

CHANGING SECURITY DYNAMICS IN AFRICA, SOURCES OF CONFLICT, AND US STRATEGY

By Stephen F. Burgess*

2005

OVERVIEW

The African Union (AU) African Standby Force (ASF) concept is bold and visionary; and African security experts are generating many of the ideas and agreements. However, most of the ASF projects remain largely donor-driven, and targets are not being met. Therefore, the US should view the ASF as a concept that may eventually come to fruition but not in the time frame set by the AU. In the short to medium term of the next ten years, the UN will continue to provide the organizational framework for most peace operations, and the US and Europe the bulk of the funding and logistical support. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) structures, which the US helped to develop, provide a vision of where the ASF might be in five years. However, ECOWAS has a long way to go in terms of funding and managing its own operations. The same applies to Southern African Development Community (SADC), IGAD, EAC and other sub-regional organizations. In the long term, US strategy should point towards African assumption of leadership in all aspects of the maintenance of peace and security. In the short to medium term, the main emphasis of the US (and other donors) should remain on deploying African peacekeepers to hot spots, such as Darfur, and sustaining them, preferably under the auspices of a UN peacekeeping operation. Second, training is required for the military, civilian police, and civilian administrators, even though some African experts do not think so. If operationalized, the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) training programs should help meet the demand for trained African peacekeepers and enhance African security. Finally, the US should continue to aid key states (Nigeria, South Africa, Ethiopia, Kenya, Senegal, Mali, Ghana, Rwanda, Uganda, Mozambique, Botswana, and others) in developing their military and conflict resolution capabilities, so that they can play enhanced leadership or contributing roles to peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts.

The New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), the AU, and sub-regional organizations have been pointing African states in the right direction for development. However, they will only bring development in the long run, after they overcome their administrative weaknesses and states' insistence on sovereignty. In the short to medium term, the US can best promote development through bilateral programs, such as the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), and the President's Emergency Program for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), which require democracy, governance standards, and accountability. Another important mechanism is The World Bank's Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) program, which provides debt relief in return for greater transparency, structural reform, and accountability. Eventually NEPAD could come to complement such programs and provide African leadership.

The importance of South African diplomacy and security and development initiatives in the continent points to the necessity of the US continuing to work with South Africa as much as possible, in spite of the differences. The US should build collaboration in peacekeeping training through the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) and the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). The US should increase funding South African initiatives,

* The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions and policies of the US Military Academy, the US Army, the Department of Defense, or any other branch of the US Government. The paper is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

such as NEPAD and conflict resolution. Reviving and upgrading the US-South Africa Bi-national Commission would also be an important signal to South Africa.

The US should continue to alter its strategy in Africa. Winning hearts and minds is important. However, Islamic radicals and terrorists in Africa have tended to concentrate their activities in major urban centers, such as Johannesburg, Durban, Mombassa, and Nairobi, where access to communications and finances and other infrastructure enables them to mount terrorist operations most effectively. Therefore, an intelligence and law enforcement approach and coalition building with South Africa and Kenya seems more appropriate than a military approach. The chances that Islamic radicals will establish Afghanistan-like bases in stateless Somalia or in the Sahara are not great. The presence of US forces in those areas to train and win hearts and minds at a considerable cost must be constantly reviewed.

The US must be more energetic but sensitive in protecting its sources of oil in the Gulf of Guinea and in entering the oil rush in Sudan. Increased US diplomatic and military presence in the Gulf of Guinea and Sudan will help to deal with the increasing role of China and the threat of instability, as well as with militias in the Niger Delta and piracy. The US must back the IMF and World Bank in efforts to bring accountability and transparency to the use of oil revenues by African governments and to overcome the “oil curse”.

The potential for conflict exists over Nile River water in Northeast Africa; however, Upper Nile states have not yet developed to the extent where they have actually threatened Egypt’s supply of water – the main trigger for conflict. Nevertheless, Egypt has behaved as a hegemon, as if there was a real threat to the Nile, which is explained by the country’s extreme dependence on the river. The national security of Egypt is linked to water. Therefore the major powers must play a role in putting pressure on Egypt to change its attitude and in fully funding the NBI and persuading upstream states to accept.

The future of water in the region holds opportunities for both conflict and cooperation. Rapid population growth and the development of water resources in the Upper Nile states will increase the threat to Egypt’s water supply. Population growth will be rapid and place rising demand on both water and energy. Egypt is faced with the choice of continuing its hegemonic behavior and coercing riparian states or building cooperation through the NBI or bilateral arrangements. Egypt’s past behavior does not bode well for a cooperative solution. Also, Upper Nile states are rejecting previous treaties and declaring the right to use the Nile as they see fit. In particular, Egypt needs to change its strategy regarding Ethiopia and strive for a new dispensation on the Blue Nile.

The conflicts and fragmentation of the eastern African region have not provided much hope for regional integration, though the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) played a prominent role in the resolution of conflicts in Sudan and Somalia after years of negotiations. IGAD helped to bring about oil revenue sharing in Sudan. IGAD’s early warning system holds out hope for conflict prevention (including over water and energy) in Northeast Africa. While IGAD will continue to play a role in fostering regional cooperation, it would be helpful if Egypt became a member of the organization. Another organization that could foster regional cooperation in Northeast Africa is the African Union, which has been heavily involved in Darfur. The Nile Basin Initiative could build cooperation, but the current arrangement does not offer incentives to Upper Nile states and should be rethought. External actors may help facilitate cooperation and persuade Egypt to adopt a more conciliatory position.

INTRODUCTION

This research report provides insight into changing security dynamics in Africa, as well as sources of conflict on the continent and what the US should do in response. The report provides a view from South Africa, where some of the highest quality research and thinking takes place on African security issues and where many of the initiatives to improve African security and accelerate African development have originated. The report first describes what African regional (and sub-regional) organizations are doing to provide greater security and development and analyzes the increasing role that the continental-level African Union (AU) and the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) as well as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and other sub-regional organizations are playing in African security and development initiatives. Second, sources of conflict are examined, starting with terrorism, determining how the US can better shape efforts in Africa to execute the war on terrorism and especially to keep weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of terrorists. Next, the role of energy in fomenting competition and conflict is considered, with a focus on Sudan in Northeast Africa and the Gulf of Guinea in West Africa. Finally, the report conveys the role that water quantity and quality plays in promoting regional tensions and potential conflict, especially in the Nile basin in Northeast Africa, and how terrorists might target water resources. The report determines how water resources can be used to promote multilateral cooperation and regional confidence building measures, for example through the Nile Basin Initiative. Finally, the report concludes by recommending what the US can do (in concert with African states and organizations) in response to the changing dynamics in Africa.

AFRICAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES

Since the 1990s, a major changing security dynamic in Africa has been the development of regional organizations and the willingness of African states to intervene in the name of those organizations to stop civil wars and the harmful spillover that they cause.¹ In the 1990s, Nigeria led a multinational coalition in two ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) missions that stopped rebel takeovers of Liberia and Sierra Leone (two ECOWAS states that requested assistance), and Togo and Senegal led an ECOMOG mission to bolster the government of Guinea-Bissau (an ECOWAS state). In 1998, Zimbabwe led two other Southern African Development Community (SADC) states in stopping rebels from overthrowing the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (a SADC state), and South Africa led Botswana in stopping an incipient army mutiny in Lesotho (a SADC state). In 2002, an ECOWAS force was inserted after a cease-fire between the warring factions in Ivory Coast, and in 2003, Nigeria led an

ECOWAS force after a cease-fire that ended renewed civil war in Liberia and brought the departure of the warlord, Charles Taylor.

In contrast, the United Nations (UN) failed to keep the peace in Angola, Somalia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone, with devastating consequences, which led to the Brahimi Report of August 2000 and UN peacekeeping reforms.² The willingness of the ECOMOG and SADC missions to enforce or keep the peace elevated the profile of African sub-regional organizations and led to efforts to strengthen the organizations' decision-making structures and processes and their peacemaking and peacekeeping capacities. In the late 1990s, ECOWAS instituted mechanisms to ensure collective decision-making.³ SADC followed suit, with a heads of state "troika" and collective decision-making installed in 2001.⁴ The US, Britain, and France as well as the European Union (EU) refocused their security assistance programs towards sub-regional organizations, with the aim of building organizational capacity and command and control in peace and stability operations.⁵

In 2002, the African Union (AU) replaced the Organization of African Unity (1963-2002) with the promise of greater activism in the areas of peace and security and development. A principal goal was to develop the ability to intervene and prevent the repetition of genocide, as had happened in Rwanda in 1994. Since 2002, the continental body became active in peace operations, with AU forces deployed to Burundi and Darfur province in Sudan (where genocide commenced in 2003 and persisted) and with increased assistance from the US, European states, and the EU. More importantly, the AU has generated the concept of an African Standby Force (ASF), which was approved by AU heads of state in July 2004 and is now in the process of formation. If operationalized, the ASF would deploy rapidly in response to humanitarian disasters, including genocide. African sub-regional organizations were designated as the "ASF building blocks," and some began assembling their own standby forces, which would contribute brigades to the ASF.⁶ South Africa and South African security experts have been playing a role in formulating and implementing the ASF concept. Therefore, this research report starts with the ASF and views from the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in Pretoria;⁷ and the report proceeds to examine NEPAD, AU, and sub-regional organizations.

The African Union and the African Standby Force

In an interview conducted on September 9, 2005, Festus Aboagye (a retired Ghanaian colonel and commander of peacekeepers and now ISS program head of the peace missions program) provided an analysis of where the ASF stands.⁸ The ASF concept is being developed based on the Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) concept that Norway and other states innovated to rapidly deploy forces in advance of UN peacekeeping operations to prevent conflicts

from reigniting. SHIRBRIG was deployed along the Ethiopian-Eritrean frontier in 2000 and in Liberia in October 2003.⁹

Thus far, the focus of ASF development has been on sub-regional organizations (especially ECOWAS) building the standby force and not on the ASF policy framework and AU management capacity. At AU headquarters, there are only a handful of officers, including three from ECOWAS, one from the Intergovernmental Association for Development (IGAD), and three from the East African Community (EAC); there are no SADC officers.¹⁰ This is far below the targeted levels for the ASF. Thus, there is no management capacity at the strategic level and no ability to effectively manage peacekeeping operations. In addition, AU headquarters personnel have been distracted by the deployment of an AU peacekeeping force to Darfur.

Looking to the future, Festus Aboagye noted that the development of AU strategic management capacity would have three critical benchmarks:

1. The development of standard operating procedures (SOPs), logistical concepts, and training principles required for peacekeeping operations;
2. Mission-level training planning capacity and standby skeleton management HQs.
3. The establishment of logistical bases in Africa or elsewhere (there are advantages and disadvantages to having them either in Africa or elsewhere).¹¹

In regard to the development of ASF training principles, African states (rather than organizations) continue to have responsibility for training peacekeepers. This is not an AU or sub-regional responsibility at the moment. In developing principles, the issue is whether the British concept of “training the trainers” should be emulated or if the US and French approach of training whole battalions is preferable. The AU Darfur Integrated Task Force and the AU Mission in Sudan have been deployed largely through international community support (especially from the US and the EU). At present, the AU is preoccupied with Darfur (and other “hot spot” conflicts), which has provided the AU with practice in conflict management and deploying and sustaining peacekeeping forces. However, this preoccupation has prevented the AU from planning for the future. At present, only two officers (a Kenyan colonel and a Senegalese officer) staff the planning element (PLANELM) and currently do AU planning. There is a need to establish a real peacekeeping PLANELM.

At a March 2005 workshop in Addis Ababa, the AU decided on five key areas of emphasis in the development of the ASF. It was agreed that ECOWAS would focus on logistical aspects and that SADC would develop doctrine for the ASF. It was also agreed that ownership of the ASF would reside with five sub-regional organizations (ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD, and a central and north African organization) and the establishment (with donor backing from the EU

and elsewhere) of an AU peace facility, which would fund peacemaking and the deployment of peacekeeping missions, such as the one in Darfur. Thus far, in Central Africa and North Africa, not much has been accomplished.

The ASF, ECOWAS, and other Sub-Regional Organizations

Festus Aboagye commented that West Africa is ahead of other regions in contributing to the ASF, due to the planning and management capacity developed by ECOWAS (assisted by donors). He assessed that there were good ECOWAS structures in place, including an ECOWAS planning structure, and that ECOWAS has been involved in managing West African deployments to Ivory Coast and Liberia and to the UN operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC).¹² ECOWAS chiefs of staff now meet regularly together and with their Ministry of Defense and Department of Foreign Affairs counterparts.

Donors are still critical for ECOWAS and its contribution to the ASF. Canada has funded ten West African officers to lead in the formation of an ECOWAS standby force (ESF) or Eco-brigade. The US is providing communications infrastructure and an early warning mechanism for the force if deployed. The Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Center is providing the expertise to define the operational and political vision and a mission statement and identify training needs, including for a civilian component of the ESF. Thus far, however, the emphasis has been on the military component. ECOWAS states have committed 1,500 troops to an ESF task force that would deploy within 30 days and 5,000 troops to a main brigade that would join the task force within 90 days.¹³

While ESF troops have been earmarked and a civilian-led command structure has been agreed, the ECOWAS has not focused on building police and civilian components. Furthermore, there are still issues regarding training, doctrine, and logistics. The US decided that Pacific Architects and Engineers stocks in Sierra Leone (that were supplying West African peacekeepers) would be designated for use by the ESF. France maintains logistical bases in Senegal and Gabon, which might be used by the ESF or the ASF as a whole. However, France has made it clear that, if Senegal is not involved in the ESF (and if Gabon is not involved in the ASF); those logistical bases cannot be used.

While one brigade in West Africa is making more progress than other regions, West Africa alone cannot keep peace all over Africa. For example, peacekeeping troops are needed in Somalia, but West African militaries, such as Ghana's, are stretched to the limit and have no more peacekeeping troops to contribute. Thus, there is a need to develop the capacities of other sub-regional organizations. This is the downfall of the donor-driven approach, which has focused

on building an ESF rather than emphasizing the development of ASF at AU headquarters and the standby forces of other regions.

In East Africa, the overlapping nature of the EAC (3 members), IGAD (7 members), and the Common Market of East and Southern Africa (13 members) presents problems. Non-IGAD members do not want to contribute to East-brig, so the three EAC states, Ethiopia, and Rwanda are the only contributors. The East-brig headquarters and logistical base are co-located in Addis Ababa (where the ASF is also located). However, the planning element (PLANELM) has been established in Kenya, with British assistance, and the Peace Support Training Centre at Karen is offering strategic level training for the East-brig. East Africa is ahead of the other regions in that it has allocated \$2.56 million of its own funds for East-brig headquarters, the PLANELM, and a logistics base.¹⁴

Other problems with the ASF include the fact that the five different regions each have their own terminology and customs. For example, a battalion is 1,000 troops in one sub-region or country versus 700 in another. There is a need for a common language and structure for the military and civilian components and harmonization in order to have a successful continental architecture. The five ASF working groups need to develop common terminology, doctrine, structure, and logistics to be adopted by each sub-region.

