old dynasty; the warrior ethic of a 4,000-family samurai leadership caste; the ready willingness of the individual to sacrifice for family, country and emperor; the cult of suicide (*bushido*) that mandated “moderation” in life; and the “fortunate blood mixture” of Malayan, Mongolian, and
Ainu elements. “Germany Awake,” to borrow a later phrase, was the central message.

August 1914 inaugurated the second seminal experience in Haushofer’s life. He was thrilled at the news of war—his wife, Martha, noted in her diary that he looked ten years younger. He was under no illusion—the war, as he had discussed with Lord Kitchener at Calcutta in 1909, would “last at least three years.” While commanding a munitions column in Alsace, he took a broad view of events, declining to concentrate on the mere mechanics of warfare (Kriegshandwerk), and thereby to reduce the struggle to ordnance on target. Instead, he saw the war, as Clausewitz had argued, as “a true political instrument.” Albeit, this was the wrong war, at the wrong time, and with the wrong ally (moribund Austria-Hungary rather than vigorous Russia and Japan). The euphoria of the July Days to him was little more than a “hysterical straw-fire.” Germany’s violation of Belgian neutrality had been a diplomatic disaster; the bloody battles in Alsace, the result of “a mutilated Schlieffen Plan.” The home front, as he had predicted in Dai Nihon, had not been prepared for “a long suffering and persevering.” Above all, Haushofer felt that no grand, global concept had guided the decision to go to war. Instead, pride and vanity had ruled the day. As had what he called “Austrian half-wittedness,” “Slavic arrogance,” “French revanchism,” “British lust for power and wealth,” and “German parvenu sins.” By the end of 1917, he had despaired of Wilhelmian Germany. “You see how ready for a Caesar I am,” he wrote his wife, Martha, “and what kind of a good instrument I would be for a Caesar, if we had one and if he knew how to make use of me.”

The entry of the United States into the war in April 1917 snapped his self-control. “Better to die European,” he viciously wrote Martha, “than to rot American.” He quickly developed “a fiery, deeply burning hate” against the Republic. He rejoiced when Lenin and “the Bolshevik filth” ended Wall Street’s “slavery of banks and capital” in Russia. America, this “deceitful,
ravenous, hypocritical, shameless beast of prey,” had entered the war simply to stuff its
“insatiable dollar-greedy stomach.” The Old World, he mused, had first “blessed” the New
World with syphilis; now the New World was returning the favor with Yankee imperialism.
“Americans are truly the only people on this world that I regard with a deep, instinctive hatred.”
There was only one escape: “I hope that the yellow race will avenge us.” Strangely, he, the
budding geopolitician, never undertook a rational analysis of the war potential of the Central
Powers as compared to that of the Entente, including the United States.

Haushofer’s anti-Americanism was paralleled by a new strain of anti-Semitism. At first
directed primarily against the “Eastern Jews” (Ostjuden), it soon spread to the rest of the Reich’s
Jewish population—less than 1% of the national total. He spoke in his letters to his half-Jewish
wife of the Jews’ “treason against Volk, race and country.” He derided their alleged refusal to
fight for Germany. He decried their “cultural pessimism.” He despised their putative war
profiteering. He wished them removed from the body politic. He returned to a familiar topic. “A
man! A kingdom, an imperial crown for a man worthy of the name!”

Most importantly, in view of his postwar career, Haushofer developed a deep alienation
from the home front. He strongly believed that “real men” fought at the front. That only “real
men” could guide the nation’s future after the war. The front experience became the common
bond, one that developed camaraderie, obedience, selflessness, sacrifice, service to the
fatherland, and care for fellow man. That community of warriors, that community of the trenches
bonded Haushofer to Hess and to Hitler. Domestic betrayal, revolution, and the “stab-in-the-
back” of November 1918 further cemented that bond.

In July 1919 Haushofer defended his Habilitationsschrift (a second dissertation) on the
“Basic Contours of the Geographical Development of the Japanese Empire 1854-1919” under the
supervision of the renowned Antarctic explorer Erich von Drygalski. Of course, in family
tradition, he passed the *venia legendi* summa cum laude. The next month, he was appointed an
unsalaried lecturer at Munich University. But student and professor soon parted ways. Drygalski
noted already in his formal evaluation of the *Habilitation* that it was not traditional “physical
geography” in the manner of Karl Ritter, Ferdinand von Richthofen and Alexander Supan, but
rather “political geography,” that is, a combination of Ratzel’s “human geography” and Rudolf
Kjellén’s “organic state theory,” or *Geopolitik*. Drygalski had hit the nail on the head.

