The Clausewitzian
Trinity in the Information Age: A Just
War Approach
by
COLONEL JOHN MARK MATTOX
United States Army
Commandant, Defense Nuclear Weapons
School
Mailing
address: Colonel John Mark Mattox
Defense Nuclear Weapons School
1900 Wyoming Blvd. SE
Kirtland AFB, NM 87117-5669
USA
email: john.mattox@us.army.mil
telephone: (505) 846-6779
Biography: Colonel John Mark Mattox is the Commandant of the Defense
Nuclear Weapons School, the U.S. Department of Defense’s premier institution
for nuclear weapons training. He holds a
BA from Brigham Young University, Master of Military Arts and Sciences (MMAS)
from the United States Army Command and General Staff College, a Master of
Strategic Studies (MSS) from the United States Army War College, and MA and
Ph.D. degrees from Indiana University.
ABSTRACT
Clausewitz’s
“remarkable trinity” has long been a touchstone for military realist
discourse. Similarly, the just war
tradition has long been a touchstone for moral discourse relating to war. Although these touchstones represent two intellectual
traditions which may appear to have little or nothing in common, the 21st-century
strategist or policymaker must take into account the imperatives of both
traditions. This is so because, in the
Information Age, public reactions to perceived moral shortcomings associated
with the decision to go to war, or with perceived moral lapses on the
battlefield, can significantly disrupt the balance which the “remarkable
trinity” requires. Accordingly, this
study takes as its task to propose a model which accommodates both military
realist and just war concerns. It
examines two popular interpretations of Clausewitz’s “remarkable trinity.” It then examines two much older trinitarian
social models, which it uses as guides to discover what a model of the
convergence of military realist and just war thought might look like. It then proposes a revised model of the
“remarkable trinity” which accommodates just war concerns. It concludes with some reflections on
contemporary applications of the model, especially as it relates to the
instruments of national power.
Key
words (for indexing): Clausewitz,
trinity, just war, information age
The
Clausewitzian Trinity in the Information Age:
A Just War Approach
Ever
since the late 19th century, Carl von Clausewitz’s posthumously published work,
On War, has factored significantly in
virtually all Anglo-American articulations of a philosophy of war. Indeed, notwithstanding the sweeping changes
which have resulted from revolutions in both military and political affairs in
the West, Clausewitz remains the undisputed touchstone for military realist discourse in the Anglo-American world.[1] In a separate but equally prominent line of
development, one finds the just war tradition, which has served as the
touchstone for moral idealist discourse
pertaining to war. Indeed, inasmuch
as the whole of Western military history is permeated with questions on the
moral limits to be observed in war, the just war tradition has been appealed to
for answers.[2]
At first blush, one might be tempted to
view these two lines of thought as having nothing whatsoever in common. However, further reflection reveals that,
certainly in the Anglo-American world as well as in larger circles, strategic
decisions concerning whether to go to war and, once engaged, how to fight the
war, almost invariably involve considerations associated with both
Clausewitz—and in particular, his “remarkable trinity”—and with the just war
tradition[3]. This is particularly true since the
Information Age has made available to private citizens the opportunity to
assess the viability of political arguments on the moral justification for war,
as well as to assess the degree of faithfulness with which the military is
perceived to observe moral imperatives as it conducts war. Thus, while, in earlier eras, the lack of
near real-time information from the battlefield may have afforded strategists
and policymakers the supposed leeway to conduct war without regard to public
reaction over issues with obvious moral implications, that day is forever
gone—as witnessed recently in the case of prisoner abuse scandals in Iraq and
Guantanamo Bay.
The ability, afforded by the
Information Age, for the public to form moral judgments (accurate or not) of
political and military decisions has important implications for the “remarkable
trinity” and its viability as a strategic model. Specifically it invites the following
questions:
·
To
what extent does the “remarkable trinity” accommodate the concerns of the just
war tradition?
·
What
might the “remarkable trinity” look like if it were overtly to illustrate the
strategic effect of moral considerations on decisions about war?
One might feel tempted to dismiss
questions like these as nothing more than a vain attempt to reconcile
incommensurables. Nevertheless, since
both Clausewitzian thought and the just war tradition feature prominently in
the Anglo-American philosophy of war, it seems altogether appropriate to seek
to understand the true nature of their interrelation and how that convergence might
be reflected in the “remarkable trinity.”