Another problem is the weak linkage between the AU and sub-regional organizations. While Article 13 of the AU Peace and Security Protocol authorized the establishment of the ASF, it did not spell out arrangements with sub-regional organizations. Instead, the AU has had to establish memoranda of understanding with sub-regional organizations and member states, which has been slow to transpire. Therefore, the initiative lies in the hands of ECOWAS, SADC, and East-brig. Instead of leading, the ASF is being established on the basis of a policy framework borrowed from ECOWAS. There is presently little or no operational or logistical function at AU headquarters. However, the last ASF meeting finally catalogued a policy document for implementation that should lead to improvements.

By June 30, 2005 (the end of Phase I of ASF development), an AU headquarters management capacity for Scenario 2—a stand-alone observer mission to be deployed in 30 days—should have been in place but was not. In regard to Scenario 4—standard peacekeeping—the capacity exists but not for deployment within 30 days. Festus Aboagye predicts that West Africa, Southern Africa, and maybe East Africa will have structures in place by the end of Phase II in 2010. Thus, the ASF could handle most of the six scenarios; however, the capacity of the ASF to intervene to stop genocide (ASF Scenario 6) will remain a long-term question.

Festus Aboagye commented that, while the AU has been generous in funding the AU peace facility, there are too few dollars and external donors for the ASF, and the nature of external support is problematic. While command and control is desired under the AU, external partners do not seem to want to establish AU decision-making; they think that it is better to have ECOWAS develop decision-making capacity first. Little or no money has been directed towards or earmarked for the ASF specifically. Also, the G-8 has not made much progress in funding and developing the Global Peace Operations Initiative. The Western policy of disengagement and abdication is likely to continue into the medium term. Thus, Africa is obliged to continue to keep its own peace with stopgap measures, as occurred in Darfur. If one took out the Nordics, British, and US, Africa would not be present in Darfur; it needs external donors. The US has not demonstrated that it will sink millions of dollars into African peace and security beyond contingencies like Darfur.

Africa's hierarchy of needs is sometimes lost on global partners. Training is not the most serious need; airlift and mobility, logistics, and communications network are. First and foremost is strategic airlift and sustainment capacity. For example, the US provided \$6 million for airlift plus "meals-ready-to-eat" (MREs) to take an Ethiopian battalion from Addis Ababa to Bujumbura, Burundi. However, the AU peacekeeping troops stayed in the capital, as they had no means to deploy into the countryside. Second, logistics are crucial; for example, all vehicles used by AU monitoring units in Burundi and Darfur were purchased or provided by external partners. However, without externally provided logistics, the benefits of training would be wasted. Third, the payment of allowances to African peacekeeping troops is mostly done by external donors and will continue. Fourth, a communications network capacity is needed. Festus Aboagye commented that logistical bases are not needed in Africa. Equipment will be sold if spares available and equipment is fully operational. Thus, provide logistics and airlift. There is no accountability for equipment.

SADC: Peace, Security, a Standby Force and Development

A number of experts commented on progress made by SADC in the area of peace and security (including a standby force) and development. Gavin Cawthra of the School of Public and Development Management, University of the Witwatersrand found that the SADC sub-region has made progress in constituting a standby force.¹⁵ However, a problem is that the concept of a standby force is not discussed within the public domain. Nevertheless, a SADC command and control structure is being devised, and the SADC BRIG includes a working group of experts. The SADC chiefs of staff and Ministry of Defense staff have adopted three policy documents in accordance with a memorandum of understanding. A problem with the SADC structure is that

each of the 13 member states insists on having a planning element (PLANELM), which will be unwieldy.

SADC was slow to respond to the call for an ASF and in the area of peace and security. After the 1996 protocol was adopted and the Organ on Politics, Defense, and Security Cooperation launched, SADC suffered from the “Mugabe–Mandela standoff,” and not much happened due to personalities, South Africa’s unwillingness to appear hegemonic, and the hesitancy of external donors. There has been a slow process of implementation of the strategic plan and framework, with 128 strategic objectives. The SADC organ structure was designed for collective decision-making and prevents a repeat of Mugabe’s 1998 claim of SADC intervention in DRC. SADC has been restructured to provide greater coordinating authority in the SADC secretariat in Gaborone, Botswana, which has resulted in a new, understaffed bureaucracy and gridlock. The role of outside actors in funding SADC so that it can get off the ground is crucial.

Rapid progress is now being made on the SADC brigade (SADCBRIG) as part of the ASF, as well as with non-military structures.¹⁶ A framework and structure are in place, with a planning element (PLANELM) in Gaborone. Personnel are in place, and there are CIVPOL and civil society coordinating structures. However, there may be a standby force but not a system. There is a lack of capacity in the SADC secretariat, with only one person to respond to 40 ministers and manage relations with donors. In contrast, ECOWAS is much better staffed and administered. However, the new Mozambican SADC Executive Secretary Dr T. Salomao is more dynamic and authoritative and has managed to bring more recruits into the peace and security division.¹⁷

Before South Africa relinquished the chair of the SADC organ in August 2005, it led efforts to get the SADCBRIG up and running and to secure parliamentary ratification of the SADC security protocol, which, along with the SADC mutual defense pact, constitute useful confidence building measures among Southern African states. The organ’s strategic plan and framework for policies are good in principle. SADC has done a good job in policy formulation but has been slow at implementation and development of capacities, because SADC has lacked an executive with the political will to implement its policies. Also, SADC remains overly dependent on donors. While joint exercises like RECAMP involving SADC forces have proven possible, planning and operationalization of the SADCBRIG and other security measures have proven to be more problematic. Until the ASF and SADCBRIG are ready, the Burundi model might still be used in which South African troops arrived first, then handed off to an AU mission, which then handed off to the UN, which proved most capable of organizing and sustaining the peacekeepers.

Harvey W. Short in the South African Department of Foreign Affairs noted that SADC is in the process of setting up a brigade, following in the wake of the ECOWAS success.¹⁸ The SADCBRIG has 9 countries, as opposed to the current 13 SADC states, which could cause difficulties in coordination. South Africa has differences with some SADC member states over the SADCBRIG. The SADC command structure is located in Gaborone, as is the early warning system, which is linked to the AU. However, the planning element (PLANELM) wants to split from the SADC secretariat due to security concerns. Central logistics coordination is problematic; South Africa has developed its own system, while several have Russian or Chinese systems. SADC will establish two to three satellite bases to serve the SADCBRIG. Certain SADC units are on short standby, while others are long-standing. There are seven infantry battalions, all motorized. Malawi and Zimbabwe have offered battalions. Angola has offered a mechanized infantry battalion. The SADCBRIG needs light armor. Three countries have offered artillery assets. Most offered signals staffs and other functions. These pledges will give planners something to work with. In terms of joint operations, several have already taken place. There will be a large-scale exercise to see how the systems come together, which looks promising.

A major question concerns force application. What is the purpose? What is going to be done with the force? Is it intra-regional? Is each region going to sort out its own regional problems? For example, the Somalis sent a large contingent to the SADC meeting in August 2005 to plea for intervention of a SADC peacekeeping force. The sentiment at the meeting was that East Africa has to respond to the Somali situation, as it is an East African problem, in the same way as West Africa responded to the Ivory Coast civil war. South African troops are over-committed, as are most SADC states. Thus, a pattern is emerging that specific regions will solve their own problems and that the SADCBRIG will be used in SADC, for example, as the fire brigade to be used if the DRC blows up again. In keeping with such an arrangement, Gavin Cawthra suggested a SADC case study be undertaken of the 1998 Lesotho intervention in order to provide lessons learned for the SADCBRIG. In 2006, SADCBRIG will have readiness status. This means that South Africa will be rewriting its white papers on defense and peacekeeping. Changes need to be made to both white papers regarding SADCBRIG.¹⁹

Another problem is that the SADC linkage with Addis Ababa and the AU is weak. First, there are few SADC security experts who work at the AU. Most personnel on the AU peace and security commission are Ghanaians and Nigerians. Two way process – lack of information. SADC needs better communications with AU with military backgrounds who know SADC. Given its financial contribution to the AU, South Africa is due 17 slots at the AU in Addis Ababa, while Nigeria is due five. There is no central coordinating mechanism, and the staff looks at sub-

regional (mainly West African) interests first. The third problem is defining the living arrangement between the AU peace and security commission and sub-regional security mechanisms (SADC, ECOWAS, etc.). A protocol needs to be signed between the AU and the sub-regional organizations, but the process has not even started. The process has been stalled for the last four years. One must look at the process between AU and sub-regional bodies and the legal issues that link them; it is still unclear who presses the button for action. Is the button in Addis Ababa? Pretoria? Gaborone?

In 1999, Libya proposed a US of Africa but stepped aside too quickly leaving a vacuum. In Qaddafi's place, Mbeki proposed the AU (based on the EU concept). Mbeki and the majority group (which is more democratic) within the AU are now falling away. In their place, the less democratic minority may rise, led by Qaddafi. In such a case, countries like Libya with Qaddafi could send a force to a situation like the DRC and pretend to be part of the AU.

Festus Aboagye commented on SADC and the ASF approach.²⁰ In SADC, the police have met and established a modalities framework. However, the police have not been factored into the overall framework. The SADC organigram presently shows that the head of mission is the special representative of military chief of staff. However, the head of mission should be only answerable to civilian heads of states and SADC secretary-general.

Maxi Schoeman, Chair of the Department of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria, commented on political problems within SADC and the SADC Mutual Defence Pact.²¹ It is unclear what the common values of SADC are in regard to regional security. One problem was the 1997 absorption of the DRC with all of its problems. There was little debate within SADC regarding DRC joining. In regard to the Mutual Defence Pact, it is not clear what countries South Africa and other SADC states have to rescue and under what circumstances. The ambiguity grows greater as SADC has accepted Madagascar as a member and is considering Uganda and Rwanda. SADC seems to be breaking with its "front line states" history and appears to be a common security arrangement possible with a diverse set of actors. The Burundian and DRC peace processes were successful largely due to South African leadership. However, South African bilateral initiatives are cloaked in the "SADC mantle." It seems that there is a deliberate strategy to keep SADC secretariat weak and under-staffed. More than 80 per cent of the funding is external from donors (e.g. EU). Zimbabwe and Angola are two obstacles in SADC. Jakkie Cilliers has commented, "SADC is nothing but a paper tiger. There is little or no substance, after 12 years of effort. The AU and ASF need South African leadership. South Africa would be better suited to play a greater role at the AU level than at the regional level at SADC, due to political

obstacles in the latter and the promise of the former,” South Africa must work hard and be careful that the same does not happen to the AU.

Garth le Pere of the Institute for Global Dialogue noted that in SADC security and development issues are interlinked.²² The problem is that the SADC secretariat is inefficient and has problems of leadership and capacity that have not improved during the restructuring process of the last five years. SADC still opts for decentralized projects rather than a regional development focus. South Africa has worked hard to develop the financial affairs mechanism for SADC, and Namibia has done the same for fisheries. However, many of the other projects have languished. There is a lack of political will by the heads of state summit. There is not a neat fit between the norms and values of the SADC blueprint for regional cooperation and how Southern African states actually behave. States have committed to forgoing some sovereignty, but they have not proven willing to give up power. SADC has a beleaguered secretariat without appropriate human resources and management skills and with no center of gravity. Currently, there are four SADC secretariat directors who do not have the skills and training to manage the functions of the secretariat. There is a lack of coordination between the SADC secretariat and member states. SADC is supposed to provide policy coordination, while the member states implement policy. The SADC national committees are supposed to be the workhorses to implement SADC policy, but they are empty shells.²³

Regional project resources are there, as donors and partners make funds available, but SADC lacks absorptive capacity. After three years, funds had to be returned by SADC secretariat to the donors unspent. Protocols in the areas of trade, investment, finance, industry, and security are in the slow process of ratification and implementation. Donors are offering funding and projects in each of these areas; for example, Denmark has been spearheading assistance in the peace and security sector for a decade with minimal results.

The default approach is project management, development, and project building among states with common interests; for example, South Africa and Mozambique in the Maputo Corridor. In Southern Africa, there are other infrastructural nodes with development corridors and South Africa investment. This is a de facto bilateral development project, which is given the SADC imprimatur, and is indicative of the “hub and spoke” model of regional development that prevails in Southern Africa.

SADC has the goal of establishing a free trade area by 2008, a customs union by 2010, and a common market soon thereafter. Instead, SADC is being bypassed by new free trade agreements on the horizon. For example, South Africa and the Southern African Customs Union are negotiating an accelerated African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and a free trade area

with the US. Free trade agreements are being negotiated with the EU, China, India, and Mercosur. SACU provides generous dispensation under to Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland, but it does not provide incentives for the development of manufacturing industry. SACU is expanding to include Mozambique. The Common Market of East and Southern Africa (COMESA) has its trade house in better orders than SADC, and there is talk of dual SADC-COMESA membership with SADC.

Garth le Pere commented that SADC Executive Secretary Dr. T. Salomao wants to manage the SADC secretariat with little outside meddling. He must overcome micro-management by the SADC council of ministers from member states. Salomao must help provide political direction and accountability. Denmark, Switzerland, Britain, Sweden, the EU, and other donors are willing to give aid. Salomao needs to secure the authority to hire the most skilled people for the many job openings in the SADC secretariat.

Zimbabwe is a huge challenge for the region. Garth le Pere believes that South Africa and SADC should take a more principled stand toward Zimbabwe, even though Mugabe remains intractable, because the donors will take the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) more seriously. The problem is that the “old boy network” from frontline states period of the 1970s and 1980s persists. It means that nothing is being done to sanction the despotic monarchy of Swaziland. If the Zimbabwe problem were fixed, pent-up potential for trade and development would be unleashed.

On a positive note, there is broad agreement in SADC and the AU that the stabilization of the African Great Lakes is important for regional stability. This has been matched by serious commitment by South Africa and many of the antagonists in Burundi, the DRC, and Rwanda to make peace. Track II negotiations in South Africa have played a role in the peacemaking process. In particular, Burundi made a quantum leap thanks to South Africa.

Garth le Pere commented that the Democratic of the Congo (DRC) and Angola, which are less stable and democratic than other SADC states, are better off in SADC than out. SADC membership allowed South Africa to move the Lusaka and Sun City peace processes for the DRC forward. At the moment, the DRC is weak, with little or no government beyond the capital, Kinshasa. Also, the DRC must guard against the revival of the predatory culture that has plagued the country for much of its history. The DRC has been quite active in SADC, but it is not ready to chair the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security yet. The DRC has been a full participant in SADC councils, but President Kabila has not chaired SADC yet. If Kabila is elected president in 2006, he may chair SADC. Finally, the membership of countries like Madagascar

and Mauritius in SADC is important, because “outsiders” are more likely to challenge the old boys’ network.

