Global Insurgency Strategy and the Salafi Jihad Movement

Richard H. Shultz
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and the
Salafi Jihad Movement

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FOREWORD

We are pleased to publish this sixty-sixth volume in the Occasional Paper series of the United States Air Force Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). While this research was not sponsored by INSS, it is both compatible with our efforts and objectives, and it is published here to support the education of national security professionals across the government.

Dick Shultz led the preparation of an earlier INSS Occasional Paper, Armed Groups: A Tier-One Security Priority (with Douglas Farah and Itamara Lochard), where he defined, characterized, and differentiated insurgents, terrorists, militias, and organized criminal groups. In this current paper, he focuses on terrorists and insurgents, differentiates and characterizes these two categories in more explicit detail, and conducts a detailed conceptual and historical analysis of insurgency and its current manifestation on a global scale by the Salafi Jihad movement. This is important work, laying out the case that as terrorism and insurgency differ, recognizing that the current “long war” is actually being fought by the other side as an insurgency must lead us to amend and adapt our strategy to one of global counterinsurgency, beyond a global war on terrorism alone.

Dick Shultz is using these papers as texts in his program to “educate the educators” of military officers, intelligence analysts, and other members of the government national security bureaucracy. We at INSS support that effort, and we are pleased to present this Occasional Paper to further that cause.

About the Institute

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strategic security and controlling and combating weapons of mass destruction; homeland defense, combating terrorism, and asymmetrical warfare; regional and emerging national security issues; and air, space, and cyber issues and planning.

INSS coordinates and focuses outside thinking in various disciplines and across the military services to develop new ideas for defense policy making. To that end, the Institute develops topics, selects researchers from within the military academic community, and administers sponsored research. It reaches out to and partners with education and research organizations across and beyond the military academic community to bring broad focus to issues of national security interest. And it hosts workshops and facilitates the dissemination of information to a wide range of private and government organizations. In these ways, INSS facilitates valuable, cost-effective research to meet the needs of our sponsors. We appreciate your continued interest in INSS and our research products.

JAMES M. SMITH
Director
GLOBAL INSURGENCY STRATEGY AND THE SALAFI JIHAD MOVEMENT

Richard H. Shultz

A NEW TYPE OF WAR?

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attack on strategic targets inside the United States by al Qaeda, scholars, analysts, and policy specialists began to interpret and frame those events within the larger context of war. But was it war? And if it was, what kind of war was it? Al Qaeda was not a state but a non-state actor. Many labeled al Qaeda a transnational terrorist organization. Could such a non-state armed group go to war with a major state actor? What kind of war could it carry out? There were no easily decipherable answers to these questions, for al Qaeda did not reflect or emulate the conduct of war as it was known and practiced in the past.

Within a short period of time the US government began to describe the post-9/11 conflict environment—one in which America found itself engaged in a fight against unconventional and asymmetrical enemies who could pose major, even strategic, security threats—as a global war on terrorism. This generated a great deal of discussion and differences of opinion. Was this an accurate portrayal of the post-9/11 security environment or did such a characterization lack strategic clarity?

By the summer of 2005 senior Bush administration officials expressed serious doubts about this terminology and recast how they described the fight against al Qaeda, its affiliates, and other terrorist groups. Illustrative of this was Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. At news conferences and in public addresses he began to speak of a global struggle against violent extremism—“the long war”—rather than a
global war on terrorism. Other senior military leaders, to include the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, followed suit.

But this begged the question, how should we understand those conducting “the long war?” Who are they and what kind of battle are they fighting? What are their objectives and what kind of strategy and tactics do they employ in this fight to achieve them? One possible answer that has been suggested is that the United States and its allies are now confronted by a *global Salafi Jihad insurgency*.

Those taking this position argue that a more precise description of the post-9/11 conflict against the Salafi Jihad movement, which will be discussed in detail later, would be to frame it as a global insurgency; one that challenges the Western-dominated state system. Within this context, al Qaeda and loosely associated groups and movements are said to comprise an evolving form of networked non-state actors who operate locally, regionally, and globally. If this is the case—that a global insurgency is under way—then the implications for how to counter it are significant and will require important changes in US policy and strategy.

But how do we know that a *global Salafi Jihad insurgency* is underway? To determine whether this is the case, this study poses the following core research questions:

- Is a diverse confederation of armed groups, linked together by a common ideology (or narrative) and strengthened by new power enhancers, conducting a global insurgency against the United States and its allies?

- Is this global insurgency being carried out by a radical Salafi Jihad movement (and its al Qaeda vanguard) and does it have as its goals a) to foster regime change locally in apostate Muslim states and b) international system transformation globally?
Is the strategy adopted by the Salafi Jihad movement a hybrid or an adaptation of the insurgency strategy that revolutionary movements employed against states during the latter half of the 20th century? If so, what does it have in common with them and how does it differ?

To answer these core research questions, a series of corollary issues will first be examined as a prelude to conceptualizing a set of requirements or model of a hypothetical global insurgency.

These requirements will then be tested against existing open source information on the actions, activities, and operations of the Salafi Jihad movement and its al Qaeda vanguard. The objective will be to determine whether preliminary evidence supports the proposition that those actions, activities, and operations, when seen through the lens of the proposed requirements, can be described, at minimum, as a global insurgency in its incipient stage of development. While these findings can only serve as preliminary indicators, the study will provide the basis for further analysis.

**INSURGENCY: CONCEPTS AND FRAMEWORKS**

The starting point for conceptualizing a hypothetical model or set of requirements for a global insurgency is a review of the following concepts and frameworks: 1) definitions and classifications of insurgency; 2) distinctions between insurgency and terrorism; and 3) relationship between insurgency and social movements. Below are the summary points from this review, followed by the text from which they are deduced.

**Summary Points**

- Four types of non-state armed groups—insurgents, terrorists, militias, criminal organizations—today pose major threats (to include strategic ones) to nation-states including the United States.
- Important differences exist among these armed groups, particularly between insurgent movements and terrorist organizations.
An appreciation of those differences is essential to combat each of these types of armed groups.

- Strategies employed by insurgent groups, both organizationally and operationally, are more multifaceted and diverse than those of its armed group counterparts.

- Insurgencies are protracted forms of unconventional warfare that seek to accomplish their goals and objectives through the employment of irregular military forces and illegal political organizations.

- The instruments of violence and influence employed by insurgents range from guerrilla operations, terrorism, and sabotage to political mobilization, political action, psychological operations and intelligence activities.

- Insurgencies are struggles for power and legitimacy. Insurgents seek to destroy the power and legitimacy of the government they are challenging, while enhancing the power and legitimacy of their movement.

- There is no one type of insurgency. A useful way to categorize them is based on their aspirations or objectives. Of the seven insurgent variations identified, the goals of revolutionary and millenarian insurgent movements are the most far-reaching. Each envisions a major transformation of the political and social system. The former seeks to advance to an idealized future, the latter to return to a golden past.

- An important lens through which to understand the nature of revolutionary and millenarian insurgencies is social movement theory. Indeed, these two forms of insurgency have several characters in common with high risk social movements.

- Social movements represent groups on the margins of state and society that seek to reform or transform the political system. To do so they develop complex political strategies, given their political marginality.

- The more far-reaching the change sought by a social movement, the more multi-faceted the tasks the movement’s organization has to accomplish. The same is true of revolutionary and millenarian insurgencies.

- To accomplish far-reaching change, radical social movements engage in high-risk activism. Like revolutionary and millenarian insurgencies, this necessitates development of a mass base of dedicated supporters who must be motivated to take action.
Shultz—Global Insurgency Strategy

- For high-risk social movements, ideology performs a number of vital functions. To build a mass base, ideology plays a central role in the recruitment process that attracts new members; shapes the loyalty of these new members to retain them; and serves as a tool for waging the struggle.

- High-risk social movement ideology constitutes a series of frames that must come to resonate with the target audience. It is through the movement’s organization that it comes to do so. Ideology and organization are symbiotically connected to one another.

**Defining Insurgency**

Insurgency is a strategy of unconventional and asymmetric warfare executed by one of four different types of non-state armed groups that today pose complicated analytic and significant operational challenges to those states that are confronted by them. Over the last two decades each of these armed groups, who carry out their activities both within and across state boundaries, have increasingly threatened state supremacy. In doing so, they present non-traditional challenges to the intelligence and security services of governments that are unlike the conventional ones posed by states.

Armed groups can be divided into a four-part typology—insurgents, terrorists, militias, and organized crime.\(^1\) While it is the case that these non-state actors have several characteristics in common,\(^2\) they also have important differences that distinguish one from the other. It is important for governments to understand why and how insurgents, terrorists, militias, and criminal organizations vary conceptually from one another and to categorize and respond to them as such. Failure to do so can result in serious policy and combat misfortune.

Insurgency, from an organizational and operational perspective, is the most intricate of the four types of activities carried out by armed groups. As will be discussed, this can be seen when insurgent movements are juxtaposed with terrorist organizations. It is likewise
the case when they are put side by side with militias and criminal
groups. Insurgents can attack the state with an array of political and
paramilitary instruments because of how they organize and operate.

Numerous authors have proposed definitions of insurgency as can
be observed in the literature on political violence. Bard O’Neill, author
of *Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare*, is
one of the most frequently cited. He describes insurgents as armed
groups that “consciously use political resources and violence to
destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more
aspects of politics [within a state].” Variations of O’Neill’s definition
abound.4

Consider the statement put forward in the CIA’s mid-1980s *Guide
to the Analysis of Insurgency*—“Insurgency is a protracted political-
military activity directed toward completely or partially controlling the
resources of a country through the use of irregular military forces and
illegal political organizations.” In doing so, insurgents seek to weaken
and/or destroy the power and legitimacy of a ruling government. They
also *simultaneously* aim at increasing their own power and legitimacy.

To this end, an insurgent movement, depending on its goals and
strategy, will draw on and employ a range of operational instruments
including guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and sabotage, as well as political
mobilization, political action, intelligence/counterintelligence activities,
and propaganda/psychological warfare.

Insurgents can adopt different organizational forms ranging from
those based on political and paramilitary dimensions to more narrowly
structured conspiratorial ones. The classic or revolutionary insurgent
model from the Cold War era was designed to recruit, indoctrinate, and
mobilize supporters to establish an alternative political authority to the
existing government, while employing intelligence and military means
to attack and weaken that government through escalating violence. A conspiratorial variation, by way of contrast, focuses more exclusively on using violence to undermine the will of a government or occupying power to sustain losses and stay in the fight. It pays much less attention to controlling a particular territory, mass mobilization or building a parallel political apparatus.

Also affecting the approach taken by insurgents is the area or terrain where they carry out their activities. They can take place in an urban and/or rural environment, as well as transnationally. Each of these locations will have an impact on how the insurgents approach each of the characteristics or elements of this strategy.

On the basis of the above considerations, the following are the essential characteristics of insurgency as it will be approached in this study:

- **Insurgency is a protracted political and military set of activities directed toward partially or completely gaining control over the territory of a country.**
- **Insurgents seek to accomplish these objectives through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organizations.**
- **Insurgents employ instruments ranging from guerrilla operations, terrorism, and sabotage to political mobilization, political action, psychological operations and intelligence/counterintelligence activities.**
- **Each of these instruments is designed to weaken and/or destroy the power and legitimacy of a ruling government, while at the same time increasing the power and legitimacy of the insurgent group.**

**Types of Insurgencies**

There was little agreement among specialists during the Cold War over how to categorize different types of insurgency. And this remained true in its aftermath in the 1990s. Various experts were animated by different aspects of this type of armed group. Consequently, they
created idiosyncratic orderings or typologies of insurgency. Some focused on the organizational and operational dimensions of insurgent movements to classify them. Others concentrated on their aspirations. The following examples are illustrative of these two approaches.

The afore-cited *Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency* sets out four broad variations of insurgency in its typology—politically organized, militarily organized, and their corresponding strategies, vulnerabilities, and other characteristics. The following table illustrates these variations:

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<th>Organizational Structure</th>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Vulnerabilities</th>
<th>Other Characteristics</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politically organized</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Extensive, complex political structure developed before military operations are initiated.</td>
<td>Shadow government created to undermine authority of existing regime; political consolidation precedes military consolidation of contested areas.</td>
<td>Vulnerable to concentrated effort aimed at neutralizing the infrastructure and establishing administrative control in contested areas.</td>
<td>Protracted warfare; tendency towards excessive revolutionary zeal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarily organized</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small, decentralized structure of armed insurgents serving as a catalyst for mobilizing opposition against an existing regime.</td>
<td>Insurgent groups hope to form focus for disaffected population; destruction of regime legitimacy by military action; military consolidation precedes political consolidation of contested areas.</td>
<td>Vulnerable to aggressive military action during early stages of rebellion because of undeveloped political structure, relatively vulnerable logistics and communications networks among local populations.</td>
<td>Hope to demoralize regime and attain power without extensive conventional warfare.</td>
</tr>
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</table>
militarily organized, traditionally organized, and urban organized. Below is a brief synopsis of what each entails:⁶

As can be seen, in this categorization there are two key or defining variables, the organizational structure and operational strategy employed to achieve intermediate and long-term insurgent objectives. Other characteristics receive consideration in the text accompanying this delineation—ideology, motivation, leadership, cadre background—but organizational structure and operational strategy are the key

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<th><strong>Traditionally organized</strong></th>
<th><strong>Urban insurgency</strong></th>
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<td>Existing tribal or religious organizational structure.</td>
<td>Cellular structure in urban environment.</td>
</tr>
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<td>No unique strategy common to all; will adopt strategy of one of the other types.</td>
<td>Threaten regime legitimacy through urban disruption.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited capacity for absorbing economic and military punishment; leadership conflicts are common; leaders often lack sufficient motivation, experience as insurgents, and political discipline.</td>
<td>Restricted to small area and must hide within population; attrition resulting from military/police pressure and the psychological stress of clandestinity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruitment on basis of ethnic exclusivity.</td>
<td>Often in support of wider insurgency waged in rural areas.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
variables used to differentiate the political, military, traditional, and urban variations. A similar approach can be seen in Christopher Clapham’s categorization of insurgencies in Africa in the 1990s.\(^7\)

Bard O’Neill, on the other hand, concentrates on insurgent aspirations. In *Insurgency and Terrorism* he identifies several types of insurgency movements. For each, their principle goal or objective is the central variables. He notes that by doing so “important distinctions emerge.” Moreover, “If we fail to see the fundamental differences with respect to goals, we make a major mistake because…differentiating among goals has not only academic value but some very vital practical implications for those involved in [countering] insurgents.”\(^8\) For instance, this would be true in terms of whether an insurgent movement or elements within it are open to negotiation and political compromise.

Based on aspirations, O’Neill singles out seven types of insurgent movements—*anarchist, egalitarian, traditionalist, pluralist, secessionist, reformist, and preservationist*. Each of these prototypes focuses their activities and operations principally at the national or nation state level. However, at least in the case of two of them, the insurgents may see their movement as part of a larger international one based on a transnational ideology.

The first type—*anarchist*—has far reaching but unrealistic goals. They seek to “eliminate all institutionalized political arrangements because they view the superordinate-subordinate authority relationships associated with them as unnecessary and illegitimate.”\(^9\) To accomplish these goals, anarchist cells tend to rely on what has been called “propaganda of the deed”—violent strikes against the authority figures of the regime. While prevalent at the turn of the 20\(^{th}\) century, in the aftermath of WWII examples of this variant are scant.
The same is not the case for egalitarian or what more accurately should be termed revolutionary insurgent movements. In this approach, the insurgents seek to impose a new political and social order on the state based on a value system that calls for distributional equality. To do so, the insurgent leadership creates a centrally controlled apparatus or organization that mobilizes the people to radically transform the social structure within the existing political community.¹⁰

In the aftermath of WWII a number of communist revolutionary movements in different parts of the developing world adopted this approach. Perhaps the most illustrative example of these Cold War revolutionary insurgencies was that in Vietnam. It was able, in succession, to force first the French and then the United States to negotiate their withdrawal from the conflict. And as will be discussed later, the National Liberation Front or Viet Cong (VC), which the United States fought, established a highly developed version of this insurgent organization. While focused on seizing power at the local or nation-state level, nevertheless, the Vietnamese and other likeminded insurgencies saw themselves as part of a larger communist international movement.¹¹

A traditional insurgency also has as its goal fundamental change of the political and social order. However, what such movements plan to replace the existing system with is one that seeks to return to and restore a regime that existed in either the recent or distant past. In the case of the latter, the ancien régime is rooted in ancestral ties and religion. O’Neill refers to this subtype as reactionary. A more analytically precise and objective characterization is to describe them as Millenarian.

Millenarian movements are ones in which religious, social, and political groupings envision a coming major transformation of society
and a return to an idealized past. Such movements typically claim that the current regime and its rulers are irreparably corrupted, unjust, and otherwise irredeemable. Moreover, such movements often believe in a supernatural power and predetermined victory through the intervention of God or other metaphysical forces.

Millenarian movements, generally, see the world through Manichaean lenses—a holy war between the forces of good and evil. And they are transnational in scope as well. Revolutionary and millenarian insurgent movements have much in common with respect to a dogmatic commitment to an ideology based on a perception of that ideology as reflecting absolute truth.

Post-WWII millenarianism is most often identified with certain conceptions of radical Islamism. In the 1950s, the Muslim Brotherhood, founded by Hassan al-Banna in 1928 as a religious, political, and social/revolutionary movement, was the most active. The global Salafi Jihad movement is its foremost offspring today.

The final insurgent variant which seeks a revolutionary transformation of the political system—Pluralist—is the only one that is not authoritarian in orientation. Their goal “is to establish a system in which the values of individual freedom, liberty, and compromise are emphasized and in which political structures are differentiated and autonomous.” O’Neill notes that “While the history of Western civilization is marked by a number of such uprisings [armed insurgencies] in recent times there have been few of any…we could classify as pluralist.” While this is true of armed movements, there are a number of examples of movements employing nonviolent strategies that have the same pluralist political objectives. The fifth type of insurgency—Secessionist—seeks to break away from the state to which it is formally a part and establish an
independent political community. In the latter half of the 20th century, secessionist insurgent movements burgeoned. But there was no uniformity in the type of political system they sought to establish. Some opted for a system that reflected their ethnic and religious traditions, while others planned for more modern forms of government. None are transnational, seeing themselves as part of a larger or global movement.

The final two types of insurgency—Reformist and Preservationist—are less ambitious in terms of their aspirations. The former seeks a more equitable distribution of the political and economic goods of the system, not a radical reordering of it. The later seeks even less. It seeks to maintain the status quo, because of the relative advantages it derives from it.

**Distinctions Between Insurgency and Terrorism**

Scrutiny reveals important differences between insurgent movements and terrorist organizations. Understanding these dissimilarities is not only an academic’s prerogative. Such an appreciation is essential for those governments faced with having to combat each of these types of armed groups. Terrorism and those armed groups whose operational activities are limited to this form of political violence have been defined in a myriad of ways. Moreover, beginning in the 1960s “terrorism” came to be used pejoratively to discredit and de-legitimize various types of armed groups.

The moniker terrorist was employed by governments for propaganda and political warfare purposes against insurgent or resistance movements. The objective in doing so was to debase the reputation of the movement, render its cause illegitimate, and portray its methods as outside the laws of war. The US characterization of the Viet Cong in the 1960s is illustrative. However, for the Viet Cong,
while terrorism was employed, it was done so as one tactic within a more complex political-military strategy.14

In the 1970s, a number of armed groups did emerge that narrowed their operational approach to a reliance on terrorist tactics. Examples included the Baader-Meinhof Gang (the Red Army Faction), the Italian Red Brigades, and Japanese Red Army. They had little or no apparent desire (or capacity) to establish a mass social movement. Rather, these terrorist groups were comprised of small cells of alienated individuals embedded within national societies. The following are their key characteristics:

- **Terrorist groups seek the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through the threat and/or use of the most proscribed kind of violence for political purposes.**

- **The act is designed to have a far-reaching psychological effect beyond the immediate target of the attack. The objective is to instill fear in and intimidate a much wider audience.**

- **The targets of terrorist groups increasingly are non-combatants, and large numbers of them, who under international norms have the status of protected individuals and groups.**

Based on these characteristics, it is observable how terrorist groups differ from insurgent movements. For instance, important distinctions exist with respect to tactics and targeting. As noted above, it is the case that insurgent use of violence can include terrorism as we have defined it. But they also rely on guerrilla warfare tactics defined here as irregular small unit attacks against the state’s military and security forces to harass, exhaust, and force them to overextend their resources.

In conjunction with violence, insurgents also use a number of political tactics to reallocate power within the country. They may do so, as noted above, for revolutionary objectives—to overthrow and replace the existing social order. Or they may have far less grandiose aspirations—overthrow an established government without a follow-on
Social revolutionary agenda, establish an autonomous national territory, cause the withdrawal of an occupying power, or extract political concessions that are unattainable through less violent means.

These differences are captured graphically in the diagram below. Here we can see that there is some overlap between terrorism and insurgency, but there are also large areas where they do not intersect.

**Insurgency and High-Risk Social Movements**

An additional lens through which to understand the nature of revolutionary and millenarian insurgency strategy is social movement theory. Indeed, these two forms of insurgency share several characteristics with social movements. It is particularly relevant with respect to the relationship between the organizational characteristics of such insurgencies and their worldview, ideology, and programs. And by using this lens we see how the terrorist moniker can conceal more than it reveals about armed groups.

Social movements often take the form of large-scale groupings of individuals and/or organizations focused on achieving some degree of political or social change. Broadly defined, a social movement is comprised of an element or grouping of the population within a state—
Shultz—Global Insurgency Strategy

a collectivity—that challenges the dominant institutional order and proposes an alternative structural arrangement.

Social movements represent groups that are on the margins of state and society. Outside the boundaries of institutional power they seek to change the system, often in fundamental ways. Given its position on the margins of state and society a social movement has to develop a sophisticated strategy to achieve its objectives.

Social movements come in a number of different forms. Sociologists distinguish between reform and radical variations. The former includes a trade union seeking to increase workers rights or a green movement advocating new ecological laws. Radical variations include the American Civil Rights Movement which demanded full civil rights and equality under the law for all Americans or the Polish Solidarity (Solidarność) movement which called for the transformation of the communist system into a democratic one.

Social movements are also distinguished by their method of operations. Some employ peaceful means; others engage in high-risk, high-cost activism. The later often involves armed violence and underground organizations. Revolutionary and millenarian insurgencies are illustrative.

Why do individuals join high-risk movements and once they do so how are they retained? Social scientists have focused on those factors that facilitate participation in collective action. Answers are sought to the following questions: One, what explains how an individual initially becomes interested in a social movement? What leads him to be willing to expose himself to a new way of thinking? Two, once exposed, how does the movement convince him that it is a legitimate alternative and persuade him to accept its worldview? Three, how is he convinced to
engage in high-risk activity. Four, how does the movement retain him to continue to do so?

High-risk social movements have to establish structured organizations with consciously conceived goals and programs for achieving those goals. They adopt characteristics of a formal organization (even when they are clandestine). However, they differ from other organizations in that they exist explicitly for bringing about major or systemic change. And the more far-reaching that proposed change, the more complex the tasks a social movement organization has to accomplish. This is especially true for social movements that take the form of revolutionary and millenarian insurgencies.

The Role of Ideology. A key element of a high-risk social movement is the role played by ideology in shaping its purpose, programs, and operations. Ideological appeals are central to their existence, to recruitment strategies that attract new members, to a member’s loyalty and retention, and as tools for waging the fight.

Ideology—“[A]n emotion-laden system of ideas, beliefs, myths, and values”—binds a movement together. An important feature of ideology is its appeal to emotion and its eliciting of an affective response. And the “myths and values of ideology are communicated through symbols” that “capture large expanses of meaning and communicate that meaning.”16 Within this context, the ideology of high-risk movements performs the following activities:

- It provides a comprehensive critique of the existing social and political order as immoral and inhuman, and instills in individuals a powerful sense of moral outrage. Such ideologies paint a situation in black and white terms. There are no grays.
- It provides an idealized and superior alternative order as a substitute for the status quo and a set of values that will serve as the basis for a new idealized society or for the return to an earlier golden age.
It serves to mobilize individuals to join the movement and gives those who become members a sense of unity, solidarity, cohesion, and sense of purpose.

It identifies the plans and programs by which the movement intends to reach its objectives, relating specific patterns of action to the realization of its vision and values.

It is through these activities that a movement’s ideological appeal results in successful recruitment. Ideology builds a series of frames that describe the social and political problems requiring immediate and drastic action and provides a road map for redressing them. Ideology includes a diagnostic frame that describes the problem, detailing the grave injustice that has transpired. A prescriptive frame that asserts what must be done to rectify it, proposing a new idealized system that will replace the depraved one. And a motivational/mobilization frame spells out the steps to be taken—the strategy to be followed—to bring to fruition the prescriptive frame.17

Revolutionary and millenarian ideologies not only provide an individual with new beliefs but a new identity and reality. The process amounts to a conversion. The recruit comes to see the social and political order as highly unjust, adopts a new holistic worldview to replace it, and receives a plausible strategy for changing it. Below, an examination of one of the most successful post-WWII revolutionary insurgency movements reveals that this is, to a major extent, a labor-intensive process that involves education and indoctrination.

Mobilization, integration, and retention constitute a process for reconstructing identity and reality. The recruit is converted to the cause and integrated into a social network of believers. High-risk social movements that adopt insurgency strategies mobilize individuals into groups that struggle and fight together—go to war—to bring about social and political change.
Ideology and Organization. The ideology of high-risk social movements comprises a series of frames that must come to resonate with the target audience. It is through the movement’s organization that this is achieved. Ideology and organization are symbiotically connected. As illustrated below, organization is the mechanism through which the ideological frames are mediated with the target audience. The interaction between ideological commitment and organizational structure can be seen particularly with respect to membership, leadership, and institutionalization.

As a high-risk movement becomes embodied in a more elaborate and structured organizational apparatus, the processes of mobilization, integration, and retention likewise become more formalized. The lines between hardcore members and those who sympathize and/or passively support the movement are sharpened. Boundaries are drawn and reinforced. Signs or symbols are established to demarcate members from non-members. This can take many forms such as special ways in which members greet and address one another.

In high-risk social movements membership becomes fully socialized into an insular and ideologically-based network where the demands associated with participation are unbending. The members’ place in the organization and the activities he is expected to engage in become the center of his existence. The internal strength of such a movement is the result of intense organizational work through which a mass base of support is created out of indoctrination efforts directed by a leadership that considers one of its most important tasks the translation of ideology into action. Once institutionalized, high-risk social movements (to include revolutionary insurgencies) become professionalized. The organization is able to outlive its charismatic founder(s) and become routinized.
REVOLUTIONARY INSURGENCY AND ITS TRANSNATIONAL EVOLUTION

Throughout the post-WWII era the developing world was the scene of extensive conflict, instability, and internal warfare. The pressures and challenges underlying that violence were the result of the decolonization process, crises of state legitimacy, redistribution of power, sectarian disputes, and secessionist pressures. In all of these conflicts states were pitted against non-state armed groups, the latter of which employed different irregular warfare strategies.

Of those different types of political-military strife, the most comprehensive was that carried out by national liberation movements employing revolutionary insurgency strategy. Due to this complexity, they were often misconstrued in terms of their ideology, narrative, and operational activities. This section reviews the core elements of that strategy, its different stages, the role of external assistance and the operational evolution of revolutionary insurgent strategy on to the transnational stage beginning in the latter 1970s. Below are the summary points from that review, followed by the text from which they have been drawn.

Summary Points

- Of the different types of political-military conflict in the developing world following WWII, the most complex was that conducted by national liberation movements employing revolutionary insurgency strategy.
- Revolutionary insurgent strategy combined unconventional paramilitary tactics with political and psychological operations to establish a competing ideological structure and war fighting organization. Its immediate goal was regime change, which serves as prelude for political and social transformation of the state.
- Successful revolutionary insurgencies employed grand strategies that implemented an integrated operational plan of action based on the following elements: ideology, leadership, mass base, logistics, organizational apparatus, political, psychological, guerrilla warfare, paramilitary tactics, and external assistance.
While each element is necessary for sustaining a revolutionary insurgency, the interrelated elements of *leadership, ideology* and *organization* lie at its core. They constitute the *remarkable trinity* of revolutionary insurgency strategy.

Leadership is indispensable. Leaders of post-WWII revolutionary insurgencies performed key fundamental tasks, most importantly devising an effective ideology and organization.

To mobilize followers a successful revolutionary insurgency required an appealing ideology that played the central role in attracting new members; shaping their loyalty to retain them; and served as a vital tool for waging the political fight for legitimacy.

Successful revolutionary insurgencies instituted organizational infrastructures that were extensive and functionally multifaceted to 1) broaden political appeal, influence, and control; and 2) create a war-fighting capability sustained through a robust command, logistical, and financial system.

The incipient stage of revolutionary insurgencies focused on building a mass base of supporters. This was the first step in establishing an organizational infrastructure capable of conducting protracted revolutionary warfare.

Recruiting a mass base to staff an insurgent organization was difficult. Traditional societies were not receptive to such activities. The revolutionary leadership had to shift traditional loyalties and induce people to become risk takers. They had to accept new roles, integrate into new social patterns, follow new authority, and tolerate the stresses inherent in protracted warfare.

To do so, leadership, ideology, and organization established a *process* to draw and bind people to the revolutionary insurgent movement. That *process* inculcated the movement’s ideology and narrative into those recruited. The *process* consisted of three tasks—*mobilization, integration, and maintenance*.

*Mobilization* began the *process* of convincing individuals to break with existing social and cultural context and accept a new one set out in ideology and narrative. The first stage ended with acceptance of membership. It consisted mainly of persuasion through ideological and nationalistic appeals, the promise of rewards, self-satisfaction, revenge, and advancement. These methods could be accompanied by more coercive ones.

In the second stage—*integration*—the recruit was socialized into the insurgent movement, brought into conformity with its goals, convinced to make a major commitment, and came to be synchronized
with and controlled by the organization. New recruits did not have this level of commitment when they joined. Achieving it necessitated a careful socialization and indoctrination course of action.

- The final stage—*maintenance* or retention—focused the highly stressful nature of protracted war and the challenge of keeping members in the fight. Maintaining compliance with the leadership’s authority, staying loyal to and identifying with the movement’s ideology and narrative, and sustaining institutional bonds required careful tending.

- The Viet Cong approach to the *mobilization, integration, and maintenance* illustrates how national-level revolutionary insurgent movements developed a mass base of support during the incipient stage. The *process* was a localized, individualized, hands-on, face-to-face, and labor intensive exercise.

- Following the incipient stage, revolutionary insurgencies entered into long periods of protracted irregular warfare. Insurgents fought *long wars* that demanded establishing and staffing war-fighting organizations that could sustain political, psychological, guerrilla warfare, and other paramilitary operations over lengthy time periods against stronger opponents. Often protracted irregular warfare proceeded through several stages.

- Because revolutionary insurgencies were radical social movements, political operations were vital for fighting the state. Through parallel hierarchies or shadow government these activities took different forms to include incorporating various social groupings to broaden the insurgent apparatus and institutionalize its mass bases.

- Political operations included two other critical activities: 1) addressing the material and social inequalities that were important causes of the insurgency. Parallel hierarchies provided social services; and 2) establishing the means of producing or acquiring war-fighting capabilities.

- Other key operational activities employed by revolutionary insurgents to execute protracted irregular warfare included 1) propaganda, political warfare, and psychological operations to propagate their narrative internally and internationally through information campaigns; 2) intelligence and counterintelligence; and 3) paramilitary operations (terrorism, guerrilla warfare, sabotage, and mobile conventional tactics).

- Finally, revolutionary insurgent movements during the Cold War sought and received external support mainly from the Soviet Union. They did so because of the power of the regimes they were fighting. But they also saw themselves as part of a global ideological and
revolutionary struggle. Still, these were first and foremost national-level insurgencies.

- In the latter 1970s certain national level groups challenging state authority through insurgency warfare began to extend the battlefield to the transnational level out of operational necessity. In the forefront of this evolution of insurgency strategy was the PLO. They introduced two important operational innovations 1) they extended their area of operations to attack targets in other regions, primarily Europe; and 2) through these operations the PLO successfully exploited propaganda of the deed to propagate its message transnationally to mobilize much wider support for its cause.

- These PLO operational innovations with respect to the conduct of insurgency were emulated by other armed groups during the 1980s. Moreover, as will be described in a later section, these innovations also had an important impact on how al Qaeda planned and conducted global operations in the 1990s and beyond.

**Background**

Post-WWII revolutionary insurgencies generally were based on variations of Marxism and nationalism. However, within the context of the Cold War and the East-West struggle, the former was often seen as of greater consequence than the latter and as linking these national-level conflicts to a global movement. Because the ideology of national liberation movements employing revolutionary insurgency strategy tended to be a variation of Marxism, they were frequently seen as appendages of a Soviet-led international communist movement. While the USSR did provide assistance to several of these insurgencies, by no means was it the general staff that directed a global revolutionary insurgency against the West.

To be sure, world revolution—international system change—was the original goal of the Communist International or Comintern. Founded in Moscow in 1919, it was established by Lenin to lay claim to the leadership and direction of the world revolutionary movement. And it did provide some assistance to local communist insurgency movements. Lenin saw the Comintern as the general staff of a world
revolution which would overthrow the international capitalist order. However, because of deep internal divisions and lack of capabilities it never came close to achieving that lofty goal during its existence.\textsuperscript{18} The Comintern was officially dissolved on May 15, 1943, by Stalin.\textsuperscript{19}

During the Cold War the Soviet Union re-established a policy of supporting national liberation movements, most notably under Brezhnev. This began in the latter 1960s with major assistance to the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong. In the early 1970s, Middle Eastern and African movements likewise received paramilitary aid. By the decades’ end it was extended to Latin America.\textsuperscript{20} Several of these movements came to power. But Moscow’s assistance was not the principle reason they were able to do so.

While it is beyond the scope of this study to go into the details of why and how this took place, two issues are important to highlight. First, Soviet policy appears to have been driven more by the superpower confrontation, international balance of power, and expansionism than by a commitment to communist internationalism and world revolution. Of course, it was framed in terms of the latter, but the consensus among specialists is the former was the central imperative.\textsuperscript{21}

Second, insurgent movements that received assistance and came to power at the end of the day enacted policies that reflected their national interest rather than communist internationalism. They were not spokes in the wheel of world revolution. Consequently, it would be a mistake to see the revolutionary wars of the post-WWII era and their outcomes as part of a global communist insurgency.

The insurgency strategy that post-WWII revolutionary movements employed was frequently misconstrued, and equated with guerrilla warfare tactics and terrorism. While these tactics were part of this
variation of insurgency, they were not the essence of it. Revolutionary insurgent strategy combined unconventional paramilitary tactics—guerrilla warfare and terrorism—with political and psychological operations to establish a competing ideological structure and war-fighting organization. Its immediate goal, regime change, served as prelude to a more definitive objective—political and social transformation of the state.

This variation of insurgency, whose roots lie in the Chinese Communist movement of the 1930s, required a grand strategy to be successful. In essence, an operational plan of action that included the following elements: ideology, leadership, mass base, logistics, organizational apparatus, political, psychological and paramilitary tactics, and external linkages/assistance.

While each was necessary for mounting and sustaining protracted warfare, the closely interrelated elements of leadership, ideology, and organization lie at the core of post-WWII revolutionary insurgent strategy. They played a vital role in each phase of conflict. And they were particularly crucial in the incipient or initial period of activity. It is in this embryonic moment that leaders must emerge and shape an ideology and narrative that responds to both real domestic grievances—corruption, repression, unemployment, poverty, insufficient social services, and disrespect for traditional norms—as well as to the desire for a better and more secure way of life. Likewise, in the incipient stage the foundation for the insurgent’s organizational infrastructure is laid.

These three elements—leadership, ideology, and organization—are crucial to the implementation of an operational plan of action that seeks first and foremost to woo the population over to the side of the insurgency movement. The population is the vital element for insurgent success. They have to win the population over to its side.
Core Elements of Strategy

Effective leadership was a key aspect of successful post-WWII revolutionary insurgent movements. Leaders performed certain vital tasks. These included establishing ideology and organization. Without effective leadership that was able to do so, ideology and organization were likely to be ineffectual.

Without a relevant ideology and narrative, mobilization of the necessary followers to join the insurgent movement will not occur. Lacking an appealing ideology, mass mobilization will not get off the ground. For high-risk social movements like these post-WWII revolutionary insurgencies, ideology played a key role in establishing support for the movement, its leaders, objectives, and actions. Effective leadership and ideology maximized appeal to the population, the vital element—key ingredient—for success.

While leadership and ideology were necessary, alone they were not sufficient for mobilization of a mass base to take place. A key enabling component was an organizational infrastructure that facilitated cross-cutting social and political structures that extend down to the local level. This broadened a movement’s appeal, influence and control. And that organization also created a war-fighting capability.

In On War, Clausewitz refers to the symbiotic relationship among three elements of what he coined the remarkable trinity: the military, the government, and the people. He proposed that a central task of the strategist was to develop and maintain a balance between them. It was essential to success in war. We would propose that the remarkable trinity for revolutionary insurgency movements, the sine qua non for success is an effective interrelationship between leadership, ideology, and organization.
The Incipient Stage and the Revolutionary Insurgent Trinity

To implement a revolutionary insurgent strategy, the leadership of nascent movements during the Cold War required a capacity to recruit the necessary personnel from within the population. Without it they were unable to execute the operational activities pertinent to each of the functional elements of their strategy.

The contemporary history of revolutionary insurgencies reveals that they succeed when supported by a sufficient part of the population. Therefore, in the incipient stage, leaders had to be able to recruit supporters—build a base—for the movement. This was the first step in establishing an organizational infrastructure capable of conducting protracted revolutionary warfare.

In the incipient stage, leaders established the means to bring individuals from various societal groupings into the movement to staff the insurgent organization and execute operational activities. But this is difficult to accomplish. Why? Traditional societies—the location where post-WWII revolutionary insurgencies took place—were not receptive to such activities. This meant overcoming local predispositions that did not lend themselves to risk taking and recruitment. Traditional culture revolved around village life, local social patterns, and loyalties that were not easily altered.

To recruit members, traditional loyalties had to be broadened to induce people to become risk takers. Unless they were willing to accept new roles, integrate into new social patterns, follow new authority, and tolerate the stresses inherent in protracted warfare, insurgent organizations could not establish a base from within the population and did not maintain themselves for long. The revolutionary organization had to create enduring bonds based on the adoption of ideology and narrative.
How did they bring this about? Leadership, ideology, and organization established a process able to draw and bind people to the insurgent movement. That process provided those recruited with social-psychological compensation for high-risk taking. It created motivation. Ideology and narrative were inculcated through this process. The rank and file that constituted the base of successful insurgencies did not automatically accept ideology and narrative. It was only through the process described below that they came to commit to it.

This process consists of three tasks—mobilization, integration, and maintenance (or retention). Each is briefly defined below, followed by a case study highlighting how the National Liberation Front or Viet Cong employed these methods to build a revolutionary insurgent organization. Arguably, in the post-WWII period they proved to be among the most proficient at it. And, as will be underscored, it was a hands-on, face-to-face, labor intensive exercise.

**Phase I—Mobilization.** Mobilization (or recruitment) was the starting point where an individual had to be convinced to break with the existing social and cultural context and accept a new one set out in ideology and narrative. Joining the movement typically was not a single act but a progression that began with the individual’s exposure to the movement generally by someone who was already an established member.

The end of the first stage was acceptance of membership in the movement. Mobilization or recruitment consisted of various kinds of activities that sought to persuade through ideological and nationalistic appeals, the promise of rewards and status, self-satisfaction, revenge, and advancement. These methods could also include more coercive ones such as group pressure, threats, and forced induction.
Phase II—Integration. In the second stage—integration—the recruit was socialized into the insurgent organization. Through integration the individual was brought into conformity with the insurgency’s goals and convinced to make a serious commitment to their achievement.

Through integration methods an individual came to be in harmony with and controlled by the organization. Achieving it necessitated a careful socialization and indoctrination course of action. Through these techniques new members learned to take orders and follow the guidance they were given. The recruit was embedded in the organization and agreed to perform those tasks that were assigned.

Phase III—Maintenance. The final stage involved maintenance or retention. Given the highly stressful and dangerous nature of protracted war, keeping members in the fight required attention. Maintaining compliance with the leadership’s authority, staying loyal to and identifying with the movement’s ideology and narrative, and sustaining institutional bonds required careful tending.

Building and retaining a base of supporters through the process of mobilization, integration, and maintenance afforded post-WWII revolutionary insurgent movements the opportunity to develop the means to conduct protracted irregular warfare. They were now able to move beyond the incipient stage to 1) engage in both underground political, social, and informational operations; and 2) activate armed elements to carry out paramilitary operations to include guerrilla warfare, sabotage, and terrorism.

The Case of the Viet Cong. The Vietnamese National Liberation Front (NLF) or Viet Cong (VC) followed the mobilization, integration, and maintenance process during its incipient stage. Douglas Pike, in his study Viet Cong: Organization and Techniques of the National
Liberation Front of South Vietnam noted: “When I first approached the subject of the National Liberation Front, I was struck by the enormous amount of time, energy, manpower, and money it spent on communication activities. It seemed obsessed with explaining itself.” The net effect, wrote Pike, was that they “brought to the villages of South Vietnam significant social change” and did so “largely by means of the communication process.”

Through it they exposed traditional villagers to new ideas, new methods, and new social structures. According to Pike, “The goal [during the period] was control of the population and through that control, the organization of the people into a weapon against the government,” and later against the United States. To do so, the VC had to change attitudes, create an alternative belief system, and establish a new socialization pattern.

What follows is a brief description of how they employed the mobilization, integration, and maintenance process. Execution of it was extensive, localized, and personalized. It focused on the individual who was introduced to the NLF through a variety of means and eventually recruited. And once recruited the indoctrination and training work began in order to turn the individual into a committed member. As Pike intimates above, the process was labor intensive and utilized “indoctrination efforts, shared social myths, and leader-led relations.”

Mobilization was the first step in creating a mystique that served as the foundation of a new identity for the individual. 

Mobilization began with an initial exposure to VC recruitment and culminated with acceptance or refusal of membership. The approach taken was based on detailed personal dossiers of individuals in a village. VC agents looked for those vulnerabilities that would make a potential recruit susceptible to one of its messages. Success came
through an understanding of the individual and the circumstances surrounding his life.

Based on that understanding of the individual one or more of the following approaches could be used by a recruiter to persuade him to consider joining—**social pressure** (friends or family who were already members would be used to bring pressure); **emotional appeals** (the target was young and could be convinced through proselytizing, convincing him that he could achieve honor and glory); **personal susceptibility** (the target was dissatisfied with his circumstances and with village life); **personal rewards** (the target sought social advancement and prestige); **injustices experienced** (the target and his family or friends had been abused by the government); **nationalist sentiments** (the target was patriotic); and **ideological attraction** (the Front’s narrative was persuasive and its idealistic goals convincing).

In sum, the NLF was an active agent that sought out recruits. While it would use coercion when necessary to gain access to villagers, once access was gained, positive forms of persuasion were most often employed to convince them to join. A variety of organizational activities were directed towards creating a setting conducive to mobilization. These activities varied from area to area and individual to individual.

The recruit was placed into a setting where through intensive indoctrination and training he would come to be embedded into the revolutionary movement and prepared for a new role and a new identity. This was the second phase of the process—**integration** of the individual into the NLF. The goal was to instill into the individual those norms and values that would bind him to the organization. He was to come to believe the ideology and narrative, become committed to political and social change, and adopt a prescribed code of behavior.
Commitment was measured in terms of obedience to the organization and allegiance to its cause. The integrated recruit was willing to sacrifice himself for the cause of the movement, and submit to the leadership and unity of its organization.