Accordingly, this study takes as its task to:
·
set
forth the fundamental notions of both the just war tradition and the
Clausewitzian trinity;
·
consider
how ideas similar to these have been accommodated in “trinities” which predate
Clausewitz; then, taking a cue from these earlier models,
·
propose
a model of the Clausewitzian trinity which takes into account the imperatives
of the just war tradition without doing damage to Clausewitzian imperatives;
and finally,
·
evaluate
the relevance of the resulting paradigm to the development of military strategy
in the Information Age.
Fundamentals
of the Just War Tradition
In broadest terms, the just war
tradition concerns itself with the conditions for the moral justification of
war and, once engaged, the moral parameters within which the war must be
fought. The former are jus ad bellum (i.e., the justice of war) considerations, and the latter
are jus in bello (i.e., justice in war) considerations. Most theorists agree that jus ad bellum justification for waging
war embodies, in some combination, the following principles: a cause that is both objectively just and
comparatively more just than the opponent’s cause, a morally right intention, a
public declaration of war based on the decision of a competent authority made
as a last resort, a reasonable probability of success, and an expectation of a
proportionately (moral) good result from the war with peace as the war’s
ultimate objective.[4] In the aggregate, these principles traditionally
are taken to specify the necessary conditions for engaging in a just war. That is, given that the conditions specified
by these principles are met, a state would thereby be considered as having
acquired moral license (although not necessarily the moral obligation) to engage in war. However, even a war adjudged to be just on jus ad bellum grounds can cease to be
just if, over time, the justifying conditions cease to be met. (For example, America’s current “Long War” in
southwest Asia could fall short of adequate jus
ad bellum justification if it ceased to be prosecuted for just causes or
with a right intention or if success, however defined, could not be
demonstrated to be a reasonable possibility.)
Moreover, a war initiated on just grounds can cease to be a just war if
it is not actually fought in a just manner.
Hence, two jus in bello principles
traditionally have served to delimit the just application of military force,
namely, proportionality in the use of force consistent with “military necessity,”[5] and discrimination between combatants and
noncombatants.[6] Acknowledgement of these principles entails
concurrent recognition of a burden of moral obligation to be borne by all
segments of those societies which fight wars—their leaders, their militaries,
and their people; and it is precisely this tripartite moral burden which points
us toward Clausewitz’s “remarkable trinity.”
Clausewitz’s
“Remarkable Trinity”
The “remarkable trinity” is not itself
a moral-theoretical construct. Indeed,
let us clearly note that moral considerations as embodied in the just war
tradition do not receive explicit
treatment in On War. While, for example, Clausewitz is concerned
that the general who fights should have a reasonable probability of victory,[7]
his concern appears to be founded on strictly pragmatic, rather than moral,
concerns. This may surprise the casual
reader of On War, since Clausewitz
uses word “moralisch” or grammatical variations of it (which Howard and Paret
correctly translate into English as “moral” or grammatical variations of it, or
as “morale”) no fewer than 60 times.[8] However, when Clausewitz uses the word
“moral,” he appears to mean things like “courage,” “tenacity,” “force of will,”
or other similar traditional soldierly virtues.
What he does not appear to
mean is “moral” in the sense of choosing to act in a way that accords with an
objective standard of right and consciously refusing to do that which, by the
same objective standard, is wrong or blameworthy—ideas which are out of place
with most military-realist accounts.
However, the fact that Clausewitz does not deal with moral issues per se
does not mean that he considered “morality,” as understood in the context of
the just war tradition, to have no place in strategic discourse. Moreover, the fact that Clausewitz does not
deal with moral considerations as understood by the just war tradition does not
imply that no place exists, or should exist, for them in his model. With this in mind, let us examine what
Clausewitz himself says, and what he has been interpreted to say, about the
nature of the “remarkable trinity.”