The US and African Regional Organizations and Security

The ASF concept is bold and visionary, and African security experts are generating many of the ideas and agreements. However, most of the ASF projects remain largely donor-driven, and targets are not being met. Therefore, the US should view the ASF as a concept that may eventually come to fruition but not in the time frame set by the AU. In the short to medium term of the next ten years, the UN will continue to provide the organizational framework for most peace operations, and the US and Europe the bulk of the funding and logistical support. ECOWAS structures, which the US helped to develop, provide a vision of where the ASF might be in five years. However, ECOWAS has a long way to go in terms of funding and managing its own operations.²⁴ The same applies to SADC, IGAD/EAC and other sub-regional organizations. In the long term, US strategy should point towards African assumption of leadership in all aspects of the maintenance of peace and security.

In the short to medium term, the main emphasis of the US (and other donors) should remain on deploying African peacekeepers to hot spots, such as Darfur, and sustaining them, preferably under the auspices of a UN peacekeeping operation. Second, training is required for the military, civilian police, and civilian administrators, even though some African experts do not think so. If operationalized, the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) training programs should help meet the demand for trained African peacekeepers and enhance African security. Finally, the US should continue to aid key states (Nigeria, South Africa, Ethiopia, Kenya, Senegal, Mali, Ghana, Rwanda, Uganda, Mozambique, Botswana, and others) in developing their military and conflict resolution capabilities, so that they can play enhanced leadership or contributing roles to peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts.

NEPAD, AU, Sub-Regional Organizations and Development

In 2002, the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) was launched; it grew out of efforts by President Mbeki and other African leaders to bring about an “African renaissance.”²⁵ NEPAD held out the promise that African states would create better conditions for foreign direct investment and aid and, in return, the G-8 would push for increased aid and investment from the developed world. The most noteworthy aspect of NEPAD is the Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), in which African states submit their governance and transparency standards to scrutiny. South Africa led in associating NEPAD and democracy good governance standards with the AU. Therefore, NEPAD is supposed to serve as a mechanism through which the AU, sub-regional organizations, and donors interact on African development issues. Also,

NEPAD is supposed to promote African security initiatives (such as the ASF) with the G-8 in order to increase aid.

Chris Landsberg of the Centre for Policy Studies commented on the relationship between NEPAD and the AU and sub-regional organizations.²⁶ A key issue is the role of sub-regional organizations as implementing agencies in relation to the AU and NEPAD.

In regard to the issue of centralization into the hands of the AU and NEPAD and African heads of state, Landsberg believes it will not work. The implication is that there is a tug of war between new emerging continental actors (AU and NEPAD) and sub-regional organizations. However, the latter have an established track record. There is a fear that continental players will impose themselves on sub-regional organizations. The memorandum of understanding regarding cooperation between continental organizations lacks clarity on a strategy to implement the stated goals.

Sub-regional organizations have embarked on a long-term transition. For example, SADC started in 1992, with a commitment to synergy with the OAU and AU, but this may not really be possible. It is wrongly assumed that sub-regional organizations know what the AU and NEPAD *raison d'être* is and that sub-regional organizations will restructure themselves accordingly. Sub-regional organizations have provided initiatives for the AU to copy. For example, SADC electoral guidelines have inspired the AU's own guidelines. IGAD's early warning system has been emulated as an AU system. ECOWAS peace and security mechanisms have inspired the AU peace and security commission.

In SADC, the personality of heads of state still drives the process. The “quiet diplomacy” of heads of state in dealing with crises in Zimbabwe and Swaziland is not working, and there should be a more systematic approach. In contrast, the ECOWAS peace and security mechanisms have *gravitas*. The quandary is how to raise SADC and the AU to the level that ECOWAS has reached.

Continental initiatives are contested and not always accepted at sub-regional level, especially NEPAD, as it is a voluntary process. NEPAD is difficult to integrate into the AU or sub-regional organizations. In reality, NEPAD is an agency engaging the outside world and is less about internal African affairs. A problem is duplication; for example, NEPAD has a peacekeeping component that overlaps with the AU peace and security commission. The AU is clear that the continental architectural priorities are intertwining the relationship between development and security, as well as stability, governance, and growth. The NEPAD emphasis is on good governance, anti-corruption, and rule of law, as well as the appropriate management of power and allocation of resources. However, the question is—which African states meet these standards?

Nevertheless, NEPAD's emphasis on market-driven growth followed by redistribution is the way to go. Greater attention should be given under NEPAD to building the capacity of African states.

Chris Landsberg commented that, in the AU, the resource constraint is not the most serious problem; a lack of political will is more serious. Small states with the least capacity to fund or pay AU dues are the ones with the propensity to propose new institutions, capacity, and roles without funding. Africa's new intervention "right to protect" regime to stop genocide and other man-made humanitarian disasters has been met with indifference.²⁷ States are clinging to sovereignty and have a lack of political will to intervene, especially in Darfur. In 2002, the AU agreed on four pretexts to intervene:

1. Genocide;
2. Gross violation of human rights;
3. Spillover of instability; and
4. Non-constitutional changes of government.

In regard to the four pretexts, there has been intervention in small states (i.e., Togo, Lesotho, and Sao Tome) but not in larger and more important states, such as Zimbabwe.

The AU has a serious lack of institutional capacity. The only commissioner with experience is Ambassador Said Djinnit, Peace and Security Commissioner. The other nine have no experience. One problem is that highly skilled people to fill these positions Skills leave the continent in the private sector. AU is highly politicized – power politics. West Africans fight and gain positions. AU relationship with civil society is characterized by a lack of trust.

President Thabo Mbeki has allies in trying to remedy these problems (Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, Algeria, Mozambique, and Tanzania). Mbeki and Blair have been cooperating on African development since 1998 Birmingham G-8 conference. Mbeki is Africa's most skilled statesman and has three years left in his presidential term to try to consolidate African regional architecture

Greg Mills, Director of the Brenthurst Foundation commented that NEPAD and the APRM seem to be dead in the water.²⁸ Only five states thus far are going through peer review. NEPAD's good governance focus has been downgraded in favor of African concerns over debt and aid. A major distraction from NEPAD and good governance and accountability has been the Gleneagles G-8 summit and the Commission for Africa, led by Prime Minister Tony Blair and President Mbeki, and the Global Challenge, which calls for a doubling of development assistance to Africa.²⁹

African states need to continue undergoing serious structural reform, as promised under NEPAD and the World Bank's Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) program. Reform is a

very politically vulnerable phase for states, which takes considerable time to complete. A rule for African reform is that it takes at least as long for a state to recover as it took to decline. Thus, Zimbabwe declined from 1997 onwards; it would take until 2013 for recovery, if the country started today. Ghana declined from 1965 to 1985 and recovered from 1985 to 2005.

Greg Mills prescribes a radical path to development for Africa that Dubai and Singapore have traversed. Both states have come to serve as transport hubs and have strategies to use domestic capital and attract investment. They also attract foreign entrepreneurs from India and elsewhere.³⁰ If South Africa followed such a path, the country would have an 8% growth rate. However, South Africa has only a 5% rate because of a lack of domestic investment and savings. In Africa, there is corruption as well as a lack of domestic financial institutions and little investment in fixed capital investment. Cash assets or bonds are preferred. Botswana is now more open to a greater variety of business actors and foreign skills in order to help overcome the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The costs of anti-retroviral drugs (ARVs) and the servicing of HIV patients are very high. This creates adversity for Botswana but also provides opportunity.

In regard to regional organizations, security, and development in Africa, there is a very mixed and complex picture, as would be expected from 53 states. There are different constraints that impinge upon the ability of governments to play positive roles to stimulate economic growth and performance. One problem is that three of the largest African states tend to be quite unstable. Rather than regional cooperation, regional insulation is needed from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and other problematic state; perhaps it was not a good idea for the DRC to become a SADC member. The SADC security protocol may have helped contain Zimbabwe situation, though it is hard to imagine the crisis becoming any worse. There is too much talking and not much action. In regard to regional organizations and development, it is still the same story. What will SADC states trade with each other? What will the SADC states (except for South Africa) export to each other besides agricultural and mineral commodities? In regard to SACU, there is cooperation but no diversification strategy for Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland. SACU's record shows that the preferential revenue formula, reciprocal exports, and infrastructural complementarity are key factors.

Professor Hussein Solomon, Director of the Centre of International Political Studies at the University of Pretoria is critical of the AU and NEPAD and SADC.³¹ The AU and NEPAD seem great on paper; however, they are based on a type of "quiet diplomacy" and "old boys' network". The AU showed promise but is caught in the sovereignty trap of the OAU. The NEPAD APRM is not meaningful, given the failure to deal with the crisis in Zimbabwe. A problem is that the peer review mechanism is not looking at human rights, but mainly economic

openness. Some of the APRM countries are ready for investment, while others are beyond the pale. The composition of the APRM board includes the corrupt President Nguema Obiang of Equatorial Guinea. Also, one of the key NEPAD states, Nigeria, appears to be chronically in crisis, with ethnic militias in the oil-rich delta region and chronic corruption undermining state capacity. In a recent speech, the British High Commissioner to South Africa never referred to NEPAD; he only mentioned the British-led Commission for Africa. President Wade of Senegal claims that NEPAD has been transformed into a talk shop. One must remember that NEPAD is the 37th development plan for Africa since 1960.³²

Patrick Rankhumise of the Institute of Security Studies commented that there is an element of mistrust among African states. A major problem is the fears of smaller states about the emergence of bullying hegemons.³³ Five big countries are pushing NEPAD and the APRM. In particular, South Africa is trying to do too much in the areas of security and development.

Elisabeth Sidropoulous,³⁴ Director of the South African Institute of International Affairs, commented that NEPAD is slowly developing and finding its way. NEPAD is associated with the AU, though it is based in Midrand (between Johannesburg and Pretoria). NEPAD is due to move to Addis Ababa by 2006. However, the NEPAD secretariat has its own structural problems, which would not be helped by moving to Addis Ababa. The NEPAD secretariat is understaffed and does not have an effective communications strategy. On a positive note, NEPAD's public relations exercise among Northern governments seems to have been successful.

NEPAD is a policy formulating and coordinating agency and not an implementation body. Countries are obliged to implement NEPAD policies on HIV/AIDS, education, and investment, and they have more capacity to implement Sub-regional economic communities (SADC, ECOWAS, EAC, etc.). NEPAD is still trying to find its niche and determining what services it is supposed to deliver to Africa. Some want it to be a clearinghouse, a think tank, a door opener to donors, and a collector and disseminator of best practices.

The APRM is the most tangible institution and most important for the donors. APRM published reports are coming, starting with Ghana and Mauritius. The accountability of governments to their electorates is paramount for the APRM, as is engaging with their electorates in healthy debate. The SAIIA is conducting "shadow" peer reviews to hold the APRM accountable.

US Strategy and Regional Organizations and Development

NEPAD, the AU, and sub-regional organizations have been pointing African states in the right direction for development. However, they will only bring development in the long run, after they overcome their administrative weaknesses and states' insistence on sovereignty. In the short

to medium term, the US can best promote development through bilateral programs, such as the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), and the President's Emergency Program for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), which require democracy, governance standards, and accountability. Another important mechanism is The World Bank's Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) program, which provides debt relief in return for greater transparency, structural reform, and accountability. Eventually NEPAD could come to complement such programs and provide African leadership.

The Role of South Africa in Security and Development

In a little over a decade, South Africa has become the principle driving force in Africa for security and development. South African companies are investing throughout Africa and are an engine of economic growth. The US has partnered with South Africa in a number of initiatives, in spite of differences in outlook and policy preferences.

Elisabeth Sidropoulos commented that South African foreign policy is a driver for building a security and development community in Africa via the AU and NEPAD.³⁵ South African foreign policymakers have identified SADC, then the AU and NEPAD as priority entities in bringing about conflict resolution, peace building and security and socio-economic development in Africa.

South Africa has been instrumental in bringing greater assistance from the EU and EU states for the AU, SADC, and NEPAD and security and development initiatives. South Africa has helped secure the assistance of EU states in providing peacekeeping training, police training, and support for capacity building that enabled South Africa to act effectively and lead the AU in Burundi. The EU and Britain fund South African troops in the DRC. Donors have joined with South Africans in training local government officials and others in the DRC.³⁶

Elisabeth Sidropoulos commented that the South African history of involvement in conflict resolution is checkered. South Africa has helped bring peace to the DRC and Burundi but has failed thus far in the Ivory Coast. The DRC is strategically important for South Africa. South Africa's electric company, ESKOM, pushed for DRC membership in SADC in 1997 in order to gain access to the DRC's hydroelectric power. South Africa was only partially successful in bringing peace in Angola, managing to bring everyone to the negotiating table. South African relations with Angola are still not as far along as they should be and should be developed through mutual commercial interests. In Ivory Coast, South African negotiating skills have been tested, as there is a different set of dynamics at work there. As a result of South Africa's role in peacemaking and peacekeeping Mbeki, the Office of the Presidency, the Department of Foreign Affairs and the budget are stretched. Mbeki cannot be involved in negotiating all conflict

resolution in Africa. In addition, the SANDF is in transition and has been overextended in its peacekeeping deployments in Africa.³⁷

Roger Southall, South African Human Sciences Resource Council, commented South African foreign policy is working in Africa.³⁸ South African engagement with the EU and EU member states has brought cooperation and greater assistance. Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) were two successes of South African diplomacy.³⁹ In Burundi, Nelson Mandela learned on the job and was assisted by a good EU ambassador.⁴⁰ South Africa kept moving negotiations in the right direction.⁴¹ After negotiations over Burundi were well under way, South Africa turned to the DRC in the Sun City negotiations. The Burundi negotiated settlement was not an AU initiative but was a South African regional initiative (with Rwanda, Uganda, and Tanzania).⁴² Regional and local interests were often very different and sometimes clashed, but South African Deputy President Jacob Zuma kept the parties together negotiating. The South African protection force that arrived in 2001 and peacekeeping force from 2002 onwards were key factors in the peace process. The Ethiopians and Mozambicans arrived in 2003 and received the AU label. The regional players (e.g., Rwanda, Uganda, and Tanzania) have different interests but now are on the side of peace. The lesson is that it is best to have a lead state heading negotiations; otherwise, there are “too many cooks”. The AU’s diplomacy in conflict resolution is not much further along than the OAU’s was.

Chris Landsberg commented that South Africa is a pivotal state and not a hegemonic power. The African National Congress (ANC) gained experience in international consensus building during the anti-apartheid struggle (1960-90). At present, there is confusion in South Africa regarding priorities. Should South Africa invest more time in the AU or SADC? Chris Landsberg believes that South Africa should look to its own interests first, then SADC, then AU, then the Nonaligned Movement (NAM).