The VC paid a great deal of attention to turning the newly recruited into a committed cadre. They expended considerable resources to imbue—socialize and indoctrinate—its members. At the end of the day, the new recruit had a new identity that was very different from that of the peasant in the Vietnamese village. Paul Berman sums up this transformation as follows: “Rather than acceptance of nature, there is mastery over fate; rather than denial of emotion, there is hate, enthusiasm, and zealotry; rather than political apathy, there is politicization; rather than self-interest, there is self-sacrifice; rather than devotion to the family, there is commitment to the revolutionary organization.”

Retaining the individual in the revolutionary insurgent organization was the third step in the process. Here also the NLF committed considerable resources and effort. It had to because it was in a long protracted war with a superpower. Mobilizing and integrating was not sufficient. The revolutionary organization had to take active steps to maintain itself. This included an aggressive use of information and propaganda to convince the rank-and-file that they would prevail. Recall what Pike said about the inordinate amount of time and effort that went into the Front’s use of information and communication.

Additionally, a range of more proactive techniques were used to help members cope with the stresses of fighting. These included individual and group morale-building programs to reinforce the messages fostered in information and propaganda. Rewards were likewise used. For those fighting these includes promotions,
commendations, and medals. Material privileges and other forms of gratification also fortified commitment.

Maintenance also took place through raising the costs of dissension and leaving. The NLF did so through constant surveillance of its members, and the use of sanctions and punishments if warranted. The latter ranged from reprimands and reeducation for desertion to execution for traitorous behavior.

In sum, the Viet Cong approach to the mobilization, integration, and maintenance process illustrates how a revolutionary insurgent movement developed a mass base of support during its incipient stage. It was a localized, individualized, hands-on, face-to-face, and labor intensive exercise. Through mobilization and extensive efforts at integration they produced the personnel that staffed a complex political and military organization, one capable of protracted warfare. Their mobilization and integration efforts, according to several assessments, were quite effective. Maintenance of that organization in the period after the incipient stage proved much more challenging for the NLF.

Can such a process be replicated at the international level to make possible a global insurgency? What methods would have to be substituted for the localized, individualized, hands-on, face-to-face ones employed by the VC and other post-WWII revolutionary insurgent organizations? As we will discuss later in this paper, during the latter 1970s an evolution in the national-level insurgency model began to take place. National-level movements began to go transnational. This was the first step in an evolutionary process that, as we shall see, will be greatly affected by globalization and the information revolution of the 1990s.
The Protracted Warfare Stage

Following the incipient stage, national-level insurgencies entered long periods of protracted irregular warfare. This proved to be highly demanding. Insurgent organizations fought *long wars* that could proceed through several stages. These were first formally conceptualized by Mao Tse Tung, based on the Chinese Communist experience. While Mao provided a set of guidelines for prosecuting a protracted war, in the field there proved to be no one formula. A number of variations took place in practice. Comparative analysis bares this out.

Because revolutionary insurgencies were also social movements, political operations were a vital part of strategy for fighting these *long wars*. These took a number of different forms. They included incorporating various social groupings—religious, occupational, women, writers, farmers, youth—into the insurgent infrastructure. That allowed a revolutionary organization to broaden its apparatus and institutionalize its base of supporters. In doing so, insurgent leaders were able to involve different segments of the population in the movement through a variety of local political and social activities. Political operations also included providing social services in areas where the insurgents had a major presence. Finally, political operations involved raising funds and managing financial structures, as well as establishing logistical networks for procurement of war fighting and other supplies from external sources.

A second set of operational activities can be grouped under the rubric of propaganda and psychological operations. These were wars for legitimacy, and successful insurgencies put a great deal of time and effort into propagating their narrative internally through newspapers, pamphlets, radio broadcasts, rallies, meetings, and one-on-one sessions.
In many instances they likewise carried out these information campaigns externally through friendly governments, international organizations where they were given forums, and front organizations.

Intelligence operations were a third important component of the war fighting capabilities of revolutionary insurgencies during the protracted war stage. Within the insurgent apparatus special divisions were established for both intelligence and counterintelligence.

Finally, the use of violence manifested itself in different kinds of paramilitary operations. This included the use of terrorism, as it was defined earlier. Post-WWII insurgents utilized it to different degrees. However, the primary way of fighting was guerrilla warfare operations directed against the military and police forces of the regime. The objective was to harass and undermine their willingness to fight. Only when the balance of forces begins to shift were larger and more quasi-conventional units introduced to fight positional battles and defend those areas where they established sanctuary.

The Role of External Assistance and Influence

Revolutionary insurgent movements during the Cold War sought and received external support mainly from the Soviet Union and its surrogates. The reason they sought this aid, in the first place, had to do with the practical realities of the conflict. To offset the superior power of the states they were confronting, even insurgent movements that had established a mass base and organizational infrastructure capable of executing the operations described in the previous section required additional resources to accomplish their objectives. External help was even more critical for those insurgencies that had not reached this degree of effectiveness.

Given that the ideological basis for revolutionary insurgencies at that time was Marxism, they sought outside assistance of various kinds
from the major communist power. Why did the USSR come to provide it, particularly in the latter 1960s? As was noted earlier, there was considerable debate at the time over how to interpret the motives underlying external assistance. We would concur with O’Neill that it principally had to do with the post-WWII superpower confrontation. “The greatest impetus to external support for such insurgent movements… [was] the continuous rivalry between the major communist powers and the West since the late 1940s.”

Soviet external support took two basic forms. First, political instruments to include propaganda, the use of front organizations, and political action inside international organizations were utilized to champion the cause and objectives of revolutionary insurgent movements on the world stage. The goal was to build support for the just cause of insurgents, while de-legitimizing the incumbent regime (and the United States if it was backing it) they were fighting.

Second, paramilitary assistance was also provided to improve the fighting proficiency of the insurgent forces against their police and military counterparts. The principle kinds of help included the transfer of weapons, training insurgent members, and providing advisory support (mainly through surrogates). The Soviet Union not only provided paramilitary assistance on its own, but also called on its East European and Cuban allies to do the same.

In providing this assistance, the USSR asserted that it was its duty to materially assist local revolutionary insurgent movements that were ideologically simpathico with the cause of world revolution. In other words, these local movements were said to be part of a world movement that aimed at international system change.

This begs the question did the sum total of post-WWII national-level revolutionary insurgencies amount to a global insurgency under
the direction of the Soviet Union? To be sure, they all rhetorically asserted they adhered to the same ideology that called for regime change locally and international system transformation globally. And the USSR asserted it was supporting national-level revolutionary insurgencies on that basis. Thus, local insurgencies were framed as part of a global struggle between competing ideological systems. These national-level insurgencies were characterized by themselves and by the USSR as members of a worldwide revolutionary movement that was at war with the West. But was this really the case?

For many revolutionary insurgencies the ideology and narrative that they founded their movements on included, often more importantly, nationalism and national identity frames, as well as contextual issues related to local political and social conditions. In other words, while we cannot discount the fact that they themselves framed their struggle within the context of the East-West global ideological confrontation, their immediate political objective—overthrow of the regime they were at war with—was of paramount importance. Therefore, national and contextual issues were of preeminent importance in framing ideology and narrative. And once in power, they did not take direction from the USSR or commit significant resources to conducting a global fight.

Likewise, with respect to the Soviet Union, the decision to more actively promote wars of national liberation through political and paramilitary assistance in the latter 1960s does not appear to have been based on the goal of establishing an existential or ideal international end state through a global insurgency strategy. Rather, it was more about the balance of power and Soviet expansionism. Moreover, Moscow saw the United States as vulnerable in the aftermath of Vietnam, unwilling to use force or assist regimes threatened by
revolution. Therefore, the USSR was more willing to project power and influence into what it termed the national liberation zone of the developing world. By the mid 1980s, it found the costs of maintaining this policy increasingly prohibitive.\textsuperscript{33}

**The Transnational Evolution of National-Level Insurgency**

In the latter 1970s certain national level groups and movements challenging state authority through unconventional warfare began to extend the battlefield to the transnational level. They did so mostly out of operational necessity. The counter-insurgency measures of the states they were fighting had become increasingly effective, preventing the establishment of a clandestine infrastructure or shadow government in the area of conflict. Because of these developments, the chances of successfully gaining control of territory within the state and inflicting real defeats on government security forces were remote. Therefore, to continue the fight a new variation or approach to insurgency was required.

Among the first armed groups to extend the battlefield transnationally were Palestinian ones fighting against Israel. This transpired over the period from the late 1940s to the middle of the 1970s. Recall that during the Arab-Israeli war of 1948 many Palestinian Arabs left their homes for neighboring countries, fleeing voluntarily or being forced to leave by Israeli forces. This was the beginning of the Palestinian Diaspora communities that exist today.

Located in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt, it was from these refugee communities that new armed political groups began to emerge. Their leaders asserted that if the Palestinians were to retake their homeland, they would have to take responsibility for doing so. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was established in 1964 for this purpose. Under the general direction of Yasser Arafat, the PLO
served as an umbrella organization for several constituent groups. These included Al-Fatah, Force 17, Hawari Group, PLF, and PFLP. Each had its own fedayeen or commando assault units that carried out cross-border strikes against Israeli territory from those contiguous states where the Palestinians had re-located. These guerrilla warfare and terrorist operations intensified in the aftermath of the 1967 war.

Israel not only defeated the armies of its Arab neighbors in six days but also seized control of the West Bank and Gaza. As a result, the exodus of Palestinians that had begun in 1948 increased dramatically especially to the near sanctuaries of Jordan and Lebanon. Consequently, infiltration attacks across the borders of these states against fortified Kibbutz’s, military targets, and public facilities escalated. And Jordan and other Arab states provided increased support for these operations as an alternative means to conventional inter-state warfare to recover lost territory and advance other goals.

Israel countered by developing a robust border defense system. It included removal of Palestinian villages, small-unit patrolling, rapid reaction operations to include hot pursuit of infiltrators seeking to flee back to their sanctuaries, and air-artillery attacks against those sanctuaries and the military forces of the regimes that provided the safe haven. In the case of the latter, Israel’s objective was to raise the costs to those providing support for fedayeen operations. This was certainly true for how it dealt with Jordan. In 1968 Israel began launching air and artillery barrages against Jordanian army positions. These reprisals resulted in considerable military casualties.

For Jordan, these attacks by Israel on its army were only part of the price for backing fedayeen operations. A second cost was the emergence of the PLO as a hostile “state within a state” inside the kingdom. In 1969 this led to several hundred violent clashes between
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the Palestinian forces and Jordanian security forces. Acts of violence against Jordanian security forces included kidnapnings and ritualistic murders. By February 1970 fighting was taking place between Jordanian security forces and the Palestinian groups in the streets of Amman, resulting in about 300 deaths. This escalated through the summer months to include several assassination attempts against King Hussein. The rest of the year saw intense fighting that resulted in thousands of deaths. By the summer of 1971 the PLO was driven out of Jordan, and had to re-establish itself in Lebanon.

Having lost its bases in Jordan and increasingly constrained in attacking cross border from Lebanon due to Israeli counterinsurgency tactics, the PLO turned to transnational operations to extend the battlefield beyond the local region. PLO operatives began traveling from the Middle East to Europe in order to carry out attacks. And those operations increasingly began to target civilians. The foremost early example of this was the attack by the PLO’s Black September Organization on Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympic Games. While the operation actually failed to achieve its immediate objective, it nevertheless was a major success in terms of capturing the imagination of the Palestinian Diaspora. And in its aftermath thousands of Palestinians rushed to join the PLO. Other operations ensued in the 1970s including skyjackings, hostage taking, letter bombs, and assassinations in various parts of Europe.

These attacks were part of a new approach which, according to John Mackinlay and Alison Al-Baddawy, reflected “an important connecting factor. Each act, usually in its final stages, became highly visible and often by design encouraged reporters, press photographers, and television and film coverage. The attacks were irresistible as news stories because they were so visually sensational but also because they
were carried out with such desperate conviction.” Because of the media coverage of these transnational operations the PLO leadership was able to reach several “important audiences: large numbers of their own nationals in foreign countries, Arab states, the Muslim community worldwide and Western states, some which preferred not to think about Palestine.”

With the effectiveness of Israeli counterinsurgency tactics, the PLO had to find a way other than localized guerrilla warfare to reach these audiences. It did so through international terrorism—attacks mainly against what international law designates as protected categories of people that are off limits in war. But to understand these attacks solely on those terms misconstrues the propaganda and political mobilization features of the operations.

Mackinlay and Al-Baddawy describe their significance and how they transformed the conduct of insurgency, introducing a new variation of this form of warfare. The PLO grasped that “[W]e are living in an era of violent activism that accepts that we are animated by the propaganda of the deed, rather than the military value of the deed itself.” The PLO adapted its campaign to this reality and “succeeded in getting themselves and the Palestinian issue onto the global agenda.” The result was that these operations came to be “widely supported, clandestinely by Arab states and overtly by radicalized Muslim communities.” These were not “the acts of politically isolated extremists.” Rather, they were key elements of a new Palestinian strategy, one that through transnational terrorist operations successfully exploited propaganda of the deed to propagate its message and mobilize support for its cause.

In sum, the PLO introduced two important operational innovations during this period with respect to the conduct of insurgency that not
only served as an inspiration for other armed groups during the 1980s but, as we shall describe later, also had an important impact on how al Qaeda conducted global operations in the 1990s. First, they extended their area of operations to strike at US targets across the globe. Second, the objective of those operations became “propaganda of the deed, rather than the military value of the deed itself.” Attacks were planned and executed for their visibility and propaganda value. In the 1990s the media became the propagator of al Qaeda’s message. And by the end of the decade it was doing the propagating of its activities and ideology not only through the media but by way of its own Internet news shows and online publications.

**REQUIREMENTS FOR A GLOBAL SALAFI JIHADIST INSURGENCY**

Is the Salafi Islamist Jihad movement executing protracted global insurgency warfare? Are they utilizing a global version of the national-level revolutionary insurgent strategy and/or its transnational adaptation as described in the previous section? To answer these questions it is first necessary to identify the requirements or conditions of a global insurgency. Five primary requirements are proposed. They are deduced from 1) the strategy employed by national-level revolutionary insurgent movements during the latter half of the 20th century, 2) how insurgent groups beginning in the latter 1970s extended that battlefield transnationally and through terrorism exploited propaganda of the deed, and 3) the key distinguishing characteristics of the Salafi Jihad movement. Below are the main summary points from the review, followed by the account from which they are taken.

**Summary Points**

- For the Salafi Islamist Jihad movement to execute a global version of the national-level revolutionary insurgent strategy it would have to meet five requirements or conditions.
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- **First requirement**—Conceptualize an ideology that performs the same functions as those adopted by high-risk social movements. This entails developing a series of frames to: 1) describe the social and political problems requiring immediate and drastic action; 2) propose a new idealized system to replace the depraved one that resonated with the population; and 3) identify steps to bring this to fruition.

- **Second requirement**—An innovative leadership that can conceptualize that ideology and establish an embryonic organization capable of operationalizing it to begin to attract and recruit a critical mass of supporters. In the incipient phase of insurgency these are first-order tasks.

- **Third requirement**—Establish an infrastructure capable of fighting a protracted global insurgency. To do so, a process is needed to draw and bind individuals to the movement. That process inculcates the movement’s ideology and narrative into those attracted to it. To do so, new facilitators or enablers—globalization, information systems, and networked organizations—have to be substituted for this normally localized, face-to-face approach.

- **Fourth requirement**—As the incipient stage proceeds, a global insurgency (as with its national-level revolutionary insurgency counterpart) enters a period of protracted or “long war.” In doing so, it has to set out for itself 1) where it intends to fight (the area of operations or AO) and 2) how it intends to do so (the organizational infrastructure and war fighting tactics they intend to use).

- **Fifth requirement**—To execute a global insurgency the Salafi Jihadists would have to employ an array of political, psychological, and paramilitary methods within their areas of operations that target both “near” and “far” enemies.

The Salafi Jihad movement, in the first place, should be understood as a millenarian movement. It seeks a major transformation of the existing political status quo and a return to an idealized past. The Salafi Jihadists charge that current regimes and rulers who dominate the Ummah (community of believers) are irreparably corrupt, unjust, and repressive. They label them infidels and apostates.

Second, like medieval millenarians the Salafi Jihadists believe in a supernatural power and predetermined victory through the intervention of God.36 They see the world through Manichaean lenses—holy war between the forces of good and evil.
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Third, the Salafi Jihadists are transnational actors. Their plan of action calls for holy war to 1) expel the United States from Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula, and Middle East; 2) eliminate the state of Israel; 3) overthrow apostate governments in the Muslim world; and 4) re-establish the Caliphate, the historic community of Islam which expanded beyond the Arabian Peninsula following the death of the prophet Mohammed and came to encompass in the seventh century both Iran and Egypt and by the eighth century North Africa, the Iberian Peninsula (Spain and Portugal), India, and Indonesia.

Given these far reaching goals, the first requirement that the Salafi Jihadists would have to satisfy to be in a position to initiate a global insurgency is to conceptualize an ideology that successfully performs the same functions as those adopted by high risk social movements. Recall that this entailed developing a series of frames that 1) described the social and political problems requiring immediate and drastic action; 2) proposed a new idealized system to replace the depraved one that resonated with the population; and 3) identified steps to bring this to fruition that appeared achievable.

Also recollect that conceptualizing an effective ideology was a considerable challenge for national-level revolutionary insurgencies because their ideology had to attract and sustain a mass base of support from within societies that were traditional, insular, and diverse. That challenge is magnified for the Salafi Jihadist movement given its global area of operation. What was demanding to establish at the national level, it would seem reasonable to suggest, is even tougher to accomplish at the transnational level.

The second requirement is an innovative leadership that can create this ideology and establish an embryonic organization capable of operationalizing it to begin to attract and recruit a critical mass of
supporters. Successful revolutionary insurgencies in their incipient phase (and later protracted warfare stages) were commanded by leaders who performed these first-order tasks of devising an effective ideology and establishing an embryonic organization.

These core elements, in the incipient stage of revolutionary insurgencies, concentrated on recruiting a mass base of supporters. This was the initial step in establishing an organizational infrastructure that would become capable of fighting protracted revolutionary warfare. This is the third requirement for a global insurgency movement.

To do so, national-level insurgencies established a process to draw and bind individuals to the revolutionary insurgent movement. That process sought to inculcate the movement’s ideology and narrative into those recruited. The process, as outlined above, consisted of three tasks—mobilization, integration, and maintenance. It was carried out, for the most part, within the boundaries of the state the revolutionary movement was challenging.

The Viet Cong case study illustrated the extent to which carrying out this process was localized, individualized, hands-on, labor intensive, and face-to-face. Can a global insurgency movement replicate the mobilization, integration, and maintenance process at the transnational level? Has the Salafi Jihad movement been able to do so? Are there new facilitators or enablers such as globalization, information systems, and networked organizations that can be substituted for this localized, face-to-face approach?

As the incipient stage proceeded, national-level revolutionary insurgent movements entered the period of protracted warfare. These were long wars. And the area of operations (AO), as defined by the insurgents, was first and foremost within the boundaries of the nation-state. That was where the insurgent’s main enemy was located and it
was where they built and employed their guerrilla war-fighting organization. To be sure, there could be international targets as well. This was especially the case where an outside power was involved in an internal war. However, the instruments used by the insurgents on these distant battlefields were most often those for political warfare.

This began to change, as was described in the previous section, in the later 1970s. At that time the PLO extended the battlefield out of necessity to the transnational level and narrowed its paramilitary tactics to propaganda of the deed through terrorist operations.

How would a global insurgency during the protracted warfare stage define its area of operations, the composition of its war-fighting organization, and the type of violence it would employ? Doing so is the fourth requirement for a global insurgency movement. It has to set out 1) where it intends to fight—the geographical space—and 2) how it intends to do so—the war-fighting organization and type of operations they intend to employ. To what extent have the Salafi Jihad movement and its al Qaeda vanguard done so?

To fight long wars, revolutionary insurgent movements established and staffed war-fighting organizations that employed political and paramilitary instruments over lengthy time periods. These instruments were part of a strategy. As was noted earlier, their war-fighting apparatus employed these methods primarily within the boundaries of the nation-state. That was their AO until groups starting with the PLO extended the AO to the transnational level. To execute a global insurgency the Salafi Jihadists would have to carry out similar political, psychological, guerilla warfare, and other paramilitary operations within its areas of operations that target both “near” and “far” enemies. This is the fifth requirement for a global insurgency movement.
A GLOBAL SALAFI JIHAD INSURGENCY: MYTH OR REALITY?

Has the global Salafi Jihad movement that emerged since the early 1980s devised and initiated a global insurgency strategy? To determine whether this is the case, the actions, activities, and operations of the Salafi Jihad movement and its al Qaeda leadership are examined through the lens of the five requirements of a global insurgency identified above. Are they consistent with those five requirements, and if so to what extent? Is the Salafi Jihad insurgency in the incipient stage or has it progressed further? Has it developed a doctrine and capabilities to carry out globally a “long Jihad?”

To answer these questions the stages through which the Salafi Jihad movement evolved are examined, employing a chronological narrative format. The narrative can be divided into the following six phases: 1) Emergence of Salafi Islamism and the Muslim Brotherhood; 2) Conceptualization of Salafi Jihad Ideology; 3) The Soviet-Afghan War; 4) After Afghanistan: Deciding on the Next Area of Operations; 5) Afghanistan Again: The Foundations for Global Insurgency; and 6) Global Insurgency in the Aftermath of 9/11.

Below are the key findings for each of the six stages through which the global Salafi Jihad movement evolved. On the eve of 9/11, it can be argued it was in the early incipient stage of a global insurgency. Next, the findings describe how al Qaeda and the Salafi Jihadists have attempted to re-organize through *four strategic adaptations* to recover from its 2001 setback and continue to facilitate a global millenarian insurgency. Following the summary of the findings is the narrative from which they are drawn.
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Summary Points

- Has the global Salafi Jihad movement that emerged in the early 1980s been able to fight its “near” and “far” enemies through a global insurgency strategy? This study proposes three conclusions.

--**First**, as 9/11 approached, a global Salafi millenarian insurgency was in its embryonic stage, carrying out guerrilla warfare and other paramilitary operations against both “near” and “far” enemies.

--**Second**, Operation Enduring Freedom was a strategic setback for that global insurgency. It now faced the challenge of adapting to recover what it lost. Over the last several years al Qaeda and the Salafi Jihadists have sought to do so through *four strategic adaptations*.

--**Third**, How successful they have been and the extent to which they are able to fight the “long Jihad” requires more research and an innovative analytic effort that was beyond the scope of this study.

- These judgments are deduced from an analysis of the *six phases* that constitute the evolution of the Global Salafi Jihad Movement. What follows are the key findings for each of those phases.

I. Revival of Salafi Islam, the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi Jihadism

- Salafi Jihadists are part of a 20th century Salafi Islamic revival. The latter is one of Islam’s most puritanical forms.

- The Salafis seek to return Islam to its roots by imitating the life and times of the Prophet and his immediate successors. They draw their understanding of Islam from a literal interpretation of the Qur'an and the Hadith.

- They reject all subsequent Islamic re-interpretations and innovations as *Jahiliyya*, a state of moral ignorance.

- The Salafi revival argued that the Muslim community—the Ummah—had fallen into *Jahiliyya*. To save them, it was necessary to reeducate the Ummah in the original practices of true Islam.

- This Salafi revival became political through the Muslim Brotherhood, founded in 1928. The Brotherhood was to serve as a vanguard party for political change and social justice. As it grew, Jihad entered its political lexicon, calling for armed struggle to liberate Muslim lands from colonial occupation and later from apostate Muslim regimes.
II. The Origins of the Salafi Jihad Movement

- In the 1950s, Salafi Jihad ideology began to take shape. Its key theorist was Sayyid Qutb. He believed nearly all of Islam was in *Jahiliyya*, having been polluted by Western decadence, materialism, and faithlessness.

- Islamic law and religious values were being subverted by apostate Muslim regimes. He called for Jihad to overthrow them. Qutb coupled a puritanical interpretation of Islam with a violent political ideology of revolt.

- Qutb saw the crisis in Muslim states within the context of a global ideological battle with the non-Muslim world, in particular Western civilization. The West was pushing the Muslim world into *Jahiliyya*. He painted an extremely de-humanizing picture of the West as soulless, immoral and depraved.

- Qutb proposed a transnational ideology to mobilize the Ummah for Jihad against near enemies (apostate Muslim regimes) and for a global fight against the West. To lead the struggle he called for creation of a Muslim vanguard.

- The first requirement to initiate a global Salafi Jihadist insurgency is conceptualizing a universal ideology that 1) describes the depraved condition requiring Jihad, 2) proposes an idealized system to replace it, and 3) identifies steps to be taken to bring it to fruition, Qutb provided this doctrinal foundation.

III. The Soviet-Afghan War

- The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan gave a fledging Salafi Jihad movement a sacred cause to mobilize beyond the national level to liberate a part of the Ummah from a foreign infidel invader.

- Those who came from the Muslim world to resist aggression against dar al-Islam (the house of Islam) became the *first generation of transnational Jihadists*. Their victory was empowering and inspiring for themselves and others.

- In Afghanistan the elements of *leadership, ideology, and organization* for mounting a guerrilla insurgency materialized. Leaders espoused an ideology that brought together Qutb’s Muslim vanguard to lead the Ummah.

- The key leader was Abdullah Yusuf Azzam. He implemented Qutb’s ideas. The Soviet invasion was infidel aggression against dar al-Islam. He issued a fatwa calling Muslims to fight a Jihad through guerrilla warfare to expel them. Major religious figures agreed.
Azzam established an infrastructure for volunteers from around the Muslim World. Afghanistan became a training ground to breed a global resistance of tens of thousands of militant Jihadis who became skilled in guerrilla and other paramilitary tactics.

These “Afghan Arabs” became the vanguard—an international brigade—for carrying out global Jihad. Afghanistan was the beginning—the starting point—for a global Salafi Jihadist insurgency. A core cadre now existed for it.

IV. After Afghanistan: Deciding on the Next Area of Operations

Following the war the “Afghan Arabs” debated where next to fight for the Islamic cause. Where was the next area of operations and who was the enemy? These questions formed the basis of a strategic re-assessment.

One group proposed liberating other Muslim lands occupied by infidels (e.g., Bosnia). That was the new AO.

Others proposed returning to their home countries to overthrow apostate Muslim regimes. Among “Afghan Arabs” it was championed by the Egyptian contingent.

Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait added another dimension to the debate. The Saudis allowed the US military to deploy to the Kingdom. Bin Laden labeled that treason. It allowed Islam’s most holy territory to be occupied by infidels.

Exiled to Sudan, bin laden and al Qaeda concluded in late 1994 that the new AO and target should center on the United States. If Salafi Jihadists were to realize their global goals, America had to be defeated.

By the mid-1990s, a new targeting doctrine for global insurgency was set. To implement it al Qaeda had to establish an organization that could employ political, psychological, guerrilla warfare, and other paramilitary techniques to fight a “long Jihad.” It was attempting to do so in Sudan when forced to leave.

V. Afghanistan Again: The Foundations for Global Insurgency

Afghanistan gave al Qaeda an opportunity to build a transnational organization. Tens of thousands of Salafi-oriented Muslim’s were trained and indoctrinated. They constituted the second generation of international holy warriors.

During the latter 1990s the foundation was established by al Qaeda for initiating a global Salafi Jihad insurgency that reflected the five requirements identified in this study.
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- Doctrine was revised to emphasize a global war fighting mission that targeted the United States—the “far enemy.”
- Beyond doctrine, al Qaeda’s organization grew in size and complexity, allowing it to plan and execute terrorist attacks against US targets across the globe, while national-level affiliates fought guerrilla wars at home.
- In Afghanistan, al Qaeda established itself as the vanguard of the global Jihad through a network of linkages with a score of national-level Islamist groups, many employing guerrilla violence against their governments.
- Radical Islamist groups appeared to function through nine regional theatres of operations. And al Qaeda emerged as their vanguard, seeking to inspire and integrate them into a transnational Salafi Jihad movement.
- Several enablers, most importantly the Afghan sanctuary, enhanced al Qaeda’s capacity to draw national level groups into a broader Jihad network that on the eve of 9/11 reached the incipient stage of a global millenarian insurgency.

VI. Global Insurgency in the Aftermath of 9/11?

- Following 9/11, al Qaeda’s Afghan infrastructure was destroyed, a strategic setback for the Salafi Jihad vanguard and the embryonic global insurgency it was facilitating. It now faced the challenge of adapting to recover.
- Since then al Qaeda and the Salafi Jihadists have sought to do so through four strategic adaptations 1) employing the Internet to establish a virtual sanctuary, 2) making use of ungoverned territory, 3) exploiting the Iraq conflict, and 4) maintaining national level Jihad activities through the nine regional theatres.
- This study focused on establishing a virtual sanctuary on the Internet. Utilizing ungoverned areas and exploiting Iraq conflict received briefer attention. Particulars on the nine regional theaters were beyond the study’s scope.
- The extent to which al Qaeda and the Salafi Jihadists have been able to successfully implement these four strategic adaptations to fight a “long Jihad” requires a level of research beyond this study.

Virtual Sanctuary

- Al Qaeda and associated Jihad groups have sought to replicate on the Internet those facilities and capabilities lost in Afghanistan in
2001. In the following seven ways the Internet has been utilized as a substitute sanctuary:

1) Propagating the Salafi Jihad ideology. This is the first requirement to initiate a global insurgency. Through Web-based activities the Salafi Jihadists execute this function globally. They disseminate ideological frames and messages to instill in the Ummah a powerful sense of moral outrage and commitment to holy war.

2) Inspiring and mobilizing the Ummah to join the Jihad. It is one thing to agree to ideological messages, another to be inspired to action. Al Qaeda and the Salafi Jihadists use a plethora of Internet methods to achieve this end. One key way they do so is by celebrating the achievements and sacrifices of those on the front lines of the global fight.

3) Psychological warfare to demoralize enemies. The flip side of inspiring the Ummah to join the fight is to demoralize near and far enemies to convince them to give up the fight. The insurgency in Iraq is illustrative. A number of Internet tactics are employed to demoralize the Americans, Iraqis, and foreigners working in Iraq.

4) Networking the global Salafi Jihad insurgency. Loss of the Afghan sanctuary led to the use of the internet for training and operational activities, to include organizing virtual cells. For each, secure communications were needed. New methods have been employed to protect these activities from disruptive US intelligence tactics.

5) Operational Information Sharing—Manuals and Handbooks. Al Qaeda and associates have established an online library of manuals and handbooks for irregular warfare. These range from doctrinal guides to instructions on how to carry out a particular tactic or employ a specific weapon. Receiving the widest attention is the Improvised Explosive Device.

6) Operational Information Sharing—Training Videos and Courses. New Internet techniques since 9/11 have been adopted by the Salafi Jihadists for online training programs. Over the last three years professionally produced training videos have been generated. A global program in the art of terrorism (GPAT) now exists.

7) Collection Targeting. The Internet provides Salafi operational units with data on targets. Through Web-based data mining they built folders/files on a range of targets from government facilities to nuclear power plants.
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Ungoverned Territory

• Beyond this virtual sanctuary, al Qaeda appears to have attempted to carry out in largely lawless tribal areas of the Afghan-Pakistan border activities it executed during 1996-2001 in Afghanistan.

• The extent to which it has been able to do so is unclear. Jihadis are traveling to the area to join the fight much like their predecessors did in the 1980s and 1990s. But a detailed picture remains elusive, at least in open sources.

• The Afghan-Pakistan border is not the only ungoverned territory in which al Qaeda and/or regional Jihadi groups have developed a presence. The Algerian-based Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) has moved into the Sahel region of Africa to establish bases.

The Iraq Front

• Al Qaeda and other the Salafi Jihad groups see Iraq within the context of a “long Jihad.” It is the main front, the forward edge of the global battle, on which to engage the far enemy—the United States. They hope to inflict a defeat of strategic consequences on it.

• The Salafi Jihadists also believe Iraq affords them a vital opportunity to spawn a third generation of skilled holy warriors who after they leave Iraq can fight in their native lands or elsewhere. In the first decades of the 21st century these “Iraqi Arabs” can serve the same purpose the “Afghan Arabs” did at the close of the 20th century.

• Iraq has become an integral part of how al Qaeda and Salafi Jihadists have sought to adapt following the strategic set back in Afghanistan to continue to foster a global insurgency.

Fostering the Global Salafi Jihad Movement

• Al Qaeda’s fourth adaptation focused on re-establishing its role as vanguard of the global Salafi Jihad movement, a role that was set back as a result of Operation Enduring Freedom.

• Developing a detailed mosaic of what is now referred to as al Qaeda and Associated Movements (AQAM) was beyond the scope of this paper. Only the broad contours of AQAM are highlighted and key questions that remain to be addressed identified.

• As late as 2005, US officials were still struggling to understand the relationship between al Qaeda and its affiliates, and the extent to which those linkages had been reestablished.

• In 2006, key US national security documents began to use the term Al Qaeda and Associated Movements (AQAM) to refer to this
rejuvenated relationship. US Central Command’s posture statement for fighting the war in 2006 was illustrative.

- An important way al Qaeda sought to re-establish linkages with local Salafi Jihad groups is through its virtual sanctuary. Recent analysis of this activity depicts it as “very structured….A handful of primary source Jihadist Web sites disseminate official communiqués, doctrinal treaties, strategy and operational documents through a far reaching network of other Web sites, message boards, e-groups, blogs, and instant messaging services."

- This network is “at once decentralized but rigidly hierarchical.” Web sites at the center of the network comprise al Qaeda and groups closely associated with it. Since 2006, their web-based activities have been coordinated and distributed through a new virtual entity—the Al-Fajr Center—to secondary and tertiary Web sites that comprise the network.

- A key follow-on question about this fourth adaptation in need of attention is who comprises the local affiliated groups of AQAM and on what basis do they view themselves as a part of AQAM? One recent study has sought to identify four criteria for membership in AQAM.

- More attention needs to be focused on this adaptation in order to develop a detailed mosaic of and its Associated Movements (AQAM).

**Emergence of Salafi Islamism and the Muslim Brotherhood**

The Salafi Jihadists are an outgrowth of, but not synonymous with, a much larger 20th century movement of Salafi Islam. The term Salafi is commonly used to describe perhaps the most doctrinaire or fundamentalist form of Islamic thought. Like other major religions, Islam has a number of different variants. The Salafi movement consists of Sunni Muslims drawn mainly (but not exclusively) from the Hanbali School, and the Wahhabi element of it. Of the four Sunni theological schools that include the Hanafi, Maliki, and Shafii, the Hanbali are considered the most stringent in terms of their conservative approach to the practice of Islam.

The Salafi movement is comprised of many of the most puritanical groups in the Muslim world. The different parts of the movement are
all united by a common religious creed. The concept of *tawhid* or the unity of God is the central element of the Salafi creed. It includes those concepts that Salafis consider necessary to be accepted as a “true Muslim.”

To safeguard *tawhid*, Salafis believe in strictly following the rules and guidance found in the Qur’an and the Sunna (the path followed by the Prophet when he was alive). They seek to return Islam to its roots by imitating the life and times of the Prophet and that of the first three generations of Muslims—the companions or Sahabah of the Prophet, their immediate followers the Tabi’in, and the followers of the Tabi’in. The Salafis draw their understanding of Islam from a literal interpretation of the Qur'an and the Sunna. The latter consists of the deeds, sayings and actions of Muhammad during the twenty-three years of his ministry, as recalled by those who knew him. The essence of Salafism is summarized by Quintan Wiktorowicz as follows:

To protect *tawhid*, Salafis argue that Muslims must strictly follow the Qur’an and hold fast to the purity of the Prophet Muhammad’s model. The latter source of religious guidance plays a particularly central role in the Salafi creed. As the Muslim exemplar, he embodied the perfection of *tawhid* in action and must be emulated in every detail. Salafis also follow the guidance of the Prophet’s companions (the *salaf*), because they learned about Islam directly from the messenger of God and are thus best able to provide an accurate portrayal of the prophetic model (the term “Salafi” signifies followers of the prophetic model as understood by the companions).37

The Salafi approach rejects all subsequent Islamic cultural practices, re-interpretations, extrapolation, and innovations that transpired since the time of the Prophet. Illustrative of this opposition are the teachings of Muhammad Ibn Abd al Wahhab. It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine the roots of the Wahhab movement (members call themselves Muwahhidun) which began over 200 years ago in Arabia.38 Suffice it to note, however, that at that time he
preached against such customary practices as breeches of Islamic laws and labeled them *Jahiliyya*, the same term used to describe the ignorance of Arabians before the Prophet. They were unbelievers, had fallen into a state of moral ignorance, and should be put to death. Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab’s most important convert was Muhammad ibn Saud, head of one of the most powerful tribes on the Arabian Peninsula. This association converted political loyalty into a religious obligation. Since then Saud rule has to varying degrees enforced compliance with the Wahhabi interpretations of Islamic values on Saudi Arabia.

It is important to note that many Salafi Islamists who adhere to this strict interpretation of Islam are peaceful. While they believe in the rules and guidance found in the Qur’an and that the imitation of the behavior of the Prophet and his closest companions should be the basis for social order, they do not assign death sentences to all those who do not accept their beliefs. Rather, they believe the best way of implementing the Salafi creed is through propagation of the faith and religious education, not violence. These Salafist groups believe God’s word should be spread by *da‘wa*, non-violent proselytizing.

In the first half of the twentieth century a Salafi revival began. Those involved in it argued that the Muslim community—the Ummah—had fallen prey to deviations from original Islamic teachings. Indeed, they were now living in a state of *Jahiliyya*. If they were to be saved from this catastrophic crisis, it was necessary to reeducate the Ummah in the original practices of the Prophet and his early followers and reestablish true Islam to its decisive role in political and social life. Thus, what the Salafi revival sought to accomplish, first and foremost, was re-embedding true Islam into the hearts of Muslims and for them to turn those beliefs into a living reality. They would do so by
acknowledging only the sovereignty of God and his sacred law (Sharia) in all spheres of life. This would liberate them from human rulers and their laws, values, and traditions.

This Salafi revival, in part, took the form of political parties. Among the most notable of these was the Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949). When al-Banna moved to Cairo in the early 1920s to attend teacher training school, he became deeply disturbed by the effects of Westernization and the concomitant rise of secularism, the breakdown of traditional values, and the decline of Islam as the foundation of political and social behavior. He eventually came to advocate the creation of a Muslim state in Egypt based on Qur'anic law. The Brotherhood was to serve as a vanguard party for bringing about this political change.

However, in its early years, the Brotherhood resembled more of a social welfare society championing the cause of disenfranchised peoples through educational and charitable work. During the 1930s, the Brotherhood propagated an Islamic doctrine that emphasized social justice and closing the gap between Egyptian classes. It also sought to bring about an Islamic renewal and asserted that Islam should not be confined to private life. Rather, it should serve as the foundation for a thorough reform of the Egyptian political, economic, and social system. The Brotherhood’s conception of politics and nationalism was Islamic. It became politically active, identifying with the Egyptian national movement. In the 1930s the outcome of this was an energetic campaign against colonialism in Egypt and other Islamic countries.

As the Brotherhood grew in the years leading up to World War II, the term Jihad began to enter its political lexicon in two ways. One, as an inner effort that Muslims needed to make in order to free themselves and to improve the well-being of the Islamic community. Two, within
the context of a need for armed struggle to liberate Muslim lands from colonial occupation. There was disagreement over the use of force within the Brotherhood. Many of its leaders publicly remained committed to a nonviolent approach. However, there were elements, particularly among younger members, who pushed hard for the establishment of a secret or clandestine armed wing that could employ sabotage, assassination, and other irregular warfare tactics. Al-Banna finally agreed.

The Brotherhood continued to grow rapidly in the 1940s reaching an estimated million members. After WWII it played an important part in the national movement, aligning itself with secular groups and factions. And its clandestine armed units carried out terrorist attacks. The organization became increasing popular and came to be seen as a serious threat by Egyptian ruling elites. As a result, al-Banna was assassinated in 1949.

The Brotherhood supported the military coup that overthrew the monarchy in 1952, having formed a close relationship with the Free Officers Movement in the period leading up to their seizure of power. Many members of the Brotherhood expected Nasser, once in power, to form an Islamic government based on their interpretations of Islam. But soon the Brotherhood found itself at odds with the policies of the junta. It became increasingly clear that the Islamic tenets of the Brotherhood were largely incompatible with the secular ideology of Gamal 'Abd al-Nasser. In 1954, there was an attempt to kill him. As a result, the Brotherhood was declared illegal. A wave of repression ensued with the imprisonment and torture of thousands of its members.

This repression, in conjunction with domestic policies that were seen as the antithesis of true Islam, led to the charge of 'Jahiliyya by members of the Brotherhood and the call to wage Jihad against the
Egyptian government. The new Egyptian leaders were considered apostates because they were ruling by some set of principles or system other than those based on Sharia.

It should be noted that there was and remains disagreement among various Salafi factions as to whether they can declare incumbent Muslim rulers apostates (a process known as takfir). According to Wiktorowicz, debate over this issue represents one of the “most prominent sources of fissure within the Salafi community and exemplifies the impact of contextual interpretation on factionalization. Although the factions share a set of criteria for declaring someone an apostate, rooted in the Salafi creed, they differ over whether these criteria have actually been met with regards to rulers in the Muslim world.”

The Origins of Salafi Jihad Ideology

In the 1950s an ideology of Salafi Jihadism began to take shape. As it evolved over the next half century it came to reflect the characteristics and role that ideology played in the revolutionary insurgencies of the period following WWII. Indeed, there are important parallels between them.

The key early theorist, who articulated an adaptation of the traditional Salafi call, as highlighted above, was Sayyid Qutb, a member of Egypt’s Muslin Brotherhood. His influence on what has become the global Salafi Jihad movement was crucial. While in prison between 1954 and 1964 as part of Nasser’s crackdown on the Brotherhood, Qutb produced important works which have come to be seen as doctrinal treaties for Salafi Jihadism. These included a long commentary on the Qur’an—*In the Shade of the Qur’an (Fi zilal al-Qur'an)—and a more action-oriented manifesto for Jihad—*Milestones (Ma'alim fi-l-Tariq). These works capture Qutb’s radical and anti-
establishment views. They are based on his interpretation of the Qur'an and Islamic history, assessment of the social and political ills of Egypt, and an evaluation of the polluting impact of Western decadence, materialism, and faithlessness on the culture of Islam. In 1964, having been released from prison, Qutb published these works. He was subsequently re-arrested, accused of plotting to overthrow the state, found guilty, and on 29 August 1966, executed by hanging.

Qutb came to believe that nearly all of Islam was in dire decline, devolving into a state of ignorance equivalent to that which characterized the era of pre-Islamic Arabia. He drew this conclusion, in part, from the work of Mawlana abu al-Ala Maududi, who founded the Islamic Society of India in 1941. Maududi first proposed that a new Jahiliyya had taken root in the Muslim world during the 1920s. He called for the establishment of a Muslim state ruled under Sharia law as a prescription for it. Maududi advocated a religious cleansing of all Muslim societies. He asserted that they had been infected by Western ideas and practices. For example, he argued that the type of governments the West foisted on the Muslim world took power out of God’s hands and put it in those of man. This violated the Qur’an which recognized only the party of God and the party of Satan.