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So, what precisely is *Geopolitik*? Haushofer could never explain it. His attempts
frustrated even Rudolf Hess due to the nebulosity of his vocabulary. Haushofer was the master of
adverbial clauses and of tapeworm sentences, all punctuated by liberal sprinklings of Latin.
Colonel Herman Beukema, U.S. Army, of the West Point faculty once described Haushofer’s
strained attempts to disguise simple geography with political mysticism as “creating an
atmosphere of profundity through the deliberate obfuscation of the general reader.” In other
words, German academia. Let me offer a sample from Haushofer:

> Lebensraum is the partial area of the earth’s surface, a piece of the earth’s surface,
> observed in accordance with its natural or artificial borders, regarding the preservation of
> the life of the life-forms (human beings, animals, plants) found therein (certain life-forms).

Mark Twain would have loved such “Awful German Language.” All we can say is that in some
500 publications, Haushofer sought to combine traditional disciplines such as geography, history,
economics, demography, political science, and anthropology into a new “science.” Much of it, he
took from established writers.

Thus, from Friedrich Ratzel, he adopted the notion of space or territory (*Raum*). It soon
became *Lebensraum*. Ratzel sought to develop political geography into a discipline designed to
trace man’s evolution over time as it related to his physical geography. The state, “part man and part soil,” was basically a “form of the distribution of life on the earth’s surface.” For Ratzel, Charles Darwin’s “struggle for survival” came down to a simple “struggle for space.” Or, as he once put it, “bio-geography.” Under Haushofer’s tutelage, Hess and Hitler read Ratzel’s *Political Geography*. And they did so “with the sacred fire of passion.”

From Sir Halford Mackinder, Haushofer seized upon the concept of the “heartland,” a term first used by the British geographer in 1919. Thereby, the nations of the world were arrayed into two camps—the robbers of the inner Euro-Asian steppe; and the sea robbers of the maritime states peripheral to the heartland. The two spheres were eternally at loggerheads. Political power in this world, Mackinder argued, was the product of “geographical conditions, both economic and strategic,” as well as the “relative number, virility, equipment, and organization of the competing people.” That was Holy Script to Haushofer.

From Rudolf Kjellén, inventor of the term geopolitics, Haushofer took the term *Autarky*, or national self-sufficiency. For the Swedish political scientist, the state was “a biological revelation, a living being.” State and power were synonymous. States were held together by neither laws nor constitutions, but rather by the “categorical imperative of expanding their space by colonization, amalgamation, or conquest.”

From the Pan-Germans, Haushofer borrowed the notion of pan-regions, beginning with the concept of “Central Europe and moving from there to Eurafrika.” Ratzel had been one of the founders of the Pan-German League and instrumental in its demand that the new Reich after 1870 acquire “elbow room.”

And what did Haushofer add to this heady brew? Basically, the notion of frontiers or borders. He rejected his generation’s faith in legal guarantees of borders as well as the concept of
“natural” physical borders, and even that of “biologically correct borders.” Instead, borders were temporary halts, breathing spells, for virile nations on the march. Borders were fluid, dynamic. Especially European history, from ancient Rome to modern Russia, was full of examples of states that used existing borders as political devices to expand their sphere of influence. Haushofer carefully declined to spell out the algebra of that expansion. Hitler did not.

* * *

Haushofer’s seemingly productive academic career suffered a severe jolt and took a radical turn with the so-called Beer-Hall Putsch at Munich in November 1923. When Hitler was incarcerated at Landsberg Fortress Prison for his part in the plot to overthrow the “defeatist” government in Berlin, Hess, at the urging of Haushofer, came out of hiding in Austria and surrendered to the Bavarian police—to be with the “master,” the “chief,” the “tribune,” Adolf Hitler. And to help Hitler write his memoir of the putsch—eventually entitled Mein Kampf. Every Wednesday between June 24 and December 12, 1924, Prof. Dr. Haushofer made the 100-kilometer-long round trip from Munich to Landsberg. Once each morning and once each afternoon he offered what he called the “young eagles,” Hess and Hitler, hours of intense personal mentoring. He had them read the historians Leopold von Ranke and Heinrich Treitschke, the philosophers Karl Marx and Friedrich Nietzsche, the social Darwinist Houston Stewart Chamberlain, the geographer Ratzel, the political scientist Kjellén, Otto von Bismarck, Carl von Clausewitz. And, of course, his own Dai Nihon as well as the first issues of his Journal of Geopolitics.