Maxi Schoeman commented that South African diplomacy in Burundi, DRC, Ivory Coast, Comoros, Ethiopia-Eritrea, and Darfur has been largely effective.⁴³ President Mbeki has tried to exercise more of a leadership role in most of the negotiations. At the same time, South Africa has been willing to step back and let others gain prestige. For example, South Africa supported Nigeria’s bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council rather than seek its own permanent seat. South Africa prefers to influence states behind the scene rather than take the credit.

Hussein Solomon commented that South Africa’s foreign policy has become more realist, being based on perceived mutual and interests and needs with other African states. Currently in South Africa, elites are still caught up in a “post-apartheid destabilization syndrome”, where there

is a contradiction between white western values and continental ones. Thus, South Africans feel constrained from overtly accepting and using western values.

Elisabeth Sidropoulos commented that South Africa is a key economic driver in the rest of Africa and an “engine of growth,” even though South Africa has only 4% growth rates and 35% unemployed. South African companies have been aggressive in Africa, which has led the South African government to be careful from a political perspective how it deals with African neighbors. The Checkers retail chain has operations in Zambia, Ghana, Mozambique, and Uganda and is putting local producers and resourcers out of business. South African manufacturers have been slower (with the exception of South African Breweries/Miller). Mining companies have been successful, and service industries (such as Vodacom) are making great inroads in Africa. Greg Mills commented that South African goods are better quality but more expensive than Chinese. South Africa is out-competing China in banking, investment, tourism, construction, and other services in Africa.⁴⁴

US Strategy and South Africa and Security and Development

The importance of South African diplomacy and security and development initiatives in the continent points to the necessity of the US continuing to work with South Africa as much as possible, in spite of the differences. The US should build collaboration in peacekeeping training through the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) and the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). The US should increase funding South African initiatives, such as NEPAD and conflict resolution. Reviving and upgrading the US-South Africa Bi-national Commission (which once was chaired by Vice President Al Gore and Deputy President Thabo Mbeki) would also be an important signal to South Africa.

TERRORISM AND ISLAMIC RADICALISM

The US is currently “shaping” the African continent in the global war on terrorism (including working to keep weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of terrorists). The US is particularly active in the Horn of Africa and Sahel. The Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) has been the most visible aspect of US efforts and has evolved from a “search and destroy” mission into a “hearts and minds” one, attempting to win over ethnic groups that once were favorable towards al-Qaeda.⁴⁵ In the Sahel, the US launched the Pan-Sahel Initiative and trained counter-terrorism units in Mali, Niger, Mauritania, and Chad to patrol vast areas of the Sahel and Sahara.⁴⁶ Recently, Algeria and Morocco have been added to the program, which is now named the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative.

Kurt Shillinger of the South African Institute of International Affairs commented that US-South African relations in the war on terror still suffer from the fact that many American

officials in the 1980s (including Dick Cheney) called the African National Congress (ANC) a terrorist organization.⁴⁷ The South African constitution is a problem in the war on terror; there are lots of legal ways to stay in South Africa. South African intelligence (National Intelligence Agency and the South African Secret Service) and the Ministry of Home Affairs have uncovered a terrorist ring and funding for terrorists in South Africa. There is considerable activity, including trafficking and falsifying documents, as well as the funding of mosques and madrassas.⁴⁸ Islamic radicalism is concentrated in Fordsburg, a southern suburb of Johannesburg, and Durban, and the more affluent communities appear the most susceptible to radical Islam. Saudis, Iranians, and Pakistanis are providing money to fund radical Islamic groups in South Africa. The Minister of Intelligence Services, Ronnie Kasrils, in a recent talk at the US Naval War College, spoke about those issues.

Kurt Shillinger commented on the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative and US strategy against Islamic radicals and terrorism in Africa and questioned whether a military-oriented strategy was the most appropriate. In 2005, \$75 million was spent in 2005 largely for joint training exercises with Mali, Niger, Chad, and Mauritania, and the Defense Department, State Department, and Justice Department all have a hand in it. The US government seems too fixated on the appropriations process. The issue seems to be getting the money appropriated as opposed to figuring out the appropriate ways to use the money once it is allocated. For example, several US Agency for International Development projects now have a counter-terrorism element, which is questionable. The Department of Defense domain has now become much larger, which reinforces the need for greater interagency coordination.

Another issue concerns poor American diplomacy and the war on terror. It is difficult to win allies in the war on terror when they are alienated by US insistence on Article 98 agreements in which African states agree not to hand over US service personnel to the International Criminal Court for trial. For example, South Africa and Kenya – two of the most important partners in the war on terror – have seen security assistance suspended because of Article 98. Furthermore, the US tends to see things from its perspectives and has not adapted its thinking to how Africans think. For example, Africa will want to deal with poverty eradication in the UN before it will work with the US in the UN in the war on terror.

The US needs to develop a way to deal with South Africa, which has a desire to be on the same playing field as the US. South Africa is not going to be told who its friends are going to be and is not going to be told what its priorities are, and President Bush will not push around President Mbeki. The British have managed to work with South Africa, while the Americans have not. Blair's Global Millennium Challenge has helped to build relations with President Mbeki and

South Africa. British intelligence in South Africa now works well with the SAS and NIA. British regional security experts have differences from their American counterparts on how they see the security environment in Southern Africa.

Greg Mills commented that there are three different types of states for concern:

1. Conduits for terrorists;
2. Recruiting areas; and
3. Failed states.⁴⁹

Are they related? Most have a majority Islamic population. Disaggregating and differentiation of states are needed. For example, there are different sets of problems regarding the development of Islam in Senegal vs. the Horn. Poverty is not the cause of terrorism. If it were, the world would be awash with terrorism. South Africa is technically, scientifically, and financially advanced, and terrorists have the ability to transit South Africa. There is easy availability of South African passports. The Islamic community is well funded and radicalized. It was once integrated but is now separated and isolated and has a radical mindset. Radical Islam has become an even more serious issue in places like Senegal. The potential for the growth of Islamic radicalism in Nigeria is massive. This shows that there is the need for nuanced analysis regarding security issues and failed states as well as states like South Africa. US analysts do not know Africa well.

Hussein Solomon commented that, in regard to terrorism, Americans need to be more sensitive.⁵⁰ For example, in talking about terrorism at a conference in West Africa, an American official emphasized the terror attacks in the US and said little about Africa. Furthermore, he lectured to his African audience and said, "If you are not with us, you are against us." This approach is not relevant to Africans. African interests need to be taken into account.⁵¹ The AU Counter-Terrorism Study Center in Algiers seems to be a rival to the AU Center against Terrorism in Addis Ababa, directed by Marin Ewi. Linkages between sub-regional organizations and the two AU center are weak.

The July 2005 London bombings make South Africa and Southern Africa a much bigger issue than before. South African Islamic communities are now coming under the microscope.⁵² Muslims are experiencing growing militancy, wahhabist proselytization, and an increasing Iranian presence in the community.⁵³ There are three main Islamic groups in South Africa, the Malays; South Asians; and African converts. South Asian Muslims are wealthy and give money and safe haven to extremists. The group of African converts is only one-third; however, the fact that group is growing means that they will be one-half. They are susceptible to radicalization. In the 1980s, South African Muslims fought on side of Iran against Iraq and in Afghanistan against the Soviets. In the 1990s, they fought on the side of the Chechens against Russia. Some have

returned to South Africa. There is a fourth transnational group exemplified by the London bomber who was caught at a safe house in Pakistan. There are links between crime syndicates and terror networks in South Africa. Pirated CD sales in South Africa fund terrorist activities elsewhere by Pakistani Muslims. The South African intelligence service has members with links to Islamic communities and could be a sympathetic group to Islamic radicals. South Africa has a sophisticated banking structure, and wealthy Muslims make South Africa a breeding ground for terrorism.

Elisabeth Sidropoulos commented that there is substantial cooperation with the US against terrorism. There is an increasing realization that South Africa needs to focus on terrorism and is developing anti-terrorism legislation. South African borders are porous, and there is the potential for terrorist bases in South Africa

Martin Slabber and Betsie Smith, of the South African Department of Foreign Affairs commented on terrorism in the Middle East and then turned to the Aswat affair, which involved a base in South Africa.⁵⁴ South Africa believes it is relatively safe from terrorists and al Qaeda, given its stands on the Palestinian issue and Iraq. However, the South African government tries not to be overconfident. Aswat was a Pakistani creation, and Pakistanis trying to get on top of situation. South Africa believes that increased justice will bring reduced extremism and terrorism. Thus, humanitarian assistance, strengthening civilian police, and capacity building are important. The South African government believes that food security and the development of water, environment, and tourism (focal areas of NEPAD) are an antidote to terrorism.

US Strategy against Islamic Radicals and Terrorists in Africa

The US should continue to alter its strategy in Africa. Winning hearts and minds is important. However, Islamic radicals and terrorists in Africa have tended to concentrate their activities in major urban centers, such as Johannesburg, Durban, Mombassa, and Nairobi, where access to communications and finances and other infrastructure enables them to mount terrorist operations most effectively. Therefore, an intelligence and law enforcement approach and coalition building with South Africa and Kenya seems more appropriate than a military approach. The chances that Islamic radicals will establish Afghanistan-like bases in stateless Somalia or in the vast spaces between Algiers and Bamako are not great. The presence of US forces in those areas to train and win hearts and minds at a considerable cost must be constantly reviewed.

ENERGY SOURCES AND CONFLICT IN WEST AFRICA AND NORTHEAST AFRICA

African energy resources are becoming increasingly important to the US and the world. Changing security relationships are affecting the development of energy resources in West Africa and Northeast Africa, as well as regional stability and US interests. In West Africa, the US is

assisting Nigeria to improve the security situation in the oil-rich Niger Delta and has helped establish “the Gulf of Guinea Commission” in the hope of improving multinational cooperation on energy and security.⁵⁵ The US is also investigating the possibility of establishing a permanent military presence in the Gulf of Guinea. In Northeast Africa, a scramble for oil has emerged in Sudan, and the conflicts in Darfur and Southern Sudan have complicated the scramble.

In the Gulf of Guinea, oil was discovered in the 1960s and exploitation began in the 1970s, specifically in Nigeria, Angola, and Gabon. In the 1990s, Congo-Brazzaville and Equatorial Guinea became the major players. Sao Tome and Principe is a newcomer. Chad is now producing oil that is shipped to Cameroon in the Gulf. The “oil curse” is present in the Gulf of Guinea; no states are using their oil revenues efficiently for socio-economic development.⁵⁶

Energy and Conflict in Sudan (Northeast Africa)

In 1978, oil was discovered in Sudan, centered in the Nubian Mountains that straddled northern and southern Sudan and the Nile. At the time, Sudan was at peace after a long civil war between north and south was ended in 1972. In 1983, Sudanese president Numeiri broke the 1972 peace agreement, imposed central government rule and Islam on the south, and denied rights to prospective oil revenues to the south. In 1983, oil companies continued to develop operations, but, by 1984, the civil war had spread causing many companies to withdraw from Sudan. Eventually, the deterioration in security conditions in the oil fields caused oil companies to suspend all operations. From 1983 to 2005, more than two million people died in the civil war, and another four million fled their homes in the fighting. Energy in Sudan became a source of conflict, particularly in the Nubian Mountains.

In 1989, General Omar al-Bashir seized power and instituted an Islamist regime and intensified the war against the south. From 1991 to 1995, Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda established their principal base in Sudan. In spite of the turmoil and radicalism in Sudan, in the early 1990’s, foreign oil companies began to return or enter for the first time, including the Canadian company Talisman Energy,⁵⁷ as exploration and construction continued. The development of the oil fields in the south was accompanied by widespread violence by the government and militias against local populations, with significant loss of life and livelihood. In the 1990s, the issue of rights over oil revenues contributed to the perpetuation of the Sudanese civil war, and revenue sharing became a demand of the rebel Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM). Partly motivated by the prospect of sharing oil wealth, Uganda and Ethiopia supported the SPLM. Thus, oil helped to prevent peace from materializing and kept Sudan from realizing its potential of becoming the central power in Northeast Africa and from socio-economic development. In November 1997 the US imposed sanctions against Sudan, because

profits from oil were being used to fuel the civil war. The pressure of sanctions kept American firms out of Sudan until 2005.

The most significant new company to set up operations in the 1990s was the China National Petroleum Company (CNPC), which in 1996 bought into the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company, a consortium that came to dominate Sudan's oil fields in partnership with the Sudanese national energy company and firms from Malaysia and India. The CNPC's first major investment project was to build a new refinery south of the capital, Khartoum, in 1999, which it upgraded in 2003, with a \$300 million investment. The CNPC responded to General al-Bashir's request by speeding up refinery construction, so it could be finished on June 30, 1999 the tenth anniversary of the coup that brought him to power.⁵⁸ The CNPC also deployed thousands of Chinese workers to build a 900-mile pipeline, linking Heglig oilfield in Kordofan province with Port Sudan on the Red Sea. In August 1999, Sudanese oil began to flow to a terminal on the Red Sea. Also, China supplied the Sudanese military regime with weapons to use against the SPLM and other rebel groups.⁵⁹

It is estimated that the CNPC has invested more than \$10 billion in Sudanese oil development and that about half of all its overseas oil now comes from Sudan. CNPC now owns 40 percent, the largest single share, of the GNPOC. Sudanese oil will become increasingly important, because China's economic boom means that oil consumption is forecast to grow by at least 10 per cent every year for the foreseeable future and that China's domestic reserves will be depleted in the next two decades.⁶⁰

A Human Rights Watch report *Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights*, found that the Sudanese government has "used oil company infrastructure to support military action, and has increased its military spending as its oil revenues have increased."⁶¹ Between 1998 and 2001, oil revenues went from zero to almost 42% of total government revenue. In 2001, Khartoum generated \$580 million in oil revenue, 60% of which went to the military to purchase foreign weapons and establish a domestic arms industry.⁶²

In 2004, the Sudanese military regime directed Janjaweed militias to "ethnically cleanse" Darfur province in western Sudan, which resulted in genocide. In September 2004, the UN Security Council led by the US, passed resolution 1564 threatening Sudan with oil sanctions unless it curbed the violence in Darfur. China immediately rendered the resolution meaningless by pledging to veto any bid to impose an embargo. Chinese behavior during the Darfur crisis leads one to predict that China will take the side of Sudan in any future interstate or intrastate conflict over energy, Nile waters or other issues.

The Emergence of Cooperation: Sudanese Oil Revenue Sharing

In 2001, the US took a lead role in peace negotiations in Sudan, with former Senator John Danforth as US special envoy, and was assisted by the UN, the Inter-Governmental Agency on Development (IGAD), and Kenya. On January 7, 2004, the SPLM and the Khartoum government signed the “Agreement on Wealth Sharing,” which outlined a six-year process for the two regions to share power and equitably distribute resources, especially oil revenues, which are due to be shared equally between the national government, led by the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and the new Government of South Sudan (led by the SPLM).