Clausewitz’s “remarkable trinity” is
set forth in one of the most widely read (if not most widely misunderstood)
passages in On War. (Punctuation in the following quotation has
been modified in order to make more perspicuous the distinctions which concern
the present study):
War is more than a true chameleon that
slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case. As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies
always make war a remarkable trinity—composed:
·
of
primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind
natural force;
·
of
the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to
roam;
·
and
of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it
subject to reason alone.[9]
Clausewitz then draws the following parallel:
·
The
first of these three aspects [listed above] mainly concerns the people;
·
the
second, the commander and his army;
·
the
third the government.[10]
He
then associates these parallel notions as follows:
·
The
passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people
[and although not stated, are certain to be inflamed or attenuated based on the
amount of information available to the people];
·
the
scope which the play of courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of
probability and chance depends on the particular character of the commander of
the army;
·
but
the political aims are the business of government alone.[11]
The initial segment of this passage
seems to provide an account of war that focuses upon the characteristics of actors in the “remarkable trinity,” rather than
upon the actors themselves, as shown in figure 1 (this and all other figures appear
at the end of this study). By way of
comparison, Summers, in his influential work, On Strategy, champions an interpretation of the “remarkable
trinity,” which highlights the actors rather than the actors’ characteristics[12],
as shown in figure 2. Villacres and
Bassford have criticized Summers for advocating this interpretation which, they
believe, misses the essence of Clausewitz’s philosophy.[13] In truth, however, both of the above
interpretations must be considered in tandem in order to appreciate the
richness of the “remarkable trinity,” and both will prove useful tools in the
quest to understand the place of just war considerations in the model as a
whole.
It is also important to consider that,
while both interpretations seem to give primacy to a world view taken from a
military perspective, it nevertheless remains the case that all three actors in
the trinity possess unique and equally valid perspectives—perspectives of which
the Information Age takes ample notice.
Thus, it is not the case that
one can fully appreciate the complexities of war and simultaneously ignore the
reality that, in addition to the military perspective, there exists also a
governmental perspective and popular perspective which, even if not made
explicit by Clausewitz, must be taken into consideration. Clausewitz, more than some of his
interpreters seem to have given him credit for, appreciated this reality, and
he stated as much in his own brief analysis:
These three tendencies are like three
different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their
relationship to one another. A theory
that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between
them would
conflict with reality to such an
extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless.[14]
Clausewitz
concludes his analysis of the trinity with an intriguing challenge, which takes
us right to the heart of the present study:
“Our task therefore [says Clausewitz] is to develop a theory that
maintains a balance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended
between three magnets.”[15] Indeed, when one considers the “remarkable
trinity” as a whole and considers the perspectives of all of its actors, the
magnetic suspension of the trinitarian elements becomes nigh unto impossible
when attempted without due regard for moral considerations as set forth in just
war theory. The influence of just war
theoretical notions upon warfare is sometimes subtle, sometimes prominent, but
always present. In order to appreciate
the role of moral questions as they may be understood to affect the “remarkable
trinity,” let us first examine two pre-Clausewitzian societal models, both of
which are trinitarian in nature and both of which include military realist and
moral idealist notions.
The
Socratic “Trinity”
Twenty centuries before Clausewitz,
Socrates, as reported by Plato, presented a trinitarian social model (figure 3)
which, like Clausewitz’s trinity, illustrates the interplay between the people,
the military, and the government and outlines the characteristics associated
with each actor.[16]
Socrates’ social model includes both
rulers and “auxiliaries” (i.e., those charged with the actual prosecution of
armed combat) in the broader category of “guardians” of the state. The fact that Socrates distinguishes between
rulers and war fighting “auxiliaries” and at the same time unites them under a
general heading is of particular interest in light of Clausewitz’s often
misunderstood—and misappropriated—claim that “war is not merely an act of policy
but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse
carried on with other means.”[17] On the one hand, Socrates thus acknowledges
that, in order to ensure the security of the political state, agencies other
than the rulers may be called upon from time to time to conduct the business of
politics, only in its most violent form.
On the other hand, the joint designation of these agencies as
“guardians” serves to reinforce the point that Socrates recognizes the
interconnectedness of the elements of his own trinity: The rulers may direct the work of the
auxiliaries, but the rulers also depend upon them to maintain a secure
environment in which the state can thrive, as well as survive.