“Landsberg,” Hitler once confided to Hans Frank, the wartime governor general of Poland, “was my university education at state expense.”

“Bringing Haushofer and Hitler together,” Joachim Fest, Hitler’s most
prolific biographer, observed, “is the most important . . . personal contribution that Rudolf Hess made to the creation and the face of National Socialism.” Despite Hitler’s claims in Mein Kampf that he had come to Munich in 1913 with his Weltanschauung fully in place, Landsberg was the crucible where he refined his basic anti-democratic, anti-Semitic, social-Darwinist, and racial-biological thoughts. In the winter of 1941-42 Hitler uncharacteristically, albeit, indirectly, gave credit to Haushofer, Hess and Landsberg. “Without my imprisonment, ‘Mein Kampf’ would never have been written; and, if I may say so, during this time, after constant rethinking, many things that had earlier been stated simply from intuition for the first time attained full clarity.”

For Karl Haushofer, mission accomplished.

Like a dry sponge, Hitler soaked up what Haushofer offered. The concept of Lebensraum, for example, was not in circulation in National Socialist terminology up to 1923. Haushofer used it routinely, including the term in the first issue of the Journal of Geopolitics in January 1924. It then cropped up regularly after 1924, in both volumes of Mein Kampf and in Hitler’s unpublished “Second Book.” Much of the vocabulary of Haushofer’s Dai Nihon became Hitler’s own: war as the true test of a nation’s will to live; social-Darwinism and the struggle for survival; might as the ultimate arbiter in international relations; Machiavellian cunning as the art of statecraft; life as a Hobbist choice of black and white, rise or fall, life or death. The German historian, Karl Dietrich Bracher, stated it clearly: “Hitler’s geopolitical conception in its Haushoferian form made its way into ‘Mein Kampf’ via Hess” at Landsberg. There, what Haushofer’s friend, Rudolf Italiaander, called “the peculiar triad Haushofer-Hess-Hitler,” was forged.

Father Edmund Walsh, the Georgetown University professor of geopolitics who knew Haushofer best, stated that at Landsberg a “new strain” of thought and word ushered forth from
Hitler. That “strain” included Haushofer’s concepts not only of *Lebensraum* and Autarky, but also of outward security, forward frontiers, border regions, the struggle to balance land and sea power, and the role of geography as a determinant of military strategy and war (*Wehr-Geographie*). In Chapter 14 of *Mein Kampf* (“Eastern Orientation or East Policies”) one can almost feel the presence of Haushofer. Terms such as “territorial formation,” “territorial conquest,” “territorial policies,” “noblest carriers of the blood,” “accidental borders.” “momentary borders,” “constriction of Lebensraum,” mingle with concepts such as “corrective and educational military training,” “acquisition of the requisite soil,” “borders are created by human beings and altered by human beings,” “the most sacred right in this world is the right to soil,” and “Germany will either become a world power or cease to exist.” It was pure Karl Haushofer.

* * *

Haushofer’s role in the Third Reich has been the subject of much mythmaking. Let us dismiss out of hand the wildest rumors—that Hess was Haushofer’s illegitimate son; that Hess and Haushofer were lovers; that Haushofer wrote *Mein Kampf*; that Haushofer was Hitler’s “brain”; and that Haushofer at Munich ran an “Institute of Geopolitics” employing a staff of 1,000 to write policy for Hitler. Half a century after the fact, we can also dismiss the charges prepared against Haushofer at the International Military Tribunal at Nürnberg by the Office of the U.S. Chief of Counsel—namely, that “Haushofer was Hitler’s intellectual godfather”; that “Hitler was only a symbol and a rabble-rousing mouthpiece”; and that the “intellectual content” of Nazi policy “was the doctrine of Haushofer.”

What *can* we document? After Hitler’s “seizure of power” in 1933, Haushofer basked in the glow of the Führer’s glory. He was on radio, the Deutsche Welle and Bayerischer Rundfunk;
he had his articles placed in the “Aryanized” Ulstein newspaper empire; his *Journal of Geopolitics* soared to an annual circulation of 700,000; he was president of his own German Academy and the League for the Preservation of Germanism Abroad; he played a prominent role in the Academy of German Law, the National Socialist Union of Teachers, the National Socialist Union of Professors, the National Socialist Union of Students, the German Labor Front, and the Strength Through Joy Program. In 1935 he became a “Fostering Member” of I. Battalion, I. SS Standarte-Munich. He reveled in all this. As Albrecht Haushofer wrote in another of the *Moabit Sonnets*, “My father was blinded still by the dream of power.”