As peace talks progressed, Secretary of State Colin Powell signaled US intentions to relax sanctions and allow companies to take advantage of Sudan’s oil wealth. US aid also rose and was set to balloon as US oil companies moved into Sudan. In 2003, Khartoum received \$7 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF).⁶³ For 2005, the figure was supposed to almost triple to \$20 million. However, the 2004 Darfur genocide led to a postponement of aid. In the long run, Sudan’s strategic value to the US is evident, especially as oil exports spiked after the January 2005 north-south peace. An April 2005 trip to Washington by Sudan’s intelligence chief demonstrated that the US had brought Sudan into a partnership in the war on terror, especially since the vast country may still be a gathering point for terrorists.⁶⁴

On January 9, 2005, a Comprehensive Peace Agreement was reached to end the north-south conflict, including provisions for the disarmament and reintegration of combatants. After six years, in 2011, a referendum could be held in the south on independence for the region. On March 24, 2005, the UN Security Council established the UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) and authorized a 10,000-strong peacekeeping force, after it had determined that the situation in the country continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security. Successful implementation of the peace agreement is essential to reducing the likelihood of fighting in the oil fields and increasing the chances that oil revenues will benefit the country.

In May 2005, a national petroleum commission was established to oversee the sharing of revenues. By mid-2005, more than 1,000 UNMIS troops had deployed out of the authorized 10,000-strong force, which is supposed to be in place across southern Sudan by the end of 2005. On July 6, 2005, the government and rebels from the Darfur region signed a “declaration of principles,” which represented a step toward peace and a possible end to the humanitarian nightmare. On July 9, 2005, a new national-unity government was inaugurated in Khartoum and was another step in consolidating peace. SPLM leader John Garang became Sudan’s vice president and president of the Southern Sudan. However, Garang was killed in a helicopter accident on July 30, 2005 and was succeeded by his deputy, Salva Kiir Mayardit. The new

constitution expanded religious and political rights and guaranteed General al-Bashir's ruling NCP party a 52 percent share of parliamentary seats, the SPLM 28 percent, and opposition parties 20 percent.

The Future of Energy and Conflict in Northeast Africa

Today, Sudan is an oil-rich nation with proven reserves of 563 million barrels (and increasing) with an estimated five billion barrels still to be discovered; the country is considered to be vastly under-explored. Sudan's oil industry has grown faster than most expected. By the end of 2004, output stood at around 350,000 barrels per day, and it is set to rise to around 500,000 barrels per day by the end of 2005.⁶⁵ In 2004, the government's oil earnings were around \$1.5 billion, an increase of some \$500 million from 2003 and were projected to continue rapidly increasing.⁶⁶ Oil companies are scrambling to take advantage of Sudan's largely untapped reserves and with a potential five billion barrels, Sudan has the capacity to produce oil for many years and grow in wealth and power. The "downstream" oil industry in Sudan is an important sector in the country's economy as Sudan has three refineries, is energy self-sufficient, and exports both refined as well as crude oil products. Reports about Sudan's actual and potential oil wealth are subject to both exaggeration and underestimation by different parties. However, it is clear that the country's oil sector has the potential to grow considerably.

Oil has provided Sudan with the opportunity for internal integration and to lead in efforts at Northeast African regional integration. Sudan is the growing power in the region and Nile basin with important backers, especially China.⁶⁷ The end of the civil war between the government and the SPLM stands to help the country's oil sector grow, especially as the main existing production areas lie in southern Sudan, the area historically most affected by the war. A number of foreign oil companies already active in the south are looking to enter the region.

Many obstacles block the path to oil-based prosperity and power for Sudan. The peace agreement may not be followed, or the UNMIS force may prove ineffectual. Growing oil revenues over the past few years have also tangibly shown the amount that, given the chance, Sudan can earn from oil. However, so far, the revenues have accrued almost exclusively to the benefit of a government that has talked peace on one front, while waging war on another. As such, it is misleading to claim that oil has played a major role in ending the civil war, even if oil revenues may yet help consolidate the emerging peace. To date, the government has disclosed little information about the fine print of oil production sharing agreements and levels and use of oil revenues. Coupled with rumors of secret bank accounts and corruption, a lack of transparency has prompted growing public resentment at home and criticism from abroad. As neither the

government nor the SPLM are democratically accountable, oil-related corruption is likely to increase unless efforts are made to prevent it.⁶⁸

While there has been much progress made, the shifts hardly guarantee continued progress on issues like Darfur. While the US and other outside powers continue to apply pressure, in the history of Sudan, all sorts of agreements have been made; however, what is written on paper has not always been respected. Under the north-south peace deal, the government set up a model where the south will be completely self-governing for six years, and in six years it could secede completely. The right to secede leaves the door open to a revival of conflict.

Therefore, it is likely that Sudan will grow in wealth and power but that corruption, conflict, and poor economic strategies will prevent the country from realizing its full potential. Excessive dependence on oil revenues may keep the country (like Nigeria) from fully developing its irrigated agriculture and hydroelectric power. However, if the peace agreement holds, Sudan will be a center of development in Northeast Africa and will export refined and crude oil products to neighboring states and attract workers to its oil fields. Sudan could use its energy resources to promote regional confidence building measures and cooperation, e.g., through pipeline projects.⁶⁹

The Gulf of Guinea and the Growing Chinese Presence

Johann Smith, a former South African Defence Force officer and private risk consultant commented that China (both the CNPC and government) has entered the Gulf of Guinea in a major way in order to gain access to oil resources.⁷⁰ China is providing billions in aid for Angola and has enabled the government of President Eduardo dos Santos to escape debt and IMF and World Bank pressures for transparency in oil deals and to stop the disappearance of billions of dollars that should be in the Angolan treasury. China is aiding Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Chad and is seeking to influence other Gulf of Guinea states. China is backing two opposition parties in Sao Tome and Principe in the run-up to the presidential elections.⁷¹ The current president Fradique De Menezes had been seeking American aid, including a US Navy base, as a way of securing his regime and the Gulf of Guinea. However, a few months ago, US Senator Hagel and DSACEUR General Charles Wald visited Sao Tome and found that the president was not as welcoming.

Johann Smith indicated that, on behalf of President Obiang of Equatorial Guinea, he had visited Russia to investigate the arms and hardware that the president was thinking of purchasing, including MiG-29s. Smith told Obiang that the purchase of MiG-29s would start an arms race involving Nigeria, Angola, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The arms list from Russia included 10 personnel carriers, military vehicles, radio equipment. Also, Equatorial Guinea leased 4 MI5 helicopters from Ukraine. Smith also indicated that President Obiang wants to purchase a

ship for \$250 million (either a frigate or corvette). He wants to project power into the Gulf of Guinea. As President Obiang prepares to leave the scene, stature, status, and recognition are the only things lacking. He has achieved everything but cannot play with his major rivals in the Gulf of Guinea.⁷² If Equatorial Guinea obtained a corvette, they would have the only naval presence in the Gulf of Guinea. Also, China has requested port and harbor facilities from Equatorial Guinea and eventually wants to project power in the Gulf of Guinea.⁷³

French foreign policy towards the region has been in disarray since 1997 with the passing of Jacques Foccart. France only has influence in Gabon and Senegal these days. In Ivory Coast, France is playing a “double game” with the rebels and the government that could lead to the disintegration of the country. In Ivory Coast, the rebels are being aided by French security services. The rebels are now so strong that they do not accept President Mbeki’s peace offers. Historically, France has had concessions in Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome, which it is now trying to leverage in competition with China. The French are positioning themselves to play a far greater role in the Gulf of Guinea. However, in the Gulf of Guinea, French-supported presidents are nearing the end of their reign (Gabon’s Bongo, Cameroon’s Biya, Congo-Brazzaville’s Sassou-Nguesso, and Chad’s Deby). Also, President Obiang has prostate cancer. In the next few years, there is bound to be turmoil in the region.

Smith indicated that a “world war” is brewing in the Gulf of Guinea, involving China, France, US, and local states and oil companies. Gabon’s oil is starting to run out, and no development has taken place there. Gabon is starting to infringe on Equatorial Guinea’s underwater oil fields. France backs Gabon; China backs Equatorial Guinea, and the US backs Nigeria. The disputed Bakassi Peninsula between Cameroon and Nigeria is another problem. South Africa’s oil company (PetroSA) had obtained good oil rights in Equatorial Guinea. However, South Africa is now out of Equatorial Guinea due to Mark Thatcher and British interests using South Africans once again. Oil companies are stripping countries of oil without putting anything back. For example, Equatorial Guinea gave Exxon Mobil a generous deal and required no community service in return. On the other side of the equation, Shell in Nigeria did too much community service and replaced local government.

France is backing the junta in Mauritania in violation of the AU policy of not recognizing military takeovers. The reason is that Mauritania has four oil refineries that France would like to control. The junta leaders are all Arab-speakers who could create problems for France later.

Greg Mills commented that it is better to leave the oil in the ground, given the “oil curse.” For example, Nigerians are worse off after 35 years and billions of dollars of oil production. The “Dutch disease” and presidential madness (Obiang) are other problems. There is

no evidence that local people will benefit. In Nigeria, federal authorities continue to control the oil-producing regions in the south. China's role in the Gulf of Guinea and Sudan is both negative and positive. China has provided a \$2 billion rotating credit to Angola, which has allowed it to escape the supervision of the IMF. China is not a beacon of good governance or moral authority. This has negative ramifications for African states and populations and a negative impact on security. On the positive side, increased Chinese demand for African commodities and Chinese provision of cheaper consumer goods to Africa has led to increased savings. In Mozambique, Maputo is the point of exit, and trade flows are all going to China from Zimbabwe, including granite and chrome in large volumes, due to Chinese demand for commodity exports. The Chinese appetite for commodities has positive and negative implications. China's government demands less transparency from African governments, which has led to a "look east" policy by some African leaders.⁷⁴

Hussein Solomon commented on energy and the role of China in Africa.⁷⁵ The energy crisis appears to be worsening (for every barrel pumped, two barrels are consumed), and has led to increased Chinese interaction with Sudan and West African states (Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome, Gabon, Angola, and others). 4,000 Chinese troops are helping to protect the Sudanese government and the oil fields. China backed Sudan on Darfur, even though Colin Powell and the US government were right about the Darfur genocide.

Elements of the South African government are worried about China's involvement in African economies. China's economic power is seen as a way to gain a foothold in Africa so that it can exert political and military power. South African officials are afraid of Chinese capitalism and believe that it is not benign. The Chinese are undermining the model that South Africa and the West want to see develop in Africa, which is exemplified by NEPAD and the commitment to democracy and good governance. A tug of war between China and western states is happening in regard to which model African states want to follow.

US Strategy and African Energy

The US must be more energetic but sensitive in protecting its sources of oil in the Gulf of Guinea and in entering the oil rush in Sudan. Increased US diplomatic and military presence in the Gulf of Guinea and Sudan will help to deal with the increasing role of China and the threat of instability, as well as with militias in the Niger Delta and piracy. The US must back the IMF and World Bank in efforts to bring accountability and transparency to the use of oil revenues by African governments and to overcome the "oil curse".

WATER AND CONFLICT IN NORTHEAST AFRICA

Introduction

Water is a major issue in Africa. Much of the best research on water in Africa is being done in South Africa, which is a semi-arid country and faces a problem of shrinking water supply and rising demand and which will be one of the states most affected by global warming. In Africa, the greatest source for conflict over water is the Nile River, with ten riparian states. The largest source for the Nile is the Blue Nile, which rises in Ethiopia. For several millennia, Egypt and Ethiopia have contended with each other over the Nile, and Egypt's foreign policy has traditionally focused on maintaining the free flow of Nile. As Ethiopia develops, more Nile water will be diverted for agricultural development and other purposes, and the potential for conflict over water increases. Furthermore, terrorists might be able to choke off the flow of water to Egypt. Therefore, it is important to determine how water quantity and quality might provoke regional tensions and potential conflict in Northeast Africa and harm US interests and how the tensions and conflict might be lessened.

In the twentieth century, struggles for water created disputes and conflicts in the Middle East, Africa, and other parts of the world. In the twenty-first century, growing population and expanding water needs are creating excessive demand, and increasing usage is producing shortages of supply, which will intensify competition for resources and increase the likelihood of conflict.⁷⁶ At the same time, there are opportunities for integration and management of water resources, which can foster cooperation and lessen the prospects for conflict. While the Gulf oil states have grown rich through energy resources, most have struggled to produce enough water to sustain development. Kuwait's annual *per capita* renewable supply of freshwater equivalent is only 11 cubic meters (11 m³) and the United Arab Emirates only 64 m³. Egypt's annual renewable supply of freshwater equivalent is only 43 cubic meters per person, which makes it one of the world's poorest renewable water resourced nations.⁷⁷ As a manner of comparison, the average US citizen used about 4.1 m³ of water per day or 1,496 m³ of water per year.⁷⁸ Water has caused both intrastate and interstate conflict.⁷⁹ For example, the Jordan River and its tributaries have been a source of dispute and conflict between Syria and Israel.⁸⁰ Also, Iraq invaded Iran in 1980 in a dispute over the Shatt-al-Arab waterway. Disputes have arisen and conflict has been a possibility over the Euphrates River between Turkey, the upstream state, and Syria and Iraq.⁸¹

Since September 11th, terrorist threats against water have grown more imaginable. Even before then, terrorists have targeted water systems. In the last four years, evidence suggests that terrorists are increasingly planning to attack water resources, possibly with radiological weapons. Today the issue is not just about preventing terrorist attacks on water systems. The issues are how

to minimize the impacts of those attacks, how to make infrastructure less vulnerable and how to recover quickly when terrorist attacks do occur. In regard to water, the issue is how to monitor water resources regularly to insure that clean drinking water remains available.