This important tie between rulers and
auxiliaries has important implications for the craftsman class as well. Socrates holds, for example, that the
economic well-being of the state (as embodied in the interests of the craftsman
class) might require the rulers to direct the auxiliaries to expand the borders
of the state by conquest.)[18] Indeed, Socrates may take us farther than any
other author along the path of understanding the subtle but significant
correspondence between the elements of the two parallel interpretations of the
“remarkable trinity” in figures 1 and 2:
Not only do both rulers and auxiliaries bear responsibility for the
protection of the state, but they also exist in a sort of symbiotic
relationship with each other and with the people. Each enables the other, such that Clausewitz
might just as well have added that “warfare is statecraft or economics by other
means.” That is, taken in context,
Clausewitz cannot be understood to mean that war is merely a one-way, linear
extension of political action, but rather that it exists merely as one (albeit
an important) component in a complex interrelationship with all aspects of
society.
Socrates additionally had as his aim
to show that the interrelationships among the people, the military, and the
government are rooted in moral considerations.
For example, he takes pains to locate the four cardinal virtues of
antiquity (i.e., wisdom, courage, temperance or self-discipline, and justice)
within his social model. Two of the
cardinal moral virtues he assigns to the “guardian” class: “wisdom” as the distinguishing virtue of
those who govern and “courage” as the distinguishing virtue of those who
fight. He argues that “justice” (the
harmony present among the parts of society in general or of individuals in
particular) and “temperance,” (i.e., self-control) ideally are found in the
individual actors in all three divisions of the social trinity, because these
virtues have to do with the way in which these actors interrelate.
Two points critical to be understood
for the present discussion are:
·
first,
that Socrates understands the value of the moral virtues to lie—not alone in
their practical value for the state, but—in the goodness which is inherent in
the virtues themselves; the value that these virtues have for the state derives
from the goodness intrinsic to the virtues; and
·
second,
each actor in the social trinity is bound to the others by bonds of moral
obligation.
That
is, if one set of actors in the trinity defaults in its responsibility to
observe specific moral virtues, society as a whole cannot function as it
should. Without this proper
interrelational functioning of society, the people, the military, and the
government will find it commensurately difficult—if not impossible—to perform
their respective functions. The clear inference, then, is that one
cannot disrupt the harmonious interrelationship which constitutes the essence
of “justice” without potentially far-reaching consequences for the state.
Some might argue that the
interrelationships found in the Socratic model ultimately hinge—not on moral
considerations, but rather—on enlightened self-interest (since, for example,
rulers could order auxiliaries to war merely because it was in the economic
interests of the craftsman class).
However, that certainly is not Socrates’ argument. Socrates insists that the properly
functioning society is a morally virtuous one and that the cardinal virtues of
wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice stand as the hallmarks of a healthy
state. To the extent that these virtues
promote the common good, they become moral imperatives by almost any
utilitarian moral account. To the extent
that they reflect the duties of corresponding segments of society, they become
moral imperatives by almost any deontological moral account.
Granted, it does not unavoidably
follow from this claim that the just war principles per se must be understood
as permanent and inextricable features of the Socratic social model. However, no such insistence is necessary to
establish the thesis of this study. It
is necessary only to establish, at this stage, that a trinitarian model
possessing features strikingly similar to Clausewitz’s “remarkable trinity” can
be shown to include moral considerations
as inextricable features.
The
Western European Medieval Social Model
The claim that the various elements
of society are morally interconnected is also clear in another tripartite
social model which, although much later than the Socratic model, still predates
Clausewitz by several centuries, namely the Western European medieval social
model (figure 4). This model prevailed
in the Latin-speaking western world during the interval between the fall of
Rome in the fifth century A.D. and the rise of the Westphalian nation-state in
the 17th century A.D. The power vacuum
resulting from the fall of Rome left the Roman Catholic Church as the sole
hierarchically organized and virtually ubiquitous candidate for a unifying
agent in Latin-speaking Western Europe.