In personal terms, Haushofer’s former student, now Deputy Führer Hess, provided the “Jewish-tainted” Haushofer family with “letters of protection” against the Aryan paragraphs of the Civil Service Reconstruction Law, the Nürnberg Racial Laws, and the follow-up legislation to Crystal Night. And Haushofer became rich, earning (in addition to his military pension) as much as 200,000 Marks per year. A skilled laborer earned 2,000 for his services to the Third Reich.

In terms of policy, Haushofer supported Hitler’s decision to quit the League of Nations; the murder of Ernst Röhm and eighty-nine SA leaders in the so-called “Night of the Long Knives”; the remilitarization of the Rhineland; rearmament and conscription; and secretly testing weapons in the Soviet Union. He used his former contacts in Japan to help to create the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1936-37. He, and his son Albrecht, advised Hitler at the Munich Conference in 1938—“a happy day in the history of geopolitics.” He congratulated Hitler on the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 1939, calling it a heavy blow against the “anaconda policy of the western Jewish plutocracy.” He deemed the invasion of Poland that same year “a heroic stroke of seldom attained greatness.” He played an active role in formulating the “resettling of Baltic
Germans” in the East. He informed Hess that the defeat of France in 1940 had radically altered history for the next 1,000 years. “The world holds its breath as once it had done during the coronation of Charlemagne.” He regretted only that he was already 70 years old and thus could serve but as “a cultural-political umbrella from behind the scenes.” As his role model, Yamagata Aritomo.

Haushofer’s world came crashing down on May 10, 1941, when Hess flew off to Scotland. Without a patron, he and the family suffered house searches, arrests, incarceration, and finally death through murder and suicide. At Nürnberg, Haushofer stated that he had acted out his role during the Third Reich “under duress” and mainly to protect his family. Perhaps most cruel of all, when in the late 1930s Karl Haushofer asked his beloved son, Albrecht, professor of geopolitics at Berlin University, whether he, “the father,” had managed to spin geopolitics off from geography as a distinct discipline, “I doubt it” was the son’s tart reply. Karl grudgingly conceded that he had lacked the ability of the political scientist to turn himself into a “systematizer,” into an academic salesman.

Despite my perhaps harshly drawn analyses, I do not want to leave you with the notion that Haushofer-Hess-Hitler were all cut from the same cloth. Karl Haushofer never issued an order to go to war. He never murdered a Jew. He never transported a slave laborer. He never arrested a fellow citizen. He disliked what he called the “street-rabble” populism and anti-Semitism of the Nazis. He disliked their herd mentality. He despised their coarseness. And he regretted that apart from Hess, none of the leading “half-educated” Nazis had ever truly understood his geopolitical theories. For his part, like so many German conservatives, he never understood the brutal, revolutionary power of Adolf Hitler.

* * *
Karl Haushofer’s life reads much like a classic five-act Greek Tragedy: conflict, crisis, climax, dénouement, and resolution. The ultimate tragedy was that, in the words of his son, Albrecht, he “broke away the seal” to the Aladdin’s lamp of geopolitics for Hess and Hitler, and “let the daemon soar into the world.” What to the professor were abstract academic concepts, to the “tribune” became an uncompromising world view, for the realization of which he was prepared to use the most brutal application of force. Tragedy, also, was that the seeds that Haushofer planted at Landsberg grew into the turgid, twisted logic of Mein Kampf. That book would eventually sell 12.45 million copies, be translated into sixteen languages, and even boast a braille edition. Albrecht Haushofer later in life commented that “the most fatal aspect” of his father’s “missionary service” to the “young eagles” at Landsberg was that he thereby provided Hitler with “academic credit” for his pseudo-scientific theories. “One has to imagine what it meant in the Bavaria of that time, when a man of my father’s stature [general and professor] and popularity constantly traveled out to Landsberg.” Haushofer’s semi-official biographer, Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, called him simply the “cultured advertising executive of the Third Reich.” Haushofer’s desultory defense to Father Walsh in 1945—that he had taken from two of his peers, Sir Thomas Holdich and Sir Halford Mackinder, the maxim “Let us educate our masters”—was apologia at the end of a career; in 1924 it was aspiration meant in earnest.