Resource degradation and scarcity have the potential to cause conflict. Supply-induced scarcity results from a total decrease in the amount of a given resource available for consumption and is related to technologies and practices used in the consumption of the resource. Demand-induced scarcity results from an increase in total population and other changes in consumption patterns. The third type, structural scarcity, is caused by a “severe imbalance in the distribution of wealth and power that results in some groups in a society getting disproportionately large slices of the resource pie, whereas others get slices that are too small to sustain their livelihoods.”⁸²

Structural scarcity is a factor in nearly every case where resource scarcity resulted in conflict. Generally speaking, none of these factors operate alone; all interact and reinforce each other in negative ways. For example, if a rapidly growing population is dependent on a fixed amount of cropland, the demand pressures requiring more food production per acre will result in over-farming of the available land, which reduces the fertility of the soil, and which becomes incapable of producing the required yield to support the population (a supply-induced scarcity). Any outside pressure from an elite group that limits the available land to farm, such as government regulations or a feudal system (structural scarcity) exacerbates the shortages. Thomas Homer-Dixon finds that “environmental scarcity is never a sole or sufficient cause of large migrations, poverty, or violence; it always joins with other economic, political, and social factors to produce its effects.”⁸³

The availability of freshwater is one of the main challenges facing the world in the twenty-first century. Population growth, which is on track to create a world with nine billion people in the coming decades, coupled with the negative effects of prolonged droughts and heat waves resulting from global warming will exert increased pressure to better manage the available water supply to meet the needs of the world’s population. Competing forces trying to maximize their use of available water can result in violent conflict if not managed properly. Conflicts resulting from the simple scarcity of water cause “resource wars” and four conditions that produce conflict over limited water resources:⁸⁴

The downstream country must be highly dependent on the water for its national well being; the upstream country must be threatening to restrict substantially the river’s flow; there must be a history of antagonism between the two countries; and, most importantly, the downstream country must believe it is militarily stronger than the upstream country. Downstream countries often fear that their upstream neighbors will use water as a means of leverage. This

situation is particularly dangerous if the downstream country also believes it has the military power to rectify the situation.⁸⁵

River water produces a potential conflict between upstream and downstream states. The downstream state is at the mercy of upstream states and must be prepared to coerce upstream states, if supply is threatened. The imperative increases as states modernize and use more of the resource. However, the tendency of downstream states to develop water systems first, claim “senior rights,” and seek hegemony over water resources causes difficulties in attempts to establish cooperation.⁸⁶

Peter Gleick of the Pacific Institute for Studies in Development, Environment, and Security has chronicled water conflicts and indicates that there have been only 24 interstate disputes resulting in the use or threatened use of military force in recorded history from political, military, or developmental issues over water between two or more states. However, the trend indicates that the pressures leading to conflict are greater today than in the past. Of the 24 disputes, 23 have occurred since 1947 and 13 (or more than half) have occurred since 1974.⁸⁷ Therefore, the frequency of interstate conflicts involving water has escalated and points towards future conflict.

Egyptian “Hydro-Hegemony” over the Nile River

The Nile is the world’s longest river; with one of its sources in the Great Lakes region of Sub-Saharan Africa, the White Nile traverses nearly 4,200 miles as it flows from Lake Victoria and Lake Albert and their tributaries northward to the Egyptian delta on the Mediterranean coast. Before the White Nile meets the Blue Nile in Khartoum to form the river that brings life to Egypt, it travels slowly through four hundred miles of a vast swampland (the “Sudd”) in southern Sudan, where nearly fifty percent of its waters are lost to evaporation.⁸⁸ In contrast, the Blue Nile, with its source in the highlands of Ethiopia at more than 8,000 feet, meets no such natural obstacle as it flows swiftly west and north toward Khartoum. The Blue Nile provides nearly eight-five percent of the water that flows through Egypt. Therefore, Ethiopia is the key to Egypt’s access to the Nile, and any major effort to divert the Nile waters in Ethiopia will have a negative effect on Egypt. With this fact in mind, Egypt has historically maintained relations with Ethiopia with the purpose of maintaining control over the Blue Nile and its water.

Nile River water has been used for drinking and sustaining life, but it has also been important for sanitation, agriculture, transportation and the production of energy, particularly in the Lower Nile of Egypt. Until recently, most of the Upper Nile basin south of Egypt and Sudan’s Gezira Scheme has featured subsistence agriculture and little industry or irrigated agriculture. Therefore, there has been no economic incentive to dam or divert the Nile. However, Egypt has

always been wary of dam and diversion projects. As Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia, and other Upper Nile states grow, the prospect of diverting Nile waters and the probability of conflict loom larger.⁸⁹

Egypt is completely dependent on the Nile, and the river's waters make life possible. A desert country bisected by the river, the Nile provides the sole means of potable water to the 68 million people of Egypt. Not only a source of water, the Nile has deposited silt along the shores of its banks for thousands of years of Egyptian growing seasons. This accumulation of sediment has resulted in the only arable land in the desert country. Also, Nile fish have been a key food source, and the river has provided the primary means of transportation and commerce for most people that populate its banks. Egypt's Nile has one of the world's greatest concentrations of people along its banks and one of the world's fastest rates of population growth. A burgeoning population, coupled with the inefficient use of the available water supply and the degradation of water quality due to limited environmental regulation mean that competition for freshwater remains challenging.⁹⁰

Egypt developed and maintained a hegemonic foreign policy and a regional structure based partly on its interest in maintaining an unimpeded flow of the Nile and has proclaimed that it would act, with force if necessary, against upstream states, if the latter threatened the free flow of Nile. In particular, Egypt developed a dyadic rivalry with successive states in the territory of Ethiopia over two millennia. Both countries established influence over each other's source of strength and used it to their advantage. For sixteen centuries, Egypt has been the headquarters of the Coptic Church, which has held authority over the Ethiopian Orthodox church and appointed the Patriarch of the church until the 1950s. The rulers of Egypt used this geopolitical reality as a bargaining chip in their relations with Ethiopian leaders. For the Egyptians, Ethiopia held the key to the Nile, and, during periods of dispute, Ethiopia's leaders would threaten to divert the waters to influence Egypt.⁹¹ For example, in reaction to the persecution of Egyptian Copts by the Mamluke sultans of Egypt, the Ethiopian King, Zara-Yaiqob (1434-68) "also made a reference to the Nile, which, he said, rose in his realms, and it was within his power to divert its course."⁹²

In the nineteenth century, Britain came to dominate Egypt and created a Northeast African regional structure that allowed it to exercise hegemony and protect the passage to India through the Suez Canal and Red Sea. Britain occupied Egypt, Sudan, and Somaliland and penetrated into East Africa, creating a settler colony in Kenya to guarantee the source of the White Nile in Uganda, which also became a colony. Britain consented to Ethiopian rights over the Blue Nile in exchange for a concession on the banks of Ethiopia's Lake Tana to protect the river's flow to Egypt; however, this agreement never came to fruition.⁹³ Recognizing the importance of the river to the survival of

Egypt, Britain brokered a treaty between its colony in Sudan and independent Egypt in 1929 that reaffirmed the latter's historic senior rights to the Nile and established legal rights for Egypt and Sudan to exploit the river's water resources.⁹⁴ In 1949, Egypt and Britain came to an agreement that allowed the Owens Falls Dam to be constructed in Uganda at the point at which the White Nile emerged from Lake Victoria. Britain agreed to allow Egyptian monitors to reside at Owens Falls Dam in order to guarantee that a regular flow of water be discharged from the dam so that the supply of water to Egypt would not be constricted.⁹⁵

In the 1950s, British dominance over the Nile and Northeast Africa was challenged and ended, starting with the 1952 Egyptian revolution and Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser's 1956 nationalization of the Suez Canal. From 1956 until 1972, Egypt allied with the Soviet Union and backed 1969 coups in Sudan, Libya, and Somalia and revolutionary nationalist movements in Africa and the Middle East, which helped to end British suzerainty. With Egypt challenging British hegemony and with de-colonization, the Northeast African structure fragmented and became unstable.⁹⁶ The US entered the region by allying with Ethiopia from the 1950s until 1974. Egypt came to depend on its own diplomatic and military efforts to sustain control of the Nile, establishing a network of relations. Egypt recognized its complete reliance on the Nile and acknowledged its willingness to use force to stop attempts at interfering with its water rights. During a dispute over the building of the Aswan High Dam in 1958-59, Nasser deployed Egyptian troops into Sudan in an attempt to coerce Sudan into acquiescing to the project.⁹⁷

Sudan has also been dependent on the Nile for water, though to a lesser extent than Egypt. In 1956, Sudan gained its independence and, by 1959, the Sudanese realized they were not benefiting from the 1929 treaty and threatened to abrogate it, if the Egyptians would not renegotiate the treaty to allow greater utilization for Sudan. The second agreement, the Nile Waters Act of 1959, was concluded in Khartoum on November 8, 1959 and was an historic document, because it established specific quotas for each signatory. The failing, however, was that the "1959 agreement ignored any rights, equitable or historic, of Ethiopia or the other seven colonies and territories on the river. In 1959, their claims were in the future, and the needs of Egypt and Sudan for plans and dams were in the present."⁹⁸

In 1972, Egypt and Sudan turned away from the Soviet Union and towards the US. The 1974 Ethiopian revolution established a radical military regime, which allied with the Soviet Union in 1977. In 1978, as Cold War tensions rose, Ethiopia's dictator (Mengistu Haile Mariam) threatened to dam the Blue Nile in order to promote development. Egyptian president Anwar Sadat responded, "We depend on the Nile 100 percent in our life, so if anyone at any moment thinks to deprive us of our life, we shall never hesitate to go to war because it is a matter of life or

death.”⁹⁹ As the Cold War ended and as Mengistu was overthrown, Ethiopian threats to the Blue Nile diminished. However, threats to the flow of the Nile did not end. In 1995, the Sudanese Interior Minister threatened to divert the flow of the Nile waters, if the Egyptian government did not drop its claims to a disputed territory along the Egyptian-Sudanese border. Egyptian Foreign Minister Amer Musa responded, “Egypt would go to war if any country sharing the Nile’s water with it attempted to change the course of the river.”¹⁰⁰

Egypt has traditionally used diplomacy and threats of force to maintain hegemony over the Nile. However, the capability of Egypt’s military to stop Ethiopia, Sudan or Uganda from interfering with the Nile has not been tested. The Egyptian military is the largest in the region, with an estimated 450,000 men under arms, and has well-developed intelligence and special forces. Since signing the Camp David Accords in 1979, Egypt has been the second greatest recipient of US foreign military assistance. With that aid, Egypt has become a well-equipped and modernized military force, with near state-of-the-art aircraft, tanks, and armored vehicles.¹⁰¹ In comparison, Ethiopia has recently downsized the total numbers of its troops after an all-out war with Eritrea (1998-2000). Ethiopia’s \$345 million military budget is roughly only 14 percent of Egypt’s annual expenditures of \$2.4 billion.¹⁰² On paper, it would seem that Egypt could expect to have its way militarily in the Nile Basin. However, the Ethiopian army has been more accustomed to combat than the Egyptian, which has not fought in a generation. Also, Egyptian maintenance of its weapons systems has been suspect, and its expeditionary capabilities are questionable.¹⁰³ If Egypt wanted to attack Ethiopia, it would have to ally with Sudan or Eritrea and traverse mountainous terrain, which would prove difficult. A blockade of land-locked Ethiopia through its main port in Djibouti would be more practicable. Attacking Uganda would be similarly problematic for Egypt. However, military analysis is speculative, given that a water crisis requiring Egyptian military action is not yet on the horizon.

The fear exists that terrorists could contaminate the Nile and other Northeast African water sources with radiological or nuclear materials. They might also try to stop or divert the river’s course. The Northeast African region is vast, and terrorists could mount operations from a number of locations. Most probably, the target would be Egypt in order to punish it for close relations with the US. A terrorist operation was more likely in the mid-1990s, when Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and Al-Qaeda were present in Sudan and attempting to assassinate President Hosni Mubarak and overthrow his regime. However, the practical problems of disrupting the flow of the Nile or poisoning it with radiological or nuclear materials are great and perhaps beyond the capabilities of Al-Qaeda. Finally, the threats to poison or divert the Nile would alienate practically all Egyptians against extremist groups.

The Upper Nile States and Emerging Competition with Egypt

The current population of the ten Nile riparian states is nearly 336 million people, with an expected growth rate that will nearly double the population to more than 600 million by the year 2025. The pressures of a population explosion and consequent rise in demand for food and water ensure that all the Nile states will be searching for ways to gain more access to Nile waters for sustenance, transportation, and agricultural and energy production. Now that the Sudanese civil war has ended, opportunities for development have emerged. Sudan is currently planning on building a dam on the Blue Nile near its border with Ethiopia to generate hydroelectric power, and the country could dramatically expand its uses of the Nile for irrigation and other agricultural purposes.¹⁰⁴ Ethiopia wants to dam some of its smaller rivers and tributaries to the north of Lake Tana in order to capture water for irrigation and electricity generation, though greater use of the Blue Nile remains a long-term project.¹⁰⁵

Uganda's water supply and electricity generation through the Owen Falls Dam are being affected by other states' use of waters that flow into Lake Victoria, the major source of the White Nile. Kenya is trying to tap into the waters of the lake in order to aid in its development. Because of steady drought in the region, Tanzania has proceeded with a plan to tap into lake waters to supply water to drought-stricken areas.¹⁰⁶ Therefore, it is in Uganda's interests to foster cooperation in the management of Nile waters.

The eight independent African states that did not sign the Nile waters agreements of 1929 and 1959 concur that they are not obliged to abide by the provisions of either treaty, because they were agreed upon and signed by Britain, acting on behalf of its colonies, which are now independent states. Therefore, most riparian states believe the treaties are non-binding and in need of renegotiation. Kife Abraham, an Ethiopian expert on the Nile basin, stated that no treaty prevented Ethiopia from tapping into the waters resources of the Nile, "Ethiopia is not bound by either the 1929 or the 1959 agreements. These were bilateral agreements to which Ethiopia was not a party."¹⁰⁷ This statement is indicative of Ethiopian nationalism, rather than the ability of the country to dramatically expand its use of the Nile in the near future. The Kenyan government commissioned the Konrad-Adenauer Foundation to study its obligations under the Nile treaties, which found that Kenya was not obliged to adhere to standards set forth in an agreement to which it did not sign as a sovereign nation.¹⁰⁸

Already the most populated country among the Nile riparian states, estimates indicate that Ethiopia's population will climb from 68 million people today to 127 million by 2025.¹⁰⁹ During the 1970's and 1980's, devastating droughts in the region claimed a million Ethiopians from famine, partly because Ethiopia had no means of capturing the Nile waters for irrigation and

drinking.¹¹⁰ Ethiopia continues to underutilize its arable land, because it lacks sufficient irrigation capabilities. A 2000 African Development Bank study shows that Ethiopia had only irrigated 190,000 acres of farmland out of a potential 3,637,000 acres.¹¹¹ Electricity is available to less than ten percent of the people, and, for those that have it; the cost is so high that it must be rationed.¹¹² Estimates indicate that only about three percent of the 110 billion m³ of freshwater that originates in Ethiopia is utilized in the country.¹¹³ As Ethiopia improves its agricultural and socio-economic conditions over the coming decades, it will do so partly by harnessing the potential of its Blue Nile resources. However, Ethiopia must be prepared to defend its development of the Blue Nile, because Egypt might react in a hostile manner.