Qutb likewise applied the concept of Jahiliyya to Muslim states and to Egypt in particular. In Qutb's view, Islamic law and religious values were being ignored by these post-colonial apostate regimes, leaving their Muslim societies in a state of debased ignorance. These regimes were, in Qutb’s view, non-Islamic and therefore illegitimate. All societies ruled by such governments were likewise not Islamic, and Muslims living in them were religiously obligated to oppose the ruling elites and to reject their political authority. This resulted in his call for them to carry out Jihad to overthrow such hedonistic regimes. In doing
so, Qutb coupled a fundamentalist interpretation of the Qur'an with a radical and violent political ideology for armed revolution.

As noted earlier, here we can see in Qutb’s thought how Salafi Jihadists differ from the larger Salafi community. Unlike the latter, Qutb and the Salafi Jihadists who followed in his footsteps moved the use of force—holy war—to such a position of importance that it was equated as equal to the five pillars of Islam. Once a regime was characterized as takfir and its leaders labeled infidels (kufî), then armed violence was a legitimate way of dealing with it.

Qutb’s writings laid the foundation for this in the 1950s. Rulers such as Nasser, through their approach to governance and rule, revealed a conscious disbelief in Islam. And Nasser’s persistence in doing so, in spite of warnings from scholars, was clear evidence about what he believed and did not believe. His actions were un-Islamic. That he persisted in behaving in this manner demonstrated that he believed it was a better way than Islam. Therefore, he was an apostate and a legitimate target for warfare.

Like revolutionary insurgents, Qutb’s called for the overthrow of anti-Islamic Muslim governments through insurrection as the prelude for radical change of the entire social and political system. Thus, Qutb's understanding of Islam was inextricably linked to his political and social prescriptions. Islam was a complete social system, and therefore it set the requirements for government that it should take the form of an Islamic theocracy. He deduced these requirements from his reading of the Qur'an, including its insight into morality, justice, and governance.

More broadly, Qutb saw the crisis in Egypt and other Muslim states within the context of a global ideological confrontation with the non-Muslim world, in particular Western civilization. The West was pushing the Muslim world into Jahiliyya. He painted an extremely de-
humanizing picture of the West, characterizing it as soulless, greedy, arrogant, barbarous, immoral, and depraved. Western civilization fostered idolatry, the most heinous of sins. The infusion of Western ways into the Muslim world had to be reversed, said Qutb, with all the might the Islamists could muster. He saw this confrontation in more than political terms; it was a cosmic struggle between those who worshiped idols and those who worshiped God. It was a Manichaean battle in which two independent realms, one representing good the other evil, were pitted against one another.

Qutb provided the foundations of a transnational ideology to mobilize the Ummah for Jihad against both near enemies—e.g., the Egyptian regime—and for the global fight against the West. And as the above suggests, he saw the two as inextricably connected. To carry out this struggle Qutb proposed the creation of a Muslim vanguard organization in *Milestones*. His concept was consistent with how 20th century revolutionary thinkers, beginning with Lenin, defined the role of a vanguard party in revolution. Mao assigned the same role to the vanguard party for leading what he called People’s War, which we referred to above as revolutionary guerrilla insurgency. For Qutb, the Muslim vanguard was an elite organization comprised of educated and motivated individuals who were to lead the masses “on the path, marching through the vast ocean of *Jahiliyya* which has encompassed the entire world.” This was a call to Islamic militancy and armed revolutionary struggle as the means for seizing political power from the state. 46

Along with Mawdudi and al-Banna, Qutb is seen as one of the most influential theorists of radical political Islamism. His thinking influenced the writings and manifestos of those who shaped the Salafi Jihad movement following the Soviet-Afghan war of the 1980s. This is
true of Qutb’s conservative interpretation of Islamic principles as found in *In the Shade of the Qur’an*, his idea of making Jihad a personal and permanent duty to defeat *Jahiliyya* and foster political and societal change, and his notion of a transnational Ummah and the inevitability of global ideological conflict between "Islam and the West." Fawaz summarizes Qutb’s impact as follows:

More than anyone else, Sayyid Qutb…inspired generations of Jihadis…to wage perpetual Jihad to abolish injustice on earth, to bring people to the worship of God alone, and to bring them out of the servitude to others into the servants of the Lord…. [J]ihad for Qutb was a permanent revolution against internal and external enemies who usurped God’s sovereignty.  

The impact of Qutb’s doctrinal concepts greatly influenced the leaders of subsequent Jihad groups in Egypt, most importantly Mohammed Abd al-Salam Faraj and Ayman al-Zawahiri. The former was the ideological and operational leader in the 1970s of what came to be widely known as Jama'at al-Jihad (the Egyptian Islamic Jihad). Faraj called for holy war, recruited followers, and created an underground organization that carried out the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981. This attack was personally sanctioned by Faraj. The Egyptian security forces reacted swiftly against al-Jihad's campaign of terror, and Faraj himself was executed in April 1982.

Faraj was a “religious nationalist,” writes Gerges, who asserted that “fighting the near enemy must take priority over that of the far enemy…. Jihad’s first priority [according to Faraj] must be to replace infidel rulers with a comprehensive Islamic system.” Ayman al-Zawahiri, a second important disciple of Qutb’s, concurred with Faraj’s focus on Jihad against the Egyptian regime, the near enemy. However, Zawahiri’s position will change in the vortex of the Afghan-Soviet war and its aftermath.
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If the first requirement the Salafi Jihadists had to satisfy to initiate a global insurgency was to construct a universal ideology that 1) described the depraved social and political conditions requiring Jihad, 2) proposed a new idealized system to replace this depraved one, and 3) identified steps to be taken to bring it to fruition, Qutb provided the doctrinal foundation for it. His interpretation of Jihad and its role in fostering political and societal change against near enemies like the secular and corrupt regime in Egypt under Nasser, his notion of a transnational Ummah, and the inevitability of ideological conflict between "Islam and the West" all can be found in the global Salafi Jihad movement that emerged after the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan.

However, before we examine those ideological and operational developments, it is important to highlight how the events in Afghanistan in the 1980s provided the context for the amplification of Salafi Jihadism and the recruitment of its first generation of fighters.

The Soviet-Afghan War

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan gave the fledging Salafi Jihad movement the sacred cause it needed to mobilize beyond the national level. There was now an opportunity to establish a leadership for the worldwide Ummah, and in Afghanistan to help liberate a part of that Ummah from a foreign infidel invader. The battle in Afghanistan was portrayed as one between Muslims and kufars or infidels. Those who came from across the Muslim world to defend the Afghans and resist aggression against dar al-Islam (the house of Islam) became the first generation of transnational Jihadists. And their self-proclaimed victory in Afghanistan—the defeat of a superpower—was empowering and inspiring for them. It caused many in this vanguard to think and act globally, taking their Islamist revolution onto the world stage.
However, the events unfolding in Afghanistan in the 1980s were only an opportunity. The emergence of Qutb’s vanguard party was not a given. As noted earlier, to mount and sustain revolutionary insurgent warfare necessitates the closely interrelated elements of leadership, ideology, and organization. Each plays a vital role in each phase of protracted conflict. And this is particularly the case in the initial period of activity. In this embryonic moment leaders must emerge and adopt an action-oriented ideology that responds to both practical grievances and to a desire for an idealized and utopian future. If this was true for post-WWII revolutionary insurgency, it was likewise the case for a radical Islamist messianic one. Such leaders must bring together what Qutb identified as the Muslim vanguard, an elite group comprised of highly educated and motivated individuals who were to lead the Ummah in armed insurrection.

The central figure to play that role during the Afghan-Soviet war was Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, also known as Shaikh Azzam. Born in 1941 in the province of Jenin on the West Bank of the Jordan River in the territory then administered under the British Mandate of Palestine, he attended Damascus University and earned a degree in Sharia law in 1966. After the 1967 war and Israel’s military occupation of the West Bank, Azzam joined the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood and took part in guerrilla warfare operations against Israel. It was here that he first learned about these irregular and asymmetric tactics for fighting more powerful enemies. However, he soon became disillusioned with those Palestinians leading the armed resistance for ideological reasons. In particular, he opposed the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and its chief, Yasser Arafat, rejecting their secular and Marxist orientation.

Azzam opted out and continued his Islamic studies at Cairo’s Al-Azhar University where he earned a Master’s degree in 1970, and his
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Ph.D. in Islamic Jurisprudence in 1973. During this time in Egypt, he met many Muslim Brotherhood followers of Qutb, including Ayman al-Zawahiri. Moreover, Azzam came to adopt Qutb’s ideas including the belief in an inevitable global clash between the Islamic and non-Islamic worlds. Not able to teach in Jordan because Palestinian militants were not welcome—King Hussein had expelled the PLO during what became known as Black September—he moved to Saudi Arabia and a position at King Abdul Aziz University. Osama bin Laden was enrolled as a student and it was there that Sheikh Azzam first met him.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was, for Azzam, a kufar or infidel aggression against dar al-Islam. He immediately issued a fatwa—Defense of the Muslim Lands, the First Obligation after Faith—which called all Muslims to fight a holy war to expel the invaders from the house of Islam. Major religious figures such as the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, Abd al-Aziz Bin Bazz, concurred. Subsequently, at the peak of the Afghan Jihad, Azzam published Join the Caravan which became one of the principal inspirations for drawing thousands of Muslims to fight in Afghanistan. Thus, in the 1980s Azzam emerged as the inspirational ideologist and a central figure in what were the initial steps in the development of the militant Islamist resistance movement. Azzam had charisma, and his words drew many to the fight.

But Azzam’s role was more than that of inspirational ideologist. He also knew how to organize and lead. After relocating to Pakistan in 1980 he established Maktab al-Khadamat (Services Office) to organize a support infrastructure in Peshawar to house those who came to be known as “Afghan Arabs”—Jihad volunteers from around the Muslim world. In the mid-1980s bin Laden provided financial assistance to expand that effort. The infrastructure established by Azzam included
camps for training in guerrilla and paramilitary tactics to prepare international recruits to fight on an unconventional and asymmetric battlefield. According to Greges, Azzam created “a military college to provide volunteers with methodical military training and to prepare senior officers to lead Jihadist operations anywhere.” By doing so, the Al-Faruq Military College fostered the “emergence of new professional Jihadist cadres.”

To recruit fighters and raise money for the cause Azzam traveled through the Muslim world, as well as to Europe and the United States. His goal was to awaken the Ummah to its duty in Afghanistan. And his charisma, prose, and politico-religious proselytizing drew many. He played a key role in establishing networks for financing, recruiting, and training radical Muslims to fight the Jihad in Afghanistan. But Azzam saw Afghanistan, according to Roy, as more than the defense of the Ummah there. It was also to serve “as a training ground to breed the vanguard that would spark an overall resistance against the encroachment of the infidels on the Ummah…. Jihad in Afghanistan was aimed at setting up the vanguard of the Ummah.”

Roy notes that “Tens of thousands of militants went to Afghanistan through these Islamic networks for training and Jihad.” They responded to the call and passed through the paramilitary training infrastructure established by Azzam, and later by bin Laden. According to Marc Sageman, they came “from all over: core Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt; Magreb Arab countries like Algeria and Morocco; Southeast Asia countries such as the Philippines and Indonesia; and the Muslim immigrant [or diaspora] communities of the United States and Europe.”

Those who went to Afghanistan established bonds of solidarity among themselves that went beyond that conflict. They became a
potential vanguard—an international brigade—for carrying out global Jihad. Sageman writes that, “the global Salafi Jihad evolved through a process of radicalization consisting of gradual self-selection…and recognition of the single common target of the Jihad.” And Roy adds that “the volunteers in Afghanistan experienced a concrete internationalization based on personal contacts, the brotherhood of comrades in arms, friendships and affinities. They learned to know other people and other languages.” In Afghanistan, they found “a new community and brotherhood with which to identify.”

They also became skilled in guerrilla warfare tactics, having learned that art from the indigenous Afghan Mujahideen who, in eight years of protracted and bloody irregular warfare in a mountainous and rugged land, wore down the mighty Soviet Army. In their book, *Afghan Guerrilla Warfare: In the Words of the Mujahideen Fighters*, Grau and Jalali chronicle the day-to-day guerrilla tactics perfected by Afghan warriors during the conflict. It was these irregular warfare methods that enabled the rifle-wielding Mujahideen to defeat a fully-armored Superpower. This was an important lesson that the international Jihadists experienced up close.

Nothing captured the day-to-day tactical battle better than the Mujahideen’s innovative use of ambush and hit-and-run tactics in mountainous terrain. It was classic guerrilla warfare, and it worked. During the eight-year war the Mujahideen response to the presence of the Red Army in Afghanistan was to utilize these traditional tribal warfare tactics to inflict casualties, cut supply and communication lines, and erode the Soviet will to occupy Afghanistan. Between 1985 and 1987 alone the Mujahideen conducted over 10,000 ambushes. They usually attacked at night or in the fading light, utilizing denial and deception tactics and employing mines, machine guns, grenade
launchers, and sniper fire to take full advantage of the cover offered by Afghanistan’s rocky terrain. In the end, it was the nature of the Afghan tribal and clan social structure and its traditional irregular methods of warfare that allowed a guerilla force to render the Soviets constantly vulnerable and eventually caused their withdrawal.57

In sum, Afghanistan was the beginning, the starting point for a global Salafi Jihadist insurgency. When that war came to an end, a core cadre of international Jihad warriors existed for it. In the aftermath of Afghanistan they emerged equipped not only with the requisite ideological and organizational framework, but the guerrilla and irregular warfare methods for conducting asymmetrical fights against superior enemies. However, where they would fight next was unclear as the last units of the Red Army rolled across the Friendship Bridge on the Afghan-Uzbekistan border on February 15, 1989.

For Azzam and his followers, the victory in Afghanistan was not the end but only the beginning. A journal article published in 1987 by Azzam made this clear. In “Al-Qaeda al-Sulbah” or “The Solid Base,” he envisioned a Muslim vanguard organization that would overthrow apostate regimes in the Middle East and establish Islamic rule. The concept for this was drawn from Qutb, who was Azzam’s spiritual guide. This vanguard would direct the energies of the Afghan mujahidin into fighting on behalf of oppressed Muslims. He viewed Jihad as a religious obligation in defense of Islam and Muslims against a defined enemy, whether local un-Islamic rulers or occupying outside infidels.58

After Afghanistan: Deciding on the Next Area of Operations?

During the incipient stage, national-level revolutionary insurgent movements have to consider strategic decisions about where to carry out the armed struggle within the boundaries of the nation state. In
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other words, the area or areas of operations (AO) had to be determined. For post-WWII revolutionary insurgents the main enemy was located within the nation-state. That was where the insurgent vanguard had to build and employ their war fighting organization.

In the aftermath of the Soviet-Afghan war many of the Afghan Arabs—Azzam’s Jihad vanguard—were faced with the issue of whether, and if so where, to next fight for the Islamic cause. Where would that AO be? And who was the next enemy? In 1989, these questions were at the core of what amounted to a strategic re-assessment.

Before he was assassinated in November 1989, Azzam proposed that the Jihadis who had helped oust the Soviet Union from Afghanistan use the same fighting methods to do so in other parts of dar al-Islam (the house of Islam) occupied by infidels—e.g., Kashmir, Somalia, and Bosnia. They should help liberate those areas as well. And Afghan vets sought to do so in the 1990s. For example, the declaration of Bosnia-Herzegovina independence in October 1991 opened up a new ethnic and religious conflict in the heart of Europe. Besieged on two fronts and seemingly abandoned by the West, the Bosnian regime, with its Muslim majority, accepted help from wherever they could get it. Thus, they welcomed Arab veterans of the Afghan war. However, attempts by these Jihadis to Islamicize the Bosnian population and use of excessive violence appears to have not been openly welcomed.59

Other Jihad veterans advocated returning to their home countries to overthrow what came to be called the "near enemy." These were characterized as distorted Muslim regimes whose repressive, corrupt, and secular nature prevented the creation of a true Islamic community
and way of life. The priority for these Jihadi nationalists was to restore Islam at home. That was the next AO.

This was controversial because it advocated fighting and killing other Muslims. Among Afghan Arab veterans it appears to have been championed by the Egyptian contingent. And they attempted in the 1990s—unsuccessfully—to fight it out with the Mubarak regime. In doing so, they employed guerrilla warfare and terrorism tactics to achieve their objectives. However, they were no match for Egyptian government forces that killed or arrested so many of their commanders and key operatives that the Jihad camp eventually split under the pressure. One faction, the Egyptian Islamic Group, initiated a unilateral ceasefire. The leadership of the other faction, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, fled the country.60

The Algerians were the other national contingent that followed their participation in the Afghan-Soviet war with full-scale irregular warfare against their home government. And the violence carried out by the Egyptians paled in comparison with that employed by the Armed Islamic Group and its successor, the Salafist Group for Dawah and Combat. However, in the end the Algerian security forces contained the threat through a brutal counterterrorism campaign.61

Finally, yet other Afghan Arabs stayed behind in Afghanistan and Peshawar and continued to contemplate how and where to extend the Jihad to new areas of operations. As this was taking place, Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait, adding a new dimension to the debate over the future AO for the Jihadists.

The possibility of further Iraqi expansion from Kuwait into Saudi Arabia created a crisis of monumental proportion for the House of Saud. In the face of a massive Iraqi military presence, Saudi Arabia's own forces were hopelessly outnumbered. In the midst of this
predicament, bin Laden offered to protect Saudi Arabia from the Iraqi army by deploying 100,000 Mujahideen to the Kingdom. If Saddam chose to invade, he assured King Fahd, they would be repulsed by the Mujahideen using the same protracted guerrilla and irregular warfare tactics that had been employed to oust the Red Army from Afghanistan. After thinking it over the Saudi Monarch decided to refuse bin Laden's offer. A protracted eight-year guerrilla war like that fought in Afghanistan was hardly an attractive option. Instead, he opted to allow the United States and allied forces to deploy on his territory and use it as a land-bridge to drive the Iraqi army from Kuwait.

Bin Laden considered this a “heretical” act. He charged that the presence of infidel troops in the "land of the two mosques" (Mecca and Medina) was sacrilegious and desecrated sacred soil. It was also confirmation of what Qutb and other Salafi theorists had asserted about the coming global confrontation between the Muslim world and the West. Not only was the West driving the Muslim world into Jahiliyya, it now occupied its most holy territory. After publicly castigating the Saudi government for allowing this to happen, bin Laden was forced into exile in Sudan and his Saudi citizenship was revoked.

Paradoxically, it was in the aftermath of this setback that the organization bin Laden helped found in Afghanistan began to emerge as a transnationally focused organization with linkages to Jihadi groups in Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Morocco, Somalia, and Eritrea, among other places, several of which were fighting protracted insurgencies. Al Qaeda forged ties with many of these militant Islamist groups.

While in Sudan, al Qaeda backed these national-focused Jihadists with training, arms, and funding. To do so, it established weapons caches and training camps where the guerrilla and irregular warfare
methods honed in Afghanistan were taught. Al Qaeda also maintained its training camps in Afghanistan for the same purpose. Sudanese intelligence officers aided al Qaeda by providing false passports and shipping documents. At that time, the operational role of al Qaeda was principally to provide support through funds, training, and weapons for national-level attacks by Jihadist groups it was aligned with. However, as we will highlight below, the first attacks on US targets also occurred during the Sudan period, and others were planned.

As al Qaeda’s presence in Sudan grew, its leaders engaged in discussions over the area of operations and which enemies should be targeted. With respect to the latter, these deliberations revolved around what has been coined the “near and far enemies.” Up to this point the targeting focus, as noted above, had been twofold: 1) liberating occupied Muslim territory from infidel forces (e.g., Afghanistan), and 2) attacking and overthrowing local Muslim governments that were apostate regimes. By late 1994 a third target and new AO was under consideration—the “far enemy.”

If the definitive objective of the Salafi Jihadist movement was to be realized— international system transformation with the re-establishment of the Caliphate, the historic community of Islam—then the main impediment to that aspiration had to be targeted and defeated. Sageman explains that those who championed this new targeting doctrine argued “the main danger for the worldwide Islamist movement was the United States, which was seen as moving in on Muslim lands such as the Arabian Peninsula and East Africa. It was the ‘head of the snake’ that had to be killed…. [T]he priority had to be switched from the “near enemy” to the “far enemy.”62 By the mid-1990s bin Laden and his top collaborators, including Ayman al-Zawahiri, adopted this important change.
Moreover, it appears that before this was formally espoused and later recorded by bin Laden in fatwas issued in the latter 1990s, operations were carried out by al Qaeda against US targets. In 1993 there is some evidence that trainers were sent to Somalia. As learned since 9/11, bin Laden saw US involvement there as an extension of its presence in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states that grew out of the 1991 war to expel Iraq from Kuwait. He believed that Washington was following an imperial policy of taking over parts of the Muslim world.

Consequently, in 1993 one of bin Laden’s top lieutenants, Muhammad Atef, traveled to Somalia to determine how al Qaeda might attack US forces stationed there. He arranged to assist Aidid’s militia. Subsequently, one of al Qaeda’s commanders and a small number of Mujahideen, veteran Islamic Holy Warriors who had fought in Afghanistan, were dispatched to provide military assistance and training. The training included tactics learned in the Afghan War for fighting against heavily armed helicopters. Aidid’s gunners were taught the most effective way to shoot down a helicopter was to use rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) rigged with timing devices to take off the tail rotor of the Black Hawk, its most vulnerable part.63

The outcome is chronicled in Black Hawk Down, Mark Bowden’s account of that battle.64 In a strict military sense, the Task Force Ranger raid was successful. The Aidid lieutenants that had been targeted were captured. But the human costs of the operation were high: nineteen Americans dead and missing, seventeen from Task Force Ranger, and eighty-four wounded. One Malaysian was also killed and seven were wounded, along with two wounded Pakistanis. Many hundreds of Somalis were killed and wounded.

Also during the Sudan period, at least one of the two attacks in Saudi Arabia in the mid-1990s may have been the result of this new

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targeting policy. Those who carried out the bombing of the National Guard training center in Riyadh confessed to having been trained by al Qaeda in its Afghan camps and were inspired by bin Laden. At least that is what the Saudi’s have reported before they were executed. Finally, during this period building the infrastructure necessary to attack major US targets in East Africa was initiated. Senior members of al Qaeda were dispatched to Kenya.

In sum, by the mid-1990s the targeting doctrine to support a global insurgency was in place to support a strategy which had as its dual objectives to foster a) regime changes locally and b) international system transformation globally. To accomplish these goals both “near enemies” and the “far enemy” had to be attacked. However, to do so al Qaeda had to establish and staff war-fighting organizations that could employ an array of political, psychological, guerrilla warfare, and other paramilitary techniques to fight a “long Jihad.”

In Sudan, it appears that al Qaeda was attempting to establish those capabilities when it was forced to leave. In 1996, bin Laden was asked to depart the country after the US pressured the Sudanese government to expel him, citing possible connections to the 1994 attempted assassination of Egyptian President Mubarak while in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Bin Laden and 200 of his key subordinates left in late 1996, returning to Afghanistan.

**Afghanistan Again: The Foundations for Global Insurgency**

Returning to Afghanistan proved fortuitous for al Qaeda. It was given an opportunity to accelerate building a transnational war-fighting organization it had begun to form in Sudan. Now allied with the Taliban, who had a belief system similar to that of bin Laden and al Qaeda, Afghanistan provided an ideal base to do so. It turned into an ever-expanding infrastructure and safe haven, far from American
political influence and military power. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, “The Taliban seemed to open the door to all who wanted to come to Afghanistan to train in the [al Qaeda] camps. The alliance with the Taliban provided al Qaeda a sanctuary in which to instruct and indoctrinate new fighters and terrorists, import weapons, forge ties with other Jihad groups and leaders [globally], and plot and staff terrorist schemes.”

Between 1996 and the attacks on September 11, 2001, Salafi-oriented Muslims from around the world traveled to Afghanistan to receive irregular warfare training and indoctrination in these facilities. How many did so is hard to determine. Estimates vary widely. The 9/11 Commission Report noted that “U.S. intelligence estimates put the total number of fighters who underwent instruction in bin Laden-supported camps in Afghanistan from 1996 through 9/11 at 10,000 to 20,000.” Others propose much higher numbers. For example, according to German police testimony in the 2006 retrial of Mounir al-Motassadek, a Moroccan accused of involvement in the 9/11 attacks, over 70,000 received paramilitary training and religious instruction in al-Qaeda’s camps in Afghanistan. Whatever the number, a considerable corps of second-generation holy warriors traveled to Afghanistan from some fifty or more countries.

An assessment of developments in Afghanistan between 1996 and the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States suggest that the foundation was being established by al Qaeda for initiating a global Salafi Jihad insurgency that reflected the requirements identified earlier in this study. Al Qaeda’s expanding infrastructure in Afghanistan allowed it to undertake several activities that tracked with these requirements.
First of all, during this period bin Laden revised al Qaeda’s ideology and doctrine to emphasize a global mission for the Salafi Jihad movement. He did so by focusing on the United States—the far enemy—and the dangers America posed for the very survival of the Muslim world. This recasting of doctrine can be seen most succinctly in his 1998 fatwa, entitled, "Declaration of the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders." The United States was attempting to destroy Islam, and Muslims were in a cataclysmic battle with the West. America’s occupation of Saudi Arabia had had a humiliating and debilitating impact on the Ummah. According to bin Laden, "Since God laid down the Arabian Peninsula, created its desert, and surrounded it with its seas, no calamity has ever befallen it like these Crusader hosts that have spread in it like locusts, crowing its soil, eating its fruits, and destroying its verdure."

And it was not just Saudi Arabia that was endangered. The United States, by orchestrating UN sanctions against Iraq, was annihilating Muslims there as well. Bin Laden asserted that Washington did not rest after the "slaughter" of the Gulf War but instead sought the "dismemberment and the destruction...of what remains of this people." In interviews during the late 1990s, he also included the plight of Muslims in Kashmir, East Timor, Sudan, Somalia, Chechnya, and elsewhere in this messianic vision of a war of survival for Islam against the West led by the United States.

Through an assessment of bin Laden’s fatwas, other written statements, and interviews during this second period in Afghanistan, it is evident that he revised al Qaeda’s ideology and doctrine for a global Salafi Jihad against the United States. Thus, in the 1998 fatwa, after specifying the American crime of occupation of the holy places, the war it was waging through sanctions against the Iraqi people, and
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America’s support of Jewish aggression in Palestine, bin Laden asserted that the United States had declared war on God. Therefore, it was the duty of every Muslim to “kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it.” The fatwa charged that to kill Americans, both civil and military, is an individual duty for every Muslim who is able, in any country where this is possible, “until the US “departs from all the lands of Islam.”

70 Civilians are off limits under the international laws of war. But for bin Laden all Americans were in one way or another complicit with the policies of their government and therefore legitimate targets. It was a millenarian outlook that saw the world through Manichaeian lenses—a holy war between the forces of good and evil that eschewed the distinctions of international law. Recall that millenarian movements are ones in which religious, social, and political groupings envision a coming major transformation of society and return to an idealized past. Such movements typically claim that the current regime and its rulers are irreparably corrupted, unjust, and otherwise irredeemable. They have to be completely vanquished.

In sum, bin Laden asserted that since Muslims everywhere in the world were suffering at the hands of the United States, the Ummah must wage holy war against their real enemy, and not only act to rid itself of unpopular and apostate regimes backed by the Americans. It was the duty of the Muslim community to protect their faith. Bin Laden declared that the United States was vulnerable and could be defeated in war by mujahideen in the same way the USSR suffered a humiliating defeat at their hands.

Beyond doctrine, important organizational developments took place during the latter 1990s as well. Al Qaeda as an organization grew in size and complexity. This was due, in part, to the fact it was able to
select and add personnel from the thousands of individuals that flowed through its training camps. It had a very large pool from which to screen and evaluate candidates from its training program for membership in its core organization. Also facilitating this organizational evolution was the secure sanctuary that al Qaeda enjoyed in Afghanistan.

Al Qaeda was able during the latter 1990s to expand its hierarchical apparatus and formalize its structure, with bin Laden, the emir-general, at the top, followed by other al Qaeda leaders.71 Below bin Laden a shura majlis or consultative council was established, with four committees reporting to it. A military committee recruited fighters and ran the training camps in which they were instructed in the guerrilla and irregular warfare methods learned in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Indeed, in his 1996 “Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places,” bin Laden singled out the importance of these techniques for fighting conventionally superior enemies. He stated: “[I]t must be obvious to you that, due to the imbalance of power between our armed forces and the enemy forces, a suitable means of fighting must be adopted, i.e., using fast moving, light forces that work under complete secrecy. In other words, to initiate a guerrilla war, where the sons of the nation, and not the military forces, take part in it.”72

The military committee also planned and launched global strikes against the United States. Finally, it oversaw other clandestine functions including a special office for procuring, forging, or altering identity documents such as passports and visas.

A finance committee established a global financial network to raise the resources necessary to sustain al Qaeda’s expanding apparatus and activities. Its financial network was based on redundancy. Al Qaeda
secured its money through the Western banking system, the Islamic banking system, and the traditional hawala system. This network was linked to a number of money sources to include Muslim charitable organizations, which al Qaeda infiltrated and used to collect and mask the funds it needed. These included the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), the Benevolence International Foundation, the al Haramian Islamic Foundation, Blessed Relief Foundation, and the Rabita Trust. These organizations have branches worldwide and engage in activities related to religious, educational, social, and humanitarian programs. But they also knowingly or unknowingly assisted in financing al-Qaeda. Wealthy individuals, particularly in the Arabian Gulf states, likewise were a source of funds, as were al Qaeda-run businesses.

Justifying its actions by issuing rulings on Shari’a law was the responsibility of the religious/legal committee. It also had a role in indoctrinating those many thousand Muslims who went to Afghanistan to be trained for holy war. Finally, a media committee disseminated information in support of al Qaeda’s political and military goals and activities. In the latter 1990s, al Qaeda began using the Internet to publicize those goals and activities, to disseminate information, to inspire and recruit, and to gather and share information. However, this was only in its embryonic stage at this point. As we shall see later, the use of the Internet burgeoned after 9/11 for al Qaeda and the Salafi Jihad movement.

This growth of al Qaeda’s organization in Afghanistan allowed it to go operational in a way it could not during its Sudan phase. It now was able to plan several terrorist operations to strike at the United States across the global landscape and had the capacity to direct and deploy clandestine units to execute those operations. And they had
three major successes as a result. These included 1) the attacks on US embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam, in August 1998; 2) the suicide attack on the USS Cole in Aden, in October 2000; and 3) the strikes against the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001. Additionally, as is now known, al Qaeda had planned and deployed personnel to carry out other attacks as well. However, for various reasons these were not successful.

From its Afghanistan sanctuary, al Qaeda at this point in time also sought to establish itself more broadly as a headquarters and vanguard for the global Salafi Jihad movement. Recall that the 1998 fatwa instituted a World Islamic Front for Jihad. The purpose of the Front was to create a transnational organization with a worldwide presence and linkage with national-level radical Islamist affiliates in numerous countries. Its ultimate goals were fourfold: 1) to unite the Ummah; 2) to overthrow all corrupt and apostate Muslim governments; 3) to drive Western influence from those countries; and 4) to abolish state boundaries and establish the Caliphate.

To this end, during the 1996-2001 phase of development, a global network of linkages was established by al Qaeda’s World Front with a score of national-level militant Salafi and other radical Islamist groups around the world, many of whom were employing unconventional and asymmetric violence against their home governments. The World Front emerged as an umbrella organization that sought to tie these like-minded, national-level parties and smaller cellular units together for a common purpose, as described in the fourfold objectives noted above.

These affiliates and their links to al Qaeda were first delineated in a comprehensive way by Rohan Gunaratna. In *Inside Al Qaeda: A Global Network of Terror*, he identified ones in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Sudan, Uzbekistan, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, the
Palestinian territories, Algeria, Libya, Eritrea, Somalia, Bosnia, Chechnya, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Germany, Britain, and the United States.

An examination of national-level groups suggests that while they have differences that are shaped by the local context in which they operate and fight, they appear to adhere to the same general ideological/religious principles and Salafi Jihadist orientation. And while they have local objectives to include overthrowing apostate governments and expulsion of outside forces, they see their fight within a larger context and subscribe to the broader goal of a global Islamic reordering of the international system so that it is no longer US dominated.

A number of specialists have suggested different frameworks for delineating the global Salafi Jihad movement that emerged during this 1996-2001 period. One of the more conceptual and analytic assessments was put forward by David Kilcullen. He proposes that a worldwide militant Islamist movement appears to function through “regional theatres of operation rather than as a monolithic bloc.” Islamist groups within these different theatres follow “general ideological or strategic approaches that conform to the pronouncements of al Qa’eda, and share a common tactical style and operational lexicon.” However, Kilcullen contends that there is “no clear evidence that al Qaeda directly controls or directs Jihadists in each theatre…. [R]ather than being a single monolithic organization, the [emerging] global Jihad movement appears to be a more complex phenomenon.”

Within this context, al Qaeda was said to “resemble the Communist International (Comintern) of the 20th century—a holding company and clearing-house for world revolution.” In other words, al Qaeda was more of a vanguard that sought to inspire and integrate these national-
level groups and their local grievances into a broader transnational Salafi Jihad ideology and to link these disparate groups together through its Afghan sanctuary, emerging global communications, finances, and technology.

Nine regional theatres are identified by Kilcullen. In three—the Americas, Western Europe, and Australia/New Zealand—Salafi Jihad groups had engaged primarily in “subversion, fund-raising and organizational development.” However, during the latter 1990s, a few terrorist operations were attempted in these regions through al Qaeda’s forward deployed clandestine operational units. And since 9/11, other local cells have also executed operations or been uncovered in the process of preparing to do so, as will be discussed later.

The remaining six regional theaters all experienced, according to Kilcullen, varying degrees of armed violence in which local radical Islamist and Salafi Jihadist armed groups employed the same common methods of guerrilla and irregular warfare tactics against local regimes. Al Qaeda could also be active in these theatres. The following, summarized from Kilcullen’s assessment, highlights these developments, which both pre-date and post-date 9/11:

- The **Greater Middle East** to include Turkey, the Levant, Israel/Palestine, Egypt, and the Arabian Peninsula is the most active theatre. During the 1990s, and following 9/11, on-going insurgent violence by local Islamist armed groups has taken place in Iraq, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Turkey, Lebanon and Israel/Palestine. This included bombings, suicide attacks, kidnappings, and raids. Al Qaeda also established regional affiliates in several parts of the region. However, much of the insurgent and terrorist action in theatre is not directed, controlled, or carried out by al Qaeda.

- The **Maghreb** states, to include Algeria, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Morocco, and Tunisia, all have experienced terrorist and insurgent violence carried out by radical Islamist armed groups. Al Qaeda also has a presence in several states in the theatre.

South and Central Asia has long been a theatre of radical Islamist violence. Afghanistan was al Qaeda’s sanctuary until 9/11. And remnants of it remain hold up along the Pakistan border. Both Pakistan and India have experienced Islamist insurgency and terrorism. The insurgency in Kashmir has Islamist elements, and the area is a base for al Qaeda affiliates. The Central Asian republics of the FSU have seen Islamist low-level insurgency.

Southeast Asia has radical Islamist insurgencies in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand, and lower-level activity in Singapore and Malaysia. The main group in theatre is Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which operates across the region, maintains links to al Qaeda, cooperates with local movements, and has links into other theatres.

The Caucasus region has seen separatist insurgencies turn increasingly Islamist with these elements allied to al Qaeda. This clearly has been the case in Chechnya. It has become a launching pad for radical Islamist attacks into Russia since the late 1990s. These have included suicide bombings.

What common themes and factors drew al Qaeda and these local groups together? How did local groups come to see their situation within the context of al Qaeda’s global construct? What role did al Qaeda’s ideology and activities from its Afghan base play in facilitating these developments?

Perhaps the key overarching theme that drew local groups to identify with al Qaeda’s global message was the proposition that Islam was in crisis. Of course, this theme is a central tenet of al Qaeda’s Salafi-Jihadist ideology and, as noted earlier, was first promulgated by Qutb. The crisis is characterized as one affecting the entire Ummah. Thus, Muslims living in Arab and Muslim countries who feel a strong sense of alienation because they believe that their government does not
truly represent Islam and is failing politically and economically, perceive their local situation not as unique but part of a larger phenomenon. Thus, radical Islamist groups fighting against these conditions at the local level see their struggle in a global context.

Adding to this crisis of Islam, and playing a major part in it according to al Qaeda’s ideology, was Western and particularly American aggression and domination. The dimensions of this included US and other Western occupation of Muslim lands either directly or through Israel; collaboration with despotic, apostate, and puppet regimes such as Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia; appropriating Muslim resources; and the ultimate goal of hegemony over the Middle East politically, economically, and culturally.

Further facilitating the spread of Salafi-Jihadist doctrine and the rise of al Qaeda, which likewise contributed to the identification of local groups with a global movement, was what one specialist describes as the reach of “Wahhabism—a puritan form of Islam virtually synonymous with Salafism—to as many countries as possible” beginning in the 1970s. “Over the next three decades, the kingdom would muster some $70 billion in overseas aid, over two thirds of which was destined for ‘Islamic activities’ such as the building of mosques, religious learning institutions, or Wahhabi religious centers.” What this resulted in was a “diffusion of individuals, institutions, and financial assets” that helped to radicalize young Muslims and promote Jihad in their countries against apostate regimes.76

In sum, al Qaeda’s ideology constituted a comprehensive narrative with which local Jihad groups could find common ground. In addition, there were several other enablers that permitted al Qaeda to draw national-level armed groups into a broader global Salafi Jihad network that, as September 11, 2001 approached, can be characterized as an
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embryonic global millenarian insurgency. And different elements of that network were executing operations against both near and far enemies, employing the range of guerrilla and other irregular warfare tactics.

We have already identified the most important of these other enablers—al Qaeda’s sanctuary in Afghanistan. Through that safe haven, al Qaeda was able to expand and add to its first generation of Jihadists—those who fought the Soviet Union—a second generation that was trained by al Qaeda during 1996-2001. Both generations came from the nine regions identified above. Many were already members of national-level Islamist organizations. Through these individuals, relationships were established that linked the al Qaeda vanguard and its World Front to national-level movements. A network of acquaintance, friendships, and mutual obligations developed that stretched worldwide between and among these groups and the al Qaeda vanguard. Similarly, within these theatres, groups came to cooperate and develop bonds of shared experience and mutual obligation. Common experiences and histories cemented relationships between the various members of the global Jihad network.

Three additional enablers also enhanced its potential to draw national-level groups into a broader Salafi Jihad network that can be characterized as in the incipient stage of a global millenarian insurgency on a global level on the eve of 9/11. They included globalization, information age technologies, and a network-based approach to organization. Each augmented al Qaeda’s capacity to do so.

Globalization eroded the traditional boundaries that separated and secured the nation-state. It allows people, goods, information, ideas, values, and organizations to move easily across international space
without heeding state borders. Modern transportation and communications systems, in conjunction with the post-Cold War breakdown of political and economic barriers around the world, accelerated the globalization process.

Information age technologies are central to globalization. These are the networks through which communications takes place on a worldwide basis. Cellular and satellite phones allow contact between the most remote and the most accessible locations of the globe. Computers and the Internet are the other pillars of the information revolution.

To take advantage of globalization and information-age technologies, al Qaeda adopted a new organizational approach that was less hierarchical and more networked to link groups in the nine theatres together. In doing so, they followed the lead of the international business community, which was in the forefront of such change. Small and large corporations developed virtual or networked organizations that were able to adapt to the information age and globalization.

Globalization, information-age technology, and a network-based approach to organization, in conjunction with the aforementioned enabler of a secure sanctuary, contributed in important ways to the appearance at the end of the 20th century of a global millenarian insurgency, in its incipient stage of development, that was carrying out guerrilla warfare and other paramilitary operations against both “near” and “far” enemies.

**Global Insurgency in the Aftermath of 9/11?**

In the aftermath of 9/11 the United States went to war with al Qaeda and the Taliban. By December 7th the Taliban regime had been overthrown and al Qaeda’s infrastructure in Afghanistan largely disrupted. The loss of that sanctuary was a major setback—a strategic
defeat—for the vanguard of the Salafi Jihad Movement and the embryonic global insurgency it was facilitating from that Afghan base. It now faced the challenge of having to adapt and innovate to recover what it had lost. Could it find new ways to replicate what had been established in Afghanistan in 1996-2001? This was the challenge al Qaeda and its Salafi affiliates faced. Could they reinvent themselves in the aftermath of Operation Enduring Freedom and continue to carry out the global insurgency they had initiated?

The remainder of this study seeks to identify how over the last five years al Qaeda and the Salafi Jihadists have attempted to re-organize to continue to execute a global fight. They appear to have done so through four strategic adaptations. The degree to which they have been able to accomplish each of these strategic adaptations and, as a result, the extent to which they are able to fight the “long Jihad”—a protracted irregular war on several fronts—cannot be answered by this study. That requires much further research that was beyond this study. Here we will focus on describing what each of these strategic adaptations entails.

- **One**, the al Qaeda vanguard and its affiliates have employed the Internet to establish in cyberspace a virtual sanctuary from which to carry out many of the activities they had initiated from their Afghan base in 1996-2001. These activities include propagating the Salafi Jihad ideology to the Ummah; recruiting, inspiring, and training Jihadis; providing operational information and materials; networking dispersed elements of the Salafi Jihad movement; irregular warfare training; and planning and executing operations.

- **Two**, al Qaeda and its affiliates have attempted to utilize ungoverned territory in the tribal areas of the Afghan-Pakistan border (and elsewhere in other regions) as physical sanctuaries to carry out some of the same activities.

- **Three**, they have exploited the conflict in Iraq utilizing it as a major recruiting and training ground to help prepare a third generation of Salafi Jihadis. Iraq not only serves as a new front to engage the United States directly, but it also affords an opportunity
to develop a new cadre of skilled fighters who can gain the kind of experience that after Iraq will allow them to more effectively fight in their native lands or elsewhere. In other words, in the first decades of the 21st century these “Iraqi Arabs” may serve the same purpose the “Afghan Arabs” did at the close of the 20th century.

- Four, al Qaeda has continued to encourage and promote the global Salafi Jihad movement that, as Kilcullen contends, appears to function at the local level within nine regional areas. In these locations, activities carried out by groups and cells that see themselves as a part of this movement continued to take place since 9/11, with some regions to include Europe experiencing major terrorist strikes.

Below, the focus will mainly be on the first adaptation. How has the al Qaeda vanguard and its affiliates employed the Internet? To what extent do they seek to establish in cyberspace a virtual sanctuary from which to carry out many of the activities that had taken place on the ground during 1996-2001 in the Afghan base? The three remaining strategic adaptations—utilizing ungoverned territory, exploiting the conflict in Iraq, and continuing the fights against near or national level enemies by local armed groups—will receive briefer attention.

Virtual Sanctuary. Since 9/11, growing attention has been paid in both the news media and more scholarly publications to how al Qaeda and other associated Salafi Jihad groups have made use of the Internet. For example, Steve Coll and Susan Glasser suggested in the Washington Post that “al Qaeda has become the first guerrilla movement in history to migrate from physical space to cyberspace. With laptops and DVDs, in secret hideouts and at neighborhood Internet cafes, young code-writing Jihadists have sought to replicate the...facilities they lost in Afghanistan with countless new locations on the Internet.”

Gabriel Weimann, in a 2004 study, provided the following insights into the expanding use of the Internet by Jihad groups. “In 1998, around half of the thirty organizations designated [by the United States]
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as Foreign Terrorist Organizations … maintained Websites; by 2000, virtually all terrorist groups had established their presence on the Internet. Our scan of the Internet in 2003-2004 revealed hundreds of Websites serving terrorists and their supporters.” He goes on to add: “Terrorism on the Internet…is a very dynamic phenomenon: Websites suddenly emerge, frequently modify their formats, and then swiftly disappear—or seem to disappear by changing their online address but retain much the same content.” Since 2004, what Weimann described has continued to burgeon.