Should he have been tried at Nürnberg? The historian Dennis Showalter in his study of Julius Streicher, editor of the racist-pornographic Der Stürmer, who was in the dock at the International Military Tribunal, argued that popular writers must be judged by their writings’ circulation and influence; that publication means recognition and influence; that it mobilizes frustrations and hostilities; that it can play a direct and instrumental role in shaping the future; and that it can translate into acceptance of the author’s views within the framework of a new
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order. Streicher was hanged for these sins. I am still struggling with my hypothetical Haushofer court case!
Author’s Bibliographical Note

This lecture is based upon my ongoing research into the Haushofer Papers, which are widely scattered among the Federal Archive (Bundesarchiv) at Koblenz, the Institut für Zeitgeschichte at Munich, and the family estate (Hartschimmelhof) near Pähl, all in Germany; as well as at the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C. Some of this material has been published in the second volume of Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Karl Haushofer. Leben und Werk (Boppard: Harald Boldt, 1979), 2 volumes. The first volume constitutes the most thorough account of Haushofer’s career available in print.

The first English-language treatment of Haushofer appeared at the height of World War II: Andreas Dorpalen, The World of General Haushofer: Geopolitics in Action (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1942). Obviously, the analysis was highly colored by the war against Nazism and its documentary basis almost barren. More than half a century later, I contributed a piece on “Geopolitik: Haushofer, Hitler and Lebensraum” to Colin S. Gray and Geoffrey Sloan, eds., Geopolitics, Geography, and Strategy (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1999); concurrently published in the Journal of Strategic Studies 22 (June/September 1999): 218-241. This constituted my first foray into the nearly 1,000 files of Haushofer Papers at Koblenz. At about the same time, Frank Ebeling tackled the hazy topic of Haushofer’s conception of “space” in Geopolitik. Karl Haushofer und seine Raumwissenschaft, 1919-1945 (Berlin: Akademie, 1994); while David T. Murphy assessed Haushofer’s role during the Weimar Republic in The Heroic Earth: Geopolitical Thought in Weimar Germany, 1918-1933 (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1997). In 1996 Father Bruno Hipler published the most critical treatment of Haushofer’s influence on Hitler to date: Hitlers Lehrmeister. Karl Haushofer als Vater der NS-Ideologie (St. Otilien: EOS, 1996), suggesting that Haushofer had, in fact, been Hitler’s
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“teacher.”


Karl Haushofer’s major books have not been translated into English, but they form the basis for any interpretation of his geopolitical musings: *Dai Nihon. Betrachtungen über Großjapans Wehrkraft und Zukunft* (Berlin: E. S. Mittler, 1913); *Das Japanische Reich in seiner geographischen Entwicklung* (Vienna: Seidel, 1921); *Geopolitik des Pazifischen Ozeans* (Berlin: Kurt Vowinckel, 1924); *Bausteine zur Geopolitik* (Berlin: Kurt Vowinckel, 1927); *Geopolitik der Pan-Ideen* (Berlin: Zentral-Verlag, 1931); *Wehr-Politik. Geographische Grundlagen einer Wehrkunde* (Berlin: Junker and Dünthaupt, 1932); and *Der nationalsozialistische Gedanken in der Welt* (Munich: Callwey, 1933), among some forty others. Of course, there are also the annual volumes of Haushofer’s journal, *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* (Heidelberg: Kurt Vowinckel, 1924-1944). The “Journal for Geopolitics” was scrutinized for its thematic contents in an unpublished dissertation by Karl-Heinz Harbeck, “Die ‘Zeitschrift für Geopolitik’ 1924-1944,” Kiel University, 1963.
Several general works on geopolitics, of course, address Haushofer’s brand of geopolitics, either in individual chapters or more thematically. These include two books by Geoffrey Parker, *Western Geopolitical Thought in the Twentieth Century* (London & Sydney: Croom Helm, 1985); and *Geopolitics: Past, Present and Future* (London and Washington, D.C.: Pinter, 1998). In addition, readers should consult the survey provided by Gearóid Ó. Tuatheil, *Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).

Last but not least, Father Edmund A. Walsh of Georgetown University interviewed Karl Haushofer on several occasions, both at Nürnberg and at Pähl, as “the General” prepared to stand trial at the International Military Tribunal as a war criminal. Walsh insisted that Haushofer pen an “apology of geopolitics,” which he published as *Wahre anstatt falsche Geopolitik für Deutschland* (Frankfurt: G. Schulte-Bulmke, 1946). Two years later, Walsh wrote a fuller account of his dealings with Haushofer: *Total Power: A Footnote to History* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1948). Unfortunately, Father Walsh kept confidential many of Haushofer’s intimate chats at the end of his life with his Bavarian Catholic confessor.