The Emergence of Cooperation: the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI)

In the early 1990s, a Nile Council of Water Ministers (NILE-COM) was formed to discuss river issues. In 1997, Egypt made an overture to Ethiopia to discuss Nile issues bilaterally, which led to an exchange of diplomatic notes and a proposal that led to the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI).¹¹⁴ In 1998, nine of the ten Nile riparian states recognized the need to establish a cooperative arrangement to deal with competing demands on water resources and established the NBI.¹¹⁵ The World Bank, UN Development Programme, Canadian International Development Agency, African Development Bank, and other agencies facilitated the formation of NBI and have continued to encourage its development. To facilitate lending to NBI projects, the World Bank fostered the formation of two sub-regions, the Eastern Nile and Nile Equatorial Lakes. The NBI is an organization founded to “create a regional partnership to facilitate the common pursuit of sustainable development and management of Nile resources.”¹¹⁶ The NBI consists of the NILE-COM, Nile Technical Advisory Committee (NILE-TAC), and Nile Secretariat (NILE-SEC). The three institutions are supposed to jointly interact to “create a coordination mechanism and an ‘enabling environment’ to realize their shared vision through action on the ground. The program is intended to be a broad-based basin-wide program of collaborative action, exchange of experience, and capacity building to ensure a strong foundation for regional cooperation.”¹¹⁷

The ultimate effectiveness of the NBI is in doubt, however. One commentator assesses the NBI as follows:

For the first time in history, all the Nile riparian states have expressed their commitment to a joint initiative. However, expressing concern over common freshwater resources and taking concrete action are two different things. Though Egypt is talking about basin-wide cooperation, it continues to develop massive new water projects unilaterally within its borders. Furthermore, there has been no recent reduction of its dependence on the Nile water. On the contrary, Egypt’s demand for water is increasing considerably.¹¹⁸

Egypt's hegemonic behavior has been an obstacle to establishing a cooperative Nile regime. Egypt has been accustomed to using the Nile as it pleases and rejecting other states' plans to use Nile waters. The NBI offers a framework for Egypt to change its behavior and begin more cooperative conduct. However, a collective action problem exists; Egypt as the hegemon is not willing to provide a plan, backed by its resources, for sharing Nile waters that would attract other NBI states and spur cooperation.¹¹⁹ Several states, such as Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, have been generally indifferent to the plight of the Nile basin and need to be convinced of the importance of sharing and managing its waters. The difficult relationship between Egypt and Ethiopia, fueled by nationalism, poses a deeper problem for the NBI.

Although the NBI provides a useful framework for cooperation, the large number of actors and interests means that "the Nile Basin Initiative has until now functioned based on the strategy of securing consensus of all ten riparian countries on less controversial issues, while postponing more difficult ones. By failing to address the core issues and projecting a superficial cooperation involving a larger number of actors, the NBI is very likely to fail."¹²⁰

One way forward is for interested states (Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Uganda) to forge agreements among fewer actors. Uganda is helping to revive the Kagera Basin Organization with Rwanda, Burundi, and Tanzania and could lead in forging a Lake Victoria agreement with Kenya and Tanzania. Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia could come to an agreement on the development of energy and irrigation projects on the Blue Nile. Sudan and Ethiopia could jointly develop a "border dam" for hydroelectric power and irrigation, though Egypt would probably veto such a project.¹²¹

Another avenue would be to elicit greater involvement of the international community. The Nile riparian states do not possess the capital or technical competence needed to develop projects that will have regional benefits. Each state, while espousing regional cooperation, still acts within its own self-interest. Nonpartisan third parties can play a role in resolving disputes and encouraging cooperation and the developmental process. Developed states have not invested considerable time and energy in assisting the NBI, choosing to monitor the situation from afar and through membership in the World Bank, UNDP, and other multilateral agencies. Advanced states can best help the situation by providing financial assistance where necessary, providing arbitrators to help adjudicate disputes, and remaining active behind the scene goading parties into action where necessary and acting as a restraint on others when required. Only through global involvement and local cooperation on river development will the ten countries sharing the Nile resources be able to contribute to the NBI's vision for water management.

The NBI was discussed at length with Anthony Turton, of the African Water Issues Research Unit (AWIRU) at the University of Pretoria and the Council for Scientific and Industrial

Research.¹²² Turton started by remarking that it was fortunate that most of the Nile Basin Initiative countries are former British colonies; therefore, there is unity in legal matters, compared with other basins (for example, the Niger River Basin is divided between British and French legal systems. However, the overriding problem is that the NBI is donor-driven and not driven by nation-states. The World Bank is perceived by many riparian states as an instrument of American policy, which is not neutral and is aligned with Egypt. The World Bank is not controlled by the US, but perceptions count. The lesson for the Nile riparian states is that donor-driven, big projects must be based on national security notions and interests and must help lesson national insecurity.

The Nile has a limited volume of water. There is no water sharing without conflict. Egyptians want downstream water until impasse is broken. NBI has no real structure to organize cooperation (only the status quo). The NBI is externally driven and patronizing and needs to have African ownership. There is high risk but Africans must take control of their own problems. The World Bank has become a hindrance not a facilitator in the NBI process. Everyone is suspicious of Egypt as they are the downstream beneficiaries. Egypt is attempting to maximize its use of the Nile River, because Egypt needs to prove that it needs the lion's share of Nile water and that it is dependent on the Nile. At a recent conference in Stockholm, four African female ministers of water spoke out against the NBI dam report, which favors Egypt. In sum, Egypt surely is a "hydro-hegemon."¹²³ The power distribution between Egypt and other states needs to be more equitable. Egyptian hegemony does not help. Egypt should not posture if it cannot support it. Egypt has strength in its intelligence service and in its covert forces. However, the rest of the military is dysfunctional. Having good intelligence is necessary to good decision-making and an important part of conflict resolution. In the 1973 war, the tide turned against Egypt after a week because of Israeli intelligence.

In regard to water, conflict, and terrorism, Anthony Turton expressed his surprise at the rapid rise of radical Islamic groups in Africa (in Zambia, DRC, Tanzania, and elsewhere) and failed states (DR, Sudan, Somalia, etc.). This is frightening but is not related to water at the moment. However, there is the prospect that radical Islam could give rise to conflict over water. The lack of economic prospects and reasonable chance at fair life is driving Islamic radicalism in Central and East Africa. Turton contended that poor river management is correlated to the rise of Islamic radicalism (economic prospects).

The remedy is not sharing water but sharing benefits. If water is properly managed, there is hope for a better life and less radicalism. One must think of water not as a stock but in terms of the flux and flow. There must be a shift in thinking away from water as a stock and therefore something to be owned and controlled, to water as a flux that recycles through the basin. A flux is

bigger than a stock. In the energy sector, hydropower is a wonderful way of using the flux of water to generate benefits other than mere simplistic thinking about water as a finite volume.

The Swedish government is funding the Kagera Basin Organization (KBO), which flows through Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, and Uganda and which deserves economic development. The Kagera Basin Organization is a sub-NBI initiative but very under funded. The ties among the KBO states are very important to success. Cooperation among a smaller group of states (KBO vs. the NBI) is more effective. Pike's Law is operative; it is difficult to get kids together in a car and that the level of complexity with the rise in the number of actors increases cubically.

Irrigation has high evaporative loss and does not make sense in Ethiopia, while hydroelectric generation does make sense. Ethiopia is starting to build small-scale hydroelectric projects. More large scale funding is needed and should be linked to NEPAD. NEPAD has not been successful at raising money yet, must do so to succeed. Economic cooperation is key for Ethiopia. Water, infrastructure, roads, taxes, border control, etc. are issues that could be linked around water sharing as an initial base.

Turton recommends water sharing and a regional water tax among SADC and EAC members, which could lead to other resource sharing in southern Africa. In West Africa, an ECOWAS structure is in place and can become platform for harmonization of Niger River basin. In contrast, there is no regional organization in North East Africa to build cooperation (especially involving Egypt).

Turton commented that Sudan is a failed state; therefore throwing money at Sudan and the NBI is not going to make a difference there. Sudan is failed, because the elite in the region around the capital, Khartoum, have always monopolized resources and treated other regions (not just the South) as tributary states, which it plays off against each other and occasionally punishes. Therefore, partition is a viable option where there would be two or three smaller states based on common interests. Southern Sudan will be a new state. Unless the Sudan problem is solved, Egyptian insecurity cannot be assuaged. A sustainable solution will entail the search for a way to reverse state failure, because stable government provides a global public good, including resource sharing.

The cross-sectoral linkages – economic development, migration, and population growth – these states will be better able to deal with these issues when they are linked in a river basin function. The Nile is that it is best understood in the theoretical context of a security complex.¹²⁴ Schultz writes about the Tigris and Euphrates as a security complex. I have written about Southern Africa as having a hydro-political complex as a sub-set of the regional security complex. The Nile is best understood in this way, but no robust research has ever been done on

this angle. There are three hydro-political complexes in Africa - the Southern African Hydro-political Complex, The West African Complex, and the Nile Basin Complex. Each has similarities and differences. The core element of such a theoretical construct is the capacity for the analysis to isolate horizontal and vertical linkages of which there are many in the Nile. The objective is to understand how the current zero-sum thinking can be changed into a plus-sum outcome in the Nile.

Christina LeB of the World Bank emphasized the projects that have been established under the Nile Basin Initiative.¹²⁵ Those water ministries and others involved have come a long way in the past decade. They talk to each other and are prepared to manage Nile water.

Ambassador Joseph Tomusange of the Ugandan High Commission to South Africa commented that the water of Lake Victoria is dropping lower and lower due to global warming and increased usage.¹²⁶ Uganda may have to dam the Nile to prevent the level from dropping much further. Otherwise, Uganda must deal with environmental problems; Water Hyacinth, depleting fish stocks, pollution and deforestation, lake transport, EAC agreements, and Great Lakes agreements on fish farming. Egypt cannot use unlimited amounts of Nile River water.

Water in Northeast Africa and US Strategy

The potential for conflict exists over Nile River water in Northeast Africa; however, Upper Nile states have not yet developed to the extent where they have actually threatened Egypt's supply of water—the main trigger for conflict. Nevertheless, Egypt has behaved as a hegemon, as if there was a real threat to the Nile, which is explained by the country's extreme dependence on the river. The national security of Egypt is linked to water. Therefore the major powers must play a role in putting pressure on Egypt to change its attitude and in fully funding the NBI and persuading upstream states to accept.

The future of water in the region holds opportunities for both conflict and cooperation. Rapid population growth and the development of water resources in the Upper Nile states will increase the threat to Egypt's water supply. Population growth will be rapid and place rising demand on both water and energy. Egypt is faced with the choice of continuing its hegemonic behavior and coercing riparian states or building cooperation through the NBI or bilateral arrangements. Egypt's past behavior does not bode well for a cooperative solution. Also, Upper Nile states are rejecting previous treaties and declaring the right to use the Nile as they see fit. In particular, Egypt needs to change its strategy regarding Ethiopia and strive for a new dispensation on the Blue Nile.

The conflicts and fragmentation of the eastern African region have not provided much hope for regional integration, though the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) played a

prominent role in the resolution of conflicts in Sudan and Somalia after years of negotiations. IGAD helped to bring about oil revenue sharing in Sudan. IGAD's early warning system holds out hope for conflict prevention (including over water and energy) in Northeast Africa. While IGAD will continue to play a role in fostering regional cooperation, it would be helpful if Egypt became a member of the organization. Another organization that could foster regional cooperation in Northeast Africa is the African Union, which has been heavily involved in Darfur. The Nile Basin Initiative could build cooperation, but the current arrangement does not offer incentives to Upper Nile states and should be rethought. External actors may help facilitate cooperation and persuade Egypt to adopt a more conciliatory position.

For more than twenty years, oil was an ingredient that helped to prevent peace from materializing in Sudan and kept Sudan from realizing its potential of becoming a central power in Northeast Africa and, among other things, from utilizing Nile waters for development. As long as peace prevails, Sudan will continue to export oil and gas and grow in wealth and power. Sudan will use more of the Nile for irrigation and hydroelectric power. With Sudan's enhanced power and with help from China and other allies, the country will be able to stand up to Egyptian pressures over the Nile. Sudan could build cooperation with Upper Nile states based on oil (pipeline politics) and water (especially with Ethiopia). Peace could bring even greater cooperation with Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya. Much depends on the quality of Sudanese diplomacy and entrepreneurship. Resumption of North-South hostilities and the Sudanese civil war are possible and would damage cooperation and Sudanese growth. In such an event, Upper Nile states will continue to grow and use water without Sudan as an intermediary.

ENDNOTES

¹ Gavin Cawthra, "A Conceptual Framework for Regional Security," in Shannon Field, ed. *Peace in Africa*, Johannesburg, Institute for Global Dialogue, 2004, 27-40.

² *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, August 2000. Victoria Holt, *African Capacity for Peace Operations: UN Collaboration with the African Union and ECOWAS*, Washington, DC: Stimson Center, February 2005, 47-57. In the 2000s, the UN became even more active in African peacekeeping missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Burundi, and Sudan and working with African regional organizations.

³ Joses Gani Yoroms, "Mechanisms for Conflict Management in ECOWAS," *Accord Occasional Paper*, 8/99. *Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security*, Economic Community of West African States, December 10, 1999.

⁴ *SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation*, August 2001. The troika was instituted at the SADC Heads of State Summit, August 2001.

⁵ Holt, *African Capacity for Peace Operations*, 9.

⁶ Holt, *African Capacity for Peace Operations*, 17-20.

⁷ See Jakkie Cilliers and Mark Malan, *Progress with the African Standby Force*, ISS Paper 107, May 2005, 1-21.

⁸ Interview with Festus Aboagye, Institute of Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa, September 9, 2005.

⁹ Lt. Colonel Felix Blanco, Spanish Army, briefing on Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), Abuja, Nigeria, March 9, 2005.

¹⁰ The shortage of officers was confirmed during my visit to AU Peace and Security Commission, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, March 1, 2005.

¹¹ Aboagye, September 9, 2005.

¹² Holt, *African Capacity for Peace Operations*, 21-28.

¹³ Cilliers and Malan, *Progress with the African Standby Force*, 7-8.

¹⁴ Cilliers and Malan, *Progress with the African Standby Force*, 10-12.

¹⁵ Gavin Cawthra, interviewed September 12, 2005 in Johannesburg, South Africa.

¹⁶ Cilliers and Malan, *Progress with the African Standby Force*, 12-15

¹⁷ Dr T. Salomao was Mozambique's Minister of Communications and a minister in the Ministry of Planning and Finance.

¹⁸ Harvey W. Short, South African Department of Foreign Affairs, interviewed in Pretoria, September 14, 2005.

¹⁹ *Defence in a Democracy: White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa*, Ministry of Defence, South Africa, May 1996. *White Paper on South African participation in international peace missions*, Ministry of Defence, South Africa, 1999,

²⁰ Aboagye, interviewed September 9, 2005.

²¹ Maxi Schoeman, Chair, Department of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria, interviewed September 12, 2005.

²² Garth le Pere, Institute for Global Dialogue, interviewed in Midrand, September 14, 2005

²³ Garth le Pere and Elling Tjonneland, "Which Way SADC? Advancing co-operation and integration in Southern Africa," Institute for Global Dialogue, 2005.