Weimann and other specialists have conceptualized frameworks for categorizing the different ways in which the Internet has been utilized, describing the functions these activities hope to serve. Extrapolating from these studies and based on extensive data mining of a primary source database compiled by the SITE Institute, one can observe these attempts to replicate in cyberspace many of the activities that took place on the ground in Afghanistan in 1996-2001. Here we divide those activities into the following seven categories:

- Propagating the Salafi Ideology of Jihad.
- Inspiring and Mobilizing the Ummah to Join the Jihad.
- Psychological Warfare to Demoralize Enemies.
- Networking the global Salafi Jihad Insurgency.
- Operational Information Sharing—Manuals and Handbooks.
- Operational Information Sharing—Training Videos and Courses.
- Collection for Targeting.

If effective, these virtual activities will provide al Qaeda and its associated movements (AQAM) with the capacity to reach like-minded individuals and groups in various regions of the world who are willing to join the cause and take action. Through AQAM Web sites these individuals and groups will have the opportunity to attain the operational skills and capacity to execute violent strikes locally and on
an independent basis. This is a new form of power projection no radical movement has had in the past.

What follows is a description of each category and how they fit together. It is based on an assessment of examples of the ways in which al Qaeda and associated Salafi Jihad groups have carried out each activity on their Internet Web sites. However, before doing so, it is also important to briefly note the role and contribution that Satellite television plays in this process. For Muslim populations in the Arab world and elsewhere satellite channels such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya are often the first way in which they are engaged with the issues and themes, described below, that are found on the Web sites of al Qaeda and associated Jihad groups. In other words, there is a synergy—even an unintended one—between them. Indeed, it may well be that Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya, among others, are the precipitants—provide an awaking—that takes the individual to the Internet for further information. Here is what they will find.

1) Propagating the Salafi Ideology of Jihad. Recall that the first requirement the Salafi Jihadists have to satisfy to be in a position to initiate a global insurgency is to transmit a transnational ideology to target audiences. They have to be able to successfully perform the same functions on the Internet as those carried out by national-level revolutionary movements. Through a large number of different Web-based activities to include sophisticated media fronts, news shows, and on-line magazines they seek to execute these functions across the globe. By doing so, they are able to disseminate a series of ideological frames and messages that describe in global and local terms the social and political conditions requiring immediate and drastic Jihad action. Salafi ideology offers a comprehensive critique of the existing local and global social/political situation as immoral and inhuman and seeks
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to instill in the Ummah a powerful sense of moral outrage and commitment to holy war.

The Global Islamic Media Front, one of the main voices of al Qaeda on the Web, is illustrative. This site, formerly known as Alneda, is heavily focused on ideological type information. They not only post all of the doctrinal speeches and statements of bin Laden and Zawahiri, among others, but also provide analysis of these items for the Ummah.

An example—“Reading and Analysis of the Hero Tapes of Usama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Abu Musab al Zarqawi”—was posted on May 1, 2006, and subsequently distributed across several other Jihad forums.

Another example that focuses, at least in part, on the broader ideological themes found in Salafi Jihad doctrine is the Voice of the Caliphate, a weekly news program issued by the Global Islamic Media Front. First appearing in 2005, it ties theory and practice together by providing examples of how the global holy war is being carried out by different elements of the Ummah.

Electronic Internet magazines serve a similar function. A recent example is The Echo of Jihad, a 45-page periodical that began appearing in 2006. Its April edition features discussion of the importance of Jihad, the relative importance of Islamic scholars versus Mujahideen leaders like bin Laden, and recent operations by Mujahideen in Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere. A second example Ja’amī (which means mosque) is produced by the Media Office of the Islamic Front of the Iraqi Resistance.

Finally, in this category of ideological and doctrinal materials one must include broad strategy documents such as al Qaeda’s seven-stage plan for the next twenty years. Since it was first posted, this “strategy”
document has been given a prominent and permanent status atop many of the most frequently visited Jihadist forums on the Internet. Western experts tend to characterize it as very naïve. They do so for the following reasons. First, there is no way the scenario depicted in the plan can be followed step by step. It is simply unworkable. Second, the idea that al-Qaeda could establish a caliphate in the Islamic world is absurd. The 20-year plan has nothing to do with reality. It is far out of reach.

However, these materials are not aimed at convincing Western experts. They are directed at those many members of the Ummah who read these materials at Jihadist forums on the Internet. What impact do they have on them? Do they envision a coming major transformation of society and return to an idealized past? And if they agree with it, are they ready, as one three-part series run by the Global Islamic Media Front asks, to “Gear Up” and prepare to join the Jihad?

2) Inspiring and Mobilizing the Ummah to Join the Jihad. It is one thing to nod in agreement with broad ideological statements. However, as the previous review of how revolutionary insurgent movement’s inspired and recruited cadre explained, next comes the hard work. The same is true here. But the Viet Cong did their inspiring and mobilizing face-to-face.

Al Qaeda and the Salafi Jihadists seek to substitute a plethora of Internet methods to achieve the same end. Here we will examine one important way they do so by celebrating the achievements and sacrifices of those on the front lines of the global fight.

Consider the biographies of martyrs which are posted on the Web with a high degree of regularity. Al Qaeda in Iraq, for example, publishes on a periodic basis a document titled “From the Biographies of Prominent Martyrs.” The eighth issue of it, dated January 2006, tells
the story of the “Knights Group” of three Mujahideen. In great detail the reader learns why and how each joined the Jihad and traveled to Iraq to fight. An account of their courageous demise follows. The three were pinned down in a house they were using as a base. The author glorifies their deaths, noting the unwillingness of each to try to escape or surrender. And one of the Jihad fighters, referred to as the lion Abu-Umar, is said to have “carried in his hands a mortar shell that he had prepared for this situation.” He surprised the Americans attacking the house, “pulled the ring out, throwing four of the criminals to hell, while he went up to Paradise.”

This is but one example. Many others are contained in the SITE Institute database. And they only maintain a sample of them. There are also other formats for these biographies such as the videoed “last will and testament” of suicide bombers. One example is the “Will of the Martyr, Abu al-Zobeir al-Mohajir,” with video footage of his operation in Karmat al-Fallujah in July 2005. It depicts a celebration in which he enthusiastically describes the operation he is about to carry out and why he intends to do so: “Allah ordered us to make Jihad…to defend his religion. I urge all young Muslim men to follow us in Jihad and give their lives for the sake of Allah’s religion.” He is then shown being embraced by his comrades, before the film cuts to the scene of his suicide car bombing—a “crusaders checkpoint” east of Fallujah. Again, this is one of many examples found at Jihad Web sites.

Other means employed to inspire and mobilize are videos of the preparation for and successful conduct of operations against US forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. These appear on a daily basis on Jihadi forums and Web sites. One example, issued by the Global Islamic Media Front on January 22, 2006, is a 28-minute video titled: “Jihad Academy,” which is described as but a “single day for those who struggle in
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Allah’s cause.” It highlights a number of attacks executed by Iraqi insurgent groups to include al Qaeda in Iraq, the Mujahideen Army, and the Islamic Army in Iraq. The attacks are shown in the dawn hours and in the dark of night. They include sniper operations, detonation of improvised explosive devices against a variety of targets, and rocket and mortar fire.

There also are many publications posted on these Web sites that fall into the category of inspiring, motivating, and mobilizing the Ummah to join the fight. These guides are advocacy and motivational pieces. The extent to which the message is being received and acted upon remains to be determined.

Paralleling these are other videos with Jihadi field commanders who provide the same kind of inspirational message. Of course, the most prominent was Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. An example, titled “A Message to the People,” was issued by the Mujahideen Shura Council, which claims to be composed of six insurgency groups in Iraq. In this 34-minute video, Zarqawi was seen planning operations in a war room, meeting with local leaders of al-Anbar province, leading Mujahideen in training exercises and on the battlefield. In another part of the film Zarqawi was seen firing an automatic weapon, and stating: “America will go out of Iraq, humiliated, defeated.”

Finally, scores of items on these Web sites go the next step and include guides describing how to prepare for and then join the fight in Iraq and elsewhere. One example, "This is the Road to Iraq," provides instructions for prospective Jihadis intent on entering the war. The first half concentrates on mental and physical preparation for Jihad, while the second half furnishes guidance for successfully entering Iraq and cultivating contacts with an insurgent group.
In addition to celebrating the achievements and sacrifices of those on the front lines of the global fight, there are other ways, and the Salafi Jihadists employ the Internet to inspire and mobilize the Ummah to join the fight. They use the same Web sites, for example, to recount the suffering and carnage they assert is being inflicted on Muslims by the United States and other Western powers, Israel, and apostate regimes in Islamic countries.

3) Psychological Warfare to Demoralize Enemies. The flip side of inspiring and mobilizing the Ummah to join the Salafi Jihad movement and fight is the demoralizing of the near and far enemies of that movement, convincing them to give up the fight. Here we will use the insurgency in Iraq, the central front in the global Jihad, as illustrative.

A number of Internet-based tactics are employed by the Salafi insurgent groups to demoralize their enemies in Iraq. Of these, the most terrifying and intimidating have been the beheadings. This tactic has been used against both Iraqis and foreigners working in Iraq. The message to each group is unambiguous. The nightmare video of those captured being decapitated by their captors is anything but a random act of terrorism—it is carefully designed for specific audiences.

With respect to members of the Iraqi government, and those contemplating joining it, the threat of beheading was explicitly made through numerous Internet-posted warnings. For example, on April 20, 2006 the Shari’a Commission of the Mujahideen Shura Council in Iraq issued the threat of “the sword and slaughter to he who joins the police and the army.” The Council stated that all Muslims who join the Iraqi security forces to serve those who “worship the devils, those who disbelieve and fight in the cause of Taghut [Satan],” shall be considered “converters who fight against Allah.” What awaits them?—“sharp swords!” And in a similar message posted in December 2005, insurgent
groups in Iraq were encouraged to “start cutting throats in the Islamic way…. Slaughter three every day to show them that you do not hesitate in implementing Allah’s orders.” To Western eyes this is immoral and savage behavior. But for Salafi Jihadists it is characterized as religious duty. The blood dripping sword has a powerful Salafi meaning.

In addition to the beheading videos, the insurgents in Iraq also post a large number of videos and reports of other kinds of executions. These include putting captives to death by firing squad, as well as pulling police out of vehicles, off of street corners, and so on to gun them down on the spot.

Members of the leadership in Iraq are often singled out by name. For example, in November 2005 an al Qaeda affiliated Jihad forum posted the photographs of the “Twenty Most Wanted People in the land of the Two Rivers.” Various assassinations of senior level officials since 2003 have demonstrated such threats are often backed up. The “devil” Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani was designated as number one—the most wanted. The text concluded—“We ask Allah that the Mujahideen will be able to remove their heads.”

With respect to the United States, the most frequent tactic employed is the previously mentioned daily reports on all the Jihad forums and Web sites of alleged successful operations carried out against American forces in Iraq. Those that stand out among a large number reviewed are the “Top Ten” videos of insurgent attacks that began to appear in 2005. Released both by the Global Islamic Media Front and a group calling itself the “Muslim Lions,” they are widely distributed across Jihad forums today. Each includes ten attacks perpetrated by groups such as Ansar al-Sunnah Army, Islamic Army in Iraq, and al Qaeda in Iraq. They are impressive productions. These
attacks also frequently appear the day after they occur in various Western print and electronic news outlets. Reports of attacks on the United States are not confined to Iraq. The message from these Web sites is that America is under assault in all the places it has entered in the Muslim world. Next to Iraq, operations against US forces in Afghanistan receive the greatest attention. And individual spectacular strikes like that on the US Consulate in Jeddah by al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia are featured widely. Taken in total the psychological warfare message is clear—the United States is exposed and vulnerable to effective and continuous Mujahideen attacks across the Muslim world.

Finally, the leaders of the global Jihad use the Internet to mock failed US attempts to capture or kill them. One example that received wide attention (to include being broadcast on al-Jazeera) was a speech by Zawahiri following the January 2006 air strike on the village of Damadola in Peshawar. Al Qaeda’s number two was supposed to be hiding. He taunted President Bush—the “Butcher of Washington”—asserting “that his death will only come at the time of Allah’s decree, and until that time, he remains amid the Muslim masses, rejoicing in their support, their attention, their generosity, their protection and their participation in Jihad until we conquer you with the help and power of Allah.”

The above items all aimed at influencing and undermining one of America’s centers of gravity—the US home front. It is not unlike what the Viet Cong successfully targeted over thirty years ago. Then as now the objective is to follow Clausewitz’s advice. Attack the enemy’s center of gravity—his strategic pressure points—and you will weaken his capacity to fight war.
4) Networking the Global Salafi Jihad Insurgency. In the latter 1990s, al Qaeda's use of the Internet concentrated on the first category of this framework—propagating the Salafi ideology of Jihad to incite and unify the Ummah for a common purpose. Since 9/11, al Qaeda and associated members of the Salafi Jihad movement (a number of which are fighting at the national level) have broadened their use of the Web to include, as highlighted above, the second and third categories—inspiring and mobilizing the Ummah to join the Jihad and psychological warfare to demoralize enemies.

However, the loss of the Afghan sanctuary resulted in a further expansion. It now includes the use of the Internet for tactical purposes, such as training, and for operational objectives, to include how to organize virtual cells.

Each of these functions requires secure communications to avoid the disruptive tactics that US intelligence has been able to employ against certain kinds of Jihadi Internet activity—e.g., closing down fixed Web sites. Thus, al Qaeda and other groups began to employ new methods to include protected bulletin boards, free upload services by Internet providers, and the creation of proxy servers, among others. Up-to-date instruction on how to employ these techniques is likewise made available. Consider the following examples.

The first has to do with how to use third-party hosting services. This technique exploits these servers, paid for primarily by advertising agencies, to transmit operationally-related information and secret communications. These servers, available across the Internet, provide relatively anonymous hosting that a visitor can easily manipulate. A second way of transmitting operationally-related information and secret communications is through posted messages on discussion boards at password-protected forums. And a third technique entails creating and
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employing Internet proxy servers. Guides and manuals on how to utilize each of these methods are available at the Global Islamic Media Front site, among others.

These methods can be used to circulate a wide range of materials like training videos, operational manuals, and guides for producing weapons such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Along with other virtual techniques they can also be exploited by operational cells to secretly communicate and organize.

One way of communicating secretly, reported by Coll and Glasser, is through public e-mail services such as Hotmail. Here is how it works: An operative opens an account on Hotmail, “writes a message in draft form, saves it as a draft, and then transmits the e-mail account name and password during chatter on a relatively secure message board.” Another operative “opens the e-mail account and reads the draft—since no e-mail message was sent, there was a reduced risk of interception.” This process has been characterized as a dead drop in cyberspace. 82

Virtual methods such as these and others also provide the means to establish operational cells in cyberspace. Discussion of how to do so began to appear on different al Qaeda affiliated Web sites in 2004, according to sources collected by the SITE Institute. These items go into the details of how to do so, suggesting that once formed, members can both exchange “work plans, strategies, and educational materials” and eventually “meet in reality and execute operations in the field.”

An example of this kind of cell was reported in the spring of 2004. On March 29th, “Royal Canadian Mounted Police officers burst into the Ottawa home of Mohammed Khawaja, a 24-year-old computer programmer…arresting him for alleged complicity in what Canadian and British authorities described as a transatlantic plot to bomb targets
in London and Canada.” Khawaja, who “met his British counterparts online came to the attention of authorities when he traveled to Britain and walked into a surveillance operation being conducted by British Police.” He had gone there to “meet with his online acquaintances. During the meeting he told them how to detonate bombs using cell phones.” He had learned to do so from the Internet.\textsuperscript{83}

The plot involved seven men from four countries (United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and Pakistan) who through the Internet formed a virtual cell. During the time the cell was developing and moving towards taking action there appears to have been training provided to a member of it in Pakistan. Whether an al Qaeda linkage was established to provide post-training guidance or direction is unclear from open sources. When arrested the cell was in the process of going operational. This was the kind of cell—mainly homegrown members who met both locally and in cyberspace—is most feared in Europe. As we shall see later, through these new Web-based methods al Qaeda and other Salafi Jihad groups seek to provide the means by which prospective holy warriors at the local level can find likeminded associates and receive the knowledge and training via the Internet that is necessary to join the fight. The head of Britain’s domestic intelligence service (MI5) stated publicly in November 2006 that she “knew of 30 [such] conspiracies” and that “future attacks could be chemical, biological or even involve some kind of nuclear device.”\textsuperscript{84}

5) Operational Information Sharing—Manuals and Handbooks

Al Qaeda has established an extensive online compilation of operational manuals and handbooks for irregular warfare. These range from documents not unlike the doctrinal manuals of conventional military forces to more narrowly focused instructional guides on how to carry out a particular tactic or produce and employ a specific weapon.
The number of these items is now quite large. Here we will only highlight a few examples.

Broader military and intelligence materials provide the means whereby training can begin in virtually any location, simply by going online. We now know that al Qaeda was producing such manuals well before 9/11 because of what was found on computers and disks left behind in Afghanistan. Perhaps the best known of these items is what in the West came to be referred to as "The Encyclopedia of Jihad." An al Qaeda production of thousand of pages, it is a guide for how to establish an underground organization. The manual has circulated across the Internet.

Perhaps the most well known and widely circulated doctrinal manual is a 1600 page document titled “The Call for a Global Islamic Resistance.” It was written by Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, a Syrian native who fought against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. In the manual he highlights how small and independent groups of Mujahideen can conduct operations against the West. In the aftermath of 9/11, Nasar called for a “third generation” of Salafi Jihadists to plan and execute operations on their own but as part of the broader movement and in solidarity with al Qaeda’s ideology. He is said to have spent time in Europe attempting to do so. In some cases members of these cells made contact with al Qaeda, and receive training and operational support. Those who carried out the July 2005 bombings in London are an example.85

Beyond these broader manuals, a plethora of more narrowly focused handbooks and guides are also readily available. Perhaps the tactic/specific weapon receiving the widest attention on Jihadi Web addresses since 2003 is the IED. Many of these reports are based on lessons being drawn from Iraq. Often these reports and handbooks
include diagrams and other visual depictions such as one distributed to a password-protected al Qaeda affiliated forum in December 2005. The author illustrates the construction of a charge, the distance that it is placed from its target, and the amount of explosive to be used to achieve a desired result against different kinds of targets. There is even a discussion of physical principles such as blast waves.

This is but one example of the serious attention that is being given to IEDs. And it should not be surprising in light of the effectiveness of the weapon in Iraq, and the efforts the Pentagon has undertaken to find an answer to it. Indeed, the Jihadi’s are busy learning about DOD efforts at counter measures. Consider a report posted in April 2006 to a password-protected Jihadist forum discussing a study produced by the US think tank CSIS on innovations in the use of IEDs in Iraq and the US response to these new insurgent tactics. The author discusses the findings in the study and announces it will be translated into Arabic. He then chides the authors stating that they should not be surprised at the innovativeness of the Mujahideen in responding to new US tactics. After all, he points out, “they have Allah on their side and you have nobody on yours.”

Earlier in 2006, a similar item focused on the US Army’s plan to deploy the Joint IED Neutralizer in Iraq as a means to reduce the risk posed by roadside improvised explosive devices. The author highlights the specifications of the Neutralizer, where it “seems less reinforced,” and discusses a series of methods that the Mujahideen can use to defeat it.

Beyond IEDs, there are handbooks and related materials on many other kinds of weapons. These range from how to build a biological weapon and dirty bombs to information warfare tactics to how to service an AK-47.
6) **Operational Information Sharing—Training Videos and Courses.** It should not be surprising that new Internet developments in information management since 9/11 are quickly being adopted and adapted by the Salafi Jihadists. A case in point is the use of videos and slideshows as the basis for online training programs. Over the last three years professionally produced training videos have been generated by al Qaeda to replicate on the Web what it had been able to provide prospective holy warriors on the ground in Afghanistan in the latter 1990s. The SITE Institute has compiled a large quantity of these materials in its database.

Recent examples include training courses produced by Labik, an al Qaeda media organization operating in Afghanistan. In March 2006, it issued and posted a series of films of Mujahideen training for combat and practicing tactical operations to include conducting raids on houses, blowing up a bridge, attacking a target with rocket-propelled grenades, and taking hostages, among other actions.

Other video productions concentrate on how to execute a specific tactic or employ a particular weapon. An example is booby trapping. In this presentation the trainee learns that this technique for attacking an enemy can be implemented in many ways which require different levels of expertise and equipment. It also explains how many of these techniques were developed by “infidel states” such as England, Russia, Germany, Italy, and the United States. The narrator suggests to the viewer that these techniques should be studied. This particular instructional exercise, which appeared in an al Qaeda forum in 2005, concentrates on four specific types of booby trapping. Similar video presentations can be found for almost every irregular warfare tactic and on each of the weapons employed in this form of combat. These include how to operate against US soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan,
how to infiltrate into those countries, and how to fight in different rural and urban environments in each location.

These developments have led the Israeli specialist Reuven Paz to propose that this vast and wide-ranging body of instructional/training videos and slideshows posted on the Web over the last few years by Jihad groups constitutes nothing short of an Internet-based “Open University for Jihad.” Paz asserts that the Salafi Jihad movement has turned the Internet into a cyber university for recruiting, indoctrinating, and training future generations of holy warriors from the Arab and Muslim world.  

Al Qaeda’s Global Islamic Media Front sees eye-to-eye with Paz’s assessment. Indeed, they made this claim before Paz. In a 2005 article titled “Al Qaeda University for Jihad Subjects,” the Front described these activities as constituting a global institution in cyberspace, providing instruction and training in psychological, electronic, and physical warfare for the Mujahideen of tomorrow. The bottom line—budding holy warriors now have the means available to begin to undertake an irregular warfare training program in cyberspace, complete with discussion boards and chat rooms.

In conjunction with the previous functions of the virtual sanctuary, the use of new information management tools highlighted in this section facilitate the development of homegrown cells discussed earlier. These cells can emerge in any location and on their own and develop the means to prepare for and carry out operations. There are now examples of this homegrown pattern that have taken place since 9/11. As noted above, in some cases the local cell has made contact with and received assistance from al Qaeda, while in other instances this was not the case. The attack on the London subway, the train bombings in Madrid, the series of suicide operations in Casablanca, and the actions
of the Hofstad group in the Netherlands, to name the most prominent cases, reflect both these homegrown variations.

7) Collection Targeting. Finally, the Internet provides Salafi operational units with a significant amount of data about potential targets, particularly ones in the West. The extent to which they have mined the Web for this kind of information was first uncovered on al Qaeda computers left behind in Afghanistan. Based on open sources readily available on the Internet, al Qaeda had built target folders/files prior to 9/11 on public utilities, transportation systems, government buildings, airports, major harbors, and nuclear power plants. They also collected US government and private sector studies of the vulnerabilities of these and other facilities to different types of terrorist operations.

Additionally, they have access to overhead imagery and related structural information of many potential targets. This allows them to not only access the target in terms of its most vulnerable points, but to observe security measures that have been taken to protect it.

According to Dan Verton, a specialist in cyberterrorism, since 9/11 "al Qaeda cells now operate with the assistance of large databases containing details of potential targets in the U.S. They use the Internet to collect intelligence on those targets, especially critical economic nodes, and modern software enables them to study structural weaknesses in facilities as well as predict the cascading failure effect of attacking certain systems."87

Since 9/11 the US government has undertaken measures to protect such information, particularly where it concerns critical facilities and infrastructure. Information that used to be publicly available is now secured. However, in this game of cat and mouse the Jihadis are teaching one another how to penetrate secure Web sites. For example,
recently the Global Islamic Media Front began circulating a 74-page guide on how to identify the vulnerabilities of and penetrate—hack—into them. The guide highlights software that can be used to do so.

**Sanctuaries in Ungoverned Territory.** Beyond this virtual sanctuary, to what extent has al Qaeda also been able to carry out in ungoverned and largely lawless tribal areas of the Afghan-Pakistan border (and possibly in other regions of the world as well) those activities that it accomplished during 1996-2001 in Afghanistan? Has it established a physical sanctuary in the border region that contributes to its ability to continue to foster global insurgency activities? Though it began out of dire necessity, it now appears that al Qaeda’s relocation to the ungoverned tribal areas of North Waziristan has evolved in this way.

It has been difficult for US security agencies to ascertain exactly what has taken place in Waziristan. Only now are the opportunities provided to al Qaeda in these lawless and ungoverned areas being understood. Until recently, the extent to which such territories could be utilized by armed groups to establish secure sanctuaries was not seriously contemplated.

For US intelligence, these areas well constitute yet another “new frontier,” an important front in the “long war.” It will need to develop a clear picture of what al Qaeda and other armed groups of concern are able to achieve in various ungoverned territories. But this is not easily accomplished according to a former intelligence officer from a non-US service who had attempted to do so against a terrorist group operating out of ungoverned territory in Africa. The objective, he explained, was to acquire ongoing intelligence of how the terrorist group we were fighting against elsewhere used that ungoverned territory. His service had a very difficult time trying to do so.
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The tribal area along the Afghan-Pakistan border is illustrative. It exists within a larger Central Asian territory that encompasses parts of several states and is distinguished by rugged terrain, poor accessibility, low population density, and little government presence. This creates safe havens for terrorists, insurgents, militias, and criminal groups. And local governments on their own lack the economic, military, intelligence, and police power to do anything about it.

In early 2002, elements of the Taliban and al Qaeda retreated into the Afghan-Pakistan frontier. And bin Laden was believed to have taken refuge in the mountains of this territory. During 2003, reports began to warn that al Qaeda and Taliban forces were regrouping in this area and forming an alliance with the radical Islamist party Hizb-i Islami. Since then they have fought a protracted war against the United States, NATO, and local government forces. It is beyond the scope of this paper to chronicle that fight. However, there now seems to be no question that al Qaeda maintains a robust fighting force and growing infrastructure in the area.

But the specific details of how al Qaeda re-established fighting units in this ungoverned space and the kind of infrastructure for training and related activities it re-built has been difficult to discern for US intelligence. To be sure, Jihadis were known to be traveling to the area to join the fight much like their predecessors did in the 1980s and 1990s. But a clear picture of what transpired since 2002 has been elusive.

Only in early 2007 did a clearer picture emerge about the extent to which al Qaeda is now exploiting this new sanctuary to continue to foster a global insurgency. According to “American officials…there was mounting evidence that Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahri, had been steadily building a [training and] operations hub
in the mountainous Pakistani tribal area of North Waziristan…. Recent intelligence showed that the compounds functioned under a loose command structure and were operated by groups of Arab, Pakistani and Afghan militants allied with.”

While training camps have “yet to reach the size and level of sophistication of the al Qaeda camps established in Afghanistan under Taliban rule,” nevertheless they are now assessed by US intelligence as much more advanced that had been previously thought. Moreover, the emergence of this safe haven in North Waziristan and the surrounding area “has helped senior [al Qaeda] operatives communicate more effectively with the outside world via courier and the Internet.”

According to Bruce Hoffman:

Al-Qaeda…has regrouped and reorganized from the setbacks meted out by the United States, its allies and partners shortly after 9/11…and is marshalling its forces to continue the war that Osama bin Laden declared against America 10 years ago with his then mostly ignored fatwa. In this respect, al-Qaeda is functioning exactly as its founders envisioned it: as both an inspiration and an organization, simultaneously summoning a broad universe of like-minded extremists to violence while still providing guidance and assistance for more spectacular types of terrorist operations.

The Afghan-Pakistan border is not the only ungoverned territory out of which al Qaeda and/or its regional affiliates have developed a presence. A case in point is the Algerian-based Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). An adherent to Salafi Jihadist branch of Islamism, the GSPC launched a ruthless insurgent campaign in Algeria in the 1990s, targeting the government, the military, and civilians. Along with the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), it killed tens of thousands of innocent Algerians.

Members of the GSPC leadership have issued public statements declaring their support and connections with al Qaeda and other Salafi
Jihadist organizations. They have also said they intend to attack US and European targets as part of the global holy war. An alleged member of the GSPC was accused of involvement in the attack on the *USS Cole*. Other GSPC operatives have been implicated in attempted terrorist operations in other parts of the world. European intelligence services estimate that this Salafi affiliate has several hundred operatives deployed outside of Algeria. Some are fighting in Iraq.

The GSPC has also moved into the Sahel region of Africa to establish base areas. Large parts of that territory, which cut across Mali, Chad, Niger, and Mauritania, are ungoverned. Of these four states, the GSPC appears to have the largest presence in the northern part of Mali. However, like al Qaeda’s presence in the tribal areas of the Afghan-Pakistan border, open source information on the activities being undertaken by the GSPC in the Sahel are sparse. What is known is that they are taking advantage of this remote area to establish a presence. They appear to be able to move freely, smuggle contraband, recruit from among the impoverished indigenous population with a large youth cohort, and establish secure bases for various activities. But the extent to which they are able to do so is not known. Neither is how this fits into the larger Salafi Jihad.

To summarize, a vacuum is burgeoning within the territory of fragile and failing states. This expanse of lawless and ungoverned space, estimated to include remote parts of more than 20 countries, is beyond the authority of local governments. It creates potential safe havens in which armed groups can establish secure bases for self-protection, training, planning, and launching. The extent and degree to which al Qaeda and other Salafi Jihadists are taking advantage of it is in need of extensive investigation.
The Iraqi Central Front. Al Qaeda and many of the associated groups that comprise the Salafi Jihad movement have come to see the conflict in Iraq within the context of the “long Jihad.” Consequently, they seek to exploit the insurgency there for two principal reasons.

First, they have anointed Iraq the main front, the forward edge of the global battle on which to engage the far enemy—the United States. They believe that by forcing the United States to give up the fight in Iraq they will inflict a defeat of enormous strategic consequences on it.

Second, the Salafi Jihadists also believe Iraq affords them a vital opportunity to spawn a new corps of skilled fighters who can gain the kind of experience that after they leave Iraq can be put to good use fighting in their native lands or elsewhere. In other words, in the first decades of the 21st century these “Iraqi Arabs” can serve the same purpose the “Afghan Arabs” did at the close of the 20th century. Evidence of this has been found in the ruins of the air strike that killed Zarqawi on June 7, 2006. According to The New York Times, “At the time of his death...[he] was still trying to transform his organization from one focused on the Iraqi insurgency into a global operation capable of striking far beyond Iraq's borders.” According to Jordanian security officials, Zarqawi’s “recruiting efforts...were threefold: He sought volunteers to fight in Iraq and others to become suicide bombers there, but he also recruited about 300 who went to Iraq for terrorist training and sent them back to their home countries, where they await orders to carry out strikes.” Others believe that beyond their home countries, some of these trainees are also in Western countries.

Statements by bin Laden, Zawahiri, Zarqawi, and other leaders of al Qaeda have made clear that they view Iraq within this twofold context. Likewise, it is the message that is repeatedly conveyed on their
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Web sites. Iraq provides a unique and historic opportunity to fight and defeat the main enemy of the global Jihad movement.

Iraq has eclipsed other fronts to include Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Yemen in terms of centrality to the global Jihad. It dominates Salafi Web sites, and is being used to rouse radical Salafi passions, inspire Arab and Muslim youth, and animate the Ummah to see Iraq through the lens of the “long Jihad.” Thus, they are told the Mujahideen are fighting a pivotal battle in Iraq to expel the United States from the region. Iraq is part of a long protracted war—a “long Jihad”—against the West that seeks to overthrow all apostate regimes, liberate all occupied lands, and reestablish the Caliphate.

Since the US intervention in 2003, these themes have been employed as part of a major effort to inspire members of the Ummah from across the Muslim world to travel to Iraq and join the fight. Moreover, it is now apparent that there are networks for expediting this process both in the Middle East and beyond. To be sure, the majority of “Iraqi Arabs” come from the region. And of these, Saudi Arabia and Yemen appear to be at the head of the list. But foreign fighters in Iraq are also drawn from other parts of the Gulf, as well as from Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Sudan. Beyond the region Mujahideen have come from Britain, France, and elsewhere in Europe.

Within Iraq these foreign fighters are part of several Salafi Jihadist groups that have joined together under the umbrella of al Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers and established the operational capabilities to emerge as a major component of the insurgency. There is no need to go into the details here of the impact they have had on the fight in Iraq. It is substantial. And, as noted above, it will produce a third generation of Jihadi fighters, young Muslims transformed into ideologically
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carried and well trained through practice holy warriors—the latest iteration of Qutb’s vanguard.

In sum, the bottom line is that Iraq has become an integral part of how al Qaeda and the Salafi Jihadists have sought to adapt and re-organize following the strategic setback in Afghanistan to continue to facilitate a global millenarian insurgency.

**Fostering the Global Salafi Jihad Movement.** Finally, al Qaeda’s fourth adaptation appears to have focused on re-establishing its self-assigned role as vanguard of the Salafi Jihad movement, a role that was set back as a result of Operation Enduring Freedom. How has al Qaeda sought to do so? Of the four adaptations examined, this was the most nebulous and at first blush difficult to discern. Moreover, developing a detailed mosaic of what is now referred to as al Qaeda and Associated Movements (AQAM) was beyond the scope of this paper. To be sure, the construct of such a mosaic is needed, and below we will identify two efforts that address elements of it. Here we can only highlight the broader contours of AQAM and identify key questions that remain to be addressed.

Recall Hoffman’s portrayal of al Qaeda “as both an inspiration and an organization.” With respect to the former, al Qaeda’s founders saw as one of the central missions of their organization the realization of the vanguard party concept advocated by Qutb. And so, to that end they sought to “summon a broad universe of like-minded extremists” to become part of a global Jihad movement.95 In the 1990s, in Afghanistan, al Qaeda was able to begin to carry out this mission by establishing a network of linkages with a score of national-level Islamist groups, who were employing guerrilla violence and terrorism against their governments. Many authors to include Hoffman have chronicled these pre-9/11 developments.
Al Qaeda from its Afghan sanctuary provided national-level Jihad organizations with financial assistance, training, weapons, and spiritual guidance. In return, these entities were to see themselves as part of al Qaeda’s global struggle. Recipients included radical Islamist armed groups from Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, Uzbekistan, Chechnya, Kashmir, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Bosnia, among a number of other places.

The capacity of al Qaeda to continue to play this vanguard role and to maintain connections with the groups that comprised this network of associations was set back considerably with the loss of its Afghan sanctuary. What has al Qaeda done to adapt in order to re-establish linkages with its old Salafi Jihad affiliates and add new ones? What are the constituent parts of AQAM? How do local Jihad groups view their place in AQAM and relationship to al Qaeda? How many local affiliates exist? These questions highlight what needs to be discovered about al Qaeda’s post-9/11 efforts to re-establish a network of linkages with national-level Islamist groups.

As late as 2005, four years after 9/11, US officials were still struggling to understand the relationship between al Qaeda and its affiliates, and the extent to which those linkages had been reestablished. In 2006, key US national security documents began to use the term and al Qaeda Associated Movements (AQAM) to refer to this rejuvenated relationship. US Central Command’s (CENTCOM) posture statement for fighting the war in 2006 is illustrative. It assessed al Qaeda through the “near enemy—far enemy” lens. AQAM was described as a global movement having a strong presence in the CENTCOM region through several local Salafi Jihad affiliates.96

These affiliates were described as fighting against local apostate regimes (who are partners of the US)—“near enemies”—in the
CENTCOM area. According to the posture statement, the relationship between al Qaeda and local Jihad groups since 9/11 has been facilitated by the Internet.

This enemy is linked by modern communications, expertly using the virtual world for indoctrination and proselytizing. The Internet empowers these extremists in a way that would have been impossible a decade ago. It enables them to have global reach.... And this safe haven of websites and the Internet is proliferating rapidly, spreading al Qaeda’s ideology well beyond its birthplace in the Middle East.97

To be sure, an important way al Qaeda has sought to re-establish linkages with local Salafi Jihad groups is through its virtual sanctuary. Indeed, as was described earlier, al Qaeda uses the Internet to propagate its Salafi Jihad ideology to instill in the Ummah a powerful sense of moral outrage and commitment to holy war. Through a large number of different Web-based activities al Qaeda seeks to propagate its message to individuals and groups across the globe. In doing so, they disseminate a series of ideological frames and messages that describe in global and local terms the social and political conditions requiring immediate and drastic Jihad action.

That this is taking place is evident. Through this virtual sanctuary al Qaeda seeks to re-establish its vanguard role and attempts to inspire and encourage a global movement of radicalized Muslim groups to fight locally against “near enemies,” while seeing themselves as a part of a larger global struggle against the United States, the “far enemy.”

But how organized are these efforts and who do they reach? A recent study by Rita Katz and Josh Devon of the SITE Institute describes this Internet activity as “very structured.... A handful of primary source Jihadist Web sites distribute the media [activities] of the leaders of al-Qaeda and other Jihadist groups. Through this small number of specific, password protected online forums, the leading
Jihadist groups, like al-Qaeda, post their communiqués and propaganda. By keeping primary source Jihadist Web sites small...[they] can provide a transparent mechanism to authenticate communiqués."  

Although these primary Web sites are relatively few in number, Katz and Devon note that members of them disseminate official communiqués, doctrinal treatises, strategic and operational documents, special messages, and other materials through a much broader and far-reaching network of other Web sites, message boards, e-groups, blogs, and instant messaging services available through the Internet. Here is one way they say this process functions:  

Once an official message from a Jihadist group is posted to a primary source message forum, members of the primary message forum will then disseminate that posting to other secondary message boards. From these secondary message boards, other peripheral individuals will then disseminate the information onto other message boards. Katz and Devon propose the following network graphic to illustrate how this virtual capability seeks to be “at once decentralized but rigidly hierarchical:”  

The primary Web sites at the center of the network graphic are comprised of al-Qaeda and organizations that appear closely associated with it to include insurgent groups in Iraq, the Taliban and other groups in Afghanistan, the Islamic Maghreb (formerly the GSPC), the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, Saudi Jihadist groups, and others. Since January 2006, report Katz and Devon, the web-based activities of these AQAM elements have been coordinated and distributed through a new virtual entity—the Al-Fajr Center—to the secondary and tertiary Web sites noted on the above graphic. What this portends is that individuals and groups across the globe may now easily acquire the kinds of
information identified in each of the seven categories of the virtual sanctuary described earlier.

In sum, the activities carried out by the *Al-Fajr Center* provide the potential for “fostering a unified, global Jihadist community.” Moreover, it can assist al Qaeda and key associates “coordinate, share information, and consolidate their power to continue to lead the [global] Jihadist movement,” which is one of al Qaeda’s original and enduring missions.¹⁰¹

If this is a key way al Qaeda has sought to re-establish its self-assigned role as vanguard of the global Salafi Jihad movement, then the follow-on question is how do we know who comprises the local affiliates of AQAM and on what basis do they view themselves as a part of AQAM? One recent study has sought to identify criteria for membership in AQAM. The author, Assaf Moghadam, proposes that to
be a member of AQAM a Salafi Jihad entity must be a Sunni Islamic
group and meet one of the following four criteria.102

First, a group can be considered part of AQAM if “Al Qaeda is
reflected in the group’s name” and its members adhere to al Qaeda’s
agenda.103 In this category he includes al Qaeda in Iraq, which prior to
September 2004 was known as Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad. Founded
by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, in October 2004 he declared the allegiance
of the group to bin Laden and al Qaeda’s strategy. This was followed
by a change in the name of group. A more recent example of the first
criteria can be found in North Africa. The Algerian Salafist Group for
Preaching and Combat, known by its French initials GSPC, announced
at the end of 2006 it was switching its name to Al Qaeda of the Islamic
Maghreb. Long associated with al Qaeda it was chosen by bin Laden to
forge links and coordinate the activities of likeminded groups in
Morocco, Nigeria, Mauritania, Tunisia and elsewhere.104 Thus, the
name change.

Second, a group may be considered part of AQAM if, according to
Moghadam, there is evidence it has “internalized the worldview of Al
Qaeda and global Jihad.” Several organizations fall into this category
including the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU); Jaish-e-
Muhammad (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), both whose base of
operations is Pakistan; Indonesia’s Jemaah Islamiyya (JI); and the
Moroccan group Assirat al Moustaquim (Direct Path). These groups
and several others similar to them meet this second criteria established
by Moghadam.105

A third criteria is that a “group is devoted to and actively practices
violence to overthrow an existing Islamic regime or regimes with the
aim to create a transnational Caliphate in its stead.”106 Here also,
several groups fit into this category including Ansar al Islam, a “radical
Islamist group of Iraqi Kurds and Arabs who have vowed to establish an independent Islamic state in Iraq.” Established in December 2001, it has had a close affiliation with al-Qaeda and was aligned with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, when he led al-Qaeda in Iraq. Also in this category is a second Iraqi group, Ansar al Sunnah Army, as well as the Army of the Levant, Jamatul Mujahedin Bangladesh (JMB) and Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami, a radical Islamic political movement that seeks to implement pure Salafi Jihad doctrine and create an Islamic caliphate in Central Asia.

Finally, a group may be considered an al-Qaeda affiliate and part of AQAM if it “has engaged in the practice of takfir.” In other words, it has labeled a Muslim regime or its leaders as apostates because they demonstrate disbelief. Recall the discussion of Qutb and how he came to charge that Nasser was guilty of conscious belief that there was a better way to rule than that based on Islam. Therefore, he was an apostate ruler and a legitimate target for Jihad. Several of the groups associated with the previous criteria likewise fit into this category. They label the local regimes they are fighting in the same terms that Qutb used to discredit Nasser. This has been true, for example, of the Algerian GSPC, and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) from which it split in 1998 over a disagreement on whether civilians constitute legitimate targets.

In sum, this final section has sought to highlight the broader contours of how al-Qaeda has attempted since 9/11 to re-establish its self-assigned role as vanguard of the Salafi Jihad movement. As noted above, more attention needs to be focused on this adaptation in order to gain a deeper understanding of what has transpired in order to develop a detailed mosaic of Al Qaeda and its Associated Movements (AQAM).
GLOBAL INSURGENCY STRATEGY AND THE SALAFI JIHAD MOVEMENT

Richard H. Shultz

A NEW TYPE OF WAR?

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attack on strategic targets inside the United States by al Qaeda, scholars, analysts, and policy specialists began to interpret and frame those events within the larger context of war. But was it war? And if it was, what kind of war was it? Al Qaeda was not a state but a non-state actor. Many labeled al Qaeda a transnational terrorist organization. Could such a non-state armed group go to war with a major state actor? What kind of war could it carry out? There were no easily decipherable answers to these questions, for al Qaeda did not reflect or emulate the conduct of war as it was known and practiced in the past.

Within a short period of time the US government began to describe the post-9/11 conflict environment—one in which America found itself engaged in a fight against unconventional and asymmetrical enemies who could pose major, even strategic, security threats—as a global war on terrorism. This generated a great deal of discussion and differences of opinion. Was this an accurate portrayal of the post-9/11 security environment or did such a characterization lack strategic clarity?

By the summer of 2005 senior Bush administration officials expressed serious doubts about this terminology and recast how they described the fight against al Qaeda, its affiliates, and other terrorist groups. Illustrative of this was Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. At news conferences and in public addresses he began to speak of a global struggle against violent extremism—“the long war”—rather than a global war on terrorism. Other senior military leaders, to include the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, followed suit.
But this begged the question, how should we understand those conducting “the long war?” Who are they and what kind of battle are they fighting? What are their objectives and what kind of strategy and tactics do they employ in this fight to achieve them? One possible answer that has been suggested is that the United States and its allies are now confronted by a global Salafi Jihad insurgency. 