However, the church’s only undisputed province was the realm of
spiritual matters. Thus, it was not
always clear who should be in charge of the comparatively dirty business of
temporal concerns, including the fighting of wars. Sometimes the church took the lead in matters
related to jus in bello (as in the
case of the campaigns of the “warrior pope” Julius II[19]),
and at other times a feudal lord, prince, king, or emperor took the lead. However, for present purposes, it is
sufficient to stipulate that “political direction” came from the “sovereign,”
be that sovereign of whatever source, ecclesiastical or temporal.
In the middle ages, every member of
feudal society belonged to one of three distinct classes:
·
those
who prayed,
·
those
who fought, and
·
those
who produced;
and each class was entirely dependent
upon the diligent and successful prosecution of the tasks which belonged to the
other two classes. Those who prayed
(often up to 18 hours a day in monasteries) were responsible to secure divine
favor for soldiers and producers. Those
who fought were responsible to protect the temporal interests of clerics and
producers so that both could pursue their vocations without fear of disruption
or molestation. Those who produced
provided the means for clerics and warriors to accomplish their
responsibilities.[20]
The medieval world did not possess the
modern and post-modern concept of “getting ahead,” as it were, within the
social structure. Each person was born
into a particular class whose function was absolutely crucial to the well-being
of society as a whole. Each who did his
job thereby not only contributed toward
the well-being of society, but in his or her own right, actually secured the well-being of every other
member of society. Thus, two important
points become evident:
·
Each
member of society was bound by interlocking bonds of moral obligation to every
other member of society.
·
Anyone
who failed to perform his or her social duty fell short on moral as well as social grounds.
Of
particular interest in the present context is that warriors were understood to
be morally bound to every other member of society in terms of the way in which
they prosecuted war. (Indeed, it is no
accident that much of the just war tradition acquired its most highly developed
form during the medieval period.) Those
who fought but disregarded the moral (and from the standpoint of the medievals,
logical) demands of jus ad bellum or jus in bello invited disaster to befall
the whole of society: On the one hand,
those who prayed and those who worked could not expect divine favor if those
who fought acted in a way that failed to take due account of justice and
fairness or that failed to minimize human suffering. On the other hand, those who fought placed
society on the path to economic ruin if they failed to take due account of the
cost of an unwinnable war, or if they wantonly destroyed the economic
livelihood of an adversary’s producers, thereby subjecting their own producers
to the possibility of reprisal. Thus, at
every turn, the tripartite divisions of society were dependent not only upon
the general moral virtue of all segments of society, but also upon the specific
adherence to just war principles by those who fought.
The
“Remarkable Trinity” and Just War Theory in Information Age Warfare
We turn now, in light of the Socratic
and medieval paradigms, to a consideration of the nexus between the just war
tradition and the “remarkable trinity” (figure 5). The Socratic and medieval social trinities
clearly illustrate that the idea of tripartite but thoroughly interconnected
social elements is one which well antedates Clausewitz. Moreover, they illustrate the notion that the
interconnections are thoroughly laden with, if not actually founded upon, moral
considerations. No claim is made that
Clausewitz’s trinity necessarily constitutes a response to the earlier models,
but no such connection is necessary to demonstrate. It is merely necessary to show that social
models similar to the Clausewitzian trinity are replete with implications for
moral theory. Thus, with the Socratic
and medieval social models in mind, let us now consider the Clausewitzian
trinity, with special attention to the matter of the extent to which his model
can be understood to accommodate just war concerns.
It does not matter that Clausewitz
himself may not have intended for his “remarkable trinity” to illustrate the
nexus between military realism and just war theory. Indeed, truly elegant models often possess
explanatory capacity beyond that recognized—or even intended—by their authors. Moreover, nothing in Clausewitz’s work
requires that the decision to continue “policy by other means”[21]
exclude moral considerations as understood in just war theory. Similarly, Clausewitz gives no appearance of
advocating that soldiers should (or must) disregard jus in bello considerations.
Even Clausewitz’s famous claim that “[t]o introduce the principle of
moderation into the theory of war itself would always lead to a logical
absurdity”[22]
can be understood as a descriptive rather than a prescriptive claim. In fact, it may be that just war theory owes
its existence to a descriptive claim of this very kind. In an important way, just war theory
constitutes the counterbalance to the tendency toward absolutism described (but
not necessarily embraced)[23]
by Clausewitz and, to that extent, can be seen as a moderating influence
calculated to help maintain the equilibrium necessary to keep “an object
suspended between [the] three magnets”[24]
which characterize the trinitarian actors.