²⁴ Briefings by personnel at ECOWAS headquarters, Abuja, Nigeria, March 2004 and March 2005. E-mail correspondence with COL (retired) Mike Smith.

²⁵ Ian Taylor, *NEPAD: Towards Africa's Development or Another False Start?* Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2005. Ian Taylor finds that NEPAD is presently more form than substance.

²⁶ Chris Landsberg of the Centre for Policy Studies, Johannesburg, interviewed September 8, 2005.

²⁷ Victoria K. Holt, *The Responsibility to Protect: Considering the Operational Capacity for Civilian Protection*, draft working paper, Stimson Center, January 2005.

²⁸ Greg Mills, Brenthurst Foundation, Johannesburg, interviewed September 12, 2005.

²⁹ Greg Mills termed the call to double assistance to Africa "Jeff Sachs' folly", because such an increase would come without Africans states having to make substantive improvements in governance and transparency.

³⁰ Greg Mills, "The Commission for Africa: More than a paperweight?" *Optima*, 51, 2, June 2005..

³¹ Professor Hussein Solomon of the University of Pretoria, interviewed September 7, 2005.

-
- ³² Chris Landsberg, interviewed September 8, 2005, commented that NEPAD has not raised much money and that it lacks power, even though South Africa still pretends that NEPAD is viable.
- ³³ Patrick Rankhumise, Senior Researcher, Peace Missions, Institute of Security Studies, Pretoria, interviewed September 9, 2005.
- ³⁴ Elisabeth Sidropoulos, Director of the South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, interviewed September 8, 2005.
- ³⁵ Elisabeth Sidropoulos, Director of the South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, interviewed September 8, 2005.
- ³⁶ Elisabeth Sidropoulos commented that Britain and Sweden must have South African support in changing domestic legislation within SADC to make the organization more effective. South Africa and EU countries are working together to find the best way to structure EU funding for South African and AU operations in Darfur and the DRC.
- ³⁷ Peter Kagwanja, "Darfur: An African Peacekeeping Crucible," Centre for International Political Studies, University of Pretoria, 2004.
- ³⁸ Roger Southall, South African Human Sciences Resource Council, interviewed in Bryanston, South Africa, September 9, 2005.
- ³⁹ Kristina A. Bentley and Roger Southall, *An African Peace process: Mandela, South Africa and Burundi*, Cape Town: South Africa: Human Sciences Resource Council, 2005.
- ⁴⁰ According to Roger Southall, Burundi's Tutsi leaders viewed former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere and lead negotiator as pro-Hutu. Mandela stepped in on the request of Nyerere before he died. Nyerere got the ball rolling. Mandela stepped in and was very blunt. The peace process needed such a fresh perspective.
- ⁴¹ Former Clinton administration special envoy to Burundi, Howard Wolpe, is dismissive of South African input. Roger Southall thinks that Wolpe is wrong, because he overlooks South African persistence in negotiating a series of settlements.
- ⁴² Roger Southall commented that Burundi was no longer as important for the US. President Clinton was more dedicated to Burundi because of the guilt factor over the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The Bush administration shifted its efforts to resolving the conflict in Sudan.
- ⁴³ Maxi Schoeman, Chair, Department of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria, interviewed September 12, 2005.
- ⁴⁴ Peter Draper, ed., *Reconfiguring the Compass - South Africa's African Trade Diplomacy*, Johannesburg, South African Institute of International Affairs, 2005.
- ⁴⁵ Visit to CJTF-HOA, Camp Lemonier, Djibouti, February-March 2005 and to CJTF-HOA training operations in Ethiopia, March 2004.
- ⁴⁶ Visit to Bamako, Mali as facilitator for African Center for Strategic Studies Counter-Terrorism Workshop, October 2003.
- ⁴⁷ Kurt Shillinger, South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, interviewed September 7, 2005.
- ⁴⁸ Kurt Shillinger, *After London: Reassessing Africa's Role in the War on Terror*, American Enterprise Institute, September 2005.
- ⁴⁹ Greg Mills, Brenthurst Foundation, September 12, 2005.
- ⁵⁰ Hussein Solomon, interviewed September 7, 2005. The Bush administration is its own worst enemy; it should look to the example of Turkey. In Turkey, an Islamist party formed the government in a secular state. It is an Islamist government wants EU membership.
- ⁵¹ Hussein Solomon noted that the AU is organized in five sub-regions and that the US Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative creates a sixth region, which could undermine the AU. The US needs to bring an end to the impasse over Western Sahara, which would help the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative. However, the US has been disappointed a by lack of Moroccan cooperation.
- ⁵² Goolam Vahed and Shamil Jeppe, "Multiple communities: Muslims in post-apartheid South Africa,": in John Daniel, Roger Southall, and Jessica Lutchman, eds. *State of the Nation: South Africa, 2004-2005*, Cape Town, South Africa: Human Sciences Research Council, 2005, 252-286.
- ⁵³ Hussein Solomon and Firoza Butler, eds. *Islam in 21st Century: Perspectives and Challenges*, Centre for International Political Studies, University of Pretoria, 2005.
- ⁵⁴ Martin Slabber and Betsie Smith, Department of Foreign Affairs, interviewed September 13, 2005.
- ⁵⁵ Visit to African Center for Strategic Studies workshop on Energy and Security, Abuja, Nigeria, March 2005.

-
- ⁵⁶ Michael T. Klare and Daniel Volman, "Africa's Oil and American National Security," *Current History* May 2004, 226.
- ⁵⁷ Campaigns against Talisman Energy by human rights and religious groups forced the company to sell its Sudan projects to an Indian company in 2003.
- ⁵⁸ Human Rights Watch, *Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights*, 2003, Government Inaugurates Khartoum Oil Refinery, June 1999.
- ⁵⁹ Peter S. Goodman, "China Invests Heavily In Sudan's Oil Industry: Beijing Supplies Arms Used on Villagers," *Washington Post*, December 23, 2004, A01.
- ⁶⁰ Goodman, A01.
- ⁶¹ Human Rights Watch, Conclusion.
- ⁶² Human Rights Watch, Part III, Human Rights Consequences of Oil Development.
- ⁶³ The US provides ESF grants to help foreign allies with infrastructure, development projects, and debt servicing.
- ⁶⁴ Scott Shane, "C.I.A. Role in Visit of Sudan Intelligence Chief Causes Dispute within Administration," *New York Times*, June 18, 2005. <http://www.genocidewatch.org/SudanCIAvisit18June2005.htm>
- ⁶⁵ Energy Information Administration, *Sudan Country Analysis Brief*, US Department of Energy, March 2005. <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/sudan.html>.
- ⁶⁶ US Department of State, *Sudan Peace Act Report of April 21, 2004 Oil Revenues and Uses of Such Oil Revenue by the Government of Sudan*, <http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/rpt/32018.htm>
- ⁶⁷ Karby Leggett, "China Flexes Economic Muscle throughout Burgeoning Africa," *Wall Street Journal*, March 29, 2005, 1.
- ⁶⁸ The European Coalition on Oil in Sudan (ECOS), <http://www.ecosonline.org/> proposed standard guidelines for oil exploration under the government-SPLM/A peace agreement.
- ⁶⁹ Greg Mills, interviewed September 12, 2005, commented that oil revenue sharing and water agreements in Sudan are more likely to hold now that Garang is gone
- ⁷⁰ Johann Smith, Private Risk Consultant, interviewed in Pretoria, September 13, 2005.
- ⁷¹ See also, "West Africa: Oil, Dollars in Votes," *Africa Confidential*, 46:4, August 5, 2005.
- ⁷² The impact and effect of Obiang's passing (possibly from prostate cancer) on his Mongomo clan will be huge. It is uncertain who will succeed him.
- ⁷³ Equatorial Guinea is China's best friend in the Gulf of Guinea, and China is willing to play "hardball" in the region.
- ⁷⁴ David Zweig and Bi Jianhai, "China's Global Hunt for Energy," *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2005.
- ⁷⁵ Hussein Solomon, September 7, 2005.
- ⁷⁶ Michael T. Klare, *Resource Wars: the New Landscape of Global Conflict*, New York: Metropolitan Books, 2001, 1-26.
- ⁷⁷ Jack M. Hollander, *The Real Environmental Crisis* (Berkeley, CA: The University of California Press, 1996), 92.
- ⁷⁸ Hollander, 99.
- ⁷⁹ H.P.W. Toset, N.P. Gleditsch, H. Hegre, "Shared rivers and interstate conflict," *Political Geography*, 19, 8, November 2000, 971-996.
- ⁸⁰ Klare, 161-189.
- ⁸¹ J.A. Allan, "Hydro-peace in the Middle East: Why no water wars?" *SAIS Review*, 22, 2, Summer 2002, 255. See also Tony Allan, *The Middle East Water Question: Hydropolitics and the Global Economy*, London, I.B. Tauris, 2002. Allan finds that the ability of many Middle East states to import grain has lessened the probability of conflict over water, since grain production consumes comparatively more water than other usages.
- ⁸² Thomas Homer-Dixon, *Environmental Scarcity and Violence*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999, 14-15.
- ⁸³ Homer-Dixon, 16.
- ⁸⁴ Homer-Dixon, 137-141. Fresh water is one of the four resources that Homer-Dixon identifies as a likely spark for conflict. The other three are agriculturally productive land, forests, and fish.
- ⁸⁵ Homer-Dixon, 139.
- ⁸⁶ John Waterbury, *The Nile Basin: National Determinants of Collective Action*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001, 28.

-
- ⁸⁷ Peter Gleick, "Water Conflict Chronology" Pacific Institute for Studies in Development, Environment, and Security, December 1, 2004, <http://www.worldwater.org/conflict.htm>. See also A.T. Wolf, "The Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database Project," *Water International*, 24(2): 1999(a). 160-163.
- ⁸⁸ Robert O. Collins, *The Nile*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002, 49.
- ⁸⁹ Klare, 158-160.
- ⁹⁰ Waterbury, 171, notes that Egypt is industrializing and becoming less dependent on the Nile. Ashok Swain, "The Nile River Basin Initiative: Too Many Cooks, Too Little Broth," *SAIS Review*, 22, 2, Summer-Fall 2002, 301, points to Egypt's desert reclamation projects that will require more water.
- ⁹¹ Haggai Erlich, *The Cross and the River: Ethiopia, Egypt and the Nile*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2001, 9.
- ⁹² Tadesse Tamrat. *Church and State in Ethiopia, 1270-1527*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972, 262.
- ⁹³ Waterbury, 57-65.
- ⁹⁴ Collins, 151.
- ⁹⁵ Waterbury, 47.
- ⁹⁶ Waterbury, 65-72.
- ⁹⁷ Waterbury, 71-72. An Egyptian "water technocracy" that developed during the 20th century helped to bring the Aswan High Dam to fruition. Egyptian water technocrats assumed key positions in the United Nations, World Bank, and other multilateral agencies, where they influenced international aid and construction policy.
- ⁹⁸ Collins, 174.
- ⁹⁹ Collins, 214.
- ¹⁰⁰ Nihial Bol, "Water Potential Weapon in Row Between Neighbors," *Inter Press Service News Agency*, July 7, 1995, 1.
- ¹⁰¹ Amnon Barzilai, "Should we be up in arms over Egypt's buildup?" www.haaretz.co.il, January 18, 2005.
- ¹⁰² *CIA World Factbook*, available at <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/>
- ¹⁰³ Barzilai, 1.
- ¹⁰⁴ Waterbury, 128-130.
- ¹⁰⁵ Barker, David Read (President, LakeNet), *Address to Lake Tana Symposium*, Bahir Dar University, Bahir Dar, Ethiopia, September 24, 2004, 1-6. http://www.worldlakes.org/uploads/Lake_Tana_Symposium24Sep04_dr.pdf.
- ¹⁰⁶ Joyce Mulama, "The Fate of the Nile in the Spotlight," *Inter Press Service News Agency*, March 16, 2004, 1.
- ¹⁰⁷ "No Treaty to Prevent Ethiopia from Utilizing the Nile Water," *Addis Tribune*, February 25, 2005, 1. <http://www.addistribune.com/Archives/2005/02/25-02-05/No.htm>. Abraham is President of the Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development.
- ¹⁰⁸ Benson Kathuri, "Egypt No Longer has the Power to Dictate over Waters," *East African Standard*, February 23, 2005, 1.
- ¹⁰⁹ Swain, 299.
- ¹¹⁰ Collins, 228.
- ¹¹¹ Swain, 297. African Development Bank, *Policy for Integrated Water Resources Management* April 2000, http://www.afdb.org/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/ADB_PAGEGROUP/TOPICS/ADBPROJECT_SECTORS/WATERSUPPLYANDSANITATION/INTEGRATED_WATER_POLICY_APR2000.PDF
- ¹¹² Roger Thurow, "Unable to Tap Power of the Nile, Ethiopia Relies on Fuel Carriers," *The Wall Street Journal*, November 26, 2003, A8.
- ¹¹³ Swain, p. 301.
- ¹¹⁴ Alan Nicol, *The Nile: Moving Beyond Cooperation*, Paris: UNESCO, 2003. Alan Nicol, "The Dynamics of River Basin Cooperation: The Nile and Okavango basins," in Turton, Anthony, Peter Ashton and Eugene Cloete, eds. *Transboundary rivers, sovereignty and development: Hydro-political drivers in the Okavango River basin* University of Pretoria, South Africa, 2003, 167-186.
- ¹¹⁵ Eritrea participates as an observer nation in the NBI.
- ¹¹⁶ Nile Basin Initiative Secretariat in cooperation with the World Bank, *Strategic Action Program: Overview*, Nile Basin Initiative International Consortium on the Nile (ICCON), May 2001. See also, Nile Basin Initiative, <http://www.nilebasin.org/nbibbackground.htm>
- ¹¹⁷ NBI, http://www.nilebasin.org/SVP_Overview.htm

¹¹⁸ Swain, 303.

¹¹⁹ Anthony Turton, GIBB-SERA Chair in Integrated Water Resource Management, Environmentek, the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, Pretoria and Director of the African Water Issues Research Unit (AWIRU) at the University of Pretoria, South Africa, August 5, 2005, in an e-mail message.

¹²⁰ Swain, 307.

¹²¹ Waterbury, 137-139.

¹²² Anthony Turton, interviewed in Pretoria, September 6, 2005.

¹²³ Anthony Turton, "Hydro Hegemony in the Context of the Orange River Basin," paper delivered at a workshop on hydro-hegemony, University of London School of Oriental and African Studies, May 20-21, 2005.

¹²⁴ Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear*. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991. .Buzan writes a lot about security complexes and Tony Allan in his 2000 book makes reference to the Nile as a security complex,

¹²⁵ Christina Leb, Nile Basin Initiative, World Bank, Washington, DC, interviewed September 2, 2005.

¹²⁶ Ambassador Joseph Tomusange, Ugandan High Commission to South Africa, interviewed in Pretoria, September 13, 2005.