Those taking this position argue that a more precise description of the post-9/11 conflict against the Salafi Jihad movement, which will be discussed in detail later, would be to frame it as a global insurgency; one that challenges the Western-dominated state system. Within this context, al Qaeda and loosely associated groups and movements are said to comprise an evolving form of networked non-state actors who operate locally, regionally, and globally. If this is the case—that a global insurgency is under way—then the implications for how to counter it are significant and will require important changes in US policy and strategy.

But how do we know that a global Salafi Jihad insurgency is underway? To determine whether this is the case, this study poses the following core research questions:

- Is a diverse confederation of armed groups, linked together by a common ideology (or narrative) and strengthened by new power enhancers, conducting a global insurgency against the United States and its allies?

- Is this global insurgency being carried out by a radical Salafi Jihad movement (and its al Qaeda vanguard) and does it have as its goals a) to foster regime change locally in apostate Muslim states and b) international system transformation globally?

- Is the strategy adopted by the Salafi Jihad movement a hybrid or an adaptation of the insurgency strategy that revolutionary movements employed against states during the
latter half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century? If so, what does it have in common with them and how does it differ?

To answer these core research questions, a series of corollary issues will first be examined as a prelude to conceptualizing a set of requirements or model of a hypothetical global insurgency. These requirements will then be tested against existing open source information on the actions, activities, and operations of the Salafi Jihad movement and its al Qaeda vanguard. The objective will be to determine whether preliminary evidence supports the proposition that those actions, activities, and operations, when seen through the lens of the proposed requirements, can be described, at minimum, as a global insurgency in its incipient stage of development. While these findings can only serve as preliminary indicators, the study will provide the basis for further analysis.

**INSURGENCY: CONCEPTS AND FRAMEWORKS**

The starting point for conceptualizing a hypothetical model or set of requirements for a global insurgency is a review of the following concepts and frameworks: 1) definitions and classifications of insurgency; 2) distinctions between insurgency and terrorism; and 3) relationship between insurgency and social movements. Below are the summary points from this review, followed by the text from which they are deduced.

**Summary Points**

- Four types of non-state armed groups—insurgents, terrorists, militias, criminal organizations—today pose major threats (to include strategic ones) to nation-states including the United States.
- Important differences exist among these armed groups, particularly between insurgent movements and terrorist organizations. An appreciation of those differences is essential to combat each of these types of armed groups.
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- Strategies employed by insurgent groups, both organizationally and operationally, are more multifaceted and diverse than those of its armed group counterparts.

- Insurgencies are protracted forms of unconventional warfare that seek to accomplish their goals and objectives through the employment of irregular military forces and illegal political organizations.

- The instruments of violence and influence employed by insurgents range from guerrilla operations, terrorism, and sabotage to political mobilization, political action, psychological operations and intelligence activities.

- Insurgencies are struggles for power and legitimacy. Insurgents seek to destroy the power and legitimacy of the government they are challenging, while enhancing the power and legitimacy of their movement.

- There is no one type of insurgency. A useful way to categorize them is based on their aspirations or objectives. Of the seven insurgent variations identified, the goals of revolutionary and millenarian insurgent movements are the most far-reaching. Each envisions a major transformation of the political and social system. The former seeks to advance to an idealized future, the latter to return to a golden past.

- An important lens through which to understand the nature of revolutionary and millenarian insurgencies is social movement theory. Indeed, these two forms of insurgency have several characters in common with high risk social movements.

- Social movements represent groups on the margins of state and society that seek to reform or transform the political system. To do so they develop complex political strategies, given their political marginality.

- The more far-reaching the change sought by a social movement, the more multi-faceted the tasks the movement’s organization has to accomplish. The same is true of revolutionary and millenarian insurgencies.

- To accomplish far-reaching change, radical social movements engage in high-risk activism. Like revolutionary and millenarian insurgencies, this necessitates development of a mass base of dedicated supporters who must be motivated to take action.

- For high-risk social movements, ideology performs a number of vital functions. To build a mass base, ideology plays a central role in the recruitment process that attracts new members; shapes the loyalty
of these new members to retain them; and serves as a tool for waging the struggle.

- High-risk social movement ideology constitutes a series of frames that must come to resonate with the target audience. It is through the movement’s organization that it comes to do so. Ideology and organization are symbiotically connected to one another.

**Defining Insurgency**

Insurgency is a strategy of unconventional and asymmetric warfare executed by one of four different types of non-state armed groups that today pose complicated analytic and significant operational challenges to those states that are confronted by them. Over the last two decades each of these armed groups, who carry out their activities both within and across state boundaries, have increasingly threatened state supremacy. In doing so, they present non-traditional challenges to the intelligence and security services of governments that are unlike the conventional ones posed by states.

Armed groups can be divided into a four-part typology—insurgents, terrorists, militias, and organized crime. While it is the case that these non-state actors have several characteristics in common, they also have important differences that distinguish one from the other. It is important for governments to understand why and how insurgents, terrorists, militias, and criminal organizations vary conceptually from one another and to categorize and respond to them as such. Failure to do so can result in serious policy and combat misfortune.

Insurgency, from an organizational and operational perspective, is the most intricate of the four types of activities carried out by armed groups. As will be discussed, this can be seen when insurgent movements are juxtaposed with terrorist organizations. It is likewise the case when they are put side by side with militias and criminal
groups. Insurgents can attack the state with an array of political and paramilitary instruments because of how they organize and operate.

Numerous authors have proposed definitions of insurgency as can be observed in the literature on political violence. Bard O’Neill, author of *Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare*, is one of the most frequently cited. He describes insurgents as armed groups that “consciously use political resources and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics [within a state].”\(^{111}\) Variations of O’Neill’s definition abound.\(^{112}\)

Consider the statement put forward in the CIA’s mid-1980s *Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency*—“Insurgency is a protracted political-military activity directed toward completely or partially controlling the resources of a country through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organizations.”\(^{113}\) In doing so, insurgents seek to weaken and/or destroy the power and legitimacy of a ruling government. They also simultaneously aim at increasing their own power and legitimacy.

To this end, an insurgent movement, depending on its goals and strategy, will draw on and employ a range of operational instruments including guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and sabotage, as well as political mobilization, political action, intelligence/counterintelligence activities, and propaganda/psychological warfare.

Insurgents can adopt different organizational forms ranging from those based on political and paramilitary dimensions to more narrowly structured conspiratorial ones. The classic or revolutionary insurgent model from the Cold War era was designed to recruit, indoctrinate, and mobilize supporters to establish an alternative political authority to the existing government, while employing intelligence and military means
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to attack and weaken that government through escalating violence. A conspiratorial variation, by way of contrast, focuses more exclusively on using violence to undermine the will of a government or occupying power to sustain losses and stay in the fight. It pays much less attention to controlling a particular territory, mass mobilization or building a parallel political apparatus.

Also affecting the approach taken by insurgents is the area or terrain where they carry out their activities. They can take place in an urban and/or rural environment, as well as transnationally. Each of these locations will have an impact on how the insurgents approach each of the characteristics or elements of this strategy.

On the basis of the above considerations, the following are the essential characteristics of insurgency as it will be approached in this study:

- Insurgency is a protracted political and military set of activities directed toward partially or completely gaining control over the territory of a country.
- Insurgents seek to accomplish these objectives through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organizations.
- Insurgents employ instruments ranging from guerrilla operations, terrorism, and sabotage to political mobilization, political action, psychological operations and intelligence/counterintelligence activities.
- Each of these instruments is designed to weaken and/or destroy the power and legitimacy of a ruling government, while at the same time increasing the power and legitimacy of the insurgent group.

Types of Insurgencies

There was little agreement among specialists during the Cold War over how to categorize different types of insurgency. And this remained true in its aftermath in the 1990s. Various experts were animated by different aspects of this type of armed group. Consequently, they
created idiosyncratic orderings or typologies of insurgency. Some focused on the organizational and operational dimensions of insurgent movements to classify them. Others concentrated on their aspirations. The following examples are illustrative of these two approaches.

The afore-cited *Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency* sets out four broad variations of insurgency in its typology—politically organized,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizational Structure</th>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Vulnerabilities</th>
<th>Other Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politically organized</td>
<td>Extensive, complex political structure developed before military operations are initiated.</td>
<td>Shadow government created to undermine authority of existing regime; political consolidation precedes military consolidation of contested areas.</td>
<td>Vulnerable to concentrated effort aimed at neutralizing the infrastructure and establishing administrative control in contested areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarily organized</td>
<td>Insurgent groups hope to form focus for disaffected population; destruction of regime legitimacy by military action; military consolidation precedes political consolidation of contested</td>
<td>Vulnerable to aggressive military action during early stages of rebellion because of undeveloped political structure, relatively vulnerable logistics and communications networks among local populations.</td>
<td>Hope to demoralize regime and attain power without extensive conventional warfare.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militarily organized</td>
<td>Traditionally organized</td>
<td>Urban insurgency</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Existing tribal or religious organizational structure.</td>
<td>No unique strategy common to all; will adopt strategy of one of the other types.</td>
<td>Limited capacity for absorbing economic and military punishment; leadership conflicts are common; leaders often lack sufficient motivation, experience as insurgents, and political discipline.</td>
<td>Recruitment on basis of ethnic exclusivity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cellular structure in urban environment.</td>
<td>Threaten regime legitimacy through urban disruption.</td>
<td>Restricted to small area and must hide within population; attrition resulting from military/police pressure and the psychological stress of clandestinity.</td>
<td>Often in support of wider insurgency waged in rural areas.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen, in this categorization there are two key or defining variables, the organizational structure and operational strategy employed to achieve intermediate and long-term insurgent objectives. Other characteristics receive consideration in the text accompanying this delineation—ideology, motivation, leadership, cadre background—but organizational structure and operational strategy are the key
variables used to differentiate the political, military, traditional, and urban variations. A similar approach can be seen in Christopher Clapham’s categorization of insurgencies in Africa in the 1990s.

Bard O’Neill, on the other had, concentrates on insurgent aspirations. In *Insurgency and Terrorism* he identifies several types of insurgency movements. For each, their principle goal or objective is the central variables. He notes that by doing so “important distinctions emerge.” Moreover, “If we fail to see the fundamental differences with respect to goals, we make a major mistake because…differentiating among goals has not only academic value but some very vital practical implications for those involved in [countering] insurgents.” For instance, this would be true in terms of whether an insurgent movement or elements within it are open to negotiation and political compromise.

Based on aspirations, O’Neill singles out seven types of insurgent movements—*anarchist, egalitarian, traditionalist, pluralist, secessionist, reformist, and preservationist*. Each of these prototypes focuses their activities and operations principally at the national or nation state level. However, at least in the case of two of them, the insurgents may see their movement as part of a larger international one based on a transnational ideology.

The first type—*anarchist*—has far reaching but unrealistic goals. They seek to “eliminate all institutionalized political arrangements because they view the superordinate-subordinate authority relationships associated with them as unnecessary and illegitimate.” To accomplish these goals, anarchist cells tend to rely on what has been called “propaganda of the deed”—violent strikes against the authority figures of the regime. While prevalent at the turn of the 20th century, in the aftermath of WWII examples of this variant are scant.
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The same is not the case for egalitarian or what more accurately should be termed revolutionary insurgent movements. In this approach, the insurgents seek to impose a new political and social order on the state based on a value system that calls for distributional equality. To do so, the insurgent leadership creates a centrally controlled apparatus or organization that mobilizes the people to radically transform the social structure within the existing political community.¹¹⁸

In the aftermath of WWII a number of communist revolutionary movements in different parts of the developing world adopted this approach. Perhaps the most illustrative example of these Cold War revolutionary insurgencies was that in Vietnam. It was able, in succession, to force first the French and then the United States to negotiate their withdrawal from the conflict. And as will be discussed later, the National Liberation Front or Viet Cong (VC), which the United States fought, established a highly developed version of this insurgent organization. While focused on seizing power at the local or nation-state level, nevertheless, the Vietnamese and other likeminded insurgencies saw themselves as part of a larger communist international movement.¹¹⁹

A traditional insurgency also has as its goal fundamental change of the political and social order. However, what such movements plan to replace the existing system with is one that seeks to return to and restore a regime that existed in either the recent or distant past. In the case of the latter, the ancien régime is rooted in ancestral ties and religion. O’Neill refers to this subtype as reactionary. A more analytically precise and objective characterization is to describe them as Millenarian.

Millenarian movements are ones in which religious, social, and political groupings envision a coming major transformation of society
and a return to an idealized past. Such movements typically claim that the current regime and its rulers are irreparably corrupted, unjust, and otherwise irredeemable. Moreover, such movements often believe in a supernatural power and predetermined victory through the intervention of God or other metaphysical forces.

Millenarian movements, generally, see the world through Manichaean lenses—a holy war between the forces of good and evil. And they are transnational in scope as well. Revolutionary and millenarian insurgent movements have much in common with respect to a dogmatic commitment to an ideology based on a perception of that ideology as reflecting absolute truth.

Post-WWII millenarianism is most often identified with certain conceptions of radical Islamism. In the 1950s, the Muslim Brotherhood, founded by Hassan al-Banna in 1928 as a religious, political, and social/revolutionary movement, was the most active. The global Salafi Jihad movement is its foremost offspring today.

The final insurgent variant which seeks a revolutionary transformation of the political system—Pluralist—is the only one that is not authoritarian in orientation. Their goal “is to establish a system in which the values of individual freedom, liberty, and compromise are emphasized and in which political structures are differentiated and autonomous.” O’Neill notes that “While the history of Western civilization is marked by a number of such uprisings [armed insurgencies] in recent times there have been few of any…we could classify as pluralist.” While this is true of armed movements, there are a number of examples of movements employing nonviolent strategies that have the same pluralist political objectives.

The fifth type of insurgency—Secessionist—seeks to break away from the state to which it is formally a part and establish an
independent political community. In the latter half of the 20th century, secessionist insurgent movements burgeoned. But there was no uniformity in the type of political system they sought to establish. Some opted for a system that reflected their ethnic and religious traditions, while others planned for more modern forms of government. None are transnational, seeing themselves as part of a larger or global movement.

The final two types of insurgency—Reformist and Preservationist—are less ambitious in terms of their aspirations. The former seeks a more equitable distribution of the political and economic goods of the system, not a radical reordering of it. The later seeks even less. It seeks to maintain the status quo, because of the relative advantages it derives from it.

**Distinctions Between Insurgency and Terrorism**

Scrutiny reveals important differences between insurgent movements and terrorist organizations. Understanding these dissimilarities is not only an academic’s prerogative. Such an appreciation is essential for those governments faced with having to combat each of these types of armed groups. Terrorism and those armed groups whose operational activities are limited to this form of political violence have been defined in a myriad of ways. Moreover, beginning in the 1960s “terrorism” came to be used pejoratively to discredit and de-legitimize various types of armed groups.

The moniker terrorist was employed by governments for propaganda and political warfare purposes against insurgent or resistance movements. The objective in doing so was to debase the reputation of the movement, render its cause illegitimate, and portray its methods as outside the laws of war. The US characterization of the Viet Cong in the 1960s is illustrative. However, for the Viet Cong,
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while terrorism was employed, it was done so as one tactic within a more complex political-military strategy.\textsuperscript{122}

In the 1970s, a number of armed groups did emerge that narrowed their operational approach to a reliance on terrorist tactics. Examples included the Baader-Meinhof Gang (the Red Army Faction), the Italian Red Brigades, and Japanese Red Army. They had little or no apparent desire (or capacity) to establish a mass social movement. Rather, these terrorist groups were comprised of small cells of alienated individuals embedded within national societies. The following are their key characteristics:

- \textit{Terrorist groups seek the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through the threat and/or use of the most proscribed kind of violence for political purposes.}

- \textit{The act is designed to have a far-reaching psychological effect beyond the immediate target of the attack. The objective is to instill fear in and intimidate a much wider audience.}

- \textit{The targets of terrorist groups increasingly are non-combatants, and large numbers of them, who under international norms have the status of protected individuals and groups.}

Based on these characteristics, it is observable how terrorist groups differ from insurgent movements. For instance, important distinctions exist with respect to tactics and targeting. As noted above, it is the case that insurgent use of violence can include terrorism as we have defined it. But they also rely on guerrilla warfare tactics defined here as irregular small unit attacks against the state’s military and security forces to harass, exhaust, and force them to overextend their resources.

In conjunction with violence, insurgents also use a number of political tactics to reallocate power within the country. They may do so, as noted above, for revolutionary objectives—to overthrow and replace the existing social order. Or they may have far less grandiose aspirations—overthrow an established government without a follow-on
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social revolutionary agenda, establish an autonomous national territory, cause the withdrawal of an occupying power, or extract political concessions that are unattainable through less violent means.

These differences are captured graphically in the diagram below. Here we can see that there is some overlap between terrorism and insurgency, but there are also large areas where they do not intersect.

Insurgency and High-Risk Social Movements

An additional lens through which to understand the nature of revolutionary and millenarian insurgency strategy is social movement theory. Indeed, these two forms of insurgency share several characteristics with social movements. It is particularly relevant with respect to the relationship between the organizational characteristics of such insurgencies and their worldview, ideology, and programs. And by using this lens we see how the terrorist moniker can conceal more than it reveals about armed groups.

Social movements often take the form of large-scale groupings of individuals and/or organizations focused on achieving some degree of political or social change. Broadly defined, a social movement is comprised of an element or grouping of the population within a state—
Social movements represent groups that are on the margins of state and society. Outside the boundaries of institutional power they seek to change the system, often in fundamental ways. Given its position on the margins of state and society a social movement has to develop a sophisticated strategy to achieve its objectives.

Social movements come in a number of different forms. Sociologists distinguish between reform and radical variations. The former includes a trade union seeking to increase workers rights or a green movement advocating new ecological laws. Radical variations include the American Civil Rights Movement which demanded full civil rights and equality under the law for all Americans or the Polish Solidarity (Solidarność) movement which called for the transformation of the communist system into a democratic one.

Social movements are also distinguished by their method of operations. Some employ peaceful means; others engage in high-risk, high-cost activism. The later often involves armed violence and underground organizations. Revolutionary and millenarian insurgencies are illustrative.

Why do individuals join high-risk movements and once they do so how are they retained? Social scientists have focused on those factors that facilitate participation in collective action. Answers are sought to the following questions: One, what explains how an individual initially becomes interested in a social movement? What leads him to be willing to expose himself to a new way of thinking? Two, once exposed, how does the movement convince him that it is a legitimate alternative and persuade him to accept its worldview? Three, how is he convinced to
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engage in high-risk activity. Four, how does the movement retain him to continue to do so?

High-risk social movements have to establish structured organizations with consciously conceived goals and programs for achieving those goals. They adopt characteristics of a formal organization (even when they are clandestine). However, they differ from other organizations in that they exist explicitly for bringing about major or systemic change. And the more far-reaching that proposed change, the more complex the tasks a social movement organization has to accomplish. This is especially true for social movements that take the form of revolutionary and millenarian insurgencies.

The Role of Ideology. A key element of a high-risk social movement is the role played by ideology in shaping its purpose, programs, and operations. Ideological appeals are central to their existence, to recruitment strategies that attract new members, to a member’s loyalty and retention, and as tools for waging the fight.

Ideology—“[A]n emotion-laden system of ideas, beliefs, myths, and values”—binds a movement together. An important feature of ideology is its appeal to emotion and its eliciting of an affective response. And the “myths and values of ideology are communicated through symbols” that “capture large expanses of meaning and communicate that meaning.”124 Within this context, the ideology of high-risk movements performs the following activities:

- It provides a comprehensive critique of the existing social and political order as immoral and inhuman, and instills in individuals a powerful sense of moral outrage. Such ideologies paint a situation in black and white terms. There are no grays.

- It provides an idealized and superior alternative order as a substitute for the status quo and a set of values that will serve as the basis for a new idealized society or for the return to an earlier golden age.
It serves to mobilize individuals to join the movement and gives those who become members a sense of unity, solidarity, cohesion, and sense of purpose.

It identifies the plans and programs by which the movement intends to reach its objectives, relating specific patterns of action to the realization of its vision and values. It is through these activities that a movement’s ideological appeal results in successful recruitment. Ideology builds a series of frames that describe the social and political problems requiring immediate and drastic action and provides a road map for redressing them. Ideology includes a diagnostic frame that describes the problem, detailing the grave injustice that has transpired. A prescriptive frame that asserts what must be done to rectify it, proposing a new idealized system that will replace the depraved one. And a motivational/mobilization frame spells out the steps to be taken—the strategy to be followed—to bring to fruition the prescriptive frame.125

Revolutionary and millenarian ideologies not only provide an individual with new beliefs but a new identity and reality. The process amounts to a conversion. The recruit comes to see the social and political order as highly unjust, adopts a new holistic worldview to replace it, and receives a plausible strategy for changing it. Below, an examination of one of the most successful post-WWII revolutionary insurgency movements reveals that this is, to a major extent, a labor-intensive process that involves education and indoctrination.

Mobilization, integration, and retention constitute a process for reconstructing identity and reality. The recruit is converted to the cause and integrated into a social network of believers. High-risk social movements that adopt insurgency strategies mobilize individuals into groups that struggle and fight together—go to war—to bring about social and political change.
Ideology and Organization. The ideology of high-risk social movements comprises a series of frames that must come to resonate with the target audience. It is through the movement’s organization that this is achieved. Ideology and organization are symbiotically connected. As illustrated below, organization is the mechanism through which the ideological frames are mediated with the target audience. The interaction between ideological commitment and organizational structure can be seen particularly with respect to membership, leadership, and institutionalization.

As a high-risk movement becomes embodied in a more elaborate and structured organizational apparatus, the processes of mobilization, integration, and retention likewise become more formalized. The lines between hardcore members and those who sympathize and/or passively support the movement are sharpened. Boundaries are drawn and reinforced. Signs or symbols are established to demarcate members from non-members. This can take many forms such as special ways in which members greet and address one another.

In high-risk social movements membership becomes fully socialized into an insular and ideologically-based network where the demands associated with participation are unbending. The members’ place in the organization and the activities he is expected to engage in become the center of his existence. The internal strength of such a movement is the result of intense organizational work through which a mass base of support is created out of indoctrination efforts directed by a leadership that considers one of its most important tasks the translation of ideology into action. Once institutionalized, high-risk social movements (to include revolutionary insurgencies) become professionalized. The organization is able to outlive its charismatic founder(s) and become routinized.
Throughout the post-WWII era the developing world was the scene of extensive conflict, instability, and internal warfare. The pressures and challenges underlying that violence were the result of the decolonization process, crises of state legitimacy, redistribution of power, sectarian disputes, and secessionist pressures. In all of these conflicts states were pitted against non-state armed groups, the latter of which employed different irregular warfare strategies.

Of those different types of political-military strife, the most comprehensive was that carried out by national liberation movements employing revolutionary insurgency strategy. Due to this complexity, they were often misconstrued in terms of their ideology, narrative, and operational activities. This section reviews the core elements of that strategy, its different stages, the role of external assistance and the operational evolution of revolutionary insurgent strategy on to the transnational stage beginning in the latter 1970s. Below are the summary points from that review, followed by the text from which they have been drawn.

**Summary Points**

- Of the different types of political-military conflict in the developing world following WWII, the most complex was that conducted by national liberation movements employing revolutionary insurgency strategy.

- Revolutionary insurgent strategy combined unconventional paramilitary tactics with political and psychological operations to establish a competing ideological structure and war fighting organization. Its immediate goal was regime change, which serves as prelude for political and social transformation of the state.

- Successful revolutionary insurgencies employed grand strategies that implemented an integrated operational plan of action based on the following elements: ideology, leadership, mass base, logistics, organizational apparatus, political, psychological, guerrilla warfare, paramilitary tactics, and external assistance.
While each element is necessary for sustaining a revolutionary insurgency, the interrelated elements of leadership, ideology and organization lie at its core. They constitute the remarkable trinity of revolutionary insurgency strategy.

Leadership is indispensable. Leaders of post-WWII revolutionary insurgencies performed key fundamental tasks, most importantly devising an effective ideology and organization.

To mobilize followers a successful revolutionary insurgency required an appealing ideology that played the central role in attracting new members; shaping their loyalty to retain them; and served as a vital tool for waging the political fight for legitimacy.

Successful revolutionary insurgencies instituted organizational infrastructures that were extensive and functionally multifaceted to 1) broaden political appeal, influence, and control; and 2) create a war-fighting capability sustained through a robust command, logistical, and financial system.

The incipient stage of revolutionary insurgencies focused on building a mass base of supporters. This was the first step in establishing an organizational infrastructure capable of conducting protracted revolutionary warfare.

Recruiting a mass base to staff an insurgent organization was difficult. Traditional societies were not receptive to such activities. The revolutionary leadership had to shift traditional loyalties and induce people to become risk takers. They had to accept new roles, integrate into new social patterns, follow new authority, and tolerate the stresses inherent in protracted warfare.

To do so, leadership, ideology, and organization established a process to draw and bind people to the revolutionary insurgent movement. That process inculcated the movement’s ideology and narrative into those recruited. The process consisted of three tasks—mobilization, integration, and maintenance.

Mobilization began the process of convincing individuals to break with existing social and cultural context and accept a new one set out in ideology and narrative. The first stage ended with acceptance of membership. It consisted mainly of persuasion through ideological and nationalistic appeals, the promise of rewards, self-satisfaction, revenge, and advancement. These methods could be accompanied by more coercive ones.

In the second stage—integration—the recruit was socialized into the insurgent movement, brought into conformity with its goals, convinced to make a major commitment, and came to be synchronized
with and controlled by the organization. New recruits did not have this level of commitment when they joined. Achieving it necessitated a careful socialization and indoctrination course of action.

- The final stage—*maintenance* or retention—focused the highly stressful nature of protracted war and the challenge of keeping members in the fight. Maintaining compliance with the leadership’s authority, staying loyal to and identifying with the movement’s ideology and narrative, and sustaining institutional bonds required careful tending.

- The Viet Cong approach to the *mobilization, integration,* and *maintenance* illustrates how national-level revolutionary insurgent movements developed a mass base of support during the incipient stage. The *process* was a localized, individualized, hands-on, face-to-face, and labor intensive exercise.

- Following the incipient stage, revolutionary insurgencies entered into long periods of protracted irregular warfare. Insurgents fought *long wars* that demanded establishing and staffing war-fighting organizations that could sustain political, psychological, guerrilla warfare, and other paramilitary operations over lengthy time periods against stronger opponents. Often protracted irregular warfare proceeded through several stages.

- Because revolutionary insurgencies were radical social movements, political operations were vital for fighting the state. Through parallel hierarchies or shadow government these activities took different forms to include incorporating various social groupings to broaden the insurgent apparatus and institutionalize its mass bases.

- Political operations included two other critical activities: 1) addressing the material and social inequalities that were important causes of the insurgency. Parallel hierarchies provided social services; and 2) establishing the means of producing or acquiring war-fighting capabilities.

- Other key operational activities employed by revolutionary insurgents to execute protracted irregular warfare included 1) propaganda, political warfare, and psychological operations to propagate their narrative internally and internationally through information campaigns; 2) intelligence and counterintelligence; and 3) paramilitary operations (terrorism, guerrilla warfare, sabotage, and mobile conventional tactics).

- Finally, revolutionary insurgent movements during the Cold War sought and received external support mainly from the Soviet Union. They did so because of the power of the regimes they were fighting. But they also saw themselves as part of a global ideological and
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revolutionary struggle. Still, these were first and foremost national-level insurgencies.

- In the latter 1970s certain national level groups challenging state authority through insurgency warfare began to extend the battlefield to the transnational level out of operational necessity. In the forefront of this evolution of insurgency strategy was the PLO. They introduced two important operational innovations 1) they extended their area of operations to attack targets in other regions, primarily Europe; and 2) through these operations the PLO successfully exploited propaganda of the deed to propagate its message transnationally to mobilize much wider support for its cause.

- These PLO operational innovations with respect to the conduct of insurgency were emulated by other armed groups during the 1980s. Moreover, as will be described in a later section, these innovations also had an important impact on how al Qaeda planned and conducted global operations in the 1990s and beyond.

Background

Post-WWII revolutionary insurgencies generally were based on variations of Marxism and nationalism. However, within the context of the Cold War and the East-West struggle, the former was often seen as of greater consequence than the latter and as linking these national-level conflicts to a global movement. Because the ideology of national liberation movements employing revolutionary insurgency strategy tended to be a variation of Marxism, they were frequently seen as appendages of a Soviet-led international communist movement. While the USSR did provide assistance to several of these insurgencies, by no means was it the general staff that directed a global revolutionary insurgency against the West.

To be sure, world revolution—international system change—was the original goal of the Communist International or Comintern. Founded in Moscow in 1919, it was established by Lenin to lay claim to the leadership and direction of the world revolutionary movement. And it did provide some assistance to local communist insurgency movements. Lenin saw the Comintern as the general staff of a world
revolution which would overthrow the international capitalist order. However, because of deep internal divisions and lack of capabilities it never came close to achieving that lofty goal during its existence.\textsuperscript{126} The Comintern was officially dissolved on May 15, 1943, by Stalin.\textsuperscript{127}

During the Cold War the Soviet Union re-established a policy of supporting national liberation movements, most notably under Brezhnev. This began in the latter 1960s with major assistance to the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong. In the early 1970s, Middle Eastern and African movements likewise received paramilitary aid. By the decades’ end it was extended to Latin America.\textsuperscript{128} Several of these movements came to power. But Moscow’s assistance was not the principle reason they were able to do so.

While it is beyond the scope of this study to go into the details of why and how this took place, two issues are important to highlight. First, Soviet policy appears to have been driven more by the superpower confrontation, international balance of power, and expansionism than by a commitment to communist internationalism and world revolution. Of course, it was framed in terms of the latter, but the consensus among specialists is the former was the central imperative.\textsuperscript{129}

Second, insurgent movements that received assistance and came to power at the end of the day enacted policies that reflected their national interest rather than communist internationalism. They were not spokes in the wheel of world revolution. Consequently, it would be a mistake to see the revolutionary wars of the post-WWII era and their outcomes as part of a global communist insurgency.

The insurgency strategy that post-WWII revolutionary movements employed was frequently misconstrued, and equated with guerrilla warfare tactics and terrorism. While these tactics were part of this
variation of insurgency, they were not the essence of it. Revolutionary insurgent strategy combined unconventional paramilitary tactics—guerrilla warfare and terrorism—with political and psychological operations to establish a competing ideological structure and war-fighting organization. Its immediate goal, regime change, served as prelude to a more definitive objective—political and social transformation of the state.

This variation of insurgency, whose roots lie in the Chinese Communist movement of the 1930s, required a grand strategy to be successful. In essence, an operational plan of action that included the following elements: ideology, leadership, mass base, logistics, organizational apparatus, political, psychological and paramilitary tactics, and external linkages/assistance.

While each was necessary for mounting and sustaining protracted warfare, the closely interrelated elements of leadership, ideology, and organization lie at the core of post-WWII revolutionary insurgent strategy. They played a vital role in each phase of conflict. And they were particularly crucial in the incipient or initial period of activity. It is in this embryonic moment that leaders must emerge and shape an ideology and narrative that responds to both real domestic grievances—corruption, repression, unemployment, poverty, insufficient social services, and disrespect for traditional norms—as well as to the desire for a better and more secure way of life. Likewise, in the incipient stage the foundation for the insurgent’s organizational infrastructure is laid.

These three elements—leadership, ideology, and organization—are crucial to the implementation of an operational plan of action that seeks first and foremost to woo the population over to the side of the insurgency movement. The population is the vital element for insurgent success. They have to win the population over to its side.
Core Elements of Strategy

Effective leadership was a key aspect of successful post-WWII revolutionary insurgent movements. Leaders performed certain vital tasks. These included establishing ideology and organization. Without effective leadership that was able to do so, ideology and organization were likely to be ineffectual.

Without a relevant ideology and narrative, mobilization of the necessary followers to join the insurgent movement will not occur. Lacking an appealing ideology, mass mobilization will not get off the ground. For high-risk social movements like these post-WWII revolutionary insurgencies, ideology played a key role in establishing support for the movement, its leaders, objectives, and actions. Effective leadership and ideology maximized appeal to the population, the vital element—key ingredient—for success.

While leadership and ideology were necessary, alone they were not sufficient for mobilization of a mass base to take place. A key enabling component was an organizational infrastructure that facilitated cross-cutting social and political structures that extend down to the local level. This broadened a movement’s appeal, influence and control. And that organization also created a war-fighting capability.

In *On War*, Clausewitz refers to the symbiotic relationship among three elements of what he coined the remarkable trinity: the military, the government, and the people. He proposed that a central task of the strategist was to develop and maintain a balance between them. It was essential to success in war. We would propose that the remarkable trinity for revolutionary insurgency movements, the *sine qua non* for success is an effective interrelationship between *leadership, ideology*, and *organization*. 
The Incipient Stage and the Revolutionary Insurgent Trinity

To implement a revolutionary insurgent strategy, the *leadership* of nascent movements during the Cold War required a capacity to recruit the necessary personnel from within the population. Without it they were unable to execute the operational activities pertinent to each of the functional elements of their strategy.

The contemporary history of revolutionary insurgencies reveals that they succeed when supported by a sufficient part of the population. Therefore, in the incipient stage, leaders had to be able to recruit supporters—build a base—for the movement. This was the first step in establishing an organizational infrastructure capable of conducting protracted revolutionary warfare.

In the incipient stage, leaders established the means to bring individuals from various societal groupings into the movement to staff the insurgent organization and execute operational activities. But this is difficult to accomplish. Why? Traditional societies—the location where post-WWII revolutionary insurgencies took place—were not receptive to such activities. This meant overcoming local predispositions that did not lend themselves to risk taking and recruitment. Traditional culture revolved around village life, local social patterns, and loyalties that were not easily altered.

To recruit members, traditional loyalties had to be broadened to induce people to become risk takers. Unless they were willing to accept new roles, integrate into new social patterns, follow new authority, and tolerate the stresses inherent in protracted warfare, insurgent organizations could not establish a base from within the population and did not maintain themselves for long. The revolutionary organization had to create enduring bonds based on the adoption of ideology and narrative.
How did they bring this about? Leadership, ideology, and organization established a process able to draw and bind people to the insurgent movement. That process provided those recruited with social-psychological compensation for high-risk taking. It created motivation. Ideology and narrative were inculcated through this process. The rank and file that constituted the base of successful insurgencies did not automatically accept ideology and narrative. It was only through the process described below that they came to commit to it.

This process consists of three tasks—mobilization, integration, and maintenance (or retention). Each is briefly defined below, followed by a case study highlighting how the National Liberation Front or Viet Cong employed these methods to build a revolutionary insurgent organization. Arguably, in the post-WWII period they proved to be among the most proficient at it. And, as will be underscored, it was a hands-on, face-to-face, labor intensive exercise.

**Phase I—Mobilization.** Mobilization (or recruitment) was the starting point where an individual had to be convinced to break with the existing social and cultural context and accept a new one set out in ideology and narrative. Joining the movement typically was not a single act but a progression that began with the individual’s exposure to the movement generally by someone who was already an established member.

The end of the first stage was acceptance of membership in the movement. Mobilization or recruitment consisted of various kinds of activities that sought to persuade through ideological and nationalistic appeals, the promise of rewards and status, self-satisfaction, revenge, and advancement. These methods could also include more coercive ones such as group pressure, threats, and forced induction.
Phase II—Integration. In the second stage—integration—the recruit was socialized into the insurgent organization. Through integration the individual was brought into conformity with the insurgency’s goals and convinced to make a serious commitment to their achievement.

Through integration methods an individual came to be in harmony with and controlled by the organization. Achieving it necessitated a careful socialization and indoctrination course of action. Through these techniques new members learned to take orders and follow the guidance they were given. The recruit was embedded in the organization and agreed to perform those tasks that were assigned.

Phase III—Maintenance. The final stage involved maintenance or retention. Given the highly stressful and dangerous nature of protracted war, keeping members in the fight required attention. Maintaining compliance with the leadership’s authority, staying loyal to and identifying with the movement’s ideology and narrative, and sustaining institutional bonds required careful tending.

Building and retaining a base of supporters through the process of mobilization, integration, and maintenance afforded post-WWII revolutionary insurgent movements the opportunity to develop the means to conduct protracted irregular warfare. They were now able to move beyond the incipient stage to 1) engage in both underground political, social, and informational operations; and 2) activate armed elements to carry out paramilitary operations to include guerrilla warfare, sabotage, and terrorism.

The Case of the Viet Cong. The Vietnamese National Liberation Front (NLF) or Viet Cong (VC) followed the mobilization, integration, and maintenance process during its incipient stage. Douglas Pike, in his study Viet Cong: Organization and Techniques of the National
Liberation Front of South Vietnam noted: “When I first approached the subject of the National Liberation Front, I was struck by the enormous amount of time, energy, manpower, and money it spent on communication activities. It seemed obsessed with explaining itself.”

The net effect, wrote Pike, was that they “brought to the villages of South Vietnam significant social change” and did so “largely by means of the communication process.”

Through it they exposed traditional villagers to new ideas, new methods, and new social structures. According to Pike, “The goal [during the period] was control of the population and through that control, the organization of the people into a weapon against the government,” and later against the United States. To do so, the VC had to change attitudes, create an alternative belief system, and establish a new socialization pattern.

What follows is a brief description of how they employed the mobilization, integration, and maintenance process. Execution of it was extensive, localized, and personalized. It focused on the individual who was introduced to the NLF through a variety of means and eventually recruited. And once recruited the indoctrination and training work began in order to turn the individual into a committed member. As Pike intimates above, the process was labor intensive and utilized “indoctrination efforts, shared social myths, and leader-led relations.”

Mobilization was the first step in creating a mystique that served as the foundation of a new identity for the individual.

Mobilization began with an initial exposure to VC recruitment and culminated with acceptance or refusal of membership. The approach taken was based on detailed personal dossiers of individuals in a village. VC agents looked for those vulnerabilities that would make a potential recruit susceptible to one of its messages. Success came
through an understanding of the individual and the circumstances surrounding his life.

Based on that understanding of the individual one or more of the following approaches could be used by a recruiter to persuade him to consider joining—social pressure (friends or family who were already members would be used to bring pressure); emotional appeals (the target was young and could be convinced through proselytizing, convincing him that he could achieve honor and glory); personal susceptibility (the target was dissatisfied with his circumstances and with village life); personal rewards (the target sought social advancement and prestige); injustices experienced (the target and his family or friends had been abused by the government); nationalist sentiments (the target was patriotic); and ideological attraction (the Front’s narrative was persuasive and its idealistic goals convincing).

In sum, the NLF was an active agent that sought out recruits. While it would use coercion when necessary to gain access to villagers, once access was gained, positive forms of persuasion were most often employed to convince them to join. A variety of organizational activities were directed towards creating a setting conducive to mobilization. These activities varied from area to area and individual to individual.

The recruit was placed into a setting where through intensive indoctrination and training he would come to be embedded into the revolutionary movement and prepared for a new role and a new identity. This was the second phase of the process—integration of the individual into the NLF. The goal was to instill into the individual those norms and values that would bind him to the organization. He was to come to believe the ideology and narrative, become committed to political and social change, and adopt a prescribed code of behavior.
Commitment was measured in terms of obedience to the organization and allegiance to its cause. The integrated recruit was willing to sacrifice himself for the cause of the movement, and submit to the leadership and unity of its organization.

The VC paid a great deal of attention to turning the newly recruited into a committed cadre. They expended considerable resources to imbue—socialize and indoctrinate—its members. At the end of the day, the new recruit had a new identity that was very different from that of the peasant in the Vietnamese village. Paul Berman sums up this transformation as follows: “Rather than acceptance of nature, there is mastery over fate; rather than denial of emotion, there is hate, enthusiasm, and zealotry; rather than political apathy, there is politicization; rather than self-interest, there is self-sacrifice; rather than devotion to the family, there is commitment to the revolutionary organization.”

Retaining the individual in the revolutionary insurgent organization was the third step in the process. Here also the NLF committed considerable resources and effort. It had to because it was in a long protracted war with a superpower. Mobilizing and integrating was not sufficient. The revolutionary organization had to take active steps to maintain itself. This included an aggressive use of information and propaganda to convince the rank-and-file that they would prevail. Recall what Pike said about the inordinate amount of time and effort that went into the Front’s use of information and communication.

Additionally, a range of more proactive techniques were used to help members cope with the stresses of fighting. These included individual and group morale-building programs to reinforce the messages fostered in information and propaganda. Rewards were likewise used. For those fighting these includes promotions,
commendations, and medals. Material privileges and other forms of gratification also fortified commitment.

Maintenance also took place through raising the costs of dissension and leaving. The NLF did so through constant surveillance of its members, and the use of sanctions and punishments if warranted. The latter ranged from reprimands and reeducation for desertion to execution for traitorous behavior.

In sum, the Viet Cong approach to the mobilization, integration, and maintenance process illustrates how a revolutionary insurgent movement developed a mass base of support during its incipient stage. It was a localized, individualized, hands-on, face-to-face, and labor intensive exercise. Through mobilization and extensive efforts at integration they produced the personnel that staffed a complex political and military organization, one capable of protracted warfare. Their mobilization and integration efforts, according to several assessments, were quite effective. Maintenance of that organization in the period after the incipient stage proved much more challenging for the NLF.

Can such a process be replicated at the international level to make possible a global insurgency? What methods would have to be substituted for the localized, individualized, hands-on, face-to-face ones employed by the VC and other post-WWII revolutionary insurgent organizations? As we will discuss later in this paper, during the latter 1970s an evolution in the national-level insurgency model began to take place. National-level movements began to go transnational. This was the first step in an evolutionary process that, as we shall see, will be greatly affected by globalization and the information revolution of the 1990s.
The Protracted Warfare Stage

Following the incipient stage, national-level insurgencies entered long periods of protracted irregular warfare. This proved to be highly demanding. Insurgent organizations fought long wars that could proceed through several stages. These were first formally conceptualized by Mao Tse Tung, based on the Chinese Communist experience. While Mao provided a set of guidelines for prosecuting a protracted war, in the field there proved to be no one formula. A number of variations took place in practice. Comparative analysis bares this out.

Because revolutionary insurgencies were also social movements, political operations were a vital part of strategy for fighting these long wars. These took a number of different forms. They included incorporating various social groupings—religious, occupational, women, writers, farmers, youth—into the insurgent infrastructure. That allowed a revolutionary organization to broaden its apparatus and institutionalize its base of supporters. In doing so, insurgent leaders were able to involve different segments of the population in the movement through a variety of local political and social activities. Political operations also included providing social services in areas where the insurgents had a major presence. Finally, political operations involved raising funds and managing financial structures, as well as establishing logistical networks for procurement of war fighting and other supplies from external sources.

A second set of operational activities can be grouped under the rubric of propaganda and psychological operations. These were wars for legitimacy, and successful insurgencies put a great deal of time and effort into propagating their narrative internally through newspapers, pamphlets, radio broadcasts, rallies, meetings, and one-on-one sessions.
In many instances they likewise carried out these information campaigns externally through friendly governments, international organizations where they were given forums, and front organizations.

Intelligence operations were a third important component of the war fighting capabilities of revolutionary insurgencies during the protracted war stage. Within the insurgent apparatus special divisions were established for both intelligence and counterintelligence.

Finally, the use of violence manifested itself in different kinds of paramilitary operations. This included the use of terrorism, as it was defined earlier. Post-WWII insurgents utilized it to different degrees. However, the primary way of fighting was guerrilla warfare operations directed against the military and police forces of the regime. The objective was to harass and undermine their willingness to fight. Only when the balance of forces begins to shift were larger and more quasi-conventional units introduced to fight positional battles and defend those areas where they established sanctuary.