Interconnections between the actors of
the “remarkable trinity” and just war considerations become particularly clear
when the people, the military, and the government are characterized as loci for
instruments of national diplomatic, informational, military, or economic
power. Consider for example, the
following interconnections:
- The government’s use of the diplomatic
instrument points directly to the just war claim that all remedies short
of war must be exhausted prior to unleashing the violence of the military instrument.
- The
informational instrument is the means by which public consideration is given to the question of whether or
not to go to war or, once war is decided upon as the course of choice, the
instrument by which an adversary either is served notice or given an
ultimatum.
- The economic
instrument largely determines jus ad
bellum evaluations, made by both military
and government, of whether a war
can be fought with a reasonable chance of success. This is particularly so in the present
age of “just-in-time” logistics, when jus
ad bellum assessments of reasonable chance of success inevitably will
be colored, if not largely determined, by logistic concerns.
- Although
the military instrument of
national power resides squarely in the combatants’ realm (and hence, in
the realm of jus in bello), still it is the case that war
fighters can, by their moral conduct, effectively either validate or
refute the jus ad bellum claims
made by the government to the
effect that, for example, the war is underwritten by the right moral
intentions. In a similar vein,
moral missteps can have profound effect on the popular support of a war effort.
All
of this is so because the government, the people, and the military are
inextricably bound to each other in the trinity, and the degree of synergy they
can obtain in the war-making enterprise inevitably will be either enhanced or
degraded, depending upon the care they take vis-à-vis just war considerations.
Contemporary
Application
Although
the realist might continue to insist that moral discourse has no place in the
politics of war, the facts of the Information Age clearly seem to contradict
that position. The current conflict in
southwest Asia serves as a striking illustration of how public access to
information of moral import (whether or not the information reported is
accurate, presented in proper context, etc.) affects the nexus between the
Clausewitzian trinity and perceptions as to how effectively just war principles
are being applied—a question which affects all
actors in the trinity. For example, prior
to the invasion of Iraq, the government argued extensively in an effort to
establish the full range of jus ad bellum
principles, to wit:
- that
the invasion of Iraq would be both just and comparatively just,
- that
it was undertaken with right intention and as a last resort,
- that
proper authority was sought (if not obtained) from competent assemblies
(i.e., U.S. Congress or the United Nations),
- that
there was reason to expect that outcomes would be successful,
- that
the moral good that could be expected to result would outweigh other
considerations, and
- that
peace could be realized.
While
the question of whether the government met its burden of proof may remain an
open question, the fact is that the government presented its case in
unmistakably just war terms; and by so doing, the government sought to confer
upon the military the moral authority
to conduct war. At the same time, the
government sought to marshal public opinion as to the moral propriety of the
war. Both military and public gave tacit
assent to the moral arguments, as evidenced by the fact that the military went
to war and Congress did not obstruct the military by legislative means. Similar interconnections exist in terms of jus in bello principles, as seen in the example
of the treatment of prisoners of war—even though the definition of what
constitutes a “prisoner of war” in the current conflict in southwest Asia has
been a subject of debate. The perception
of moral misconduct on the part of the military at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere
raised both public and government scrutiny concerning the suggestion that the
military or its members had violated the bond of moral trust between it and the
government and between it and the people.
All of this points to the conclusion
that the actors in Clausewitz’s “remarkable trinity” not only exert a profound
influence upon one another in the calculus of war, but also that their
interactions are permeated with moral considerations as enshrined by the just
war tradition. That is to say, in spite
of Clausewitz’s realist rhetoric, it appears that the “remarkable trinity” is
useful as, among other things, an explanatory device for matters of moral
import, as set forth by the just war tradition.
If ever there was a time, before or
after Clausewitz, when military realists should have believed that they could
afford the “luxury” of undertaking war without respect to moral considerations,
that time certainly is past. As the
United States faces the increasingly ominous prospect of a “Long War” in
southwest Asia without any certain terminus, it becomes crucial for the nation
to reflect carefully upon the nature of the moral considerations that connect
the elements of the “remarkable trinity.”