The Role of External Assistance and Influence

Revolutionary insurgent movements during the Cold War sought and received external support mainly from the Soviet Union and its surrogates. The reason they sought this aid, in the first place, had to do with the practical realities of the conflict. To offset the superior power of the states they were confronting, even insurgent movements that had established a mass base and organizational infrastructure capable of executing the operations described in the previous section required additional resources to accomplish their objectives. External help was even more critical for those insurgencies that had not reached this degree of effectiveness.

Given that the ideological basis for revolutionary insurgencies at that time was Marxism, they sought outside assistance of various kinds
from the major communist power. Why did the USSR come to provide it, particularly in the latter 1960s? As was noted earlier, there was considerable debate at the time over how to interpret the motives underlying external assistance. We would concur with O’Neill that it principally had to do with the post-WWII superpower confrontation. “The greatest impetus to external support for such insurgent movements… [was] the continuous rivalry between the major communist powers and the West since the late 1940s.”

Soviet external support took two basic forms. First, political instruments to include propaganda, the use of front organizations, and political action inside international organizations were utilized to champion the cause and objectives of revolutionary insurgent movements on the world stage. The goal was to build support for the just cause of insurgents, while de-legitimizing the incumbent regime (and the United States if it was backing it) they were fighting.

Second, paramilitary assistance was also provided to improve the fighting proficiency of the insurgent forces against their police and military counterparts. The principle kinds of help included the transfer of weapons, training insurgent members, and providing advisory support (mainly through surrogates). The Soviet Union not only provided paramilitary assistance on its own, but also called on its East European and Cuban allies to do the same.

In providing this assistance, the USSR asserted that it was its duty to materially assist local revolutionary insurgent movements that were ideologically simpatico with the cause of world revolution. In other words, these local movements were said to be part of a world movement that aimed at international system change.

This begs the question did the sum total of post-WWII national-level revolutionary insurgencies amount to a global insurgency under
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the direction of the Soviet Union? To be sure, they all rhetorically asserted they adhered to the same ideology that called for regime change locally and international system transformation globally. And the USSR asserted it was supporting national-level revolutionary insurgencies on that basis. Thus, local insurgencies were framed as part of a global struggle between competing ideological systems. These national-level insurgencies were characterized by themselves and by the USSR as members of a worldwide revolutionary movement that was at war with the West. But was this really the case?

For many revolutionary insurgencies the ideology and narrative that they founded their movements on included, often more importantly, nationalism and national identity frames, as well as contextual issues related to local political and social conditions. In other words, while we cannot discount the fact that they themselves framed their struggle within the context of the East-West global ideological confrontation, their immediate political objective—overthrow of the regime they were at war with—was of paramount importance. Therefore, national and contextual issues were of preeminent importance in framing ideology and narrative. And once in power, they did not take direction from the USSR or commit significant resources to conducting a global fight.

Likewise, with respect to the Soviet Union, the decision to more actively promote wars of national liberation through political and paramilitary assistance in the latter 1960s does not appear to have been based on the goal of establishing an existential or ideal international end state through a global insurgency strategy. Rather, it was more about the balance of power and Soviet expansionism. Moreover, Moscow saw the United States as vulnerable in the aftermath of Vietnam, unwilling to use force or assist regimes threatened by
revolution. Therefore, the USSR was more willing to project power and influence into what it termed the national liberation zone of the developing world. By the mid 1980s, it found the costs of maintaining this policy increasingly prohibitive.\textsuperscript{141}

**The Transnational Evolution of National-Level Insurgency**

In the latter 1970s certain national level groups and movements challenging state authority through unconventional warfare began to extend the battlefield to the transnational level. They did so mostly out of operational necessity. The counter-insurgency measures of the states they were fighting had become increasingly effective, preventing the establishment of a clandestine infrastructure or shadow government in the area of conflict. Because of these developments, the chances of successfully gaining control of territory within the state and inflicting real defeats on government security forces were remote. Therefore, to continue the fight a new variation or approach to insurgency was required.

Among the first armed groups to extend the battlefield transnationally were Palestinian ones fighting against Israel. This transpired over the period from the late 1940s to the middle of the 1970s. Recall that during the Arab-Israeli war of 1948 many Palestinian Arabs left their homes for neighboring countries, fleeing voluntarily or being forced to leave by Israeli forces. This was the beginning of the Palestinian Diaspora communities that exist today.

Located in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt, it was from these refugee communities that new armed political groups began to emerge. Their leaders asserted that if the Palestinians were to retake their homeland, they would have to take responsibility for doing so. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was established in 1964 for this purpose. Under the general direction of Yasser Arafat, the PLO
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served as an umbrella organization for several constituent groups. These included Al-Fatah, Force 17, Hawari Group, PLF, and PFLP. Each had its own *fedayeen* or commando assault units that carried out cross-border strikes against Israeli territory from those contiguous states where the Palestinians had re-located. These guerrilla warfare and terrorist operations intensified in the aftermath of the 1967 war.

Israel not only defeated the armies of its Arab neighbors in six days but also seized control of the West Bank and Gaza. As a result, the exodus of Palestinians that had begun in 1948 increased dramatically especially to the near sanctuaries of Jordan and Lebanon. Consequently, infiltration attacks across the borders of these states against fortified Kibbutz’ s, military targets, and public facilities escalated. And Jordan and other Arab states provided increased support for these operations as an alternative means to conventional inter-state warfare to recover lost territory and advance other goals.

Israel countered by developing a robust border defense system. It included removal of Palestinian villages, small-unit patrolling, rapid reaction operations to include hot pursuit of infiltrators seeking to flee back to their sanctuaries, and air-artillery attacks against those sanctuaries and the military forces of the regimes that provided the safe haven. In the case of the latter, Israel’s objective was to raise the costs to those providing support for *fedayeen* operations. This was certainly true for how it dealt with Jordan. In 1968 Israel began launching air and artillery barrages against Jordanian army positions. These reprisals resulted in considerable military casualties.

For Jordan, these attacks by Israel on its army were only part of the price for backing *fedayeen* operations. A second cost was the emergence of the PLO as a hostile “state within a state” inside the kingdom. In 1969 this led to several hundred violent clashes between
the Palestinian forces and Jordanian security forces. Acts of violence against Jordanian security forces included kidnappings and ritualistic murders. By February 1970 fighting was taking place between Jordanian security forces and the Palestinian groups in the streets of Amman, resulting in about 300 deaths. This escalated through the summer months to include several assassination attempts against King Hussein. The rest of the year saw intense fighting that resulted in thousands of deaths. By the summer of 1971 the PLO was driven out of Jordan, and had to re-establish itself in Lebanon.

Having lost its bases in Jordan and increasingly constrained in attacking cross border from Lebanon due to Israeli counterinsurgency tactics, the PLO turned to transnational operations to extend the battlefield beyond the local region. PLO operatives began traveling from the Middle East to Europe in order to carry out attacks. And those operations increasingly began to target civilians. The foremost early example of this was the attack by the PLO’s Black September Organization on Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympic Games. While the operation actually failed to achieve its immediate objective, it nevertheless was a major success in terms of capturing the imagination of the Palestinian Diaspora. And in its aftermath thousands of Palestinians rushed to join the PLO. Other operations ensued in the 1970s including skyjackings, hostage taking, letter bombs, and assassinations in various parts of Europe.

These attacks were part of a new approach which, according to John Mackinlay and Alison Al-Baddawy, reflected “an important connecting factor. Each act, usually in its final stages, became highly visible and often by design encouraged reporters, press photographers, and television and film coverage. The attacks were irresistible as news stories because they were so visually sensational but also because they
were carried out with such desperate conviction.” Because of the media coverage of these transnational operations the PLO leadership was able to reach several “important audiences: large numbers of their own nationals in foreign countries, Arab states, the Muslim community worldwide and Western states, some which preferred not to think about Palestine.”142

With the effectiveness of Israeli counterinsurgency tactics, the PLO had to find a way other than localized guerrilla warfare to reach these audiences. It did so through international terrorism—attacks mainly against what international law designates as protected categories of people that are off limits in war. But to understand these attacks solely on those terms misconstrues the propaganda and political mobilization features of the operations.

Mackinlay and Al-Baddawy describe their significance and how they transformed the conduct of insurgency, introducing a new variation of this form of warfare. The PLO grasped that “[W]e are living in an era of violent activism that accepts that we are animated by the propaganda of the deed, rather than the military value of the deed itself.” The PLO adapted its campaign to this reality and “succeeded in getting themselves and the Palestinian issue onto the global agenda.” The result was that these operations came to be “widely supported, clandestinely by Arab states and overtly by radicalized Muslim communities.” These were not “the acts of politically isolated extremists.”143 Rather, they were key elements of a new Palestinian strategy, one that through transnational terrorist operations successfully exploited propaganda of the deed to propagate its message and mobilize support for its cause.

In sum, the PLO introduced two important operational innovations during this period with respect to the conduct of insurgency that not
only served as an inspiration for other armed groups during the 1980s but, as we shall describe later, also had an important impact on how al Qaeda conducted global operations in the 1990s. First, they extended their area of operations to strike at US targets across the globe. Second, the objective of those operations became “propaganda of the deed, rather than the military value of the deed itself.” Attacks were planned and executed for their visibility and propaganda value. In the 1990s the media became the propagator of al Qaeda’s message. And by the end of the decade it was doing the propagating of its activities and ideology not only through the media but by way of its own Internet news shows and online publications.

REQUIREMENTS FOR A GLOBAL SALAFI JIHADIST INSURGENCY

Is the Salafi Islamist Jihad movement executing protracted global insurgency warfare? Are they utilizing a global version of the national-level revolutionary insurgent strategy and/or its transnational adaptation as described in the previous section? To answer these questions it is first necessary to identify the requirements or conditions of a global insurgency. Five primary requirements are proposed. They are deduced from 1) the strategy employed by national-level revolutionary insurgent movements during the latter half of the 20th century, 2) how insurgent groups beginning in the latter 1970s extended that battlefield transnationally and through terrorism exploited propaganda of the deed, and 3) the key distinguishing characteristics of the Salafi Jihad movement. Below are the main summary points from the review, followed by the account from which they are taken.

Summary Points

- For the Salafi Islamist Jihad movement to execute a global version of the national-level revolutionary insurgent strategy it would have to meet five requirements or conditions.
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- **First requirement**—Conceptualize an ideology that performs the same functions as those adopted by high-risk social movements. This entails developing a series of frames to: 1) describe the social and political problems requiring immediate and drastic action; 2) propose a new idealized system to replace the depraved one that resonated with the population; and 3) identify steps to bring this to fruition.

- **Second requirement**—An innovative leadership that can conceptualize that ideology and establish an embryonic organization capable of operationalizing it to begin to attract and recruit a critical mass of supporters. In the incipient phase of insurgency these are first-order tasks.

- **Third requirement**—Establish an infrastructure capable of fighting a protracted global insurgency. To do so, a process is needed to draw and bind individuals to the movement. That process inculcates the movement’s ideology and narrative into those attracted to it. To do so, new facilitators or enablers—globalization, information systems, and networked organizations—have to be substituted for this normally localized, face-to-face approach.

- **Fourth requirement**—As the incipient stage proceeds, a global insurgency (as with its national-level revolutionary insurgency counterpart) enters a period of protracted or “long war.” In doing so, it has to set out for itself 1) where it intends to fight (the area of operations or AO) and 2) how it intends to do so (the organizational infrastructure and war fighting tactics they intend to use).

- **Fifth requirement**—To execute a global insurgency the Salafi Jihadists would have to employ an array of political, psychological, and paramilitary methods within their areas of operations that target both “near” and “far” enemies.

The Salafi Jihad movement, in the first place, should be understood as a millenarian movement. It seeks a major transformation of the existing political status quo and a return to an idealized past. The Salafi Jihadists charge that current regimes and rulers who dominate the Ummah (community of believers) are irreparably corrupt, unjust, and repressive. They label them infidels and apostates.

Second, like medieval millenarians the Salafi Jihadists believe in a supernatural power and predetermined victory through the intervention of God. They see the world through Manichaean lenses—holy war between the forces of good and evil.
Third, the Salafi Jihadists are transnational actors. Their plan of action calls for holy war to 1) expel the United States from Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula, and Middle East; 2) eliminate the state of Israel; 3) overthrow apostate governments in the Muslim world; and 4) re-establish the Caliphate, the historic community of Islam which expanded beyond the Arabian Peninsula following the death of the prophet Mohammed and came to encompass in the seventh century both Iran and Egypt and by the eighth century North Africa, the Iberian Peninsula (Spain and Portugal), India, and Indonesia.

Given these far reaching goals, the first requirement that the Salafi Jihadists would have to satisfy to be in a position to initiate a global insurgency is to conceptualize an ideology that successfully performs the same functions as those adopted by high risk social movements. Recall that this entailed developing a series of frames that 1) described the social and political problems requiring immediate and drastic action; 2) proposed a new idealized system to replace the depraved one that resonated with the population; and 3) identified steps to bring this to fruition that appeared achievable.

Also recollect that conceptualizing an effective ideology was a considerable challenge for national-level revolutionary insurgencies because their ideology had to attract and sustain a mass base of support from within societies that were traditional, insular, and diverse. That challenge is magnified for the Salafi Jihadist movement given its global area of operation. What was demanding to establish at the national level, it would seem reasonable to suggest, is even tougher to accomplish at the transnational level.

The second requirement is an innovative leadership that can create this ideology and establish an embryonic organization capable of operationalizing it to begin to attract and recruit a critical mass of
supporters. Successful revolutionary insurgencies in their incipient phase (and later protracted warfare stages) were commanded by leaders who performed these first-order tasks of devising an effective ideology and establishing an embryonic organization.

These core elements, in the incipient stage of revolutionary insurgencies, concentrated on recruiting a mass base of supporters. This was the initial step in establishing an organizational infrastructure that would become capable of fighting protracted revolutionary warfare. This is the third requirement for a global insurgency movement.

To do so, national-level insurgencies established a process to draw and bind individuals to the revolutionary insurgent movement. That process sought to inculcate the movement’s ideology and narrative into those recruited. The process, as outlined above, consisted of three tasks—mobilization, integration, and maintenance. It was carried out, for the most part, within the boundaries of the state the revolutionary movement was challenging.

The Viet Cong case study illustrated the extent to which carrying out this process was localized, individualized, hands-on, labor intensive, and face-to-face. Can a global insurgency movement replicate the mobilization, integration, and maintenance process at the transnational level? Has the Salafi Jihad movement been able to do so? Are there new facilitators or enablers such as globalization, information systems, and networked organizations that can be substituted for this localized, face-to-face approach?

As the incipient stage proceeded, national-level revolutionary insurgent movements entered the period of protracted warfare. These were long wars. And the area of operations (AO), as defined by the insurgents, was first and foremost within the boundaries of the nation-state. That was where the insurgent’s main enemy was located and it
was where they built and employed their guerrilla war-fighting organization. To be sure, there could be international targets as well. This was especially the case where an outside power was involved in an internal war. However, the instruments used by the insurgents on these distant battlefields were most often those for political warfare.

This began to change, as was described in the previous section, in the later 1970s. At that time the PLO extended the battlefield out of necessity to the transnational level and narrowed its paramilitary tactics to propaganda of the deed through terrorist operations.

How would a global insurgency during the protracted warfare stage define its area of operations, the composition of its war-fighting organization, and the type of violence it would employ? Doing so is the fourth requirement for a global insurgency movement. It has to set out 1) where it intends to fight—the geographical space—and 2) how it intends to do so—the war-fighting organization and type of operations they intend to employ. To what extent have the Salafi Jihad movement and its al Qaeda vanguard done so?

To fight long wars, revolutionary insurgent movements established and staffed war-fighting organizations that employed political and paramilitary instruments over lengthy time periods. These instruments were part of a strategy. As was noted earlier, their war-fighting apparatus employed these methods primarily within the boundaries of the nation-state. That was their AO until groups starting with the PLO extended the AO to the transnational level. To execute a global insurgency the Salafi Jihadists would have to carry out similar political, psychological, guerilla warfare, and other paramilitary operations within its areas of operations that target both “near” and “far” enemies. This is the fifth requirement for a global insurgency movement.
A GLOBAL SALAFI JIHAD INSURGENCY: MYTH OR REALITY?

Has the global Salafi Jihad movement that emerged since the early 1980s devised and initiated a global insurgency strategy? To determine whether this is the case, the actions, activities, and operations of the Salafi Jihad movement and its al Qaeda leadership are examined through the lens of the five requirements of a global insurgency identified above. Are they consistent with those five requirements, and if so to what extent? Is the Salafi Jihad insurgency in the incipient stage or has it progressed further? Has it developed a doctrine and capabilities to carry out globally a “long Jihad?”

To answer these questions the stages through which the Salafi Jihad movement evolved are examined, employing a chronological narrative format. The narrative can be divided into the following six phases: 1) Emergence of Salafi Islamism and the Muslim Brotherhood; 2) Conceptualization of Salafi Jihad Ideology; 3) The Soviet-Afghan War; 4) After Afghanistan: Deciding on the Next Area of Operations; 5) Afghanistan Again: The Foundations for Global Insurgency; and 6) Global Insurgency in the Aftermath of 9/11.

Below are the key findings for each of the six stages through which the global Salafi Jihad movement evolved. On the eve of 9/11, it can be argued it was in the early incipient stage of a global insurgency. Next, the findings describe how al Qaeda and the Salafi Jihadists have attempted to re-organize through four strategic adaptations to recover from its 2001 setback and continue to facilitate a global millenarian insurgency. Following the summary of the findings is the narrative from which they are drawn.
Summary Points

- Has the global Salafi Jihad movement that emerged in the early 1980s been able to fight its “near” and “far” enemies through a global insurgency strategy? This study proposes three conclusions.
  
  --**First**, as 9/11 approached, a global Salafi millenarian insurgency was in its embryonic stage, carrying out guerrilla warfare and other paramilitary operations against both “near” and “far” enemies.
  
  --**Second**, Operation Enduring Freedom was a strategic setback for that global insurgency. It now faced the challenge of adapting to recover what it lost. Over the last several years al Qaeda and the Salafi Jihadists have sought to do so through *four strategic adaptations*.
  
  --**Third**, How successful they have been and the extent to which they are able to fight the “long Jihad” requires more research and an innovative analytic effort that was beyond the scope of this study.

- These judgments are deduced from an analysis of the *six phases* that constitute the evolution of the Global Salafi Jihad Movement. What follows are the key findings for each of those phases.

I. Revival of Salafi Islam, the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi Jihadism

- Salafi Jihadists are part of a 20th century Salafi Islamic revival. The latter is one of Islam’s most puritanical forms.
  
  - The Salafis seek to return Islam to its roots by imitating the life and times of the Prophet and his immediate successors. They draw their understanding of Islam from a literal interpretation of the Qur'an and the Hadith.
  
  - They reject all subsequent Islamic re-interpretations and innovations as *Jahiliyya*, a state of moral ignorance.
  
  - The Salafi revival argued that the Muslim community—the Ummah—had fallen into *Jahiliyya*. To save them, it was necessary to reeducate the Ummah in the original practices of true Islam.
  
  - This Salafi revival became political through the Muslim Brotherhood, founded in 1928. The Brotherhood was to serve as a vanguard party for political change and social justice. As it grew, Jihad entered its political lexicon, calling for armed struggle to liberate Muslim lands from colonial occupation and later from apostate Muslim regimes.
II. The Origins of the Salafi Jihad Movement

- In the 1950s, Salafi Jihad ideology began to take shape. Its key theorist was Sayyid Qutb. He believed nearly all of Islam was in *Jahiliyya*, having been polluted by Western decadence, materialism, and faithlessness.

- Islamic law and religious values were being subverted by apostate Muslim regimes. He called for Jihad to overthrow them. Qutb coupled a puritanical interpretation of Islam with a violent political ideology of revolt.

- Qutb saw the crisis in Muslim states within the context of a global ideological battle with the non-Muslim world, in particular Western civilization. The West was pushing the Muslim world into *Jahiliyya*. He painted an extremely de-humanizing picture of the West as soulless, immoral and depraved.

- Qutb proposed a transnational ideology to mobilize the Ummah for Jihad against near enemies (apostate Muslim regimes) and for a global fight against the West. To lead the struggle he called for creation of a Muslim vanguard.

- The first requirement to initiate a global Salafi Jihadist insurgency is conceptualizing a universal ideology that 1) describes the depraved condition requiring Jihad, 2) proposes an idealized system to replace it, and 3) identifies steps to be taken to bring it to fruition, Qutb provided this doctrinal foundation.

III. The Soviet-Afghan War

- The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan gave a fledging Salafi Jihad movement a sacred cause to mobilize beyond the national level to liberate a part of the Ummah from a foreign infidel invader.

- Those who came from the Muslim world to resist aggression against dar al-Islam (the house of Islam) became the *first generation of transnational Jihadists*. Their victory was empowering and inspiring for themselves and others.

- In Afghanistan the elements of leadership, ideology, and organization for mounting a guerrilla insurgency materialized. Leaders espoused an ideology that brought together Qutb’s Muslim vanguard to lead the Ummah.

- The key leader was Abdullah Yusuf Azzam. He implemented Qutb’s ideas. The Soviet invasion was infidel aggression against dar al-Islam. He issued a fatwa calling Muslims to fight a Jihad through guerrilla warfare to expel them. Major religious figures agreed.
• Azzam established an infrastructure for volunteers from around the Muslim World. Afghanistan became a training ground to breed a global resistance of tens of thousands of militant Jihadis who became skilled in guerrilla and other paramilitary tactics.

• These “Afghan Arabs” became the vanguard—an international brigade—for carrying out global Jihad. Afghanistan was the beginning—the starting point—for a global Salafi Jihadist insurgency. A core cadre now existed for it.

IV. After Afghanistan: Deciding on the Next Area of Operations

• Following the war the “Afghan Arabs” debated where next to fight for the Islamic cause. Where was the next area of operations and who was the enemy? These questions formed the basis of a strategic re-assessment.

• One group proposed liberating other Muslim lands occupied by infidels (e.g., Bosnia). That was the new AO.

• Others proposed returning to their home countries to overthrow apostate Muslim regimes. Among “Afghan Arabs” it was championed by the Egyptian contingent.

• Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait added another dimension to the debate. The Saudis allowed the US military to deploy to the Kingdom. Bin Laden labeled that treason. It allowed Islam’s most holy territory to be occupied by infidels.

• Exiled to Sudan, bin laden and al Qaeda concluded in late 1994 that the new AO and target should center on the United States. If Salafi Jihadists were to realize their global goals, America had to be defeated.

• By the mid-1990s, a new targeting doctrine for global insurgency was set. To implement it al Qaeda had to establish an organization that could employ political, psychological, guerrilla warfare, and other paramilitary techniques to fight a “long Jihad.” It was attempting to do so in Sudan when forced to leave.

V. Afghanistan Again: The Foundations for Global Insurgency

• Afghanistan gave al Qaeda an opportunity to build a transnational organization. Tens of thousands of Salafi-oriented Muslim’s were trained and indoctrinated. They constituted the second generation of international holy warriors.

• During the latter 1990s the foundation was established by al Qaeda for initiating a global Salafi Jihad insurgency that reflected the five requirements identified in this study.
Doctrine was revised to emphasize a global war fighting mission that targeted the United States—the “far enemy.”

Beyond doctrine, al Qaeda’s organization grew in size and complexity, allowing it to plan and execute terrorist attacks against US targets across the globe, while national-level affiliates fought guerrilla wars at home.

In Afghanistan, al Qaeda established itself as the vanguard of the global Jihad through a network of linkages with a score of national-level Islamist groups, many employing guerrilla violence against their governments.

Radical Islamist groups appeared to function through nine regional theatres of operations. And al Qaeda emerged as their vanguard, seeking to inspire and integrate them into a transnational Salafi Jihad movement.

Several enablers, most importantly the Afghan sanctuary, enhanced al Qaeda’s capacity to draw national level groups into a broader Jihad network that on the eve of 9/11 reached the incipient stage of a global millenarian insurgency.

VI. Global Insurgency in the Aftermath of 9/11?

Following 9/11, al Qaeda’s Afghan infrastructure was destroyed, a strategic setback for the Salafi Jihad vanguard and the embryonic global insurgency it was facilitating. It now faced the challenge of adapting to recover.

Since then al Qaeda and the Salafi Jihadists have sought to do so through four strategic adaptations 1) employing the Internet to establish a virtual sanctuary, 2) making use of ungoverned territory, 3) exploiting the Iraq conflict, and 4) maintaining national level Jihad activities through the nine regional theatres.

This study focused on establishing a virtual sanctuary on the Internet. Utilizing ungoverned areas and exploiting Iraq conflict received briefer attention. Particulars on the nine regional theaters were beyond the study’s scope.

The extent to which al Qaeda and the Salafi Jihadists have been able to successfully implement these four strategic adaptations to fight a “long Jihad” requires a level of research beyond this study.

Virtual Sanctuary

Al Qaeda and associated Jihad groups have sought to replicate on the Internet those facilities and capabilities lost in Afghanistan in
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2001. In the following seven ways the Internet has been utilized as a substitute sanctuary:

1) **Propagating the Salafi Jihad ideology.** This is the first requirement to initiate a global insurgency. Through Web-based activities the Salafi Jihadists execute this function globally. They disseminate ideological frames and messages to instill in the Ummah a powerful sense of moral outrage and commitment to holy war.

2) **Inspiring and mobilizing the Ummah to join the Jihad.** It is one thing to agree to ideological messages, another to be inspired to action. Al Qaeda and the Salafi Jihadists use a plethora of Internet methods to achieve this end. One key way they do so is by celebrating the achievements and sacrifices of those on the front lines of the global fight.

3) **Psychological warfare to demoralize enemies.** The flip side of inspiring the Ummah to join the fight is to demoralize near and far enemies to convince them to give up the fight. The insurgency in Iraq is illustrative. A number of Internet tactics are employed to demoralize the Americans, Iraqis, and foreigners working in Iraq.

4) **Networking the global Salafi Jihad insurgency.** Loss of the Afghan sanctuary led to the use of the internet for training and operational activities, to include organizing virtual cells. For each, secure communications were needed. New methods have been employed to protect these activities from disruptive US intelligence tactics.

5) **Operational Information Sharing—Manuals and Handbooks.** Al Qaeda and associates have established an online library of manuals and handbooks for irregular warfare. These range from doctrinal guides to instructions on how to carry out a particular tactic or employ a specific weapon. Receiving the widest attention is the Improvised Explosive Device.

6) **Operational Information Sharing—Training Videos and Courses.** New Internet techniques since 9/11 have been adopted by the Salafi Jihadists for online training programs. Over the last three years professionally produced training videos have been generated. A global program in the art of terrorism (GPAT) now exists.

7) **Collection Targeting.** The Internet provides Salafi operational units with data on targets. Through Web-based data mining they built folders/files on a range of targets from government facilities to nuclear power plants.
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Ungoverned Territory

- Beyond this virtual sanctuary, al Qaeda appears to have attempted to carry out in largely lawless tribal areas of the Afghan-Pakistan border activities it executed during 1996-2001 in Afghanistan.
- The extent to which it has been able to do so is unclear. Jihadis are traveling to the area to join the fight much like their predecessors did in the 1980s and 1990s. But a detailed picture remains elusive, at least in open sources.
- The Afghan-Pakistan border is not the only ungoverned territory in which al Qaeda and/or regional Jihadi groups have developed a presence. The Algerian-based Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) has moved into the Sahel region of Africa to establish bases.

The Iraq Front

- Al Qaeda and other the Salafi Jihad groups see Iraq within the context of a “long Jihad.” It is the main front, the forward edge of the global battle, on which to engage the far enemy—the United States. They hope to inflict a defeat of strategic consequences on it.
- The Salafi Jihadists also believe Iraq affords them a vital opportunity to spawn a third generation of skilled holy warriors who after they leave Iraq can fight in their native lands or elsewhere. In the first decades of the 21st century these “Iraqi Arabs” can serve the same purpose the “Afghan Arabs” did at the close of the 20th century.
- Iraq has become an integral part of how al Qaeda and Salafi Jihadists have sought to adapt following the strategic set back in Afghanistan to continue to foster a global insurgency.

Fostering the Global Salafi Jihad Movement

- Al Qaeda’s fourth adaptation focused on re-establishing its role as vanguard of the global Salafi Jihad movement, a role that was set back as a result of Operation Enduring Freedom.
- Developing a detailed mosaic of what is now referred to as al Qaeda and Associated Movements (AQAM) was beyond the scope of this paper. Only the broad contours of AQAM are highlighted and key questions that remain to be addressed identified.
- As late as 2005, US officials were still struggling to understand the relationship between al Qaeda and its affiliates, and the extent to which those linkages had been reestablished.
- In 2006, key US national security documents began to use the term Al Qaeda and Associated Movements (AQAM) to refer to this
rejuvenated relationship. US Central Command’s posture statement for fighting the war in 2006 was illustrative.

- An important way al Qaeda sought to re-establish linkages with local Salafi Jihad groups is through its virtual sanctuary. Recent analysis of this activity depicts it as “very structured….A handful of primary source Jihadist Web sites disseminate official communiqués, doctrinal treaties, strategy and operational documents through a far reaching network of other Web sites, message boards, e-groups, blogs, and instant messaging services.”

- This network is “at once decentralized but rigidly hierarchical.” Web sites at the center of the network comprise al Qaeda and groups closely associated with it. Since 2006, their web-based activities have been coordinated and distributed through a new virtual entity—the Al-Fajr Center—to secondary and tertiary Web sites that comprise the network.

- A key follow-on question about this fourth adaptation in need of attention is who comprises the local affiliated groups of AQAM and on what basis do they view themselves as a part of AQAM? One recent study has sought to identify four criteria for membership in AQAM.

- More attention needs to be focused on this adaptation in order to develop a detailed mosaic of and its Associated Movements (AQAM).

**Emergence of Salafi Islamism and the Muslim Brotherhood**

The Salafi Jihadists are an outgrowth of, but not synonymous with, a much larger 20th century movement of Salafi Islam. The term Salafi is commonly used to describe perhaps the most doctrinaire or fundamentalist form of Islamic thought. Like other major religions, Islam has a number of different variants. The Salafi movement consists of Sunni Muslims drawn mainly (but not exclusively) from the Hanbali School, and the Wahhabi element of it. Of the four Sunni theological schools that include the Hanafi, Maliki, and Shafii, the Hanbali are considered the most stringent in terms of their conservative approach to the practice of Islam.

The Salafi movement is comprised of many of the most puritanical groups in the Muslim world. The different parts of the movement are
all united by a common religious creed. The concept of tawhid or the unity of God is the central element of the Salafi creed. It includes those concepts that Salafis consider necessary to be accepted as a “true Muslim.”

To safeguard tawhid, Salafi’s believe in strictly following the rules and guidance found in the Qur’an and the Sunna (the path followed by the Prophet when he was alive). They seek to return Islam to its roots by imitating the life and times of the Prophet and that of the first three generations of Muslims—the companions or Sahabah of the Prophet, their immediate followers the Tabi’in, and the followers of the Tabi’in. The Salafis draw their understanding of Islam from a literal interpretation of the Qur'an and the Sunna. The latter consists of the deeds, sayings and actions of Muhammad during the twenty-three years of his ministry, as recalled by those who knew him. The essence of Salafism is summarized by Quintan Wiktorowicz as follows:

To protect tawhid, Salafis argue that Muslims must strictly follow the Qur’an and hold fast to the purity of the Prophet Muhammad’s model. The latter source of religious guidance plays a particularly central role in the Salafi creed. As the Muslim exemplar, he embodied the perfection of tawhid in action and must be emulated in every detail. Salafis also follow the guidance of the Prophet’s companions (the salaf), because they learned about Islam directly from the messenger of God and are thus best able to provide an accurate portrayal of the prophetic model (the term “Salafi” signifies followers of the prophetic model as understood by the companions).145

The Salafi approach rejects all subsequent Islamic cultural practices, re-interpretations, extrapolation, and innovations that transpired since the time of the Prophet. Illustrative of this opposition are the teachings of Muhammad Ibn Abd al Wahhab. It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine the roots of the Wahhab movement (members call themselves Muwahhidun) which began over 200 years ago in Arabia.146 Suffice it to note, however, that at that time he
preached against such customary practices as breeches of Islamic laws and labeled them *Jahiliyya*, the same term used to describe the ignorance of Arabians before the Prophet.¹⁴⁷ They were unbelievers, had fallen into a state of moral ignorance, and should be put to death. Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab’s most important convert was Muhammad ibn Saud, head of one of the most powerful tribes on the Arabian Peninsula. This association converted political loyalty into a religious obligation.¹⁴⁸ Since then Saud rule has to varying degrees enforced compliance with the Wahhabi interpretations of Islamic values on Saudi Arabia.

It is important to note that many Salafi Islamists who adhere to this strict interpretation of Islam are peaceful. While they believe in the rules and guidance found in the Qur’an and that the imitation of the behavior of the Prophet and his closest companions should be the basis for social order, they do not assign death sentences to all those who do not accept their beliefs. Rather, they believe the best way of implementing the Salafi creed is through propagation of the faith and religious education, not violence. These Salafist groups believe God’s word should be spread by *da’wa*, non-violent proselytizing.

In the first half of the twentieth century a Salafi revival began.¹⁴⁹ Those involved in it argued that the Muslim community—the Ummah—had fallen prey to deviations from original Islamic teachings. Indeed, they were now living in a state of *Jahiliyya*. If they were to be saved from this catastrophic crisis, it was necessary to reeducate the Ummah in the original practices of the Prophet and his early followers and reestablish true Islam to its decisive role in political and social life. Thus, what the Salafi revival sought to accomplish, first and foremost, was re-embedding true Islam into the hearts of Muslims and for them to turn those beliefs into a living reality. They would do so by
acknowledging only the sovereignty of God and his sacred law (Sharia) in all spheres of life. This would liberate them from human rulers and their laws, values, and traditions.

This Salafi revival, in part, took the form of political parties. Among the most notable of these was the Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949). When al-Banna moved to Cairo in the early 1920s to attend teacher training school, he became deeply disturbed by the effects of Westernization and the concomitant rise of secularism, the breakdown of traditional values, and the decline of Islam as the foundation of political and social behavior. He eventually came to advocate the creation of a Muslim state in Egypt based on Qur'anic law. The Brotherhood was to serve as a vanguard party for bringing about this political change.

However, in its early years, the Brotherhood resembled more of a social welfare society championing the cause of disenfranchised peoples through educational and charitable work. During the 1930s, the Brotherhood propagated an Islamic doctrine that emphasized social justice and closing the gap between Egyptian classes. It also sought to bring about an Islamic renewal and asserted that Islam should not be confined to private life. Rather, it should serve as the foundation for a thorough reform of the Egyptian political, economic, and social system. The Brotherhood’s conception of politics and nationalism was Islamic. It became politically active, identifying with the Egyptian national movement. In the 1930s the outcome of this was an energetic campaign against colonialism in Egypt and other Islamic countries.

As the Brotherhood grew in the years leading up to World War II, the term Jihad began to enter its political lexicon in two ways. One, as an inner effort that Muslims needed to make in order to free themselves and to improve the well-being of the Islamic community. Two, within
the context of a need for armed struggle to liberate Muslim lands from colonial occupation. There was disagreement over the use of force within the Brotherhood. Many of its leaders publicly remained committed to a nonviolent approach. However, there were elements, particularly among younger members, who pushed hard for the establishment of a secret or clandestine armed wing that could employ sabotage, assassination, and other irregular warfare tactics. Al-Banna finally agreed.

The Brotherhood continued to grow rapidly in the 1940s reaching an estimated million members. After WWII it played an important part in the national movement, aligning itself with secular groups and factions. And its clandestine armed units carried out terrorist attacks. The organization became increasing popular and came to be seen as a serious threat by Egyptian ruling elites. As a result, al-Banna was assassinated in 1949.

The Brotherhood supported the military coup that overthrew the monarchy in 1952, having formed a close relationship with the Free Officers Movement in the period leading up to their seizure of power. Many members of the Brotherhood expected Nasser, once in power, to form an Islamic government based on their interpretations of Islam. But soon the Brotherhood found itself at odds with the policies of the junta. It became increasingly clear that the Islamic tenets of the Brotherhood were largely incompatible with the secular ideology of Gamal 'Abd al-Nasser. In 1954, there was an attempt to kill him. As a result, the Brotherhood was declared illegal. A wave of repression ensued with the imprisonment and torture of thousands of its members.

This repression, in conjunction with domestic policies that were seen as the antithesis of true Islam, led to the charge of *Jahiliyya* by members of the Brotherhood and the call to wage *Jihad* against the
Egyptian government. The new Egyptian leaders were considered apostates because they were ruling by some set of principles or system other than those based on Sharia.

It should be noted that there was and remains disagreement among various Salafi factions as to whether they can declare incumbent Muslim rulers apostates (a process known as takfir). According to Wiktorowicz, debate over this issue represents one of the “most prominent sources of fissure within the Salafi community and exemplifies the impact of contextual interpretation on factionalization. Although the factions share a set of criteria for declaring someone an apostate, rooted in the Salafi creed, they differ over whether these criteria have actually been met with regards to rulers in the Muslim world.”

The Origins of Salafi Jihad Ideology

In the 1950s an ideology of Salafi Jihadism began to take shape. As it evolved over the next half century it came to reflect the characteristics and role that ideology played in the revolutionary insurgencies of the period following WWII. Indeed, there are important parallels between them.

The key early theorist, who articulated an adaptation of the traditional Salafi call, as highlighted above, was Sayyid Qutb, a member of Egypt’s Muslin Brotherhood. His influence on what has become the global Salafi Jihad movement was crucial. While in prison between 1954 and 1964 as part of Nasser’s crackdown on the Brotherhood, Qutb produced important works which have come to be seen as doctrinal treaties for Salafi Jihadism. These included a long commentary on the Qur’an—*In the Shade of the Qur’an (Fi zilal al-Qur'an)—and a more action-oriented manifesto for Jihad—*Milestones (Ma'alim fi-l-Tariq). These works capture Qutb’s radical and anti-
establishment views. They are based on his interpretation of the Qur'an and Islamic history, assessment of the social and political ills of Egypt, and an evaluation of the polluting impact of Western decadence, materialism, and faithlessness on the culture of Islam. In 1964, having been released from prison, Qutb published these works. He was subsequently re-arrested, accused of plotting to overthrow the state, found guilty, and on 29 August 1966, executed by hanging.

Qutb came to believe that nearly all of Islam was in dire decline, devolving into a state of ignorance equivalent to that which characterized the era of pre-Islamic Arabia. He drew this conclusion, in part, from the work of Mawlana abu al-Ala Maududi, who founded the Islamic Society of India in 1941. Maududi first proposed that a new \textit{Jahiliyya} had taken root in the Muslim world during the 1920s. He called for the establishment of a Muslim state ruled under Sharia law as a prescription for it. Maududi advocated a religious cleansing of all Muslim societies. He asserted that they had been infected by Western ideas and practices. For example, he argued that the type of governments the West foisted on the Muslim world took power out of God’s hands and put it in those of man. This violated the Qur’an which recognized only the party of God and the party of Satan.

Qutb likewise applied the concept of \textit{Jahiliyya} to Muslim states and to Egypt in particular. In Qutb's view, Islamic law and religious values were being ignored by these post-colonial apostate regimes, leaving their Muslim societies in a state of debased ignorance. These regimes were, in Qutb’s view, non-Islamic and therefore illegitimate. All societies ruled by such governments were likewise not Islamic, and Muslims living in them were religiously obligated to oppose the ruling elites and to reject their political authority. This resulted in his call for them to carry out Jihad to overthrow such hedonistic regimes. In doing
so, Qutb coupled a fundamentalist interpretation of the Qur'an with a radical and violent political ideology for armed revolution.

As noted earlier, here we can see in Qutb’s thought how Salafi Jihadists differ from the larger Salafi community. Unlike the latter, Qutb and the Salafi Jihadists who followed in his footsteps moved the use of force—holy war—to such a position of importance that it was equated as equal to the five pillars of Islam. Once a regime was characterized as takfir and its leaders labeled infidels (kufi), then armed violence was a legitimate way of dealing with it.

Qutb’s writings laid the foundation for this in the 1950s. Rulers such as Nasser, through their approach to governance and rule, revealed a conscious disbelief in Islam. And Nasser’s persistence in doing so, in spite of warnings from scholars, was clear evidence about what he believed and did not believe. His actions were un-Islamic. That he persisted in behaving in this manner demonstrated that he believed it was a better way than Islam. Therefore, he was an apostate and a legitimate target for warfare.

Like revolutionary insurgents, Qutb’s called for the overthrow of anti-Islamic Muslim governments through insurrection as the prelude for radical change of the entire social and political system. Thus, Qutb's understanding of Islam was inextricably linked to his political and social prescriptions. Islam was a complete social system, and therefore it set the requirements for government that it should take the form of an Islamic theocracy. He deduced these requirements from his reading of the Qur'an, including its insight into morality, justice, and governance.

More broadly, Qutb saw the crisis in Egypt and other Muslim states within the context of a global ideological confrontation with the non-Muslim world, in particular Western civilization. The West was pushing the Muslim world into Jahiliyya. He painted an extremely de-
humanizing picture of the West, characterizing it as soulless, greedy, arrogant, barbarous, immoral, and depraved. Western civilization fostered idolatry, the most heinous of sins. The infusion of Western ways into the Muslim world had to be reversed, said Qutb, with all the might the Islamists could muster. He saw this confrontation in more than political terms; it was a cosmic struggle between those who worshiped idols and those who worshiped God. It was a Manichaean battle in which two independent realms, one representing good the other evil, were pitted against one another.

Qutb provided the foundations of a transnational ideology to mobilize the Ummah for Jihad against both near enemies—e.g., the Egyptian regime—and for the global fight against the West. And as the above suggests, he saw the two as inextricably connected. To carry out this struggle Qutb proposed the creation of a Muslim vanguard organization in *Milestones*. His concept was consistent with how 20th century revolutionary thinkers, beginning with Lenin, defined the role of a vanguard party in revolution. Mao assigned the same role to the vanguard party for leading what he called People’s War, which we referred to above as revolutionary guerrilla insurgency. For Qutb, the Muslim vanguard was an elite organization comprised of educated and motivated individuals who were to lead the masses “on the path, marching through the vast ocean of Jahiliyya which has encompassed the entire world.” This was a call to Islamic militancy and armed revolutionary struggle as the means for seizing political power from the state.  

Along with Mawdudi and al-Banna, Qutb is seen as one of the most influential theorists of radical political Islamism. His thinking influenced the writings and manifestos of those who shaped the Salafi Jihad movement following the Soviet-Afghan war of the 1980s. This is
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ture of Qutb’s conservative interpretation of Islamic principles as found
*In the Shade of the Qur’an*, his idea of making Jihad a personal and
permanent duty to defeat *Jahiliyya* and foster political and societal
change, and his notion of a transnational Ummah and the inevitability
of global ideological conflict between "Islam and the West." Fawaz
summarizes Qutb’s impact as follows:

More than anyone else, Sayyid Qutb…inspired generations of
Jihadis…to wage perpetual Jihad to abolish injustice on earth,
to bring people to the worship of God alone, and to bring them
out of the servitude to others into the servants of the Lord…. [J]ihad for Qutb was a permanent revolution against internal
and external enemies who usurped God’s sovereignty.155

The impact of Qutb’s doctrinal concepts greatly influenced the
leaders of subsequent Jihad groups in Egypt, most importantly
Mohammed Abd al-Salam Faraj and Ayman al-Zawahiri. The former
was the ideological and operational leader in the 1970s of what came to
be widely known as Jama'at al-Jihad (the Egyptian Islamic Jihad). Faraj
called for holy war, recruited followers, and created an underground
organization that carried out the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981.
This attack was personally sanctioned by Faraj. The Egyptian security
forces reacted swiftly against al-Jihad's campaign of terror, and Faraj
himself was executed in April 1982.

Faraj was a “religious nationalist,” writes Gerges, who asserted that
“fighting the near enemy must take priority over that of the far
enemy…. Jihad’s first priority [according to Faraj] must be to replace
infidel rulers with a comprehensive Islamic system.”156 Ayman al-
Zawahiri, a second important disciple of Qutb’s, concurred with Faraj’s
focus on Jihad against the Egyptian regime, the near enemy. However,
Zawahiri’s position will change in the vortex of the Afghan-Soviet war
and its aftermath.
If the *first requirement* the Salafi Jihadists had to satisfy to initiate a global insurgency was to construct a universal ideology that 1) described the depraved social and political conditions requiring Jihad, 2) proposed a new idealized system to replace this depraved one, and 3) identified steps to be taken to bring it to fruition, Qutb provided the doctrinal foundation for it. His interpretation of Jihad and its role in fostering political and societal change against near enemies like the secular and corrupt regime in Egypt under Nasser, his notion of a transnational Ummah, and the inevitability of ideological conflict between "Islam and the West" all can be found in the global Salafi Jihad movement that emerged after the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan.

However, before we examine those ideological and operational developments, it is important to highlight how the events in Afghanistan in the 1980s provided the context for the amplification of Salafi Jihadism and the recruitment of its first generation of fighters.

**The Soviet-Afghan War**

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan gave the fledging Salafi Jihad movement the sacred cause it needed to mobilize beyond the national level. There was now an opportunity to establish a leadership for the worldwide Ummah, and in Afghanistan to help liberate a part of that Ummah from a foreign infidel invader. The battle in Afghanistan was portrayed as one between Muslims and kufars or infidels. Those who came from across the Muslim world to defend the Afghans and resist aggression against dar al-Islam (the house of Islam) became the first generation of transnational Jihadists. And their self-proclaimed victory in Afghanistan—the defeat of a superpower—was empowering and inspiring for them. It caused many in this vanguard to think and act globally, taking their Islamist revolution onto the world stage.
However, the events unfolding in Afghanistan in the 1980s were only an opportunity. The emergence of Qutb’s vanguard party was not a given. As noted earlier, to mount and sustain revolutionary insurgent warfare necessitates the closely interrelated elements of leadership, ideology, and organization. Each plays a vital role in each phase of protracted conflict. And this is particularly the case in the initial period of activity. In this embryonic moment leaders must emerge and adopt an action-oriented ideology that responds to both practical grievances and to a desire for an idealized and utopian future. If this was true for post-WWII revolutionary insurgency, it was likewise the case for a radical Islamist messianic one. Such leaders must bring together what Qutb identified as the Muslim vanguard, an elite group comprised of highly educated and motivated individuals who were to lead the Ummah in armed insurrection.

The central figure to play that role during the Afghan-Soviet war was Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, also known as Shaikh Azzam. Born in 1941 in the province of Jenin on the West Bank of the Jordan River in the territory then administered under the British Mandate of Palestine, he attended Damascus University and earned a degree in Sharia law in 1966. After the 1967 war and Israel’s military occupation of the West Bank, Azzam joined the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood and took part in guerrilla warfare operations against Israel. It was here that he first learned about these irregular and asymmetric tactics for fighting more powerful enemies. However, he soon became disillusioned with those Palestinians leading the armed resistance for ideological reasons. In particular, he opposed the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and its chief, Yasser Arafat, rejecting their secular and Marxist orientation.

Azzam opted out and continued his Islamic studies at Cairo’s Al-Azhar University where he earned a Master’s degree in 1970, and his
Ph.D. in Islamic Jurisprudence in 1973. During this time in Egypt, he met many Muslim Brotherhood followers of Qutb, including Ayman al-Zawahiri. Moreover, Azzam came to adopt Qutb’s ideas including the belief in an inevitable global clash between the Islamic and non-Islamic worlds. Not able to teach in Jordan because Palestinian militants were not welcome—King Hussein had expelled the PLO during what became known as Black September—he moved to Saudi Arabia and a position at King Abdul Aziz University. Osama bin Laden was enrolled as a student and it was there that Sheikh Azzam first met him.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was, for Azzam, a kufar or infidel aggression against dar al-Islam. He immediately issued a fatwa—Defense of the Muslim Lands, the First Obligation after Faith—which called all Muslims to fight a holy war to expel the invaders from the house of Islam. Major religious figures such as the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, Abd al-Aziz Bin Bazz, concurred. Subsequently, at the peak of the Afghan Jihad, Azzam published Join the Caravan which became one of the principal inspirations for drawing thousands of Muslims to fight in Afghanistan. Thus, in the 1980s Azzam emerged as the inspirational ideologist and a central figure in what were the initial steps in the development of the militant Islamist resistance movement. Azzam had charisma, and his words drew many to the fight.

But Azzam’s role was more than that of inspirational ideologist. He also knew how to organize and lead. After relocating to Pakistan in 1980 he established Maktab al-Khadamat (Services Office) to organize a support infrastructure in Peshawar to house those who came to be known as “Afghan Arabs”—Jihad volunteers from around the Muslim world. In the mid-1980s bin Laden provided financial assistance to expand that effort. The infrastructure established by Azzam included
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camps for training in guerrilla and paramilitary tactics to prepare international recruits to fight on an unconventional and asymmetric battlefield. According to Greges, Azzam created “a military college to provide volunteers with methodical military training and to prepare senior officers to lead Jihadist operations anywhere.” By doing so, the Al-Faruq Military College fostered the “emergence of new professional Jihadist cadres.”

To recruit fighters and raise money for the cause Azzam traveled through the Muslim world, as well as to Europe and the United States. His goal was to awaken the Ummah to its duty in Afghanistan. And his charisma, prose, and politico-religious proselytizing drew many. He played a key role in establishing networks for financing, recruiting, and training radical Muslims to fight the Jihad in Afghanistan. But Azzam saw Afghanistan, according to Roy, as more than the defense of the Ummah there. It was also to serve “as a training ground to breed the vanguard that would spark an overall resistance against the encroachment of the infidels on the Ummah…. Jihad in Afghanistan was aimed at setting up the vanguard of the Ummah.”

Roy notes that “Tens of thousands of militants went to Afghanistan through these Islamic networks for training and Jihad.” They responded to the call and passed through the paramilitary training infrastructure established by Azzam, and later by bin Laden. According to Marc Sageman, they came “from all over: core Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt; Magreb Arab countries like Algeria and Morocco; Southeast Asia countries such as the Philippines and Indonesia; and the Muslim immigrant [or diaspora] communities of the United States and Europe.”

Those who went to Afghanistan established bonds of solidarity among themselves that went beyond that conflict. They became a
potential vanguard—an international brigade—for carrying out global Jihad. Sageman writes that, “the global Salafi Jihad evolved through a process of radicalization consisting of gradual self-selection…and recognition of the single common target of the Jihad.” And Roy adds that “the volunteers in Afghanistan experienced a concrete internationalization based on personal contacts, the brotherhood of comrades in arms, friendships and affinities. They learned to know other people and other languages.” In Afghanistan, they found “a new community and brotherhood with which to identify.”

They also became skilled in guerrilla warfare tactics, having learned that art from the indigenous Afghan Mujahideen who, in eight years of protracted and bloody irregular warfare in a mountainous and rugged land, wore down the mighty Soviet Army. In their book, *Afghan Guerrilla Warfare: In the Words of the Mujahideen Fighters*, Grau and Jalali chronicle the day-to-day guerrilla tactics perfected by Afghan warriors during the conflict. It was these irregular warfare methods that enabled the rifle-wielding Mujahideen to defeat a fully-armored Superpower. This was an important lesson that the international Jihadists experienced up close.

Nothing captured the day-to-day tactical battle better than the Mujahideen’s innovative use of ambush and hit-and-run tactics in mountainous terrain. It was classic guerrilla warfare, and it worked. During the eight-year war the Mujahideen response to the presence of the Red Army in Afghanistan was to utilize these traditional tribal warfare tactics to inflict casualties, cut supply and communication lines, and erode the Soviet will to occupy Afghanistan. Between 1985 and 1987 alone the Mujahideen conducted over 10,000 ambushes. They usually attacked at night or in the fading light, utilizing denial and deception tactics and employing mines, machine guns, grenade
launchers, and sniper fire to take full advantage of the cover offered by Afghanistan’s rocky terrain. In the end, it was the nature of the Afghan tribal and clan social structure and its traditional irregular methods of warfare that allowed a guerilla force to render the Soviets constantly vulnerable and eventually caused their withdrawal.\textsuperscript{165}

In sum, Afghanistan was the beginning, the starting point for a global Salafi Jihadist insurgency. When that war came to an end, a core cadre of international Jihad warriors existed for it. In the aftermath of Afghanistan they emerged equipped not only with the requisite ideological and organizational framework, but the guerrilla and irregular warfare methods for conducting asymmetrical fights against superior enemies. However, where they would fight next was unclear as the last units of the Red Army rolled across the Friendship Bridge on the Afghan-Uzbekistan border on February 15, 1989.

For Azzam and his followers, the victory in Afghanistan was not the end but only the beginning. A journal article published in 1987 by Azzam made this clear. In “Al-Qaeda al-Sulbah” or “The Solid Base,” he envisioned a Muslim vanguard organization that would overthrow apostate regimes in the Middle East and establish Islamic rule. The concept for this was drawn from Qutb, who was Azzam’s spiritual guide. This vanguard would direct the energies of the Afghan mujahidin into fighting on behalf of oppressed Muslims. He viewed Jihad as a religious obligation in defense of Islam and Muslims against a defined enemy, whether local un-Islamic rulers or occupying outside infidels.\textsuperscript{166}

\textbf{After Afghanistan: Deciding on the Next Area of Operations?}

During the incipient stage, national-level revolutionary insurgent movements have to consider strategic decisions about where to carry out the armed struggle within the boundaries of the nation state. In
other words, the area or areas of operations (AO) had to be determined. For post-WWII revolutionary insurgents the main enemy was located within the nation-state. That was where the insurgent vanguard had to build and employ their war fighting organization.

In the aftermath of the Soviet-Afghan war many of the Afghan Arabs—Azzam’s Jihad vanguard—were faced with the issue of whether, and if so where, to next fight for the Islamic cause. Where would that AO be? And who was the next enemy? In 1989, these questions were at the core of what amounted to a strategic re-assessment.

Before he was assassinated in November 1989, Azzam proposed that the Jihadis who had helped oust the Soviet Union from Afghanistan use the same fighting methods to do so in other parts of dar al-Islam (the house of Islam) occupied by infidels—e.g., Kashmir, Somalia, and Bosnia. They should help liberate those areas as well. And Afghan vets sought to do so in the 1990s. For example, the declaration of Bosnia-Herzegovina independence in October 1991 opened up a new ethnic and religious conflict in the heart of Europe. Besieged on two fronts and seemingly abandoned by the West, the Bosnian regime, with its Muslim majority, accepted help from wherever they could get it. Thus, they welcomed Arab veterans of the Afghan war. However, attempts by these Jihadis to Islamicize the Bosnian population and use of excessive violence appears to have not been openly welcomed.167

Other Jihad veterans advocated returning to their home countries to overthrow what came to be called the "near enemy." These were characterized as distorted Muslim regimes whose repressive, corrupt, and secular nature prevented the creation of a true Islamic community
and way of life. The priority for these Jihadi nationalists was to restore Islam at home. That was the next AO.

This was controversial because it advocated fighting and killing other Muslims. Among Afghan Arab veterans it appears to have been championed by the Egyptian contingent. And they attempted in the 1990s—unsuccessfully—to fight it out with the Mubarak regime. In doing so, they employed guerrilla warfare and terrorism tactics to achieve their objectives. However, they were no match for Egyptian government forces that killed or arrested so many of their commanders and key operatives that the Jihad camp eventually split under the pressure. One faction, the Egyptian Islamic Group, initiated a unilateral ceasefire. The leadership of the other faction, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, fled the country.\textsuperscript{168}

The Algerians were the other national contingent that followed their participation in the Afghan-Soviet war with full-scale irregular warfare against their home government. And the violence carried out by the Egyptians paled in comparison with that employed by the Armed Islamic Group and its successor, the Salafist Group for Dawah and Combat. However, in the end the Algerian security forces contained the threat through a brutal counterterrorism campaign.\textsuperscript{169}

Finally, yet other Afghan Arabs stayed behind in Afghanistan and Peshawar and continued to contemplate how and where to extend the Jihad to new areas of operations. As this was taking place, Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait, adding a new dimension to the debate over the future AO for the Jihadists.

The possibility of further Iraqi expansion from Kuwait into Saudi Arabia created a crisis of monumental proportion for the House of Saud. In the face of a massive Iraqi military presence, Saudi Arabia's own forces were hopelessly outnumbered. In the midst of this
predicament, bin Laden offered to protect Saudi Arabia from the Iraqi army by deploying 100,000 Mujahideen to the Kingdom. If Saddam chose to invade, he assured King Fahd, they would be repulsed by the Mujahideen using the same protracted guerrilla and irregular warfare tactics that had been employed to oust the Red Army from Afghanistan. After thinking it over the Saudi Monarch decided to refuse bin Laden's offer. A protracted eight-year guerrilla war like that fought in Afghanistan was hardly an attractive option. Instead, he opted to allow the United States and allied forces to deploy on his territory and use it as a land-bridge to drive the Iraqi army from Kuwait.

Bin Laden considered this a “heretical” act. He charged that the presence of infidel troops in the "land of the two mosques" (Mecca and Medina) was sacrilegious and desecrated sacred soil. It was also confirmation of what Qutb and other Salafi theorists had asserted about the coming global confrontation between the Muslim world and the West. Not only was the West driving the Muslim world into Jahiliyya, it now occupied its most holy territory. After publicly castigating the Saudi government for allowing this to happen, bin Laden was forced into exile in Sudan and his Saudi citizenship was revoked.

Paradoxically, it was in the aftermath of this setback that the organization bin Laden helped found in Afghanistan began to emerge as a transnationally focused organization with linkages to Jihadi groups in Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Morocco, Somalia, and Eritrea, among other places, several of which were fighting protracted insurgencies. Al Qaeda forged ties with many of these militant Islamist groups.

While in Sudan, al Qaeda backed these national-focused Jihadists with training, arms, and funding. To do so, it established weapons caches and training camps where the guerrilla and irregular warfare
methods honed in Afghanistan were taught. Al Qaeda also maintained its training camps in Afghanistan for the same purpose. Sudanese intelligence officers aided al Qaeda by providing false passports and shipping documents. At that time, the operational role of al Qaeda was principally to provide support through funds, training, and weapons for national-level attacks by Jihadist groups it was aligned with. However, as we will highlight below, the first attacks on US targets also occurred during the Sudan period, and others were planned.

As al Qaeda’s presence in Sudan grew, its leaders engaged in discussions over the area of operations and which enemies should be targeted. With respect to the latter, these deliberations revolved around what has been coined the “near and far enemies.” Up to this point the targeting focus, as noted above, had been twofold: 1) liberating occupied Muslim territory from infidel forces (e.g., Afghanistan), and 2) attacking and overthrowing local Muslim governments that were apostate regimes. By late 1994 a third target and new AO was under consideration—the “far enemy.”

If the definitive objective of the Salafi Jihadist movement was to be realized—international system transformation with the re-establishment of the Caliphate, the historic community of Islam—then the main impediment to that aspiration had to be targeted and defeated. Sageman explains that those who championed this new targeting doctrine argued “the main danger for the worldwide Islamist movement was the United States, which was seen as moving in on Muslim lands such as the Arabian Peninsula and East Africa. It was the ‘head of the snake’ that had to be killed…. [T]he priority had to be switched from the “near enemy” to the “far enemy.” 170 By the mid-1990s bin Laden and his top collaborators, including Ayman al-Zawahiri, adopted this important change.
Moreover, it appears that before this was formally espoused and later recorded by bin Laden in fatwas issued in the latter 1990s, operations were carried out by al Qaeda against US targets. In 1993 there is some evidence that trainers were sent to Somalia. As learned since 9/11, bin Laden saw US involvement there as an extension of its presence in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states that grew out of the 1991 war to expel Iraq from Kuwait. He believed that Washington was following an imperial policy of taking over parts of the Muslim world.

Consequently, in 1993 one of bin Laden’s top lieutenants, Muhammad Atef, traveled to Somalia to determine how al Qaeda might attack US forces stationed there. He arranged to assist Aidid’s militia. Subsequently, one of al Qaeda’s commanders and a small number of Mujahideen, veteran Islamic Holy Warriors who had fought in Afghanistan, were dispatched to provide military assistance and training. The training included tactics learned in the Afghan War for fighting against heavily armed helicopters. Aidid’s gunners were taught the most effective way to shoot down a helicopter was to use rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) rigged with timing devices to take off the tail rotor of the Black Hawk, its most vulnerable part.  

The outcome is chronicled in *Black Hawk Down*, Mark Bowden’s account of that battle. In a strict military sense, the Task Force Ranger raid was successful. The Aidid lieutenants that had been targeted were captured. But the human costs of the operation were high: nineteen Americans dead and missing, seventeen from Task Force Ranger, and eighty-four wounded. One Malaysian was also killed and seven were wounded, along with two wounded Pakistanis. Many hundreds of Somalis were killed and wounded.

Also during the Sudan period, at least one of the two attacks in Saudi Arabia in the mid-1990s may have been the result of this new
targeting policy. Those who carried out the bombing of the National Guard training center in Riyadh confessed to having been trained by al Qaeda in its Afghan camps and were inspired by bin Laden. At least that is what the Saudi’s have reported before they were executed. Finally, during this period building the infrastructure necessary to attack major US targets in East Africa was initiated. Senior members of al Qaeda were dispatched to Kenya.

In sum, by the mid-1990s the targeting doctrine to support a global insurgency was in place to support a strategy which had as its dual objectives to foster a) regime changes locally and b) international system transformation globally. To accomplish these goals both “near enemies” and the “far enemy” had to be attacked. However, to do so al Qaeda had to establish and staff war-fighting organizations that could employ an array of political, psychological, guerrilla warfare, and other paramilitary techniques to fight a “long Jihad.”

In Sudan, it appears that al Qaeda was attempting to establish those capabilities when it was forced to leave. In 1996, bin Laden was asked to depart the country after the US pressured the Sudanese government to expel him, citing possible connections to the 1994 attempted assassination of Egyptian President Mubarak while in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Bin Laden and 200 of his key subordinates left in late 1996, returning to Afghanistan.

Afghanistan Again: The Foundations for Global Insurgency

Returning to Afghanistan proved fortuitous for al Qaeda. It was given an opportunity to accelerate building a transnational war-fighting organization it had begun to form in Sudan. Now allied with the Taliban, who had a belief system similar to that of bin Laden and al Qaeda, Afghanistan provided an ideal base to do so. It turned into an ever-expanding infrastructure and safe haven, far from American
political influence and military power. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, “The Taliban seemed to open the door to all who wanted to come to Afghanistan to train in the [al Qaeda] camps. The alliance with the Taliban provided al Qaeda a sanctuary in which to instruct and indoctrinate new fighters and terrorists, import weapons, forge ties with other Jihad groups and leaders [globally], and plot and staff terrorist schemes.”\(^{173}\)

Between 1996 and the attacks on September 11, 2001, Salafi-oriented Muslims from around the world traveled to Afghanistan to receive irregular warfare training and indoctrination in these facilities. How many did so is hard to determine. Estimates vary widely. The 9/11 Commission Report noted that “U.S. intelligence estimates put the total number of fighters who underwent instruction in bin Laden-supported camps in Afghanistan from 1996 through 9/11 at 10,000 to 20,000.”\(^{174}\) Others propose much higher numbers. For example, according to German police testimony in the 2006 retrial of Mounir al-Motassadek, a Moroccan accused of involvement in the 9/11 attacks, over 70,000 received paramilitary training and religious instruction in al-Qaeda’s camps in Afghanistan.\(^{175}\) Whatever the number, a considerable corps of second-generation holy warriors traveled to Afghanistan from some fifty or more countries.

An assessment of developments in Afghanistan between 1996 and the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States suggest that the foundation was being established by al Qaeda for initiating a global Salafi Jihad insurgency that reflected the requirements identified earlier in this study. Al Qaeda’s expanding infrastructure in Afghanistan allowed it to undertake several activities that tracked with these requirements.
First of all, during this period bin Laden revised al Qaeda’s ideology and doctrine to emphasize a global mission for the Salafi Jihad movement. He did so by focusing on the United States—the far enemy—and the dangers America posed for the very survival of the Muslim world. This recasting of doctrine can be seen most succinctly in his 1998 fatwa, entitled, "Declaration of the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders." The United States was attempting to destroy Islam, and Muslims were in a cataclysmic battle with the West. America’s occupation of Saudi Arabia had had a humiliating and debilitating impact on the Ummah. According to bin Laden, "Since God laid down the Arabian Peninsula, created its desert, and surrounded it with its seas, no calamity has ever befallen it like these Crusader hosts that have spread in it like locusts, crowing its soil, eating its fruits, and destroying its verdure."^176

And it was not just Saudi Arabia that was endangered. The United States, by orchestrating UN sanctions against Iraq, was annihilating Muslims there as well. Bin Laden asserted that Washington did not rest after the "slaughter" of the Gulf War but instead sought the "dismemberment and the destruction...of what remains of this people."^177 In interviews during the late 1990s, he also included the plight of Muslims in Kashmir, East Timor, Sudan, Somalia, Chechnya, and elsewhere in this messianic vision of a war of survival for Islam against the West led by the United States.

Through an assessment of bin Laden’s fatwas, other written statements, and interviews during this second period in Afghanistan, it is evident that he revised al Qaeda’s ideology and doctrine for a global Salafi Jihad against the United States. Thus, in the 1998 fatwa, after specifying the American crime of occupation of the holy places, the war it was waging through sanctions against the Iraqi people, and
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America’s support of Jewish aggression in Palestine, bin Laden asserted that the United States had declared war on God. Therefore, it was the duty of every Muslim to “kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it.” The fatwa charged that to kill Americans, both civil and military, is an individual duty for every Muslim who is able, in any country where this is possible, “until the US “departs from all the lands of Islam.”

Civilians are off limits under the international laws of war. But for bin Laden all Americans were in one way or another complicit with the policies of their government and therefore legitimate targets. It was a millenarian outlook that saw the world through Manichaeen lenses—a holy war between the forces of good and evil that eschewed the distinctions of international law. Recall that millenarian movements are ones in which religious, social, and political groupings envision a coming major transformation of society and return to an idealized past. Such movements typically claim that the current regime and its rulers are irreparably corrupted, unjust, and otherwise irredeemable. They have to be completely vanquished.

In sum, bin Laden asserted that since Muslims everywhere in the world were suffering at the hands of the United States, the Ummah must wage holy war against their real enemy, and not only act to rid itself of unpopular and apostate regimes backed by the Americans. It was the duty of the Muslim community to protect their faith. Bin Laden declared that the United States was vulnerable and could be defeated in war by mujahideen in the same way the USSR suffered a humiliating defeat at their hands.

Beyond doctrine, important organizational developments took place during the latter 1990s as well. Al Qaeda as an organization grew in size and complexity. This was due, in part, to the fact it was able to
select and add personnel from the thousands of individuals that flowed through its training camps. It had a very large pool from which to screen and evaluate candidates from its training program for membership in its core organization. Also facilitating this organizational evolution was the secure sanctuary that al Qaeda enjoyed in Afghanistan.

Al Qaeda was able during the latter 1990s to expand its hierarchical apparatus and formalize its structure, with bin Laden, the emir-general, at the top, followed by other al Qaeda leaders. \(^{179}\) Below bin Laden a *shura majlis* or consultative council was established, with four committees reporting to it. A military committee recruited fighters and ran the training camps in which they were instructed in the guerrilla and irregular warfare methods learned in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Indeed, in his 1996 “Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places,” bin Laden singled out the importance of these techniques for fighting conventionally superior enemies. He stated: “[I]t must be obvious to you that, due to the imbalance of power between our armed forces and the enemy forces, a suitable means of fighting must be adopted, i.e., using fast moving, light forces that work under complete secrecy. In other words, to initiate a guerrilla war, where the sons of the nation, and not the military forces, take part in it.” \(^{180}\)

The military committee also planned and launched global strikes against the United States. Finally, it oversaw other clandestine functions including a special office for procuring, forging, or altering identity documents such as passports and visas.

A finance committee established a global financial network to raise the resources necessary to sustain al Qaeda’s expanding apparatus and activities. Its financial network was based on redundancy. Al Qaeda
secured its money through the Western banking system, the Islamic banking system, and the traditional hawala system. This network was linked to a number of money sources to include Muslim charitable organizations, which al Qaeda infiltrated and used to collect and mask the funds it needed. These included the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), the Benevolence International Foundation, the al Haramian Islamic Foundation, Blessed Relief Foundation, and the Rabita Trust. These organizations have branches worldwide and engage in activities related to religious, educational, social, and humanitarian programs. But they also knowingly or unknowingly assisted in financing al-Qaeda. Wealthy individuals, particularly in the Arabian Gulf states, likewise were a source of funds, as were al Qaeda-run businesses.

Justifying its actions by issuing rulings on Shari’a law was the responsibility of the religious/legal committee. It also had a role in indoctrinating those many thousand Muslims who went to Afghanistan to be trained for holy war. Finally, a media committee disseminated information in support of al Qaeda’s political and military goals and activities. In the latter 1990s, al Qaeda began using the Internet to publicize those goals and activities, to disseminate information, to inspire and recruit, and to gather and share information. However, this was only in its embryonic stage at this point. As we shall see later, the use of the Internet burgeoned after 9/11 for al Qaeda and the Salafi Jihad movement.

This growth of al Qaeda’s organization in Afghanistan allowed it to go operational in a way it could not during its Sudan phase. It now was able to plan several terrorist operations to strike at the United States across the global landscape and had the capacity to direct and deploy clandestine units to execute those operations. And they had
three major successes as a result. These included 1) the attacks on US embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam, in August 1998; 2) the suicide attack on the USS Cole in Aden, in October 2000; and 3) the strikes against the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001. Additionally, as is now known, al Qaeda had planned and deployed personnel to carry out other attacks as well. However, for various reasons these were not successful.

From its Afghanistan sanctuary, al Qaeda at this point in time also sought to establish itself more broadly as a headquarters and vanguard for the global Salafi Jihad movement. Recall that the 1998 fatwa instituted a World Islamic Front for Jihad. The purpose of the Front was to create a transnational organization with a worldwide presence and linkage with national-level radical Islamist affiliates in numerous countries. Its ultimate goals were fourfold: 1) to unite the Ummah; 2) to overthrow all corrupt and apostate Muslim governments; 3) to drive Western influence from those countries; and 4) to abolish state boundaries and establish the Caliphate.

To this end, during the 1996-2001 phase of development, a global network of linkages was established by al Qaeda’s World Front with a score of national-level militant Salafi and other radical Islamist groups around the world, many of whom were employing unconventional and asymmetric violence against their home governments. The World Front emerged as an umbrella organization that sought to tie these like-minded, national-level parties and smaller cellular units together for a common purpose, as described in the fourfold objectives noted above.

These affiliates and their links to al Qaeda were first delineated in a comprehensive way by Rohan Gunaratna. In Inside Al Qaeda: A Global Network of Terror, he identified ones in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Sudan, Uzbekistan, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, the
Palestinian territories, Algeria, Libya, Eritrea, Somalia, Bosnia, Chechnya, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Germany, Britain, and the United States.\textsuperscript{181}

An examination of national-level groups suggests that while they have differences that are shaped by the local context in which they operate and fight, they appear to adhere to the same general ideological/religious principles and Salafi Jihadist orientation. And while they have local objectives to include overthrowing apostate governments and expulsion of outside forces, they see their fight within a larger context and subscribe to the broader goal of a global Islamic reordering of the international system so that it is no longer US dominated.

A number of specialists have suggested different frameworks for delineating the global Salafi Jihad movement that emerged during this 1996-2001 period. One of the more conceptual and analytic assessments was put forward by David Kilcullen. He proposes that a worldwide militant Islamist movement appears to function through “regional theatres of operation rather than as a monolithic bloc.” Islamist groups within these different theatres follow “general ideological or strategic approaches that conform to the pronouncements of al Qa’eda, and share a common tactical style and operational lexicon.” However, Kilcullen contends that there is “no clear evidence that al Qaeda directly controls or directs Jihadists in each theatre…. [R]ather than being a single monolithic organization, the [emerging] global Jihad movement appears to be a more complex phenomenon.”\textsuperscript{182}

Within this context, al Qaeda was said to “resemble the Communist International (Comintern) of the 20th century—a holding company and clearing-house for world revolution.”\textsuperscript{183} In other words, al Qaeda was more of a vanguard that sought to inspire and integrate these national-
level groups and their local grievances into a broader transnational Salafi Jihad ideology and to link these disparate groups together through its Afghan sanctuary, emerging global communications, finances, and technology.

Nine regional theatres are identified by Kilcullen. In three—the Americas, Western Europe, and Australia/New Zealand—Salafi Jihad groups had engaged primarily in “subversion, fund-raising and organizational development.” However, during the latter 1990s, a few terrorist operations were attempted in these regions through al Qaeda’s forward deployed clandestine operational units. And since 9/11, other local cells have also executed operations or been uncovered in the process of preparing to do so, as will be discussed later.

The remaining six regional theaters all experienced, according to Kilcullen, varying degrees of armed violence in which local radical Islamist and Salafi Jihadist armed groups employed the same common methods of guerrilla and irregular warfare tactics against local regimes. Al Qaeda could also be active in these theatres. The following, summarized from Kilcullen’s assessment, highlights these developments, which both pre-date and post-date 9/11:

- **The Greater Middle East** to include Turkey, the Levant, Israel/Palestine, Egypt, and the Arabian Peninsula is the most active theatre. During the 1990s, and following 9/11, on-going insurgent violence by local Islamist armed groups has taken place in Iraq, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Turkey, Lebanon and Israel/Palestine. This included bombings, suicide attacks, kidnappings, and raids. Al Qaeda also established regional affiliates in several parts of the region. However, much of the insurgent and terrorist action in theatre is not directed, controlled, or carried out by al Qaeda.

- **The Maghreb** states, to include Algeria, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Morocco, and Tunisia, all have experienced terrorist and insurgent violence carried out by radical Islamist armed groups. Al Qaeda also has a presence in several states in the theatre.
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- **South and Central Asia** has long been a theatre of radical Islamist violence. Afghanistan was al Qaeda’s sanctuary until 9/11. And remnants of it remain hold up along the Pakistan border. Both Pakistan and India have experienced Islamist insurgency and terrorism. The insurgency in Kashmir has Islamist elements, and the area is a base for al Qaeda affiliates. The Central Asian republics of the FSU have seen Islamist low-level insurgency.

- **Southeast Asia** has radical Islamist insurgencies in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand, and lower-level activity in Singapore and Malaysia. The main group in theatre is Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which operates across the region, maintains links to al Qaeda, cooperates with local movements, and has links into other theatres.

- The **Caucasus** region has seen separatist insurgencies turn increasingly Islamist with these elements allied to al Qaeda. This clearly has been the case in Chechnya. It has become a launching pad for radical Islamist attacks into Russia since the late 1990s. These have included suicide bombings.

What common themes and factors drew al Qaeda and these local groups together? How did local groups come to see their situation within the context of al Qaeda’s global construct? What role did al Qaeda’s ideology and activities from its Afghan base play in facilitating these developments?

Perhaps the key overarching theme that drew local groups to identify with al Qaeda’s global message was the proposition that Islam was in crisis. Of course, this theme is a central tenet of al Qaeda’s Salafi-Jihadist ideology and, as noted earlier, was first promulgated by Qutb. The crisis is characterized as one affecting the entire Ummah. Thus, Muslims living in Arab and Muslim countries who feel a strong sense of alienation because they believe that their government does not
truly represent Islam and is failing politically and economically, perceive their local situation not as unique but part of a larger phenomenon. Thus, radical Islamist groups fighting against these conditions at the local level see their struggle in a global context.

Adding to this crisis of Islam, and playing a major part in it according to al Qaeda’s ideology, was Western and particularly American aggression and domination. The dimensions of this included US and other Western occupation of Muslim lands either directly or through Israel; collaboration with despotic, apostate, and puppet regimes such as Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia; appropriating Muslim resources; and the ultimate goal of hegemony over the Middle East politically, economically, and culturally.

Further facilitating the spread of Salafi-Jihadist doctrine and the rise of al Qaeda, which likewise contributed to the identification of local groups with a global movement, was what one specialist describes as the reach of “Wahhabism—a puritan form of Islam virtually synonymous with Salafism—to as many countries as possible” beginning in the 1970s. “Over the next three decades, the kingdom would muster some $70 billion in overseas aid, over two thirds of which was destined for ‘Islamic activities’ such as the building of mosques, religious learning institutions, or Wahhabi religious centers.” What this resulted in was a “diffusion of individuals, institutions, and financial assets” that helped to radicalize young Muslims and promote Jihad in their countries against apostate regimes.¹⁸⁴

In sum, al Qaeda’s ideology constituted a comprehensive narrative with which local Jihad groups could find common ground. In addition, there were several other enablers that permitted al Qaeda to draw national-level armed groups into a broader global Salafi Jihad network that, as September 11, 2001 approached, can be characterized as an
embryonic global millenarian insurgency. And different elements of that network were executing operations against both near and far enemies, employing the range of guerrilla and other irregular warfare tactics.

We have already identified the most important of these other enablers—al Qaeda’s sanctuary in Afghanistan. Through that safe haven, al Qaeda was able to expand and add to its first generation of Jihadists—those who fought the Soviet Union—a second generation that was trained by al Qaeda during 1996-2001. Both generations came from the nine regions identified above. Many were already members of national-level Islamist organizations. Through these individuals, relationships were established that linked the al Qaeda vanguard and its World Front to national-level movements. A network of acquaintance, friendships, and mutual obligations developed that stretched worldwide between and among these groups and the al Qaeda vanguard. Similarly, within these theatres, groups came to cooperate and develop bonds of shared experience and mutual obligation. Common experiences and histories cemented relationships between the various members of the global Jihad network.

Three additional enablers also enhanced its potential to draw national-level groups into a broader Salafi Jihad network that can be characterized as in the incipient stage of a global millenarian insurgency on a global level on the eve of 9/11. They included globalization, information age technologies, and a network-based approach to organization. Each augmented al Qaeda’s capacity to do so.

Globalization eroded the traditional boundaries that separated and secured the nation-state. It allows people, goods, information, ideas, values, and organizations to move easily across international space
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without heeding state borders. Modern transportation and communications systems, in conjunction with the post-Cold War breakdown of political and economic barriers around the world, accelerated the globalization process.

Information age technologies are central to globalization. These are the networks through which communications takes place on a worldwide basis. Cellular and satellite phones allow contact between the most remote and the most accessible locations of the globe. Computers and the Internet are the other pillars of the information revolution.

To take advantage of globalization and information-age technologies, al Qaeda adopted a new organizational approach that was less hierarchical and more networked to link groups in the nine theatres together. In doing so, they followed the lead of the international business community, which was in the forefront of such change. Small and large corporations developed virtual or networked organizations that were able to adapt to the information age and globalization.

Globalization, information-age technology, and a network-based approach to organization, in conjunction with the aforementioned enabler of a secure sanctuary, contributed in important ways to the appearance at the end of the 20th century of a global millenarian insurgency, in its incipient stage of development, that was carrying out guerrilla warfare and other paramilitary operations against both “near” and “far” enemies.

Global Insurgency in the Aftermath of 9/11?

In the aftermath of 9/11 the United States went to war with al Qaeda and the Taliban. By December 7th the Taliban regime had been overthrown and al Qaeda’s infrastructure in Afghanistan largely disrupted. The loss of that sanctuary was a major setback—a strategic
defeat—for the vanguard of the Salafi Jihad Movement and the embryonic global insurgency it was facilitating from that Afghan base. It now faced the challenge of having to adapt and innovate to recover what it had lost. Could it find new ways to replicate what had been established in Afghanistan in 1996-2001? This was the challenge al Qaeda and its Salafi affiliates faced. Could they reinvent themselves in the aftermath of Operation Enduring Freedom and continue to carry out the global insurgency they had initiated?

The remainder of this study seeks to identify how over the last five years al Qaeda and the Salafi Jihadists have attempted to re-organize to continue to execute a global fight. They appear to have done so through *four strategic adaptations*. The degree to which they have been able to accomplish each of these *strategic adaptations* and, as a result, the extent to which they are able to fight the “long Jihad”—a protracted irregular war on several fronts—cannot be answered by this study. That requires much further research that was beyond this study. Here we will focus on describing what each of these *strategic adaptations* entails.

- **One**, the al Qaeda vanguard and its affiliates have employed the Internet to establish in cyberspace a virtual sanctuary from which to carry out many of the activities they had initiated from their Afghan base in 1996-2001. These activities include propagating the Salafi Jihad ideology to the Ummah; recruiting, inspiring, and training Jihadis; providing operational information and materials; networking dispersed elements of the Salafi Jihad movement; irregular warfare training; and planning and executing operations.

- **Two**, al Qaeda and its affiliates have attempted to utilize ungoverned territory in the tribal areas of the Afghan-Pakistan border (and elsewhere in other regions) as physical sanctuaries to carry out some of the same activities.

- **Three**, they have exploited the conflict in Iraq utilizing it as a major recruiting and training ground to help prepare a third generation of Salafi Jihadis. Iraq not only serves as a new front to engage the United States directly, but it also affords an opportunity
to develop a new cadre of skilled fighters who can gain the kind of experience that after Iraq will allow them to more effectively fight in their native lands or elsewhere. In other words, in the first decades of the 21st century these “Iraqi Arabs” may serve the same purpose the “Afghan Arabs” did at the close of the 20th century.

- Four, al Qaeda has continued to encourage and promote the global Salafi Jihad movement that, as Kilcullen contends, appears to function at the local level within nine regional areas. In these locations, activities carried out by groups and cells that see themselves as a part of this movement continued to take place since 9/11, with some regions to include Europe experiencing major terrorist strikes.

Below, the focus will mainly be on the first adaptation. How has the al Qaeda vanguard and its affiliates employed the Internet? To what extent do they seek to establish in cyberspace a virtual sanctuary from which to carry out many of the activities that had taken place on the ground during 1996-2001 in the Afghan base? The three remaining strategic adaptations—utilizing ungoverned territory, exploiting the conflict in Iraq, and continuing the fights against near or national level enemies by local armed groups—will receive briefer attention.

Virtual Sanctuary. Since 9/11, growing attention has been paid in both the news media and more scholarly publications to how al Qaeda and other associated Salafi Jihad groups have made use of the Internet. For example, Steve Coll and Susan Glasser suggested in the Washington Post that “al Qaeda has become the first guerrilla movement in history to migrate from physical space to cyberspace. With laptops and DVDs, in secret hideouts and at neighborhood Internet cafes, young code-writing Jihadists have sought to replicate the…facilities they lost in Afghanistan with countless new locations on the Internet.”

Gabriel Weimann, in a 2004 study, provided the following insights into the expanding use of the Internet by Jihad groups. “In 1998, around half of the thirty organizations designated [by the United States]
as Foreign Terrorist Organizations … maintained Websites; by 2000, virtually all terrorist groups had established their presence on the Internet. Our scan of the Internet in 2003-2004 revealed hundreds of Websites serving terrorists and their supporters.” He goes on to add: “Terrorism on the Internet…is a very dynamic phenomenon: Websites suddenly emerge, frequently modify their formats, and then swiftly disappear—or seem to disappear by changing their online address but retain much the same content.”\textsuperscript{186} Since 2004, what Weimann described has continued to burgeon.

Weimann and other specialists have conceptualized frameworks for categorizing the different ways in which the Internet has been utilized, describing the functions these activities hope to serve. Extrapolating from these studies and based on extensive data mining of a primary source database compiled by the SITE Institute, one can observe these attempts to replicate in cyberspace many of the activities that took place on the ground in Afghanistan in 1996-2001.\textsuperscript{187} Here we divide those activities into the following seven categories:

- Propagating the Salafi Ideology of Jihad.
- Inspiring and Mobilizing the Ummah to Join the Jihad.
- Psychological Warfare to Demoralize Enemies.
- Networking the global Salafi Jihad Insurgency.
- Operational Information Sharing—Manuals and Handbooks.
- Operational Information Sharing—Training Videos and Courses.
- Collection for Targeting.

If effective, these virtual activities will provide al Qaeda and its associated movements (AQAM) with the capacity to reach like-minded individuals and groups in various regions of the world who are willing to join the cause and take action. Through AQAM Web sites these individuals and groups will have the opportunity to attain the operational skills and capacity to execute violent strikes locally and on
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an independent basis. This is a new form of power projection no radical movement has had in the past.

What follows is a description of each category and how they fit together. It is based on an assessment of examples of the ways in which al Qaeda and associated Salafi Jihad groups have carried out each activity on their Internet Web sites. However, before doing so, it is also important to briefly note the role and contribution that Satellite television plays in this process. For Muslim populations in the Arab world and elsewhere satellite channels such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya are often the first way in which they are engaged with the issues and themes, described below, that are found on the Web sites of al Qaeda and associated Jihad groups. In other words, there is a synergy—albeit an unintended one—between them. Indeed, it may well be that Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya, among others, are the precipitants—provide an awaking—that takes the individual to the Internet for further information. Here is what they will find.

1) Propagating the Salafi Ideology of Jihad. Recall that the first requirement the Salafi Jihadists have to satisfy to be in a position to initiate a global insurgency is to transmit a transnational ideology to target audiences. They have to be able to successfully perform the same functions on the Internet as those carried out by national-level revolutionary movements. Through a large number of different Web-based activities to include sophisticated media fronts, news shows, and on-line magazines they seek to execute these functions across the globe. By doing so, they are able to disseminate a series of ideological frames and messages that describe in global and local terms the social and political conditions requiring immediate and drastic Jihad action. Salafi ideology offers a comprehensive critique of the existing local and global social/political situation as immoral and inhuman and seeks
to instill in the Ummah a powerful sense of moral outrage and commitment to holy war.

The Global Islamic Media Front, one of the main voices of al-Qaeda on the Web, is illustrative. This site, formerly known as Alneda, is heavily focused on ideological type information. They not only post all of the doctrinal speeches and statements of bin Laden and Zawahiri, among others, but also provide analysis of these items for the Ummah. An example—“Reading and Analysis of the Hero Tapes of Usama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Abu Musab al Zarqawi”—was posted on May 1, 2006, and subsequently distributed across several other Jihad forums.

Another example that focuses, at least in part, on the broader ideological themes found in Salafi Jihad doctrine is the Voice of the Caliphate, a weekly news program issued by the Global Islamic Media Front. First appearing in 2005, it ties theory and practice together by providing examples of how the global holy war is being carried out by different elements of the Ummah.

Electronic Internet magazines serve a similar function. A recent example is *The Echo of Jihad*, a 45-page periodical that began appearing in 2006. Its April edition features discussion of the importance of Jihad, the relative importance of Islamic scholars versus Mujahideen leaders like bin Laden, and recent operations by Mujahideen in Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere. A second example *Ja’ami* (which means mosque) is produced by the Media Office of the Islamic Front of the Iraqi Resistance.