This is so because, if for no other reason, the Information Age has so
facilitated near-real-time reporting of political deliberations and battlefield
events that the private citizen no longer can be considered shrouded in
“invincible ignorance”[25]
such that only government officials can be regarded as occupying a sufficiently
informed position from which to reflect upon just war considerations. On the contrary, just war considerations are
now part of the public debate across the entire social spectrum.
Indeed, all three actors in the
“remarkable trinity” have a vested interest—not only in the political and
economic outcomes of a war, but—also in the moral outcomes of war. For example, if justifications for going to
war are questionable or difficult to demonstrate (as some would argue was the
case in the U.S. attempt to justify the invasion of Iraq on the basis of
alleged evidence of the presence of weapons of mass destruction),[26]
the continual availability of news reports effectively places the people in a
position, along with government and military, to opine upon the moral propriety
of war thus justified. Similarly, if
morally outrageous behavior is manifest on or near the battlefield (as was the
case at Abu Ghraib prison),[27]
modern telecommunications will ensure that that behavior is impossible to
hide.
In sum, both realist and idealist
constructs—especially those reflected in the just war tradition—enjoy a
comfortable fit with Clausewitz’s “remarkable trinity.” One ignores the realist connections between
the elements of the trinity at the risk of losing on the battlefield. One ignores the moral connections between the
elements of the trinity at the risk of corroding the moral bonds of obligation
which bind together the actors in the trinity and, at worst, at the risk of
breaking those bonds altogether.[28] Indeed, inasmuch as the Information Age has
laid open to the plain view of all—the military, the government, and the
people—the moral implications of war-making decisions by government and the
violent execution of “policy by other means”[29]
on the battlefield, all actors in the “remarkable trinity” must understand and
appreciate the nexus between the “remarkable trinity” itself and the demands of
just war theory. In the Information Age,
that nexus no longer can be ignored.
Clausewitz’s
“Remarkable Trinity”: Summers’
interpretation Interlocking
bonds of moral obligation (shown
in gray above) characterized by justice (i.e., each social segment reliably performing its proper
function) and by temperance (i.e., each social segment performing its
proper function in proper degree)—“proper”
being defined as that course which is most likely to produce harmonious
interaction between the actors in the trinity with the result that all
members of society can attain eudemonia—“human
flourishing,” or “the good life,” which the ancient Greeks understood to
be the ideal state for human beings. Temperance and
justice forge the connections among the various
components of society “Auxiliaries” (war fighters) War fighters are
distinguished by their extraordinary courage Rulers are
distinguished by their extraordinary wisdom Figure 3. The
Socratic Model of the State Craftsmen Rulers Guardians of the State
The
Western European Medieval Social Model
Provided spiritual underwriting and leadership to the fighters and
producers Interlocking bonds of moral obligation (shown in gray
above): Each social segment is
trusted to perform its function in a way that will ensure the preservation
of society as a whole Figure 4. Provided military protection to
those who prayed and those who produced A
Just War Approach to Clausewitz’s
“Remarkable Trinity”
· Government is
responsible to demonstrate the jus ad
bellum propriety of the war to its citizens who must finance the war · The people are
responsible, via their representatives, to adjudicate the jus ad bellum claims of the
government. · Government is
responsible to ensure that the military conducts the war in accordance with
jus in · The people hold
the government accountable for the jus
in Prime just war
theory focus is on jus ad bellum
issues
Interlocking bonds of moral obligation (shown in gray
above) Figure 5. · Military is
accountable to the people for its jus
in · The people hold
the military responsible to ensure it conducts the war in accordance with jus in Prime just war
theory focus is on jus in Public debate
(and public support for government policies and military decisions)
concerns itself with both jus ad
bellum and jus in · Government is
responsible to demonstrate to its citizen-solders the jus ad bellum propriety of the war · Military is
responsible to execute the war in response to the government’s jus ad bellum determinations. · Government is
responsible to ensure that the military conducts the war in accordance with
jus in · Military is
accountable to the government for its jus
in Political leadership prime implementers of diplomatic &
infor-mational instruments of national
power Combatants prime implementers of the military
instrument of national power Noncombatants prime implementers of the economic
instrument of national power
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NOTES