Finally, in this category of ideological and doctrinal materials one must include broad strategy documents such as al Qaeda’s seven-stage plan for the next twenty years. Since it was first posted, this “strategy”
document has been given a prominent and permanent status atop many of the most frequently visited Jihadist forums on the Internet. Western experts tend to characterize it as very naïve. They do so for the following reasons. First, there is no way the scenario depicted in the plan can be followed step by step. It is simply unworkable. Second, the idea that al-Qaeda could establish a caliphate in the Islamic world is absurd. The 20-year plan has nothing to do with reality. It is far out of reach.

However, these materials are not aimed at convincing Western experts. They are directed at those many members of the Ummah who read these materials at Jihadist forums on the Internet. What impact do they have on them? Do they envision a coming major transformation of society and return to an idealized past? And if they agree with it, are they ready, as one three-part series run by the Global Islamic Media Front asks, to “Gear Up” and prepare to join the Jihad?

2) Inspiring and Mobilizing the Ummah to Join the Jihad. It is one thing to nod in agreement with broad ideological statements. However, as the previous review of how revolutionary insurgent movement’s inspired and recruited cadre explained, next comes the hard work. The same is true here. But the Viet Cong did their inspiring and mobilizing face-to-face.

Al Qaeda and the Salafi Jihadists seek to substitute a plethora of Internet methods to achieve the same end. Here we will examine one important way they do so by celebrating the achievements and sacrifices of those on the front lines of the global fight.

Consider the biographies of martyrs which are posted on the Web with a high degree of regularity. Al Qaeda in Iraq, for example, publishes on a periodic basis a document titled “From the Biographies of Prominent Martyrs.” The eighth issue of it, dated January 2006, tells
the story of the “Knights Group” of three Mujahideen. In great detail
the reader learns why and how each joined the Jihad and traveled to
Iraq to fight. An account of their courageous demise follows. The three
were pinned down in a house they were using as a base. The author
glorifies their deaths, noting the unwillingness of each to try to escape
or surrender. And one of the Jihad fighters, referred to as the lion Abu-
Umar, is said to have “carried in his hands a mortar shell that he had
prepared for this situation.” He surprised the Americans attacking the
house, “pulled the ring out, throwing four of the criminals to hell, while
he went up to Paradise.”

This is but one example. Many others are contained in the SITE
Institute database. And they only maintain a sample of them. There are
also other formats for these biographies such as the videoed “last will
and testament” of suicide bombers. One example is the “Will of the
Martyr, Abu al-Zobeir al-Mohajir,” with video footage of his operation
in Karmat al-Fallujah in July 2005. It depicts a celebration in which he
enthusiastically describes the operation he is about to carry out and why
he intends to do so: “Allah ordered us to make Jihad…to defend his
religion. I urge all young Muslim men to follow us in Jihad and give
their lives for the sake of Allah’s religion.” He is then shown being
embraced by his comrades, before the film cuts to the scene of his
suicide car bombing—a “crusaders checkpoint” east of Fallujah. Again,
this is one of many examples found at Jihad Web sites.

Other means employed to inspire and mobilize are videos of the
preparation for and successful conduct of operations against US forces
in Afghanistan and Iraq. These appear on a daily basis on Jihadi forums
and Web sites. One example, issued by the Global Islamic Media Front
on January 22, 2006, is a 28-minute video titled: “Jihad Academy,”
which is described as but a “single day for those who struggle in
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Allah’s cause.” It highlights a number of attacks executed by Iraqi insurgent groups to include al Qaeda in Iraq, the Mujahideen Army, and the Islamic Army in Iraq. The attacks are shown in the dawn hours and in the dark of night. They include sniper operations, detonation of improvised explosive devices against a variety of targets, and rocket and mortar fire.

There also are many publications posted on these Web sites that fall into the category of inspiring, motivating, and mobilizing the Ummah to join the fight. These guides are advocacy and motivational pieces. The extent to which the message is being received and acted upon remains to be determined.

Paralleling these are other videos with Jihadi field commanders who provide the same kind of inspirational message. Of course, the most prominent was Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. An example, titled “A Message to the People,” was issued by the Mujahideen Shura Council, which claims to be composed of six insurgency groups in Iraq. In this 34-minute video, Zarqawi was seen planning operations in a war room, meeting with local leaders of al-Anbar province, leading Mujahideen in training exercises and on the battlefield. In another part of the film Zarqawi was seen firing an automatic weapon, and stating: “America will go out of Iraq, humiliated, defeated.”

Finally, scores of items on these Web sites go the next step and include guides describing how to prepare for and then join the fight in Iraq and elsewhere. One example, "This is the Road to Iraq," provides instructions for prospective Jihadis intent on entering the war. The first half concentrates on mental and physical preparation for Jihad, while the second half furnishes guidance for successfully entering Iraq and cultivating contacts with an insurgent group.
In addition to celebrating the achievements and sacrifices of those on the front lines of the global fight, there are other ways, and the Salafi Jihadists employ the Internet to inspire and mobilize the Ummah to join the fight. They use the same Web sites, for example, to recount the suffering and carnage they assert is being inflicted on Muslims by the United States and other Western powers, Israel, and apostate regimes in Islamic countries.

3) Psychological Warfare to Demoralize Enemies. The flip side of inspiring and mobilizing the Ummah to join the Salafi Jihad movement and fight is the demoralizing of the near and far enemies of that movement, convincing them to give up the fight. Here we will use the insurgency in Iraq, the central front in the global Jihad, as illustrative.

A number of Internet-based tactics are employed by the Salafi insurgent groups to demoralize their enemies in Iraq. Of these, the most terrifying and intimidating have been the beheadings. This tactic has been used against both Iraqis and foreigners working in Iraq. The message to each group is unambiguous. The nightmare video of those captured being decapitated by their captors is anything but a random act of terrorism—it is carefully designed for specific audiences.

With respect to members of the Iraqi government, and those contemplating joining it, the threat of beheading was explicitly made through numerous Internet-posted warnings. For example, on April 20, 2006 the Shari’a Commission of the Mujahideen Shura Council in Iraq issued the threat of “the sword and slaughter to he who joins the police and the army.” The Council stated that all Muslims who join the Iraqi security forces to serve those who “worship the devils, those who disbelieve and fight in the cause of Taghut [Satan],” shall be considered “converters who fight against Allah.” What awaits them?—“sharp swords!” And in a similar message posted in December 2005, insurgent
groups in Iraq were encouraged to “start cutting throats in the Islamic way…. Slaughter three every day to show them that you do not hesitate in implementing Allah’s orders.” To Western eyes this is immoral and savage behavior. But for Salafi Jihadists it is characterized as religious duty. The blood dripping sword has a powerful Salafi meaning.

In addition to the beheading videos, the insurgents in Iraq also post a large number of videos and reports of other kinds of executions. These include putting captives to death by firing squad, as well as pulling police out of vehicles, off of street corners, and so on to gun them down on the spot.

Members of the leadership in Iraq are often singled out by name. For example, in November 2005 an al Qaeda affiliated Jihad forum posted the photographs of the “Twenty Most Wanted People in the land of the Two Rivers.” Various assassinations of senior level officials since 2003 have demonstrated such threats are often backed up. The “devil” Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani was designated as number one—the most wanted. The text concluded—“We ask Allah that the Mujahideen will be able to remove their heads.”

With respect to the United States, the most frequent tactic employed is the previously mentioned daily reports on all the Jihad forums and Web sites of alleged successful operations carried out against American forces in Iraq. Those that stand out among a large number reviewed are the “Top Ten” videos of insurgent attacks that began to appear in 2005. Released both by the Global Islamic Media Front and a group calling itself the “Muslim Lions,” they are widely distributed across Jihad forums today. Each includes ten attacks perpetrated by groups such as Ansar al-Sunnah Army, Islamic Army in Iraq, and al Qaeda in Iraq. They are impressive productions. These
attacks also frequently appear the day after they occur in various Western print and electronic news outlets.

Reports of attacks on the United States are not confined to Iraq. The message from these Web sites is that America is under assault in all the places it has entered in the Muslim world. Next to Iraq, operations against US forces in Afghanistan receive the greatest attention. And individual spectacular strikes like that on the US Consulate in Jeddah by al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia are featured widely. Taken in total the psychological warfare message is clear—the United States is exposed and vulnerable to effective and continuous Mujahideen attacks across the Muslim world.

Finally, the leaders of the global Jihad use the Internet to mock failed US attempts to capture or kill them. One example that received wide attention (to include being broadcast on al-Jazeera) was a speech by Zawahiri following the January 2006 air strike on the village of Damadola in Peshawar. Al Qaeda’s number two was supposed to be hiding. He taunted President Bush—the “Butcher of Washington”—asserting “that his death will only come at the time of Allah’s decree, and until that time, he remains amid the Muslim masses, rejoicing in their support, their attention, their generosity, their protection and their participation in Jihad until we conquer you with the help and power of Allah.”

The above items all aimed at influencing and undermining one of America’s centers of gravity—the US home front. It is not unlike what the Viet Cong successfully targeted over thirty years ago. Then as now the objective is to follow Clausewitz’s advice. Attack the enemy’s center of gravity—his strategic pressure points—and you will weaken his capacity to fight war.
4) Networking the Global Salafi Jihad Insurgency. In the latter 1990s, al Qaeda's use of the Internet concentrated on the first category of this framework—propagating the Salafi ideology of Jihad to incite and unify the Ummah for a common purpose. Since 9/11, al Qaeda and associated members of the Salafi Jihad movement (a number of which are fighting at the national level) have broadened their use of the Web to include, as highlighted above, the second and third categories—inspiring and mobilizing the Ummah to join the Jihad and psychological warfare to demoralize enemies.

However, the loss of the Afghan sanctuary resulted in a further expansion. It now includes the use of the Internet for tactical purposes, such as training, and for operational objectives, to include how to organize virtual cells.

Each of these functions requires secure communications to avoid the disruptive tactics that US intelligence has been able to employ against certain kinds of Jihadi Internet activity—e.g., closing down fixed Web sites. Thus, al Qaeda and other groups began to employ new methods to include protected bulletin boards, free upload services by Internet providers, and the creation of proxy servers, among others. Up-to-date instruction on how to employ these techniques is likewise made available. Consider the following examples.

The first has to do with how to use third-party hosting services. This technique exploits these servers, paid for primarily by advertising agencies, to transmit operationally-related information and secret communications. These servers, available across the Internet, provide relatively anonymous hosting that a visitor can easily manipulate. A second way of transmitting operationally-related information and secret communications is through posted messages on discussion boards at password-protected forums. And a third technique entails creating and
employing Internet proxy servers. Guides and manuals on how to utilize each of these methods are available at the Global Islamic Media Front site, among others.

These methods can be used to circulate a wide range of materials like training videos, operational manuals, and guides for producing weapons such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Along with other virtual techniques they can also be exploited by operational cells to secretly communicate and organize.

One way of communicating secretly, reported by Coll and Glasser, is through public e-mail services such as Hotmail. Here is how it works: An operative opens an account on Hotmail, “writes a message in draft form, saves it as a draft, and then transmits the e-mail account name and password during chatter on a relatively secure message board.” Another operative “opens the e-mail account and reads the draft—since no e-mail message was sent, there was a reduced risk of interception.” This process has been characterized as a dead drop in cyberspace.¹⁹⁰

Virtual methods such as these and others also provide the means to establish operational cells in cyberspace. Discussion of how to do so began to appear on different al Qaeda affiliated Web sites in 2004, according to sources collected by the SITE Institute. These items go into the details of how to do so, suggesting that once formed, members can both exchange “work plans, strategies, and educational materials” and eventually “meet in reality and execute operations in the field.”

An example of this kind of cell was reported in the spring of 2004. On March 29th, “Royal Canadian Mounted Police officers burst into the Ottawa home of Mohammed Khawaja, a 24-year-old computer programmer…arresting him for alleged complicity in what Canadian and British authorities described as a transatlantic plot to bomb targets
in London and Canada.” Khawaja, who “met his British counterparts online came to the attention of authorities when he traveled to Britain and walked into a surveillance operation being conducted by British Police.” He had gone there to “meet with his online acquaintances. During the meeting he told them how to detonate bombs using cell phones.” He had learned to do so from the Internet.191

The plot involved seven men from four countries (United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and Pakistan) who through the Internet formed a virtual cell. During the time the cell was developing and moving towards taking action there appears to have been training provided to a member of it in Pakistan. Whether an al Qaeda linkage was established to provide post-training guidance or direction is unclear from open sources. When arrested the cell was in the process of going operational. This was the kind of cell—mainly homegrown members who met both locally and in cyberspace—is most feared in Europe. As we shall see later, through these new Web-based methods al Qaeda and other Salafi Jihad groups seek to provide the means by which prospective holy warriors at the local level can find likeminded associates and receive the knowledge and training via the Internet that is necessary to join the fight. The head of Britain’s domestic intelligence service (MI5) stated publicly in November 2006 that she “knew of 30 [such] conspiracies” and that “future attacks could be chemical, biological or even involve some kind of nuclear device.”192

5) Operational Information Sharing—Manuals and Handbooks
Al Qaeda has established an extensive online compilation of operational manuals and handbooks for irregular warfare. These range from documents not unlike the doctrinal manuals of conventional military forces to more narrowly focused instructional guides on how to carry out a particular tactic or produce and employ a specific weapon.
The number of these items is now quite large. Here we will only highlight a few examples.

Broader military and intelligence materials provide the means whereby training can begin in virtually any location, simply by going online. We now know that al Qaeda was producing such manuals well before 9/11 because of what was found on computers and disks left behind in Afghanistan. Perhaps the best known of these items is what in the West came to be referred to as "The Encyclopedia of Jihad." An al Qaeda production of thousand of pages, it is a guide for how to establish an underground organization. The manual has circulated across the Internet.

Perhaps the most well known and widely circulated doctrinal manual is a 1600 page document titled “The Call for a Global Islamic Resistance.” It was written by Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, a Syrian native who fought against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. In the manual he highlights how small and independent groups of Mujahideen can conduct operations against the West. In the aftermath of 9/11, Nasar called for a “third generation” of Salafi Jihadists to plan and execute operations on their own but as part of the broader movement and in solidarity with al Qaeda’s ideology. He is said to have spent time in Europe attempting to do so. In some cases members of these cells made contact with al Qaeda, and receive training and operational support. Those who carried out the July 2005 bombings in London are an example.193

Beyond these broader manuals, a plethora of more narrowly focused handbooks and guides are also readily available. Perhaps the tactic/specific weapon receiving the widest attention on Jihadi Web addresses since 2003 is the IED. Many of these reports are based on lessons being drawn from Iraq. Often these reports and handbooks
include diagrams and other visual depictions such as one distributed to a password-protected al Qaeda affiliated forum in December 2005. The author illustrates the construction of a charge, the distance that it is placed from its target, and the amount of explosive to be used to achieve a desired result against different kinds of targets. There is even a discussion of physical principles such as blast waves.

This is but one example of the serious attention that is being given to IEDs. And it should not be surprising in light of the effectiveness of the weapon in Iraq, and the efforts the Pentagon has undertaken to find an answer to it. Indeed, the Jihadi’s are busy learning about DOD efforts at counter measures. Consider a report posted in April 2006 to a password-protected Jihadist forum discussing a study produced by the US think tank CSIS on innovations in the use of IEDs in Iraq and the US response to these new insurgent tactics. The author discusses the findings in the study and announces it will be translated into Arabic. He then chides the authors stating that they should not be surprised at the innovativeness of the Mujahideen in responding to new US tactics. After all, he points out, “they have Allah on their side and you have nobody on yours.”

Earlier in 2006, a similar item focused on the US Army’s plan to deploy the Joint IED Neutralizer in Iraq as a means to reduce the risk posed by roadside improvised explosive devices. The author highlights the specifications of the Neutralizer, where it “seems less reinforced,” and discusses a series of methods that the Mujahideen can use to defeat it.

Beyond IEDs, there are handbooks and related materials on many other kinds of weapons. These range from how to build a biological weapon and dirty bombs to information warfare tactics to how to service an AK-47.
6) Operational Information Sharing—Training Videos and Courses. It should not be surprising that new Internet developments in information management since 9/11 are quickly being adopted and adapted by the Salafi Jihadists. A case in point is the use of videos and slideshows as the basis for online training programs. Over the last three years professionally produced training videos have been generated by al Qaeda to replicate on the Web what it had been able to provide prospective holy warriors on the ground in Afghanistan in the latter 1990s. The SITE Institute has compiled a large quantity of these materials in its database.

Recent examples include training courses produced by Labik, an al Qaeda media organization operating in Afghanistan. In March 2006, it issued and posted a series of films of Mujahideen training for combat and practicing tactical operations to include conducting raids on houses, blowing up a bridge, attacking a target with rocket-propelled grenades, and taking hostages, among other actions.

Other video productions concentrate on how to execute a specific tactic or employ a particular weapon. An example is booby trapping. In this presentation the trainee learns that this technique for attacking an enemy can be implemented in many ways which require different levels of expertise and equipment. It also explains how many of these techniques were developed by “infidel states” such as England, Russia, Germany, Italy, and the United States. The narrator suggests to the viewer that these techniques should be studied. This particular instructional exercise, which appeared in an al Qaeda forum in 2005, concentrates on four specific types of booby trapping. Similar video presentations can be found for almost every irregular warfare tactic and on each of the weapons employed in this form of combat. These include how to operate against US soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan,
how to infiltrate into those countries, and how to fight in different rural and urban environments in each location.

These developments have led the Israeli specialist Reuven Paz to propose that this vast and wide-ranging body of instructional/training videos and slideshows posted on the Web over the last few years by Jihad groups constitutes nothing short of an Internet-based “Open University for Jihad.” Paz asserts that the Salafi Jihad movement has turned the Internet into a cyber university for recruiting, indoctrinating, and training future generations of holy warriors from the Arab and Muslim world. ¹⁹⁴

Al Qaeda’s Global Islamic Media Front sees eye-to-eye with Paz’s assessment. Indeed, they made this claim before Paz. In a 2005 article titled “Al Qaeda University for Jihad Subjects,” the Front described these activities as constituting a global institution in cyberspace, providing instruction and training in psychological, electronic, and physical warfare for the Mujahideen of tomorrow. The bottom line—budding holy warriors now have the means available to begin to undertake an irregular warfare training program in cyberspace, complete with discussion boards and chat rooms.

In conjunction with the previous functions of the virtual sanctuary, the use of new information management tools highlighted in this section facilitate the development of homegrown cells discussed earlier. These cells can emerge in any location and on their own and develop the means to prepare for and carry out operations. There are now examples of this homegrown pattern that have taken place since 9/11. As noted above, in some cases the local cell has made contact with and received assistance from al Qaeda, while in other instances this was not the case. The attack on the London subway, the train bombings in Madrid, the series of suicide operations in Casablanca, and the actions
of the Hofstad group in the Netherlands, to name the most prominent cases, reflect both these homegrown variations.

7) Collection Targeting. Finally, the Internet provides Salafi operational units with a significant amount of data about potential targets, particularly ones in the West. The extent to which they have mined the Web for this kind of information was first uncovered on al Qaeda computers left behind in Afghanistan. Based on open sources readily available on the Internet, al Qaeda had built target folders/files prior to 9/11 on public utilities, transportation systems, government buildings, airports, major harbors, and nuclear power plants. They also collected US government and private sector studies of the vulnerabilities of these and other facilities to different types of terrorist operations.

Additionally, they have access to overhead imagery and related structural information of many potential targets. This allows them to not only access the target in terms of its most vulnerable points, but to observe security measures that have been taken to protect it.

According to Dan Verton, a specialist in cyberterrorism, since 9/11 "al Qaeda cells now operate with the assistance of large databases containing details of potential targets in the U.S. They use the Internet to collect intelligence on those targets, especially critical economic nodes, and modern software enables them to study structural weaknesses in facilities as well as predict the cascading failure effect of attacking certain systems." 195

Since 9/11 the US government has undertaken measures to protect such information, particularly where it concerns critical facilities and infrastructure. Information that used to be publicly available is now secured. However, in this game of cat and mouse the Jihadis are teaching one another how to penetrate secure Web sites. For example,
recently the Global Islamic Media Front began circulating a 74-page
guide on how to identify the vulnerabilities of and penetrate—hack—
into them. The guide highlights software that can be used to do so.

Sanctuaries in Ungoverned Territory. Beyond this virtual
sanctuary, to what extent has al Qaeda also been able to carry out in
ungoverned and largely lawless tribal areas of the Afghan-Pakistan
border (and possibly in other regions of the world as well) those
activities that it accomplished during 1996-2001 in Afghanistan? Has it
established a physical sanctuary in the border region that contributes to
its ability to continue to foster global insurgency activities? Though it
began out of dire necessity, it now appears that al Qaeda’s relocation to
the ungoverned tribal areas of North Waziristan has evolved in this
way.

It has been difficult for US security agencies to ascertain exactly
what has taken place in Waziristan. Only now are the opportunities
provided to al Qaeda in these lawless and ungoverned areas being
understood. Until recently, the extent to which such territories could be
utilized by armed groups to establish secure sanctuaries was not
seriously contemplated.

For US intelligence, these areas well constitute yet another “new
frontier,” an important front in the “long war.” It will need to develop a
clear picture of what al Qaeda and other armed groups of concern are
able to achieve in various ungoverned territories. But this is not easily
accomplished according to a former intelligence officer from a non-US
service who had attempted to do so against a terrorist group operating
out of ungoverned territory in Africa. The objective, he explained, was
to acquire ongoing intelligence of how the terrorist group we were
fighting against elsewhere used that ungoverned territory. His service
had a very difficult time trying to do so.
The tribal area along the Afghan-Pakistan border is illustrative. It exists within a larger Central Asian territory that encompasses parts of several states and is distinguished by rugged terrain, poor accessibility, low population density, and little government presence. This creates safe havens for terrorists, insurgents, militias, and criminal groups. And local governments on their own lack the economic, military, intelligence, and police power to do anything about it.

In early 2002, elements of the Taliban and al Qaeda retreated into the Afghan-Pakistan frontier. And bin Laden was believed to have taken refuge in the mountains of this territory. During 2003, reports began to warn that al Qaeda and Taliban forces were regrouping in this area and forming an alliance with the radical Islamist party Hizb-i Islami. Since then they have fought a protracted war against the United States, NATO, and local government forces. It is beyond the scope of this paper to chronicle that fight. However, there now seems to be no question that al Qaeda maintains a robust fighting force and growing infrastructure in the area.

But the specific details of how al Qaeda re-established fighting units in this ungoverned space and the kind of infrastructure for training and related activities it re-built has been difficult to discern for US intelligence. To be sure, Jihadis were known to be traveling to the area to join the fight much like their predecessors did in the 1980s and 1990s. But a clear picture of what transpired since 2002 has been elusive.

Only in early 2007 did a clearer picture emerge about the extent to which al Qaeda is now exploiting this new sanctuary to continue to foster a global insurgency. According to “American officials…there was mounting evidence that Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahri, had been steadily building a [training and] operations hub
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in the mountainous Pakistani tribal area of North Waziristan…. Recent intelligence showed that the compounds functioned under a loose command structure and were operated by groups of Arab, Pakistani and Afghan militants allied with.”

While training camps have “yet to reach the size and level of sophistication of the al Qaeda camps established in Afghanistan under Taliban rule,” nevertheless they are now assessed by US intelligence as much more advanced that had been previously thought. Moreover, the emergence of this safe haven in North Waziristan and the surrounding area “has helped senior [al Qaeda] operatives communicate more effectively with the outside world via courier and the Internet.”

According to Bruce Hoffman:

Al-Qaeda…has regrouped and reorganized from the setbacks meted out by the United States, its allies and partners shortly after 9/11…and is marshalling its forces to continue the war that Osama bin Laden declared against America 10 years ago with his then mostly ignored fatwa. In this respect, al-Qaeda is functioning exactly as its founders envisioned it: as both an inspiration and an organization, simultaneously summoning a broad universe of like-minded extremists to violence while still providing guidance and assistance for more spectacular types of terrorist operations.

The Afghan-Pakistan border is not the only ungoverned territory out of which al Qaeda and/or its regional affiliates have developed a presence. A case in point is the Algerian-based Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). An adherent to Salafi Jihadist branch of Islamism, the GSPC launched a ruthless insurgent campaign in Algeria in the 1990s, targeting the government, the military, and civilians. Along with the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), it killed tens of thousands of innocent Algerians.

Members of the GSPC leadership have issued public statements declaring their support and connections with al Qaeda and other Salafi
Jihadist organizations. They have also said they intend to attack US and European targets as part of the global holy war. An alleged member of the GSPC was accused of involvement in the attack on the *USS Cole*. Other GSPC operatives have been implicated in attempted terrorist operations in other parts of the world. European intelligence services estimate that this Salafi affiliate has several hundred operatives deployed outside of Algeria. Some are fighting in Iraq.

The GSPC has also moved into the Sahel region of Africa to establish base areas. Large parts of that territory, which cut across Mali, Chad, Niger, and Mauritania, are ungoverned. Of these four states, the GSPC appears to have the largest presence in the northern part of Mali. However, like al Qaeda’s presence in the tribal areas of the Afghan-Pakistan border, open source information on the activities being undertaken by the GSPC in the Sahel are sparse. What is known is that they are taking advantage of this remote area to establish a presence. They appear to be able to move freely, smuggle contraband, recruit from among the impoverished indigenous population with a large youth cohort, and establish secure bases for various activities. But the extent to which they are able to do so is not known. Neither is how this fits into the larger Salafi Jihad.

To summarize, a vacuum is burgeoning within the territory of fragile and failing states. This expanse of lawless and ungoverned space, estimated to include remote parts of more than 20 countries, is beyond the authority of local governments. It creates potential safe havens in which armed groups can establish secure bases for self-protection, training, planning, and launching. The extent and degree to which al Qaeda and other Salafi Jihadists are taking advantage of it is in need of extensive investigation.
The Iraqi Central Front. Al Qaeda and many of the associated groups that comprise the Salafi Jihad movement have come to see the conflict in Iraq within the context of the “long Jihad.” Consequently, they seek to exploit the insurgency there for two principal reasons.

First, they have anointed Iraq the main front, the forward edge of the global battle on which to engage the far enemy—the United States. They believe that by forcing the United States to give up the fight in Iraq they will inflict a defeat of enormous strategic consequences on it.

Second, the Salafi Jihadists also believe Iraq affords them a vital opportunity to spawn a new corps of skilled fighters who can gain the kind of experience that after they leave Iraq can be put to good use fighting in their native lands or elsewhere. In other words, in the first decades of the 21st century these “Iraqi Arabs” can serve the same purpose the “Afghan Arabs” did at the close of the 20th century. Evidence of this has been found in the ruins of the air strike that killed Zarqawi on June 7, 2006. According to The New York Times, “At the time of his death...[he] was still trying to transform his organization from one focused on the Iraqi insurgency into a global operation capable of striking far beyond Iraq's borders.” According to Jordanian security officials, Zarqawi’s “recruiting efforts...were threefold: He sought volunteers to fight in Iraq and others to become suicide bombers there, but he also recruited about 300 who went to Iraq for terrorist training and sent them back to their home countries, where they await orders to carry out strikes.” Others believe that beyond their home countries, some of these trainees are also in Western countries.

Statements by bin Laden, Zawahiri, Zarqawi, and other leaders of al Qaeda have made clear that they view Iraq within this twofold context. Likewise, it is the message that is repeatedly conveyed on their
Web sites. Iraq provides a unique and historic opportunity to fight and defeat the main enemy of the global Jihad movement.

Iraq has eclipsed other fronts to include Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Yemen in terms of centrality to the global Jihad. It dominates Salafi Web sites, and is being used to rouse radical Salafi passions, inspire Arab and Muslim youth, and animate the Ummah to see Iraq through the lens of the “long Jihad.” Thus, they are told the Mujahideen are fighting a pivotal battle in Iraq to expel the United States from the region. Iraq is part of a long protracted war—a “long Jihad”—against the West that seeks to overthrow all apostate regimes, liberate all occupied lands, and reestablish the Caliphate.

Since the US intervention in 2003, these themes have been employed as part of a major effort to inspire members of the Ummah from across the Muslim world to travel to Iraq and join the fight. Moreover, it is now apparent that there are networks for expediting this process both in the Middle East and beyond. To be sure, the majority of “Iraqi Arabs” come from the region. And of these, Saudi Arabia and Yemen appear to be at the head of the list. But foreign fighters in Iraq are also drawn from other parts of the Gulf, as well as from Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Sudan. Beyond the region Mujahideen have come from Britain, France, and elsewhere in Europe.

Within Iraq these foreign fighters are part of several Salafi Jihadist groups that have joined together under the umbrella of al Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers and established the operational capabilities to emerge as a major component of the insurgency. There is no need to go into the details here of the impact they have had on the fight in Iraq. It is substantial. And, as noted above, it will produce a third generation of Jihadi fighters, young Muslims transformed into ideologically
convinced and well trained through practice holy warriors—the latest iteration of Qutb’s vanguard.

In sum, the bottom line is that Iraq has become an integral part of how al Qaeda and the Salafi Jihadists have sought to adapt and re-organize following the strategic setback in Afghanistan to continue to facilitate a global millenarian insurgency.

**Fostering the Global Salafi Jihad Movement.** Finally, al Qaeda’s fourth adaptation appears to have focused on re-establishing its self-assigned role as vanguard of the Salafi Jihad movement, a role that was set back as a result of Operation Enduring Freedom. How has al Qaeda sought to do so? Of the four adaptations examined, this was the most nebulous and at first blush difficult to discern. Moreover, developing a detailed mosaic of what is now referred to as al Qaeda and Associated Movements (AQAM) was beyond the scope of this paper. To be sure, the construct of such a mosaic is needed, and below we will identify two efforts that address elements of it. Here we can only highlight the broader contours of AQAM and identify key questions that remain to be addressed.

Recall Hoffman’s portrayal of al Qaeda “as both an inspiration and an organization.” With respect to the former, al Qaeda’s founders saw as one of the central missions of their organization the realization of the vanguard party concept advocated by Qutb. And so, to that end they sought to “summon a broad universe of like-minded extremists” to become part of a global Jihad movement. In the 1990s, in Afghanistan, al Qaeda was able to begin to carry out this mission by establishing a network of linkages with a score of national-level Islamist groups, who were employing guerrilla violence and terrorism against their governments. Many authors to include Hoffman have chronicled these pre-9/11 developments.
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Al Qaeda from its Afghan sanctuary provided national-level Jihad organizations with financial assistance, training, weapons, and spiritual guidance. In return, these entities were to see themselves as part of al Qaeda’s global struggle. Recipients included radical Islamist armed groups from Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, Uzbekistan, Chechnya, Kashmir, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Bosnia, among a number of other places.

The capacity of al Qaeda to continue to play this vanguard role and to maintain connections with the groups that comprised this network of associations was set back considerably with the loss of its Afghan sanctuary. What has al Qaeda done to adapt in order to re-establish linkages with its old Salafi Jihad affiliates and add new ones? What are the constituent parts of AQAM? How do local Jihad groups view their place in AQAM and relationship to al Qaeda? How many local affiliates exist? These questions highlight what needs to be discovered about al Qaeda’s post-9/11 efforts to re-establish a network of linkages with national-level Islamist groups.

As late as 2005, four years after 9/11, US officials were still struggling to understand the relationship between al Qaeda and its affiliates, and the extent to which those linkages had been reestablished. In 2006, key US national security documents began to use the term and al Qaeda Associated Movements (AQAM) to refer to this rejuvenated relationship. US Central Command’s (CENTCOM) posture statement for fighting the war in 2006 is illustrative. It assessed al Qaeda through the “near enemy—far enemy” lens. AQAM was described as a global movement having a strong presence in the CENTCOM region through several local Salafi Jihad affiliates.  

These affiliates were described as fighting against local apostate regimes (who are partners of the US)—“near enemies”—in the
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CENTCOM area. According to the posture statement, the relationship between al Qaeda and local Jihad groups since 9/11 has been facilitated by the Internet.

This enemy is linked by modern communications, expertly using the virtual world for indoctrination and proselytizing. The Internet empowers these extremists in a way that would have been impossible a decade ago. It enables them to have global reach.... And this safe haven of websites and the Internet is proliferating rapidly, spreading al Qaeda’s ideology well beyond its birthplace in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{205}

To be sure, an important way al Qaeda has sought to re-establish linkages with local Salafi Jihad groups is through its virtual sanctuary. Indeed, as was described earlier, al Qaeda uses the Internet to propagate its Salafi Jihad ideology to instill in the Ummah a powerful sense of moral outrage and commitment to holy war. Through a large number of different Web-based activities al Qaeda seeks to propagate its message to individuals and groups across the globe. In doing so, they disseminate a series of ideological frames and messages that describe in global and local terms the social and political conditions requiring immediate and drastic Jihad action.

That this is taking place is evident. Through this virtual sanctuary al Qaeda seeks to re-establish its vanguard role and attempts to inspire and encourage a global movement of radicalized Muslim groups to fight locally against “near enemies,” while seeing themselves as a part of a larger global struggle against the United States, the “far enemy.”

But how organized are these efforts and who do they reach? A recent study by Rita Katz and Josh Devon of the SITE Institute describes this Internet activity as “very structured.... A handful of primary source Jihadist Web sites distribute the media [activities] of the leaders of al-Qaeda and other Jihadist groups. Through this small number of specific, password protected online forums, the leading
Jihadist groups, like al-Qaeda, post their communiqués and propaganda. By keeping primary source Jihadist Web sites small...[they] can provide a transparent mechanism to authenticate communiqués.”

Although these primary Web sites are relatively few in number, Katz and Devon note that members of them disseminate official communiqués, doctrinal treatises, strategic and operational documents, special messages, and other materials through a much broader and far-reaching network of other Web sites, message boards, e-groups, blogs, and instant messaging services available through the Internet. Here is one way they say this process functions:

Once an official message from a Jihadist group is posted to a primary source message forum, members of the primary message forum will then disseminate that posting to other secondary message boards. From these secondary message boards, other peripheral individuals will then disseminate the information onto other message boards.

Katz and Devon propose the following network graphic to illustrate how this virtual capability seeks to be “at once decentralized but rigidly hierarchical:”

The primary Web sites at the center of the network graphic are comprised of al Qaeda and organizations that appear closely associated with it to include insurgent groups in Iraq, the Taliban and other groups in Afghanistan, the Islamic Maghreb (formerly the GSPC), the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, Saudi Jihadist groups, and others. Since January 2006, report Katz and Devon, the web-based activities of these AQAM elements have been coordinated and distributed through a new virtual entity—the Al-Fajr Center—to the secondary and tertiary Web sites noted on the above graphic. What this portends is that individuals and groups across the globe may now easily acquire the kinds of
information identified in each of the seven categories of the virtual sanctuary described earlier.

In sum, the activities carried out by the *Al-Fajr Center* provide the potential for “fostering a unified, global Jihadist community.” Moreover, it can assist al Qaeda and key associates “coordinate, share information, and consolidate their power to continue to lead the [global] Jihadist movement,” which is one of al Qaeda’s original and enduring missions.

If this is a key way al Qaeda has sought to re-establish its self-assigned role as vanguard of the global Salafi Jihad movement, then the follow-on question is how do we know who comprises the local affiliates of AQAM and on what basis do they view themselves as a part of AQAM? One recent study has sought to identify criteria for membership in AQAM. The author, Assaf Moghadam, proposes that to
be a member of AQAM a Salafi Jihad entity must be a Sunni Islamic group and meet one of the following four criteria.210

First, a group can be considered part of AQAM if “Al Qaeda is reflected in the group’s name” and its members adhere to al Qaeda’s agenda.211 In this category he includes al Qaeda in Iraq, which prior to September 2004 was known as Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad. Founded by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, in October 2004 he declared the allegiance of the group to bin Laden and al Qaeda’s strategy. This was followed by a change in the name of group. A more recent example of the first criteria can be found in North Africa. The Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, known by its French initials GSPC, announced at the end of 2006 it was switching its name to Al Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb. Long associated with al Qaeda it was chosen by bin Laden to forge links and coordinate the activities of likeminded groups in Morocco, Nigeria, Mauritania, Tunisia and elsewhere.212 Thus, the name change.

Second, a group may be considered part of AQAM if, according to Moghadam, there is evidence it has “internalized the worldview of Al Qaeda and global Jihad.” Several organizations fall into this category including the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU); Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), both whose base of operations is Pakistan; Indonesia’ Jemaah Islamiyya (JI); and the Moroccan group Assirat al Moustaquim (Direct Path). These groups and several others similar to them meet this second criteria established by Moghadam.213

A third criteria is that a “group is devoted to and actively practices violence to overthrow an existing Islamic regime or regimes with the aim to create a transnational Caliphate in its stead.”214 Here also, several groups fit into this category including Ansar al Islam, a “radical
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Islamist group of Iraqi Kurds and Arabs who have vowed to establish an independent Islamic state in Iraq.” Established in December 2001, it has had a close affiliation with al-Qaeda and was aligned with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, when he led al Qaeda in Iraq.\textsuperscript{215} Also in this category is a second Iraqi group, Ansar al Sunnah Army, as well as the Army of the Levant, Jamatul Mujahedin Bangladesh (JMB) and Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami, a radical Islamic political movement that seeks to implement pure Salafi Jihad doctrine and create an Islamic caliphate in Central Asia.\textsuperscript{216}

Finally, a group may be considered an al Qaeda affiliate and part of AQAM if it “has engaged in the practice of \textit{takfir}.” In other words, it has labeled a Muslim regime or its leaders as apostates because they demonstrate disbelief. Recall the discussion of Qutb and how he came to charge that Nasser was guilty of conscious belief that there was a better way to rule than that based on Islam. Therefore, he was an apostate ruler and a legitimate target for Jihad. Several of the groups associated with the previous criteria likewise fit into this category. They label the local regimes they are fighting in the same terms that Qutb used to discredit Nasser. This has been true, for example, of the Algerian GSPC, and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) from which it split in 1998 over a disagreement on whether civilians constitute legitimate targets.

In sum, this final section has sought to highlight the broader contours of how al Qaeda has attempted since 9/11 to re-establish its self-assigned role as vanguard of the Salafi Jihad movement. As noted above, more attention needs to be focused on this adaptation in order to gain a deeper understanding of what has transpired in order to develop a detailed mosaic of Al Qaeda and its Associated Movements (AQAM).
NOTES


2 While there are important and complex differences among and between armed groups, they nevertheless share common defining characteristics. These include: One, armed groups challenge the authority, power and legitimacy of states, seeking to either undermine or co-opt them. Two, in doing so, they do not adhere to and will seek to manipulate the rule of law and democratic principles. Three, the leaders and followers of armed groups believe in the use of violence to achieve political, religious, economic, and personal aims. Four, these groups use violence in unconventional, asymmetric, and indiscriminate ways. Five, they operate within and across state boundaries, across geographical regions and, sometimes, globally. Six, armed groups usually are clandestine organizations, although they may maintain overt political fronts. Their clandestine infrastructure includes “intelligence” and “counterintelligence” capabilities. Seven, armed groups all have factional and external rivalries that affect their cooperation, interaction, and effectiveness.


5 Central Intelligence Agency, Analysis of Insurgency, (undated), 2.

6 Ibid., 5.

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9 Ibid.

10 Ibid. 18.


19 It is asserted that Stalin did so because he wanted his World War II allies to believe that the USSR was no longer pursuing a policy of trying to foment revolution. See Robert Service, *Stalin: A Biography*, (London: Macmillan, 2004), pp 444-445.


21 For a review of these arguments see Ibid.


23 Pike, Viet Cong, 374.


26 Ibid., ch. 9.


28 Berman, Revolutionary Organization, ch. 10.


31 O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism, 112.

32 Ibid., ch. 2.

33 Ibid, 201-203.


The teaching of ul-Wahhab was founded on that of Ibn Taimiyya (1263-1328), who was a member of the school of Ahmad ibn Hanbal. Ibn Taimiyya claimed the power of a mujtahid (one who can give independent decisions). These decisions were based on the Koran he understood in a literal sense. He rejected all innovations such as the visiting of the sacred shrines and the invocation of the saints as idolatry.

According to al Wahhab, a Muslim must present an oath of allegiance to a Muslim ruler during his lifetime to ensure his redemption after death. The ruler was owed unquestioned allegiance from as long as he leads in conformity to the laws of God. The purpose of the Muslim community is to become the living embodiment of God's laws, and it is the duty of the ruler to ensure that people know God's laws and live by them.


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48 Ibid, 9-11.


51 Greges, The Far Enemy, 134.

52 Roy, Globalized Islam, 296.

53 Ibid, 297.


55 Roy, Globalized Islam, 300.


60 Greges, The Far Enemy, ch. 4-5.


62 Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 44.

63 Shultz and Dew, Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat, ch. 4.


Ibid, 67.

“There were 70,000 Al-Qaeda camps trained,” *BBC News*, (January 4, 2005). [http://news.bbc.co.uk](http://news.bbc.co.uk).


Ibid.

Ibid.

Key figures include the Egyptian-born Ayman al-Zawahiri, the ideologist, and disciple of Palestinian scholar-guerrilla organizer Abdullah Azzam, who recruited thousands of Muslims to fight in Afghanistan. Zawahiri was founder of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, which opposes the Egyptian Government through violent means. He helped forge the coalition of al-Jihad, al Qaeda, two Pakistani groups and another from Bangladesh in February 1998 to wage war on the United States *Mohammed Atef*, the military commander, was also born in Egypt. He headed al Qaeda's military committee and had primary responsibility for supervising training camps in Afghanistan and planning global operations. Among his first was attacks on US troops by providing training to Somali tribes fighting them in 1993. *Abu Zubaydah*, the operations chief, was born in Saudi Arabia. Following the East African embassy bombings he appears to have replaced Atef as the primary contact for recruits and as the organizer of overseas operations.


Ibid, 15


Through continuous and intensive examination of extremist Web sites, the SITE Institute has developed an extensive database of materials on how various Jihad groups make use of the Internet. This database was employed as the primary source for this part of the study. The SITE Institute can be accessed at [http://www.site institue.org](http://www.siteinstitu.org).

Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Victorious Army Group, Ansar al-Tawhid Brigades, Islamic Jihad Brigades, the Strangers Brigades, and the Horrors Brigades.

There appears to be at least two ways to find out which third party sites are being used to distribute information and communications. One is through Jihadi Internet forums which provide links to index pages. These pages contain a list of sources from which the information can be deduced and downloaded.

Coll and Glasser, “Terrorists Turn to the Web as Base of Operations.”

Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

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93 This term is borrowed from Gerges, *The Far Enemy*.


97 Ibid, 9-10, 47.


99 Ibid, 5.

100 Ibid.

101 Ibid, 7.


106 Ibid, 102.

107 Ibid, 368.

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113 Central Intelligence Agency, Analysis of Insurgency, (undated), 2.
114 Ibid., 5.
116 O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism, 17.
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid. 18.


125 For the use of this approach to assess radical Islamism see Quintan Wiktorowicz, Radical Islam Rising, (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005).
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129 For a review of these arguments see Ibid.


134 Ibid., ch. 9.


140 Ibid., ch. 2.

141 Ibid, 201-203.


143 Ibid, 23.

144 Norman Cohn, *The Pursuit of the Millennium: Revolutionary Millenarians and Mystical Anarchists of the Middle Ages*, revised and


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156 Ibid, 9-11.


159 Greges, The Far Enemy, 134.

160 Roy, Globalized Islam, 296.

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168 Greges, *The Far Enemy*, ch. 4-5.


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177 Ibid.

178 Ibid.

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197 Ibid.

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205 Ibid, 9-10, 47.


207 Ibid, 5.

208 Ibid.

209 Ibid, 7.

210 Moghadam, The Globalization Of Martyrdom-Al Qaeda, Salafi- Jihadism, And The Diffusion Of Suicide Attacks. See Ch 4 and Appendix A.


214 Ibid, 102.

215 Ibid, 368.

216 Ibid, 370.